The combination of a second-generation ABL and a <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> tactical aircraft system would transform air-toairand air-to-ground operations. A second-generation ABL would be lighter and smaller than the current system,have a more powerful laser with an increased lethal range and/or a larger magazine. Such a system would be able to“sanitize” a larger area and engage more targets than can the current ABL. At shorter ranges, a second-generation ABLcould also strike ground targets, contributing to the precision-strike and SEAD missions.The Defense Department is considering the deployment of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> on a range of platforms includingUCAVs, an advanced version of the AC-130 gunship, and even the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 50 The developmentof relatively compact and lightweight laser or HPM devices would revolutionize tactical air operations. Directed-<strong>energy</strong>systems could be employed both as a weapon, engaging air-breathing and ground targets, and as an advanced sensorcapability for tracking and targeting airborne and mobile ground targets. A <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> weapon could be builtintegrally to the F-35 or UCAV, drawing power from a drive shaft, or could be carried internally or externally as single-shotmunitions. 51Directed-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> will change the character of air warfare, both defensively and offensively. One of the firstemerging missions for laser <strong>weapons</strong> will be aircraft self-defense. Heat-seeking SAMs are demonstrating increasedcapability to overcome passive countermeasures such as chaff and flares. The Air Force has an active program to developa <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong>-based Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures system designed to actively engage IR missiles,particularly man-portable SAMs. 52 A similar system could be employed on tactical aircraft, providing space and <strong>energy</strong>where available. Because the target of such a defensive system would be approaching the <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong>-armedaircraft, the power requirement and size of a defensive system should be relatively modest. Deployed in rotatingpods, such a system could provide 360-degree defensive coverage. Triggered by the aircraft’s own missile-warning system,the infrared countermeasure system could rapidly engage multiple SAMs. 53Directed-<strong>energy</strong> systems could replace cannons and, eventually, even missiles, as the primary offensive air-to-airarmament for both tactical fighters and UCAVs. A rapid-firing <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> system offers the opportunity toexploit the ability of modern phased-array radars to track and target a large number of objects simultaneously. Atpresent, the limiting factor in air-to-air engagements is the number of missiles an aircraft can carry. Directed-<strong>energy</strong><strong>weapons</strong> could overcome this limitation, permitting a few aircraft so equipped to engage many targets. Directed<strong>energy</strong><strong>weapons</strong> also allow for very rapid target engagement, facilitating improved engagement opportunities againstboth maneuvering aircraft and low-flying, high-speed or terrain-following cruise missiles.It is likely that for the foreseeable future, the wisest course will be to equip aircraft with a mix of missiles and<strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong>. Nevertheless, the impact of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong>-armed aircraft on the battlespace could be asprofound in principle as was the introduction of jet aircraft.The application of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> technology with the greatest potential to change the conduct of warfareover the long term is in space. Two concepts have been studied. The first involves the deployment of <strong>weapons</strong> onsatellites in space. The second would place the weapon and associated power generation systems on the ground or,alternatively, on an aircraft such as the ABL, but achieve the desired leverage of the high ground of space through theuse of a series of space-based mirrors. 54 Space-based <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> could perform a range of missions fromstrategic and theater missile defense to counter-air, strikes against surface targets, offensive and defensive counterspaceand ISR support to other forces. 55 By deploying the <strong>weapons</strong> in space, a nation would be able to maximize theThe Military Uses and National-Security Implications of Directed-Energy Weapons31
inherent advantages of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong>, notably rapid access to targets, speed-of-light engagement, longrange and continuous coverage of the battlespace. 56Space-based <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> could be employed independently or as part of a joint force. Independentoperations are particularly important in those instances where only space-based <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> can accessthe target. Independent missions would include both offensive and defensive counter-space, boost-phase missiledefense (particularly against a limited number of missiles) and, perhaps, ground strike against critical strategic targets.Space-based <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> would operate as part of a joint force in the conduct of layered missile-defenseoperations, air defense, suppression of enemy air defenses, ISR and targeting support to other forces, and operationalground strikes.III.LIMITATIONS AND COUNTERMEASURESTO DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONSWith the deployment of any new <strong>weapons</strong> system, there is a need to understand its technical and operational limitations.Directed-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> clearly offer some novel and potentially very important military capabilities that couldserve as the basis for entirely new missions and operational concepts. At the same time, there are serious concernsregarding the ability of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> to operate under real-world conditions and to be effective against relativelysimple countermeasures.One of the major criticisms offered against the utility of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong>, particularly high-<strong>energy</strong> lasers, isthat they are unable to operate through inclement weather or in the presence of obscurants, whether naturally occurringor man-made. Modern laser systems such as the ABL employ adaptive optics to compensate for the problem ofbeam attenuation caused by atmospheric turbulence. The ABL addresses the problem of weather and obscurants byengaging targets above cloud level.Clouds and obscurants are a challenge to the current generation of chemical-laser <strong>weapons</strong>. This matters least for ABL oran SBL engaging ballistic and airborne targets above cloud level. Clouds are also not a problem for the THEL/MTHELor similar systems operating near the Earth. However, fog, smoke and other obscurants will be a problem for near-Earthlaser <strong>weapons</strong>.Directed-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> also must confront efforts by adversaries to counter their effects. A variety of countermeasuresare possible depending on the kind of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> weapon and the type of target. Shielding or ablativematerial can attenuate the effectiveness of continuous-wave laser <strong>weapons</strong> but will be relatively ineffective againstpulsed lasers that use impulse power as their damage mechanism rather than target heating. A highly reflective surfaceor rapid rotation of the target could also reduce damage from continuous-wave laser attack.Another potential limit to the military application of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong> is damage assessment. Not all electronicsystems will respond the same way to the deposition of an equal amount of <strong>energy</strong>. 57 In light of this, <strong>directed</strong><strong>energy</strong><strong>weapons</strong> will have to be “oversized” in order to have a high likelihood of creating the desired effect even in aresistant target. In addition, the effects on targets of <strong>directed</strong>-<strong>energy</strong> <strong>weapons</strong>, particularly HPMs, may be difficult toassess externally. The absence of electronic emissions from a bunker, for example, may be a sign that the facility wasneutralized by HPM <strong>weapons</strong> or, conversely, that the target is “playing possum.” 5832 The Military Uses and National-Security Implications of Directed-Energy Weapons