Layout 8 - Winston Churchill

GOLDEN EGGS...attack across the Western Desert would have to be divertedto Greece. Enigma-based evidence of an attack mounted. Atthe Defence Committee (Operations) meeting of 8 January1941, where all present were privy to Enigma, Churchillnoted that “all information pointed to an early advance bythe German Army, which was massing in Roumania, withthe object of invading Greece via Bulgaria.” 23As a result of assessments being made at Bletchley, thisand further Enigma decrypts in the following two daysenabled Churchill to inform the Army and Air ForceCommanders-in-Chief in the Middle East—General Wavelland Air Chief Marshal Longmore—that “a large-scalemovement may begin on or soon after 20th March.” 24Enigma showed that the force that had been assembled forwhatever action was planned included two armoured divisionsand 200 dive bombers.Enigma continued to confirm the German threat toGreece. A crucial decrypt on January 9th gave the news thatGerman Air Force personnel were moving into Bulgaria tolay down telephone and teleprinter lines to the Bulgarian-Greek border along the main axis of advance towardsSalonika. 25 A decrypt of January 18 showed German AirForce hutments being sent to Bulgaria. 26 A decrypt two dayslater showed that the German Air Force mission inRomania was discussing long-term arrangements for thesupply of German Air Force fuel to depots in Bulgaria. 27As evidence mounted, a political decision was essential.The War Cabinet’s unanimous conclusion was thatBritain must come to the aid of Greece, however hopelessthat task might be. With Enigma, the facts were known wellin advance, adding to the pressure for a decision. WithoutEnigma, the dilemma would not have arisen until too late.German, Hungarian and Italian troops attackedYugoslavia and Greece on 6 April 1941. By April 30th bothnations had been overrun. Between April 24th and 30th,more than 30,000 British, Australian and New Zealandtroops were evacuated to Crete, where they awaited asecond German onslaught. On the 28th, Enigma revealedthe German intention for an air-supported attack, andChurchill telegraphed to General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East (then in Cairo): “It seems clear from ourinformation that a heavy airborne attack by German troopsand bombers will soon be made on Crete.” 28It would be an entirely airborne attack. But how wasthe commander on Crete, New Zealand General BernardFreyberg, who was not privy to Enigma, to be informedwithout endangering the source? On May 7th, Churchillproposed that Freyberg be sent actual texts of the decryptsrelating to German plans for a parachute landing at MalemeAirport in Crete. This was done, but the Secret IntelligenceService warned Freyberg not to act on this informationunless he had at least one non-Enigma source for it—lestthe Germans realise that their own top-secret communica-tions had been broken. As he did not have any other source,Freyberg was unable to make the necessary dispositions toconcentrate his defences at Maleme.Desperate for Freyberg to see the actual texts of thedecrypts regarding German plans for glider and parachuteattacks, Churchill wrote to the three Chiefs of Staff on May10th: “So important do I consider all this aspect that itwould be well to send a special officer by air to see GeneralFreyberg and show him personally the actual texts of all themessages bearing upon this subject. The officer would beanswerable for their destruction in the event of enginefailure en route. No one should be informed but theGeneral, who would give his orders to his subordinateswithout explaining his full reasons.” 29The airborne landings took place on 20 May 1941. Inthe fighting that followed, 5326 Allied and 6565 Germansoldiers were killed; 12,000 British and Commonwealthforces were evacuated from Crete between 28 and 31 May;12,254 were taken prisoner by the Germans. During thenaval actions around the island, eight British warships weresunk. There had been no way to take advantage of theGerman Enigma messages on land or at sea.Euphemisms for EnigmaUsed by Churchill in telegrams and messages cited above.(Churchill also spoke of his “Golden Eggs”)Boniface • An unimpeachable sourceA reliable source • Most secret sourcesSpecial sources • Special informationSpecial stuff • Our special stuffSure information • Our information hereOur special sources of informationPeril in the AtlanticIn the summer of 1940 the cryptologists at Bletchleyhad broken the settings of the German Home Waters NavalEnigma, but these settings were changed at the end of1940. From that moment, sinkings by German submarineswere heavy and continuous, even reaching the Atlantic coastof Canada and the United States.A breakthrough in Bletchley’s ability to read theGerman Naval Enigma came with the Lofoten Islands raidon 4 March 1941. Proposed by Hugh Dalton, the head ofSpecial Operations Executive (SOE), and approved byChurchill and the Chiefs of Staff, the raid—OperationClaymore—was much boasted publicly as having been forthe destruction of the fish oil processing plant there. Thiswas the most important source by which Germany obtainedvitamins A and D: indeed, during the raid, eleven factoriesand 800,000 tons of fish oil were destroyed.The actual aim of the raid, kept secret throughout thewar and for many years after 1945, was to capture anEnigma machine used by the German Navy, the code keysFINEST HOUR 149 / 24