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290 Notes(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953), 82–111. It is significant that many arthistorians associate the German language with a supposed ‘‘lack of precision’’ in philosophicalwriting: ‘‘The transition from German to English, a necessity for all the Germanemigrés, helped most of them to write in a way that was more succinct and precise.Panofsky is a particularly brilliant example. Pächt is another.’’ Carl Nordenfalk, ‘‘OttoPächt, in Memoriam’’ Revue de l’art, no. 82 (1988): 82.44. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 6, 8–9, 66–74, passim.45. Robert Klein, ‘‘Thoughts on Iconography,’’ in Form and Meaning: Essays on Renaissanceand Modern Art, trans. Madeline Jay and Leon Wieseltier (New York: Viking Press,[1979]), 160. This is an implicit echo of Panofsky, ‘‘Der Begriff des Kunstwollens,’’ Aufsätze,29 (passage cited above as an epigraph to this book) [Panofsky, ‘‘The Concept of ArtisticVolition,’’ 18–19].46. See Meyer Schapiro, Selected Papers, 4 vols. (New York: George Braziller, 1977–94).Pierre Francastel, La Figure et le lieu: L’Ordre visuel au Quattrocento (Paris: Gallimard, 1967),7–23, 55, passim. Michael Baxandall, Patterns of Intention: On the Historical Explanation ofPictures (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 1–11, where the author reiterates that alldescription is ‘‘partially interpretive,’’ being not a ‘‘representation of seeing the picture’’but a ‘‘representation of thinking about having seen the picture’’ (11).47. See Hubert Damisch, The Origin of Perspective, trans. John Goodman (Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), chap. 1, ‘‘At the Crossroads,’’ 3–20. This entire book is a demonstrationthat critical inquiry—hence skeptical, even ‘‘impatient,’’ as Damisch writes in hispreface—is necessary for the very production of knowledge about art. The ‘‘textualthreshold’’ in question is, of course, Panofsky’s Perspective as Symbolic Form (English trans.Christopher S. Wood [Cambridge, Mass.: Zone Books, 1991]).48. See CPJ: 167–68 (§ 35).49. CPJ: 68–80 (Intro., v–viii), 221–25 (§ 58), etc.50. ‘‘I am now at work on the critique of taste, and I have discovered a new sort of apriori principles, different from those heretofore observed. For there are three faculties ofthe mind: the faculty of cognition, the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure, and thefaculty of desire. In the Critique of Pure (theoretical) Reason, I found a priori principles forthe first of these, and in the Critique of Practical Reason a priori principles for the third. Itried to find them for the second as well, and although I thought it impossible to find suchprinciples, the analysis of the previously mentioned faculties of the human mind allowedme to discover something systematic, which has given me ample material at which tomarvel and if possible to explore, sufficient to last me for the rest of my life, and has putme on the path now to recognize three parts of philosophy, each of which has its a prioriprinciples, which can be enumerated and for which one can precisely determine the scopeof knowledge that is possible through them—theoretical philosophy, teleology, and practicalphilosophy.’’ Kant to Karl Leonhard Reinhold, December 1787, as cited in editor’sintroduction to CPJ, xiv.51. See, for example, CPJ: 192–93 (§ 49). Elsewhere, Kant calls the visual (pictorial) arts‘‘those of the expression of ideas in sensible intuition’’ (CPJ: 199 [§ 51]).52. See the assessment of Pierre Bourdieu: ‘‘Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism isindubitably one of the most beautiful challenges ever posed to positivism.’’ Afterword tohis French translation, 135.53. Panofsky, ‘‘Das Problem des Stils,’’ 25–26. I will have more to say below about theterm ‘‘metapsychological.’’54. ‘‘Artistic volition [Kunstwollen], which must be distinguished from both the artist’svolition [Wollen des Künstlers] and the volition of his time [Wollen seiner Zeit] . . . can only