body-of-secrets-anatomy-of-the-ultra-secret-national-security-agency-2002

cryptanalysis and traffic analysis.Thus NSA-70, which was responsible for all high-level cryptanalysis,was replaced by ADVA ("Advanced Soviet"), which focused exclusively onnew ways to attack high-level Soviet cipher problems. GENS ("GeneralSoviet") concentrated mainly on mid- and lower-level Russian cryptosystems, as well as on analysis of content. ACOM (Asian Communist)attempted to exploit the systems of China, North Korea, and the rest ofCommunist Asia. Finally, ALLO ("All Others") analyzed the systemsbelonging to the nations making up the rest of the world, includingAmerica's allies. ALLO-34, for example, was responsible for Middle Easttraffic analysis. Three other divisions were primarily for support: MPRO("Machine Processing") was responsible for computer number crunching;TCOM ("Telecommunications") controlled the worldwide flow of signals;and Collection managed the NSA's far-flung network of listening posts.On November 23, 1956, Ralph Canine walked out of NSA for the lasttime as director. "Canine . . . stands out as the guy who everybodyrespected in the agency," recalled Howard Campaigne. "I was surprisedto learn later that the people above him didn't think nearly as much [ofhim] as we did. He made a tremendous impression."In a restricted corner of a remote air base in Peshawar, Pakistan,Francis Gary Powers sat shoehorned into the narrow cockpit of U-2Number 360. At twenty minutes past six on the morning of May 1, 1960,the scorching sun had already pushed above the tallest peaks of thewestern Himalayas. In the low, fertile plain known as the Vale ofPeshawar, rippling heat waves created the impression of an endless lake.Powers was locked in a white space helmet and a tightly tailoredpressure suit. Beads of sweat flowed down from his short brown hair andpassed across his broad forehead and cheekbones in thin streams. Hislong underwear was soaked with perspiration.The first U-2 had been launched from West Germany four yearsearlier, on Independence Day of 1956. Shortly before, NSA had detected apossible mobilization by Moscow in response to a series of riots in EastGermany, thus making the mission more urgent. But hope that the U-2would be able to slip across the Soviet Union undetected was dashed bythe eavesdroppers at Fort Meade. "NSA picked up the [Soviet]transmission of their [the U-2's] track so we knew that they had beentracked a good deal of the time," said Richard M. Bissell, Jr., the CIAofficial who ran the program. Nevertheless, seeing where the Russianswere able to pick up the plane and where they weren't gave NSA anindication of just where the holes were in Soviet radar coverage.As he did with the bomber overflights, Eisenhower played a major rolein the planning for each mission. "He would sometimes cut out particular44