1 Political authority and obligation Political authority and obligation

18 Keith Hyams
those who are less motivated to benefi t society, or those who want to reap the benefi ts of
others’ obedience without paying the cost, will not regard the benefi ts that the state brings
as a reason for them to obey the law. If we want to show that everyone has a duty to obey the
law, then we must show not only that obedience to the law, by permitting the state to exist,
benefi ts society. We must also show that everyone has a d uty to act in wa ys that benefi t
society.
Th e moral theory best placed to ground the claim that everyone has a duty to act in ways
that benefi t society is utilitarianism. First proposed by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth
century, utilitarianism says that everything that we do should aim to maximize the
amount of pleasure and minimize t he amount of pain in t he world. It does not matter
whose pleasure or pain is at stake: what is important is the overall aggregated balance of
pleasure over pain across e veryone. Whenever we have a c hoice about how to ac t, we
should always choose the option that best fulfi ls this aim.
One objection immediately arises to any attempt to use utilitarianism as grounding for
political authority and obligation. If someone is deciding whether to obey or to break the
law on a particular occasion, then surely, according to utilitarianism, he or she ought choose
whichever option would maximize the amount of pleasure in the world and minimize the
amount of pain. Whether that option is wi thin the law or outside the law is ir relevant,
except in so far as any punishment that illegal actions might attract should be factored into
the person’s calculations.
But perhaps a more sophisticated version of utilitarianism can meet this objection. Bentham’s
version of utilitarianism—sometimes called act utilitarianism—judges individual
actions directly against the utilitarian requirement to maximize p leasure and minimize
pain. In contrast, a more sophisticated version—sometimes called rule utilitarianism—
introduces two stages, as follows.
1. Potential rules are judged against the utilitarian requirement to maximize pleasure
and minimize pain, and the best rules are chosen accordingly.
2. Individual actions are judged right or wrong against these rules, regardless of how
each action performs in terms of its direct infl uence on the amount of pleasure and
pain in the world.
If we adopt rule utilitarianism rather than act utilitarianism, then it is easier to see how we
might construct a utilitarian case for political authority and obligation. Th e benefi ts that
obedience to the law and the existence of the state bring would be conducive to the promotion
of pleasure and the reduction of pain. As such, it seems quite plausible that a rule requiring
obedience to the law would be among those rules most likely to maximize pleasure
and minimize pain. Th is would be true only if the laws of the state in question were suitably
designed—but then a rule utilitarian would also argue that the laws themselves should be
chosen by utilitarian criteria.
Th e problem with the utilitarian justifi cation for political authority and obligation is that
it is only as strong as the utilitarian moral theory itself. While utilitarianism does still have
its supporters, most theorists now tend to regard utilitarianism as (at best) an incomplete
theory of morality. In deciding how to act, we should take into account not only the likely
consequences of an action, but also considerations such as rights and justice. We should do