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Rethinking Global Economic Governance in Light of the CrisisRound outcome—and given the speed with which information on negotiating positionscan be transmitted back to national capitals, these factors alone may contribute to thefollowing features observed during the Doha Round: trade negotiators from leadingjurisdictions signal their willingness to negotiate, 3 but when the focus is on particularlysensitive sectors (like agriculture) and more information is revealed about the truenature of domestic political constraints, then suddenly negotiating flexibility shrivels,and an impasse results.Moreover, prime ministers and presidents are well aware of their own negotiator’slimited mandates (imposed because of strong domestic constituencies), suspect or inferthat other heads of government have imposed similarly restrictive negotiate mandates,and, unless presented with compelling pressures to the contrary, sustain the statusquo. Consequently, such heads of government resist the elevation of Doha Roundnegotiations to international forums, such as the G20. National constraints are projectedon to the international negotiation, in a manner that Schelling foresaw and some tradenegotiators openly acknowledged. Speaking in Washington, DC in 2005, the then-EUTrade Commissioner Peter Mandelson said:“I do not underestimate the constraints imposed by domestic politics on both sidesof the Atlantic but we have a wide set of joint interests in the Doha Round. Atthe end of the day, we are two very large Continental players with different, butsimilar economic structures and specialisations. We should not be in the businessof pre-cooking and imposing outcomes. But it is essential that we work to buildcommon or coordinated policy platforms. If we cannot agree on basic approachesthen nothing will happen. It’s as simple as that.” (Mandelson 2005).3 After all, no negotiator wants to exclude themselves from a major negotiation by admitting they can give little or nothing.114