1 Political authority and obligation Political authority and obligation

More documents

Recommendations

Info

10 Keith Hyams Introduction Th e starting point for many of the issues discussed in this book is the state. How should political representatives be chosen? How much should the state tax us and how should it spend that tax? When should the state go to war? How should the state control our borders? Before moving on to these questions in later chapters, one question suggests itself before all others: why should we have a state at all? Why should we, human beings born into a world that is ruled everywhere by this state or that, acquiesce in the power of those states? Why should we accept the authority that they claim for themselves and why should we obey their laws? Questions about political authority and obligation require us to delve into normative issues—issues about what we should do a nd about what principles we should follow. In order to justify political authority and obligation, we need to identify normative principles that can ground our case. But we also need to address descriptive issues—issues that are about how the world is or how the world would be if something were to happen. We need to know whether obeying the laws set and enforced by our governments would be the best way in which to follow the normative principles that we identify. Consider, for example, the claim that we should obey the law because, if we do not do so, then society will collapse into chaos. Th is claim implies an argument with two premises: ● a normative premise, which says that we have a d uty not to let s ociety collapse into chaos; and ● a descriptive premise, which says that, if w e do no t obey the law, then society will collapse into chaos. KEY CONCEPTS Authority To have authority in the practical sense is not merely to have power over someone. To have power over someone is to have at one’s disposal the means to make that person do something—but authority requires something more: that the person subject to the authority have a certain ‘pro’ attitude towards the person or institution that claims authority. Authoritative directives are obeyed not because those who obey them are fearful of punishment, but because those who obey them think that the directives should be obeyed by virtue of their issuing from the authority. Together, these two premises entail the conclusion that we have a duty to obey the law. In order to challenge this conclusion, people might question either the normative premise or the descriptive premise. They might ask normative questions: do we really have a duty not to let society collapse? Why should I believe that we have such a duty? Or they might ask descriptive questions: why will society collapse if I do not obey the law? Are there no other ways in which we could prevent society from collapsing other than by obeying the law? Might we not, for example, set up anarchist self-governing federations instead?
Political authority and obligation 11 Th e following sections will discuss various arguments in support of the claim that we have a duty to obey the law. In order to assess these arguments, you should try to work out on what normative and descriptive premises they rely, and how plausible you think those premises are. Consent By far the most widely discussed justifi cation for political authority and obligation is what is o ft en called consent theory (o r contract theory). C onsent t heorists c laim t hat w e should obey the law because we have consented to do so. Consent theory is a type of voluntarism, because it says that our obligation to obey the law derives from a v oluntary undertaking on our part. Consent theory is oft en associated with the seventeenth-century English philosophers Th omas Hobbes and John Locke, and with the eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. But the thought that we have consented to obey the law was fi rst given currency by the Greek philosopher Plato, in his dialogue ‘Crito’ (360 bc; 1892). Plato recounts how Socrates was condemned to death by an Athenian court for corrupting the minds of the youth with his ideas. Whereas Socrates’ friends urge him to escape, Socrates himself refuses to fl ee and stays to drink the fatal hemlock. Socrates argues, among other things, t hat his lo ng residence in A thens constitutes an agreement to ob ey t he laws of Athens. By living in Athens he has, in o ther words, consented to obey the law. He must therefore respect the court’s verdict and submit to his execution. KEY CONCEPTS Consent When someone consents to something, he or she either takes on a duty to do a particular thing or permits others to do a particular thing. Consent is important not only to politics, but also to a whole range of contexts. We talk, for example, about whether sex was consensual, about consenting to some medical treatment, and so on. As Hurd writes (1996: 123): ‘Consent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a handshake; a theft into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial appropriation of name and likeness into a biography.’ Consent theorists make two claims. First, they claim that, by consenting to obey the law, each of us can impose on ourselves an obligation to obey the law. Second, they claim that we have, in fac t, consented to obey the law. Th e fi rst of these claims has g enerally been regarded as uncontroversial; it is the second claim that has provoked one of the liveliest and most enduring debates in the history of political thought. As the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher David Hume wrote:
Page 1: 1 Political authority and obligatio
Page 5 and 6: Political authority and obligation
Page 13 and 14: See chapter 7 Political authority a
Page 15 and 16: KEY POINTS Anarchy Political author

1 Political authority and obligation Political authority and obligation

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?