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1 Political authority and obligation Political authority and obligation

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<strong>Political</strong> <strong>authority</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>obligation</strong> 17<br />

reasonably challenge the hypothetical consent theorist to explain why we should care what<br />

it would be rational for us to do, when, in reality, we might prefer to act irrationally. If the<br />

hypothetical consent theorist replies along the lines of, ‘Because it is in your best interests<br />

to do what it is rational to do’, then it looks like his or her argument for political <strong>authority</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> <strong>obligation</strong> appeals to the benefi ts that the state brings, rather than on the moral importance<br />

of consent. But if the hypothetical consent theorist’s argument relies ultimately on the<br />

benefi ts that the state brings, then the hypothetical consent seems to drop out of the picture—that<br />

is, we might as well seek to justify political <strong>obligation</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>authority</strong> by direct<br />

reference to the benefi ts that the state brings. In the next section, we will look at precisely<br />

this possibility.<br />

KEY POINTS<br />

● Consent theorists claim that we should obey the law, because we have consented to do so.<br />

● Modern consent theorists rely on the Lockean notion of tacit consent. Tacit consent has been<br />

interpreted in different ways, but is most usefully interpreted as consent by doing something<br />

that you would not otherwise be permitted to do, because someone has a right that you not<br />

do that thing without thereby consenting.<br />

● Some consent theorists argue that residence in a geographical territory counts as tacit consent<br />

to obey the law. One objection to this claim says that we are not free enough to leave our<br />

country of birth for our residence to count as effective consent. Another objection suggests<br />

that residing on one’s own l<strong>and</strong> is not a prohibited act <strong>and</strong> cannot therefore count as tacit<br />

consent.<br />

● Some consent theorists argue that voting in a democratic election counts as tacit consent<br />

to obey the law. But as long as those who do not vote are forced to obey the law despite<br />

their abstention, it seems reasonable to treat voting as coerced, <strong>and</strong> therefore ineffective,<br />

consent.<br />

● Hypothetical consent theorists argue that we would consent to set up a state <strong>and</strong> obey the<br />

law if the state did not already exist. The diffi culty for hypothetical consent theorists is to<br />

explain why it should matter morally what we would do, rather than what we have, in fact,<br />

done.<br />

Utilitarianism<br />

One reason to think that we should obey the law regardless of the presence or absence of<br />

consent is that obedience to the law allows the state to exist <strong>and</strong> that the existence of the<br />

state brings many benefi ts. We have roads down which to drive, police to keep the peace<br />

within our borders, <strong>and</strong> armies to protect our borders. Some of us a re lucky enough to<br />

enjoy access to free or heavily subsidized health care <strong>and</strong> education. Are these benefi ts not<br />

themselves suffi cient justifi cation for political <strong>authority</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>obligation</strong>?<br />

Th e answer to this question is both ‘yes’ <strong>and</strong> ‘no’. For those who want to act in ways that<br />

benefi t society, the benefi ts that the state brings will provide a reason to obey the law. But

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