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A dangerous campaign:Why we shouldn’t risk the SchengenAgreementTito Boeri and Herbert BrückerBocconi University and CEPR; IABPlaying politics with migration is dangerous but dangerously attractive in today’s climateof European malaise. Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, tried to achieve new momentum inhis re-election campaign by calling for a revision of the Schengen Agreement. His goal,obviously, was to win right-wing voters in the crucial first round of France’s two-stepelection. His political and economic rationale, by contrast, remains opaque to say theleast.• Is it an attempt to reduce migration particularly from the northern African countries?• Or is it all about reducing illegal migration?• Or is the intention of the French president to hinder the free mobility of workers andother persons across the EU member states?More generally, uncoordinated national policies are not the right way to governmigration in an area as economically integrated as Europe. Uncoordinated policieswill give rise a prisoner’s dilemma situation where all members spend inefficientlylarge amounts on border controls, sub-optimal asylum and humanitarian policies, andinefficiently restrictive policies on legal migration.What is Schengen?The Schengen Agreement and the related legal framework – the “Schengen acquis” inEU jargon – have three main dimensions (EC 2009):• Removal of border controls for persons moving within the Schengen area157
Rethinking Global Economic Governance in Light of the Crisis• Coordination on short-term visitors for third-countries’ citizens, i.e. the “Schengenvisa” that lets them travel freely within the Schengen area (applying only oncerather than for each Schengen country they want to visit).• Coordination on border control measures vis-à-vis third countries and, when needed,members’ border control measures supplemented and supported by other memberstates (via the agency Frontex).Critically, the Schengen Agreement also establishes information systems that facilitatepolice cooperation among members, especially as concerns illegal migrants.The benefits of the Schengen Agreement are obvious to travellers in Europe – it savestime and money (by reducing information and transaction costs) for citizens and noncitizenswith Schengen visas. But there are other benefits:• Schengen has gone hand in hand with an increase of net immigration to the Schengenarea – an increase not experienced by the countries outside the area. As Table1 shows, non-Schengen nations have experienced a decline in immigration flows.• Job opportunities offered by an individual country in the Schengen area are moreattractive as they come with the option of freely moving across the entire area.• Schengen has also eased the conditions for doing business in Europe; travellersfrom abroad perceive the Schengen area as a common market, which is much moreattractive to businesses than the fragmented situation before the agreement.Table 1. Inflows of migrants, thousands of peopleEuropean Countriesnot in the SchengenAreaCountries in theSchengen Areapre-Schengen(1985–95)post-Schengen(1996–2007)% Variation2417.964 1130.986 -53%12104.84 19393.5105 60%Difference 113%Source: OECD, International Migration Dataset.158
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