body-of-secrets-anatomy-of-the-ultra-secret-national-security-agency-2002

of the Pueblo crew. But for nearly a year the cumbersome talks draggedon."Americans were shocked at President Lyndon Johnson's inability to'free our boys,' " said William Taylor, Jr., of the Center for Strategic andInternational Studies. "Coming on top of repeated disasters in theVietnam War, congressional opposition to Johnson grew rapidly. Thiswas the beginning of the end of a failed presidency." Two months afterthe capture, on March 30, 1968, Johnson stunned the nation when heannounced that he would not run for a second term.By the fall of 1968, the Pueblo had become a hot political issue.Richard Nixon, running for the presidency against Vice President HubertHumphrey, pounded on a podium and called for revenge. "When afourth-rate military power like North Korea will seize an American navalvessel on the high seas," he said, "it's time for new leadership."On December 23, 1968, Major General Gilbert Woodward, theAmerican representative to the Military Armistice Commission inPanmunjom, signed a North Korean—prepared apology admitting to theespionage and the intrusion. However, before it was signed, Woodwarddenounced the papers as false. "I will sign the document," he said, "tofree the crew and only free the crew." Nevertheless, the North Koreansaccepted the fig leaf, and later that day all the Pueblo crewmen—alongwith the body of Duane Hodges—crossed the bridge linking North andSouth Korea. It had been exactly eleven months since the ordeal began.Imprisoned [eleven] months,A grand collection of lumpsWe've gathered since the dawn of detention.But do you think we're resentful?Hell no! We're repentful!How repentful it's safer not to mention.Following the crew's release, a Navy court of inquiry was harshlycritical of Bucher's performance during the crisis. He was accused of notrecognizing in time the serious threat to his ship. "A determination toresist seizure was never developed in Pueblo prior to or during theincident," it said. "Commander Bucher had the responsibility fordeveloping the best defensive capability possible in his ship utilizing allweapons and personnel available. This he did not do."He was also severely criticized for giving up his ship and its secrets."He should have persisted—increased speed, zigzagged, andmaneuvered radically. No boarding party could have come aboard hadthe ship so maneuvered. In view of the absence of fire or flooding and few241