erK3dZ

Foreign Office. Von Mende routinely intervened with the Bavarian governmenton Bandera’s behalf for residency permits and the like, and now intervened withthe Bavarian authorities for “false passports and other documentation.” 73 Theexact results of von Mende’s help are not clear, but Bandera was left alone.In April 1959 Bandera again asked West German intelligence for support andthis time Gehlen was interested. The CIA noted that, “It [is] apparent that Bandera[is] seeking support for illegal ops into Ukraine.” The West Germans agreed tosupport at least one such mission based on the “fact [that] Bandera and groupno longer the cut throats they were” and because Bandera “supplied proof [of]existing contact with inside assets.” A team trained and funded by the BND crossedfrom Czechoslovakia in late July, and the BND promised Bandera support forfuture operations if this one were to be even “moderately successful.” 74Bandera’s personal contact in West German intelligence was Heinz DankoHerre, Gehlen’s old deputy in Fremde Heere Ost who had worked with theGen. Andrei Vlassov’s army of Russian émigrés and former prisoners in the lastdays of the war and was now Gehlen’s closest adviser. 75 CIA officials in Munichrepeated the usual warnings. Herre was not dissuaded. “Bandera,” Herre said,“has been known to us for about 20 years [!]…. Within and without Germanyhe has over half a million followers.” Herre, reported the CIA base in Munich isaware of Bandera’s earlier reputation [but] is aware that nothing has happened,during the period of [BND’s] association, indicating that Bandera still is usinghis earlier rough tactics…. [Herre] also feels that, in principle, Bandera has moreto offer operationally than most if not all other Russian (sic) émigré groups inthe West today. 76Herre admitted that West German use of Bandera was a “closely held” secreteven within the BND and that the relationship was “not cleared with Bonn dueto political overtones.” 77 By September Herre reported that the BND was getting“good [foreign intelligence] reports on the Soviet Ukraine” as a result of theiroperations. 78 He offered to keep CIA fully informed as to Bandera’s activitiesin return for a favor. Bandera had been trying to obtain a U.S. visa since 1955in order to meet with Ukrainian supporters in the United States and to meetwith State Department and CIA officials. Herre thought that a visa procuredwith West German help would improve his own relationship with Bandera. CIAofficials in Munich actually recommended the visa in October 1959. 7984 | Collaborators