1 Political authority and obligation Political authority and obligation

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22 Keith Hyams The ‘normal justification’ thesis Joseph Raz (1986) also argues that moral reasons are relevant to the justifi cation of political authority and obligation. But Raz, in contrast to Nozick, argues that at least some laws ought to be obeyed simply because they issue from the state. Raz argues that the normal way in which to show that an authority is legitimate and ought to be obeyed is to show that, by following the directives of the authority, we would be likely better to comply with the reasons that are applicable to us—that is, the reasons that each of us have to do or not to do something—than if we were to try to follow the reasons directly. Th ese reasons include, but are not limited to, moral reasons for action. If an authority tells us to do something that meets this criterion, then we are obliged to do what the authority tells us to do, rather than decide for ourselves how we should act. So, for example, all car drivers have reasons—both moral and self-interested—to avoid road accidents. Th ese reasons would apply to car drivers even if the state did not exist or had said nothing about road accidents. One way in which accidents can be avoided is if we all try to follow the reason directly and drive on the same side of the road, without any intervention by the state. But we are unlikely to coordinate amongst ourselves to drive on the same side of the road. On the other hand, the state can easily tell us to drive on this side of the road or that. So if the state does tell us on which side of the road to drive, then we are duty-bound to obey the state and to give up our own attempts to coordinate another solution without the state. Th is is because we are more likely to avoid road accidents by obeying the state than by continuing our individual eff orts. KEY TEXTS Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986) In this seminal text, Joseph Raz explores the nature and significance of political authority and freedom, and asks how they can be justified. Raz argues that what underlies the liberal concern with political freedom is autonomy. Autonomy requires the provision of collective goods—goods that are important to many people in society. As such, the state ought not to promote individualism, but to provide these collective goods. In addition to Raz’s account of authority, another important legacy of The Morality of Freedom is Raz’s theory of rights, which claims that someone has a right only when some interest of his or hers is served if he or she has a right. Whether or not you agree with Raz’s account of authority, even Raz himself admits that the authority that existing states claim for themselves goes beyond the bounds of that which can be justifi ed on this account. On Raz’s account, existing states will have some authority over people, but the extent of their authority will diff er person by person, because each person is sub ject to quite diff erent reasons for action. Rarely will people be subject to political authority as ext ensively as existin g states would like to claim that they are.
KEY POINTS Anarchy Political authority and obligation 23 ● Many laws tell us to do that which the basic rules of morality demand that we do anyway, independently of the law. ● States may legitimately enforce obedience to the basic rules of morality. Most theorists agree that all existing states enforce at least some laws that go beyond the basic rules of morality. ● Nozick and other libertarians argue that states may enforce only property rights and rights against harm. Nozick calls a state that performs only these functions a ‘minimal state’. ● Nozick argues that states are permitted uniquely to enforce morality by appealing to the risk involved in enforcing rights. ● Raz argues that the normal way in which to show that an authority is justifi ed is to show that, by following the directives of the authority, people would better comply with reasons applicable to them than if they were to try to follow those reasons directly. Raz notes that the authority that existing states claim for themselves would not be entirely justifi ed on this view. BOX 1.3 PROUDHON: AN ANARCHIST VIEW OF THE STATE To be GOVERNED is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied upon, directed, law-driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so … To be GOV- ERNED is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonored. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality. (Proudhon, 1851; 1923: 293–4) Some thinkers who do not accept any of the arguments canvassed above argue instead that we are not bound by a duty to obey the law. Such thinkers do no necessarily think that we should abolish the state, because some accept that there are good prudential reasons to maintain the current order—at least for the time being. Th is position—anarchy in theory, but not in practice—is known as philosophical anarchism and was fi rst proposed by William Godwin (1793; 1976). Of the positive arguments for philosophical anarchism—those built on reasons not to obey the law, rather than merely the absence of reasons to obey it—the most widely discussed in recent times has been the claim of R. P. Wolff (1970) that
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