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The Management of Significant Adverse Events in NHS

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<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012© Healthcare Improvement Scotland 2012First published June 2012<strong>The</strong> publication is copyright to Healthcare Improvement Scotland. All or part <strong>of</strong> this publication may bereproduced, free <strong>of</strong> charge <strong>in</strong> any format or medium provided it is not for commercial ga<strong>in</strong>. <strong>The</strong> textmay not be changed and must be acknowledged as Healthcare Improvement Scotland copyright withthe document’s date and title specified.www.healthcareimprovementscotland.org2


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................... 4CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR <strong>NHS</strong> AYRSHIRE & ARRAN ......................... 6OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEARNING IN <strong>NHS</strong>SCOTLAND ................................................................ 91 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 111.1 Background ......................................................................................................................................... 111.2 Methodology for the Review ........................................................................................................ 112 <strong>NHS</strong> AYRSHIRE & ARRAN’S DESCRIPTION OF ARRANGEMENTS ................................. 133 REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................. 163.1 Identification, Notification and Initial Event Report<strong>in</strong>g .................................................... 163.2 Escalation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Events</strong> ......................................................................................................................... 183.3 Types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Reviews ......................................................................... 203.4 Investigation and Report<strong>in</strong>g Timel<strong>in</strong>es.................................................................................... 223.5 Involvement <strong>of</strong> Families ................................................................................................................. 243.6 Staff Involvement.............................................................................................................................. 253.7 Action Plann<strong>in</strong>g ................................................................................................................................. 263.8 Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Learn<strong>in</strong>g .......................................................................................................................... 293.9 Structure and Accountability ....................................................................................................... 303.10 Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Information ................................................................................................................... 32APPENDIX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE ............................................................................................ 35APPENDIX 2: EVENTS LEADING TO THE REVIEW ..................................................................... 39APPENDIX 3: LIST OF ADVERSE EVENTS ON <strong>NHS</strong> AYRSHIRE & ARRAN SIGNIFICANTADVERSE EVENT REVIEW DATABASE .......................................................................................... 413


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012EXECUTIVE SUMMARY<strong>The</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et Secretary for Health, Wellbe<strong>in</strong>g and Cities Strategy <strong>in</strong>structed HealthcareImprovement Scotland to carry out, as a matter <strong>of</strong> urgency, a review <strong>of</strong> the cl<strong>in</strong>icalgovernance systems and processes <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, <strong>in</strong> particular those thatrelate to their management <strong>of</strong> critical <strong>in</strong>cidents, adverse events, action plann<strong>in</strong>g andlocal learn<strong>in</strong>g.This followed a decision by the Scottish Information Commissioner on 21 February2012 on <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s response to a Freedom <strong>of</strong> Information (Scotland) Actappeal regard<strong>in</strong>g critical <strong>in</strong>cident reviews and significant adverse event reviews.This document reports on the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> the Healthcare Improvement Scotland ReviewGroup and makes recommendations for improvement for both <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arranand <strong>NHS</strong>Scotland.<strong>The</strong> key f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs from the report are summarised below.• <strong>The</strong> Review Group found a lack <strong>of</strong> clarity on the l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> accountability, report<strong>in</strong>gand ownership <strong>of</strong> significant adverse event review actions and learn<strong>in</strong>g. Wefound complex and unwieldy cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance structures (see section‘Structure and Accountability’).• <strong>The</strong> Review Group found confusion about staff understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the scope toshare <strong>in</strong>formation on significant adverse event reviews and a variation <strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> the policy. This hampered learn<strong>in</strong>g and improvement (seesection ‘Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Information’).• Although the Review Group found examples <strong>of</strong> comprehensive <strong>Significant</strong><strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports there was not a robust and systematic approachto implement<strong>in</strong>g action plans and monitor<strong>in</strong>g progress (see section ‘ActionPlann<strong>in</strong>g’).• <strong>The</strong> Review Group found that <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran had a commitment to<strong>in</strong>volve patients and families and raise awareness <strong>of</strong> the need to <strong>in</strong>volve families.<strong>The</strong> system that tracks and responds to issues raised by families was an area <strong>of</strong>weakness and the Review Group found an <strong>in</strong>consistent approach was used t<strong>of</strong>amily <strong>in</strong>volvement (see section ‘Involvement <strong>of</strong> Families’).• <strong>The</strong> Review Group did not f<strong>in</strong>d evidence <strong>of</strong> a system to identify thematic learn<strong>in</strong>gto allow change and improvements to cl<strong>in</strong>ical practice (see section ‘Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>learn<strong>in</strong>g’).• <strong>The</strong>re is strength <strong>in</strong> the potential <strong>of</strong> AthenA (<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s electronicdocument management system) to support the management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events. However, the Review Group found weaknesses <strong>in</strong>: the logg<strong>in</strong>gand monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events; how <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arranconnects the <strong>in</strong>formation systems it uses; and the level <strong>of</strong> scrut<strong>in</strong>y applied to the4


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012<strong>in</strong>formation with<strong>in</strong> Datix (<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s electronic risk managementsystem) (see section ‘Identification, Notification and Initial Event Report<strong>in</strong>g’).• <strong>The</strong> Review Group also found that there were weaknesses <strong>in</strong> the way decisionsto undertake significant adverse event reviews were evidenced and documented(see section ‘Escalation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Events</strong>’).• <strong>The</strong> criteria used to decide between desktop review or full significant adverseevent review were not clear and the Review Group has also highlighted the risksassociated with s<strong>in</strong>gle person desktop reviews (see section ‘Types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong><strong>Adverse</strong> Event Reviews’).• Although there were examples <strong>of</strong> timely local <strong>in</strong>vestigation, the performancemanagement and progress chas<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>st timel<strong>in</strong>e targets, <strong>in</strong> general, needssignificant improvement (see section ‘Investigation and Report<strong>in</strong>g Timel<strong>in</strong>es’).• <strong>The</strong> Critical Incident Stress <strong>Management</strong> resource is an area <strong>of</strong> strength to besusta<strong>in</strong>ed and developed. (This resource supports <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s staffand provides <strong>in</strong>tervention designed to prevent potentially harmful psychologicalreactions <strong>of</strong>ten associated with traumatic <strong>in</strong>cidents.)5


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR<strong>NHS</strong> AYRSHIRE & ARRAN<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran has sought to build a more open and transparent approach to themanagement <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events and has made progress <strong>in</strong> this regard. It hassought to actively <strong>in</strong>volve families <strong>in</strong> this exercise.However, and notwithstand<strong>in</strong>g the considerable efforts made to build an improvedsystem, the Review Group identified material weaknesses <strong>in</strong> the system <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events review management. Many <strong>of</strong> these related to document control andsystems <strong>of</strong> governance. However, the Review Group felt that the more substantialshortfalls related to staff <strong>in</strong>volvement, action plann<strong>in</strong>g and the dissem<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> widerlearn<strong>in</strong>g. In summary, the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures was notreliably or consistently applied <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran.<strong>The</strong> follow<strong>in</strong>g recommendations are made.Recommendation 1:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should work, build<strong>in</strong>g on AthenA, to establish a s<strong>in</strong>gle robustdatabase <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events that allows easier track<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> progress and averifiable audit trail.Recommendation 2:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure that whatever system is used, there is clarity <strong>of</strong>record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> complete and consistent <strong>in</strong>formation with appropriate connectivity andaudit trails between systems.Recommendation 3:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure that there is an appropriate level <strong>of</strong> scrut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> the Datix system to give assurance to the Board as to the robustness <strong>of</strong>the identification, management and learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events.Recommendation 4:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should establish a robust and transparent process for theescalation <strong>of</strong> adverse events, and ensure decisions there<strong>in</strong> are well documented.Recommendation 5:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should undertake a retrospective analysis <strong>of</strong> the deaths that didnot proceed to significant adverse event review, to provide assurance that appropriate<strong>in</strong>vestigation and learn<strong>in</strong>g was undertaken.Recommendation 6:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should move to a consistent model for significant adverse eventreviews, ensur<strong>in</strong>g the effective <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> a multidiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary team.6


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Recommendation 7:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should review the timel<strong>in</strong>e performance targets, ensur<strong>in</strong>g thatthey are ambitious, but achievable. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure a transparentapproach to report<strong>in</strong>g on progress aga<strong>in</strong>st such targets with early <strong>in</strong>tervention, toimprove performance, as appropriate.Recommendation 8:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should build on its approach to <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g families <strong>in</strong> thecommitment to ensure greater openness.Recommendation 9:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should establish a robust system for track<strong>in</strong>g and respond<strong>in</strong>g tothe issues raised by families. This system should be <strong>in</strong>tegral to the overall system for themanagement <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events.Recommendation 10:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should review its approach to the <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events, with the aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g consistentopportunities for learn<strong>in</strong>g and improvement.Recommendation 11:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should build on its approach to the support <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>significant adverse events.Recommendation 12:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should make urgent progress <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g the status <strong>of</strong> allsignificant adverse event review action plans s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran shouldalso consider the scope to extend their review to cases pre-dat<strong>in</strong>g 2009, with<strong>in</strong> thebounds <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation that is available.Recommendation 13:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure an ongo<strong>in</strong>g approach to thematic learn<strong>in</strong>g, giv<strong>in</strong>gopportunities for those work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran to learn from significantadverse events and to change and adapt cl<strong>in</strong>ical practice accord<strong>in</strong>gly.Recommendation 14:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should review its cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance structure with the focus ondeliver<strong>in</strong>g a more streaml<strong>in</strong>ed and simpler arrangement, giv<strong>in</strong>g sharper clarityregard<strong>in</strong>g accountability.Recommendation 15:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure a focus on empower<strong>in</strong>g cl<strong>in</strong>ical services todevelop, own and progress action plans and to share wider learn<strong>in</strong>g and to reflect this <strong>in</strong>a revised flowchart.Recommendation 16:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure that Healthcare Directors have explicit objectivesrelated to the effective organisation and learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events, andsuch objectives are cascaded, appropriately, through their Directorates.7


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Recommendation 17:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should undertake a fundamental review <strong>of</strong> its approach toshar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation aris<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events. It should ensure that theapproach rema<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> the legislative requirements, but maximises the opportunitiesfor staff to understand the broader context and background regard<strong>in</strong>g specific <strong>in</strong>cidents.8


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEARNING IN<strong>NHS</strong>SCOTLANDWhen review<strong>in</strong>g significant adverse event management, <strong>NHS</strong> boards <strong>in</strong> Scotland shouldaim to have <strong>in</strong> place a clear governance framework for report<strong>in</strong>g and learn<strong>in</strong>g from themost serious <strong>in</strong>cidents. This framework will support preventative measures and willreduce the risk <strong>of</strong> serious harm to patients.<strong>The</strong> importance <strong>of</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g and shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation relat<strong>in</strong>g to any aspects <strong>of</strong> the<strong>NHS</strong> board’s bus<strong>in</strong>ess, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g significant adverse events, is critical to enable theorganisation to facilitate any wider local change and improvement. <strong>The</strong>re is widespreadacceptance that an effective governance framework will enable a culture for cont<strong>in</strong>uousimprovement and, <strong>in</strong> turn, support transparency and accountability. <strong>The</strong> bullet po<strong>in</strong>tsbelow are regarded as headl<strong>in</strong>e pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> an effective governance framework.• Focus on purpose and outcomes.• Clear functions and roles for organisations and Board members.• Values <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tegrity, trust, openness, equality and diversity.• Informed, transparent decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g and manag<strong>in</strong>g risk.• Develop<strong>in</strong>g the capacity and capability <strong>of</strong> organisations.• Engag<strong>in</strong>g stakeholders and mak<strong>in</strong>g accountability real.Whilst the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs and recommendations <strong>of</strong> this review are specific to the systems andprocesses <strong>in</strong>vestigated <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, the wider <strong>NHS</strong> <strong>in</strong> Scotland should takethis opportunity to review and consider these f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs and assess their own significantadverse event management processes and procedures with<strong>in</strong> their wider governancestructures.<strong>The</strong> recent publications from the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) NationalFramework for Learn<strong>in</strong>g from Serious Incidents Requir<strong>in</strong>g Investigation (2010) and theInstitute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) Respectful <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> Serious Cl<strong>in</strong>ical<strong>Adverse</strong> Event (2011) provide a good reference po<strong>in</strong>t for <strong>NHS</strong> boards to undertake anylocal review <strong>of</strong> their own arrangements. In addition, to support and facilitate this,Healthcare Improvement Scotland has identified a number <strong>of</strong> further recommendationsfor <strong>NHS</strong> boards and the wider <strong>NHS</strong>Scotland. <strong>The</strong>se are listed below.Recommendations for <strong>NHS</strong> boardsRecommendation 18:<strong>NHS</strong> boards should ensure that they are tak<strong>in</strong>g an active and planned approach toengag<strong>in</strong>g with key stakeholders particularly the patients, family and carers affected by asignificant adverse event.9


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Recommendation 19:<strong>NHS</strong> boards should ensure that their staff are tra<strong>in</strong>ed and have suitable knowledge andunderstand<strong>in</strong>g to be <strong>in</strong>volved and contribute to the full management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the implementation <strong>of</strong> actions relat<strong>in</strong>g to learn<strong>in</strong>g, change andimprovement.Recommendation 20:<strong>NHS</strong> boards should ensure that all members <strong>of</strong> staff have a clear understand<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> theirroles and responsibilities regard<strong>in</strong>g significant adverse events and that clear l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong>accountability are def<strong>in</strong>ed and reflective <strong>of</strong> the organisation’s governance structure.Recommendation 21:<strong>NHS</strong> boards should ensure that their document control and related <strong>in</strong>formation systemsare suitably <strong>in</strong>tegrated and robust to provide a complete audit trail <strong>of</strong> significantadverse event management from the <strong>in</strong>cident occurr<strong>in</strong>g to evidenc<strong>in</strong>g change andimprovement. <strong>The</strong>se systems should also allow <strong>NHS</strong> boards to undertake ongo<strong>in</strong>gthematic learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events.Recommendation 22:<strong>NHS</strong> boards should ensure that the decisions related to the management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events are risk based, <strong>in</strong>formed and transparent to allow an appropriate level<strong>of</strong> scrut<strong>in</strong>y and assurance.Recommendation 23:<strong>NHS</strong> boards should ensure that the management <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events iscompleted <strong>in</strong> a timely manner and that the thematic learn<strong>in</strong>g is appropriatelydissem<strong>in</strong>ated and acted upon throughout the organisation.Recommendations for <strong>NHS</strong>ScotlandRecommendation 24:<strong>NHS</strong>Scotland should develop a consistent and agreed approach to the identification,<strong>in</strong>vestigation, report<strong>in</strong>g and learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events.Recommendation 25:Through appropriate measurement <strong>NHS</strong>Scotland should maximise the opportunities for<strong>NHS</strong> boards to share and learn from significant adverse event review.<strong>The</strong> focus <strong>of</strong> any significant adverse event review should be on learn<strong>in</strong>g andimprovement <strong>in</strong> order to m<strong>in</strong>imise the risk <strong>of</strong> events recurr<strong>in</strong>g. Whilst it is importantthat with<strong>in</strong> local <strong>NHS</strong> boards thematic learn<strong>in</strong>g is dissem<strong>in</strong>ated and acted upon, theremay be opportunities for wider national learn<strong>in</strong>g and assurance facilitated byappropriate measurement. <strong>The</strong> implementation <strong>of</strong> these recommendations seeks toimprove the management <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events <strong>in</strong> the <strong>NHS</strong> <strong>in</strong> Scotland whichwill, <strong>in</strong> turn, reduce the risk <strong>of</strong> serious harm to patients.10


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 20121 INTRODUCTION1.1 Background1 A significant adverse event can be described as an unexpected or avoidable eventthat could have resulted, or did result <strong>in</strong>, unnecessary serious harm or death <strong>of</strong> apatient, staff, visitors or members <strong>of</strong> the public. <strong>The</strong> review and management <strong>of</strong> theseevents should enable <strong>NHS</strong> boards to learn from these events <strong>in</strong> order to m<strong>in</strong>imise therisk <strong>of</strong> them happen<strong>in</strong>g aga<strong>in</strong>. This report reviews the management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran and identifies areas <strong>of</strong> good practice and issuesthat need to be addressed.2 Other <strong>NHS</strong> boards will also wish to consider the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs and recommendations<strong>in</strong> respect <strong>of</strong> the management <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events, as they relate to the systemsand processes with<strong>in</strong> their own <strong>NHS</strong> boards.3 On 21 February 2012, the Scottish Information Commissioner published aDecision Notice (036/2012) that was highly critical <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s responseto a Freedom <strong>of</strong> Information (Scotland) Act appeal. This decision focused on a requestwhich Mr Wilson, an employee <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, made on 10 February 2011 forcopies <strong>of</strong> Critical Incident Review Reports and <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event ReviewReports completed s<strong>in</strong>ce January 2005, together with the action plans aris<strong>in</strong>g from thereports.4 <strong>The</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>et Secretary for Health, Wellbe<strong>in</strong>g and Cities Strategy <strong>in</strong>structedHealthcare Improvement Scotland to carry out, as a matter <strong>of</strong> urgency, a review <strong>of</strong> theapproach taken by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran <strong>in</strong> manag<strong>in</strong>g significant adverse events.Healthcare Improvement Scotland identified and brought together a Review Groupmade up <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals with relevant specialist knowledge from acrossScotland. <strong>The</strong> Terms <strong>of</strong> Reference for the review are set out <strong>in</strong> Appendix 1, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g themembership <strong>of</strong> the Review Group. A full description <strong>of</strong> the events lead<strong>in</strong>g to the revieware set out <strong>in</strong> Appendix 2.1.2 Methodology for the Review5 <strong>The</strong> Review Group has considered the current significant adverse eventmanagement system <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran <strong>in</strong> considerable depth. It has drawn on avariety <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation sources <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g documentation related to the process and anumber <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>terviews with staff work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran.6 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran has publicly acknowledged significant issues related totheir significant adverse event management system prior to 2009. <strong>The</strong> Review Grouptherefore decided to focus its efforts on significant adverse events s<strong>in</strong>ce January 2009 toMarch 2012. This time period covered 57 significant adverse event reviews.7 Healthcare Improvement Scotland took <strong>in</strong>to consideration 2,500 separate pieces<strong>of</strong> documentary <strong>in</strong>formation and the Review Group <strong>in</strong>terviewed or met with over 60<strong>in</strong>dividuals who had worked <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran over the time period <strong>of</strong> thereview.11


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 20128 <strong>The</strong> documentary evidence provided by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran came from avariety <strong>of</strong> sources and <strong>in</strong>cluded policy and procedural documents relat<strong>in</strong>g to thesignificant adverse event process, <strong>in</strong>cident/event reports from the Datix riskmanagement system, sampled <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports and relatedaction plans, process monitor<strong>in</strong>g documents, governance group agendas and m<strong>in</strong>utes.<strong>The</strong> documentary evidence <strong>in</strong>cluded a recent <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran Internal AuditReport from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) published <strong>in</strong> November 2011. Collationand analysis <strong>of</strong> the material was undertaken by the staff <strong>of</strong> Healthcare ImprovementScotland.9 A visit to <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran was conducted on 29 and 30 March 2012 and aseries <strong>of</strong> follow-up <strong>in</strong>terviews were held by teleconference <strong>in</strong> April and May 2012. <strong>The</strong><strong>in</strong>terviews that were conducted <strong>in</strong>cluded a wide range <strong>of</strong> staff and frontl<strong>in</strong>e operationalstaff, support staff, directors and the Chief Executive. In addition, there were <strong>in</strong>terviewswith the former chair <strong>of</strong> the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee and Mr Wilson.10 Alongside the overall review <strong>of</strong> the system for the management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events, the Review Group exam<strong>in</strong>ed, <strong>in</strong> depth, seven significant adverse events,cover<strong>in</strong>g a mix <strong>of</strong> specialties. <strong>The</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> the sampled cases, the policy and relatedprocedures and also a review <strong>of</strong> other key reference documents, allowed the ReviewGroup to shape a number <strong>of</strong> additional requests for <strong>in</strong>formation and also thedevelopment <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong> questions and prompts for the visit to <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arranon 29 and 30 March 2012. This allowed additional focused question<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the process tothe staff either <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> a particular <strong>in</strong>cident or its review.11 <strong>The</strong> Review Group received considerable support and assistance throughout thereview from the staff <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, and is grateful for their time andcommitment. <strong>The</strong> Review Group is particularly appreciative <strong>of</strong> the openness shown bythose they met and <strong>in</strong>terviewed.12


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 20122 <strong>NHS</strong> AYRSHIRE & ARRAN’S DESCRIPTION OFARRANGEMENTS12 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran has demonstrated an ambition to develop an approachthat reflects the key pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> a safer system <strong>of</strong> care. Over the past several years, ithas been apparent that there has been considerable effort <strong>in</strong> creat<strong>in</strong>g a new<strong>in</strong>frastructure and policies to support the identification, <strong>in</strong>vestigation, management andlearn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran. A strong feature <strong>of</strong> itsapproach is the <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> patients and families <strong>in</strong> the open shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formationaris<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events.13 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran employs 10,000 staff and has a revenue budget <strong>of</strong> around£590m for 2012/13. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s organisational structure is set out <strong>in</strong>Figure 1. <strong>The</strong> Healthcare Directorates are described <strong>in</strong> this diagram. <strong>The</strong>y are led by aDirector accountable to the Chief Executive and are supported by an Associate MedicalDirector and an Associate Nurse Director.Figure 1: Organisational structure14 <strong>The</strong> Chief Executive <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran presented to the Review Group on29 March 2012 the history <strong>of</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy andSupport<strong>in</strong>g Procedures. Figure 2 shows the timel<strong>in</strong>e for the development <strong>of</strong> policychanges. <strong>The</strong> current policy (Version 4) was the subject <strong>of</strong> extensive consultation overthe course <strong>of</strong> 2010.13


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Figure 2: Timel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> development <strong>of</strong> serious adverse event policy15 Figure 3 describes the progress made and key challenges identified by the ChiefExecutive.Figure 3: Progress and challenges identified by Chief Executive<strong>The</strong> journey and it’s challengesFocus <strong>of</strong> Experience• Inclusive agenda• Consistency and rigour <strong>of</strong>report<strong>in</strong>g• Develop family <strong>in</strong>volvement• Demonstrate sharedlearn<strong>in</strong>gChallenges• Evolve staff m<strong>in</strong>dset• Develop new ways <strong>of</strong>work<strong>in</strong>g - widerengagement• Deliver new level <strong>of</strong>openness, transparencyand disclosure• Clear communication withboth family and staff• Robust scrut<strong>in</strong>y andgovernance processes• Maximise organisationallearn<strong>in</strong>g14


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201216 In the glossary to its current <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures,<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran expla<strong>in</strong>s that a significant adverse event:“may also be referred to locally as a ‘critical’ event, ‘significant <strong>in</strong>cident’ or ‘significantadverse <strong>in</strong>cident’ and is an event which has been graded on the ‘consequence’ scale asbe<strong>in</strong>g ‘major’ or ‘extreme’”.17 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s response to significant adverse events sits with<strong>in</strong> thebroader context <strong>of</strong> the duties <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> boards <strong>in</strong> relation to cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance. <strong>The</strong>Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee’s Annual Report for 2010/11 describes cl<strong>in</strong>icalgovernance as the:“statutory obligation and is a framework through which <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran isaccountable for cont<strong>in</strong>uously improv<strong>in</strong>g the quality <strong>of</strong> its services and safeguard<strong>in</strong>g highstandards <strong>of</strong> care by creat<strong>in</strong>g an environment <strong>in</strong> which excellence <strong>in</strong> cl<strong>in</strong>ical care willflourish.“18 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures states (<strong>in</strong> paragraph 7.2)that:“assurance will be provided to the <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committeeby regular report<strong>in</strong>g on f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs and recommendations and subsequently the Board viathe m<strong>in</strong>utes <strong>of</strong> the Local Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Groups and Health, Safety and Wellbe<strong>in</strong>gCommittee”.19 <strong>The</strong> Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee is chaired by a non-executive director and<strong>in</strong>cludes other non-executives as members, and other executives (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g theExecutive Medical Director and Executive Nurse Director) as ex-<strong>of</strong>ficio members. <strong>The</strong>Committee met seven times throughout 2010/11 and six times <strong>in</strong> 2011/12.20 <strong>The</strong> Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee receives full reports <strong>of</strong> significant adverseevent reviews and support<strong>in</strong>g action plans.21 In addition to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee, there are HealthcareDirectorate Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Groups and operational cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance groups.22 <strong>The</strong> Healthcare Quality, Governance and Standards Unit sits at the hub <strong>of</strong> thesignificant adverse event process. Section 9.3.3 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy andSupport<strong>in</strong>g Procedures refers to responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the Healthcare Quality, Governanceand Standards Unit. Responsibilities <strong>in</strong>clude to:“co-ord<strong>in</strong>ate, manage and adm<strong>in</strong>istratively support a significant adverse event review;ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> all records relat<strong>in</strong>g to significant adverse events; obta<strong>in</strong> updates <strong>in</strong> relation tothe action plan and report progress to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee; tracktimescales, implement, monitor and report upon key performance <strong>in</strong>dicators”.15


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 20123 REVIEW FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS3.1 Identification, Notification and Initial Event Report<strong>in</strong>gEstablish<strong>in</strong>g a basel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation23 <strong>The</strong> Review Group agreed at the outset <strong>of</strong> the review that it was essential toobta<strong>in</strong> a clear and def<strong>in</strong>itive history <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events from 1 January 2009through to the present day. Establish<strong>in</strong>g the basel<strong>in</strong>e was a crucial early step for theReview Group.24 At the start <strong>of</strong> the review <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran identified for the Review Group arange <strong>of</strong> significant adverse event reviews from January 2010.25 <strong>The</strong> Review Group also received summary <strong>in</strong>formation on all the significantadverse events documented on the <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Database between2009 and 2012 on 19 March 2012. Further <strong>in</strong>vestigation established that the summary<strong>in</strong>formation related to 2009 and 2010 ‘completed’ cases and did not <strong>in</strong>clude ‘live’<strong>in</strong>cidents: the ‘live’ list was received by email the follow<strong>in</strong>g day. <strong>The</strong>re were a total <strong>of</strong> 57significant adverse event reviews recorded between 2009 and 2012 (‘completed’ and‘live’). <strong>The</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation consisted <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>itial summary with a brief description <strong>of</strong> thecases, but did not <strong>in</strong>clude timel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>formation (for example, date <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident and datereported).26 Whilst the Review Group received full co-operation from the staff <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong>Ayrshire & Arran, it did encounter substantial difficulties <strong>in</strong> arriv<strong>in</strong>g at a consistent set<strong>of</strong> significant adverse event reviews between 2009 and 2012 due to conflict<strong>in</strong>g reportsand pieces <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation. For <strong>in</strong>stance, seven significant adverse event reviewsidentified <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong>al set <strong>of</strong> ‘completed’ and ‘live’ cases failed to be <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong>subsequent material and clarification was sought on their status. From an emailreceived on 3 April 2012, key pieces <strong>of</strong> timel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>formation for some <strong>of</strong> the 2009significant adverse event reviews was “not available”.27 Given the substantial amount <strong>of</strong> conflict<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>complete <strong>in</strong>formationthroughout the review, the Review Group spent a very large amount <strong>of</strong> time seek<strong>in</strong>gclarification on the <strong>in</strong>formation and highlight<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>consistencies and gaps <strong>in</strong> thedocumentation.Information provided <strong>in</strong> response to Mr Wilson’s FOI28 <strong>The</strong> Review Group received the redacted action plans, provided to Mr Wilson,which were placed on the <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran website. <strong>The</strong>re were 54 redacted actionplans provided <strong>in</strong> response to his FOI request.29 <strong>The</strong> Review Group sought clarity as to why a further four cases had not beenprovided to Mr Wilson, as they appeared to fall with<strong>in</strong> the timeframe <strong>of</strong> the FOI request.<strong>The</strong> Review Group was <strong>in</strong>formed by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran that the cases – whilst loggedon the <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Database – were not actually critical <strong>in</strong>cidentreviews or significant adverse event reviews, and did not fall with<strong>in</strong> the terms <strong>of</strong>Mr Wilson’s FOI request. This example was a good illustration <strong>of</strong> the substantial16


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012difficulties <strong>in</strong> reach<strong>in</strong>g a def<strong>in</strong>itive position regard<strong>in</strong>g the status <strong>of</strong> significant adverseevent reviews. A full list <strong>of</strong> the recorded database cases is provided <strong>in</strong> Appendix 3 <strong>of</strong> thisreport.Information from exist<strong>in</strong>g systems30 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran established a <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Database<strong>in</strong> July 2011 to track and manage cases and support<strong>in</strong>g action plans. <strong>The</strong> database isstand alone and separate from the Datix system and the AthenA document managementsite. Each case is given a ‘DB’ reference number (for example, DB10) as well as anidentifier aris<strong>in</strong>g from the Datix system. <strong>The</strong> cases date back to 2006, with aretrospective load<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> case <strong>in</strong>formation on to the database. As at 19 April 2012, therewere 97 cases logged <strong>in</strong>to the database, but several had been mistakenly escalated <strong>in</strong>tothe database (for example, compla<strong>in</strong>ts) and subsequently “removed”. Also, thenumber<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> cases <strong>in</strong> the database did not reflect the chronological order <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>cidents. <strong>The</strong> cases commenced at DB01 and ended at DB97 (as at 12 April 2012).Fifty-seven cases arose from 2009 onwards and a further 32 pre-dated 2009, with therema<strong>in</strong>der (eight) be<strong>in</strong>g removed as mistakenly placed on the database.31 A shared computer drive holds folders conta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation relat<strong>in</strong>g to thesignificant adverse event reviews and is separate from the database.32 <strong>The</strong> Review Group had a demonstration <strong>of</strong> the database on 30 March 2012. <strong>The</strong>Review Group selected a case from its sample set. It was noted that database fields,describ<strong>in</strong>g progress aga<strong>in</strong>st the review recommendations were largely <strong>in</strong>complete.<strong>The</strong>re was no support<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g staff or patient <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> thesignificant adverse event conta<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong> the database, but <strong>in</strong>formation was available <strong>in</strong> theseparate drive’s folders. <strong>The</strong> progress report section <strong>of</strong> the database was blank.33 <strong>The</strong> Review Group received a demonstration <strong>of</strong> the AthenA documentmanagement system. <strong>The</strong> Review Group was impressed by the breadth and depth, andthe potential <strong>of</strong> the system. <strong>The</strong> system had the potential to be a collaborative tool andallowed for more effective support for the process. However, at present there are only23 cases on the system.34 Based on the substantial difficulties <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g the basel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong>significant adverse event reviews, the Review Group considered there weresignificant weaknesses <strong>in</strong> logg<strong>in</strong>g and monitor<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events <strong>in</strong><strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran. <strong>The</strong> Review Group felt that work on the AthenA documentmanagement system should be accelerated and a swift move made away from thecurrent separate repositories <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation which cause confusion.Recommendation 1:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should work, build<strong>in</strong>g on AthenA, to establish a s<strong>in</strong>gle robustdatabase <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events that allows easier track<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> progress and averifiable audit trail.17


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201235 <strong>The</strong> Review Group also noted that the quality <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation and record<strong>in</strong>gwith<strong>in</strong> the Datix system was variable. Many <strong>of</strong> the system’s entries lacked detail andfailed to give a clear picture <strong>of</strong> the subsequent management <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident. <strong>The</strong>re was<strong>of</strong>ten no evidence to allow a clear audit trail, from <strong>in</strong>cident through to<strong>in</strong>vestigation and beyond, and a lack <strong>of</strong> connectivity between systems.Recommendation 2:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure that whatever system is used, that there is clarity<strong>of</strong> record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> complete and consistent <strong>in</strong>formation with appropriate connectivity andaudit trails between systems.36 <strong>The</strong> previous Chair <strong>of</strong> the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee confirmed that therewas not an audit <strong>of</strong> Datix files <strong>of</strong> the ‘major’ and ‘extreme’ cases to “test” the robustness<strong>of</strong> the system <strong>of</strong> management and report<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>The</strong> Review Group concluded that thereshould be a higher level <strong>of</strong> scrut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation with<strong>in</strong> the Datix system toensure that there is an effective system <strong>of</strong> quality assurance <strong>of</strong> the management <strong>of</strong>significant adverse events.Recommendation 3:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure that there is an appropriate level <strong>of</strong> scrut<strong>in</strong>y <strong>of</strong> the<strong>in</strong>formation <strong>in</strong> the Datix system to give assurance to the Board as to the robustness <strong>of</strong>the identification, management and learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events.3.2 Escalation <strong>of</strong> <strong>Events</strong>Mak<strong>in</strong>g the decision to escalate37 <strong>The</strong> Review Group was given a recent example <strong>of</strong> a local <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>in</strong>to asignificant adverse event. <strong>The</strong> Review Group was advised that it had been decided, at anexecutive level, not to escalate this case to a full significant adverse event review.Section 9.3.2 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures states that:“consideration <strong>of</strong> an event for significant adverse event review should not prevent the<strong>in</strong>itiation <strong>of</strong> local <strong>in</strong>vestigation and is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the l<strong>in</strong>e manager with<strong>in</strong> thearea. Local <strong>in</strong>vestigation will then <strong>in</strong>form any subsequent process, the ma<strong>in</strong> benefits arethe early corrective action, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g statement collection when events rema<strong>in</strong> clear forthe staff <strong>in</strong>volved. Local <strong>in</strong>vestigation report, with any relevant associated documentation,must be shared with appo<strong>in</strong>ted the [sic] <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review team lead <strong>in</strong>vestigator”.38 <strong>The</strong> Review Group sought clarification on this case to understand how this eventhad been managed through the extant policy. <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that the case hadnot been advanced beyond a local <strong>in</strong>vestigation or reported to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical GovernanceCommittee. <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that learn<strong>in</strong>g appeared to have been largelylimited to the specialty <strong>in</strong>volved. <strong>The</strong> Review Group could f<strong>in</strong>d no conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g evidenceas to why the decision had been reached to restrict the management <strong>of</strong> the case to thelocal level. Moreover, given the serious nature <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident the Review Group wouldhave reasonably expected report<strong>in</strong>g to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee and widerlearn<strong>in</strong>g to have been dissem<strong>in</strong>ated throughout <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran.18


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201239 <strong>The</strong> policy states <strong>in</strong> section 9.3.1 that a:“decision may be made NOT to proceed <strong>in</strong> the commission<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> a <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong>Event Review Team follow<strong>in</strong>g a ‘Major or Extreme’ Event. <strong>The</strong> decision can only be takenat Executive Medical or Executive Nurse Director level. <strong>The</strong> rationale for not proceed<strong>in</strong>gmust be clearly established and recorded”.40 <strong>The</strong> Review Group established that there was not a well-def<strong>in</strong>ed approach to theescalation <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events. Some staff – as expressed <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>utes <strong>of</strong> theHealthcare Directorate Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group meet<strong>in</strong>gs – <strong>in</strong>dicated their concernregard<strong>in</strong>g the early escalation to more senior management. <strong>The</strong>re was also not a welldef<strong>in</strong>edand transparently documented process for record<strong>in</strong>g decisions to escalate, ornot, to the level <strong>of</strong> significant adverse event review.41 Overall, there was a lack <strong>of</strong> documented evidence regard<strong>in</strong>g the decision toproceed to significant adverse event review. <strong>The</strong> Review Group concluded that therewas not a robust audit trail evidenc<strong>in</strong>g decisions not to proceed to significantadverse event reviews.Recommendation 4:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should establish a robust and transparent process for theescalation <strong>of</strong> adverse events, and ensure decisions there<strong>in</strong> are well documented.Information from the risk management system42 <strong>The</strong> Review Group also sought and received all ‘major’ and ‘extreme’ adverseevents logged on the Datix system between January 2009 and 2012. <strong>The</strong>re was a total <strong>of</strong>1,417 events. Thirty-one <strong>of</strong> those events could be traced back to the 57 significantadverse events under review by the Review Group. Two <strong>of</strong> the seven <strong>in</strong> the sample wereregistered as ‘major’ or ‘extreme’ <strong>in</strong> the Datix system. <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that 132<strong>of</strong> the events <strong>in</strong> the Datix system were described as result<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a death and was able torelate 13 <strong>of</strong> those deaths to the 57 significant adverse event reviews. <strong>The</strong> Review Groupnoted the apparently low proportion <strong>of</strong> ‘major’ and ‘extreme’ events that went on tosignificant adverse event review.43 <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that an attempt had been made <strong>in</strong> early 2011 toestablish an escalation process for <strong>in</strong>cidents logged <strong>in</strong> the Datix system, but thisproposal had not been advanced.44 <strong>The</strong> Review Group exam<strong>in</strong>ed the available details on the 132 deaths, mentionedpreviously. It was noted that the deaths logged on the Datix system covered a range <strong>of</strong>specialties. <strong>The</strong> Review Group did not make a judgement <strong>of</strong> the handl<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation<strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> the deaths, but noted that there was an opportunity to ensure a moreconsistent and systematic approach to the escalation and management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events.45 <strong>The</strong> Review Group concluded that there was limited evidence <strong>of</strong> asystematic and consistent approach to the <strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> the deaths that wererecorded with<strong>in</strong> the Datix system, and which did not proceed to significantadverse event review between 2009 and 2012.19


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Recommendation 5:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should undertake a retrospective analysis <strong>of</strong> the deaths that didnot proceed to significant adverse event review, to provide assurance that appropriate<strong>in</strong>vestigation and learn<strong>in</strong>g was undertaken.3.3 Types <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event ReviewsDesktop versus a full significant adverse event review46 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran conducts two types <strong>of</strong> significant adverse event reviews:- a desktop review, and- a full significant adverse event review consist<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>vestigation reviewteam.47 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures states <strong>in</strong> section 9.3.2 that:“the Director will determ<strong>in</strong>e the appropriate level <strong>of</strong> review and will advise accord<strong>in</strong>glyi.e. desktop review or full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review or no further action. A desktopreview relates to a tra<strong>in</strong>ed reviewer conduct<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>itial review <strong>of</strong> a significant adverseevent. <strong>The</strong> desktop review will identify whether or not there is a need to recommend fullsignificant adverse event review and will <strong>in</strong>clude recommendations from specialists whenavailable e.g. Occupational Health and Safety etc. Even when issues are identified, theremay not be a need to move to full review e.g. recommendations already conta<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> asignificant adverse event review report, issues that can be dealt with on a local basis. <strong>The</strong>Executive Director who requested the desktop review will consider the report anddeterm<strong>in</strong>e future action.”48 Of the 57 cases s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009, 14 were desktop reviews (25%) and the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g43 (75%) were full significant adverse event reviews.49 <strong>The</strong> Review Group heard examples <strong>of</strong> both types <strong>of</strong> reviews. <strong>The</strong> desktop reviewwas a more limited case note review carried out by an <strong>in</strong>dividual member <strong>of</strong> staff, withappropriate specialist <strong>in</strong>put. <strong>The</strong> desktop review did not appear to extend to the full andmore detailed exam<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> the evidence (for example, conduct<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>terviews) as <strong>in</strong>the full <strong>in</strong>vestigation approach. It was described by one member <strong>of</strong> staff as a prelim<strong>in</strong>aryexam<strong>in</strong>ation, which may or may not lead to the full significant adverse event review.50 <strong>The</strong> full significant adverse event review team was led and populated by<strong>in</strong>dividuals external to the service <strong>in</strong> which the <strong>in</strong>cident happened. <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> EventPolicy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures <strong>in</strong> section 9.3.3 provides a detailed description <strong>of</strong> theprocess <strong>of</strong> undertak<strong>in</strong>g a full significant adverse event review. This <strong>in</strong>cludes thecomposition and attributes <strong>of</strong> the review team, the roles and responsibilities to supportthe review team and the responsibilities <strong>of</strong> the review team members. With<strong>in</strong> thissection, the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures states:“At the very outset <strong>of</strong> the first meet<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>vestigation team, the LeadInvestigator/Chairperson should make it explicit that the purpose <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>vestigation isNOT to apportion blame, but to determ<strong>in</strong>e the facts, to learn and to make appropriaterecommendations that will target the root causes identified.”20


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201251 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures sets out with<strong>in</strong> Flowcharts 1and 2 the procedure for cl<strong>in</strong>ical and non-cl<strong>in</strong>ical adverse events. For cl<strong>in</strong>ical reviews, theExecutive Medical or Executive Nurs<strong>in</strong>g Director or on-call Director has the identifiedresponsibility to determ<strong>in</strong>e the need for a significant adverse event review. <strong>The</strong> ReviewGroup noted, through its review <strong>of</strong> the example cases, that there did not appear to beclear explanation as to which event would merit a ‘desktop’ or ‘full review’ and that therationale for this decision was not always recorded with<strong>in</strong> the paperwork the ReviewGroup received. In addition, there are clear and detailed procedures and <strong>in</strong>structionswith<strong>in</strong> section 9.3.3 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures which<strong>in</strong>cludes def<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the attributes <strong>of</strong> the review team members, the responsibilities <strong>of</strong> theHealthcare Quality Governance and Standards Unit and the review team’sresponsibilities. However, there is not a similar detailed methodology attributed to thedesktop review process – which the Review Group witnessed were normallyundertaken by the same <strong>in</strong>dividual. This risked a level <strong>of</strong> subjectivity <strong>in</strong> such reviews.52 <strong>The</strong> Review Group therefore noted the lack <strong>of</strong> clarity as to the criteria used todecide whether to proceed with a desktop review or commence a full significantadverse event review. It was also a po<strong>in</strong>t raised by those the Review Group <strong>in</strong>terviewedthat there did not appear to be a transparent and explicit set <strong>of</strong> criteria govern<strong>in</strong>g suchdecisions. <strong>The</strong>re were emails seek<strong>in</strong>g reviews to be conducted but there was noevidence to support the rationale for one route over the other. This was a po<strong>in</strong>t alsoacknowledged <strong>in</strong> the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report.53 <strong>The</strong> Review Group considered that there was a need to adopt a morestandardised and consistent approach to decid<strong>in</strong>g whether an event would merit a fullsignificant adverse event review. Initial local <strong>in</strong>vestigation and action should cont<strong>in</strong>ue tobe supported to ensure the immediate safety <strong>of</strong> patients.54 <strong>The</strong> Review Group questioned the lack <strong>of</strong> documentary evidenceunderp<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g decisions to proceed down one route over the other, andhighlighted the risks associated with the s<strong>in</strong>gle person desktop review, especiallyregard<strong>in</strong>g the absence <strong>of</strong> the full engagement with a wider team.Recommendation 6:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should move to a consistent model for significant adverse eventreviews, ensur<strong>in</strong>g the effective <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> a multidiscipl<strong>in</strong>ary team.21


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 20123.4 Investigation and Report<strong>in</strong>g Timel<strong>in</strong>es55 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures states that any:“members <strong>of</strong> staff who have knowledge <strong>of</strong> or has been directly <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> an adverseevent, must complete a report utilis<strong>in</strong>g the current risk management system, with<strong>in</strong> 24hours” (see paragraph 4.10).56 In a few <strong>in</strong>stances, substantial delays between the date <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident and report<strong>in</strong>greflected the fact that the actual <strong>in</strong>cident had taken place a significant period before thedate that the actual <strong>in</strong>cident became known to <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran (for example, a‘missed diagnosis’ which goes unnoticed and only comes to light many months later).However, <strong>in</strong> other <strong>in</strong>stances there are delays which are not accounted for by this reason.Tables 1–6 provide an analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigation report<strong>in</strong>g timel<strong>in</strong>es.Table 1: Seven sample cases - performance aga<strong>in</strong>st 24-hour target (length <strong>of</strong> time,<strong>in</strong> days, between the <strong>in</strong>cident occurr<strong>in</strong>g and the <strong>in</strong>cident be<strong>in</strong>g reported on Datix)Case numberIncident occurr<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>in</strong>cident be<strong>in</strong>greported on Datix (days)1 (v) 52* Same/next day3* 34 (v) 25* 96* Same/next day7* 522 (misdiagnosis case)(v) = verified dates aga<strong>in</strong>st Datix records*Datix record not provided to verify date and no time <strong>in</strong>formation supplied to calculate 24 hour targetTable 2: 57 significant adverse event review cases - performance aga<strong>in</strong>st 24-hourtarget (length <strong>of</strong> time, <strong>in</strong> days, between the <strong>in</strong>cident occurr<strong>in</strong>g and the <strong>in</strong>cidentbe<strong>in</strong>g reported on Datix)Same/Nextday2 to 4 days 5 to 7 Days 8+ days Miss<strong>in</strong>g Negativedays*17 (29.8%) 12 (21%) 3 (5.3%) 21 (36.8%) 3 (5.3%) 1 (1.8%)*<strong>The</strong> reference to ‘negative days’ relates to the <strong>in</strong>cident be<strong>in</strong>g presumably mis-recorded as happen<strong>in</strong>gafter the date <strong>of</strong> report<strong>in</strong>g.22


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Table 3: All 1,417 Datix recorded <strong>in</strong>cidents - performance aga<strong>in</strong>st 24-hour target(length <strong>of</strong> time, <strong>in</strong> days, between the <strong>in</strong>cident occurr<strong>in</strong>g and the <strong>in</strong>cident be<strong>in</strong>greported on Datix)Same/Nextday2 to 4 days 5 to 7 Days 8+ days Miss<strong>in</strong>g865 (61%) 329 (23%) 51 (3.5%) 150 (11%) 22 (1.5%)57 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures sets out target days for thecompletion <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigations. Table 4 sets out the target days for each type <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>cident.Table 4: Performance targetsTypeDaysInsignificant/M<strong>in</strong>or Initial <strong>in</strong>vestigation to be completed with<strong>in</strong> 10 work<strong>in</strong>g daysModerateInitial <strong>in</strong>vestigation to be completed with<strong>in</strong> 21 work<strong>in</strong>g daysMajorInitial <strong>in</strong>vestigation to be completed with<strong>in</strong> 40 work<strong>in</strong>g daysExtremeFormal <strong>in</strong>vestigation to be completed with<strong>in</strong> 45 work<strong>in</strong>g days58 In Tables 5 and 6, the performance is shown aga<strong>in</strong>st the 45 work<strong>in</strong>g days targetfor the sampled cases and the 57 significant adverse event reviews. <strong>The</strong>se are based onfigures provided by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran.Table 5: Seven sampled cases - performance with<strong>in</strong> 45 work<strong>in</strong>g days target forcompletion <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigationCase numberWith<strong>in</strong> 45 work<strong>in</strong>g days, 20 for desktop1 572 823 514 1185 desktop -146 1057 desktop -7Table 6: 57 significant adverse event review cases - performance with<strong>in</strong> 45work<strong>in</strong>g days target for completion <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>vestigationWith<strong>in</strong> 45work<strong>in</strong>g daystarget46-90 days 91-135days136+days Ongo<strong>in</strong>g Miss<strong>in</strong>gdata7 (12%) 16 (28%) 6 (11%) 11 (19%) 6 (11%) 11 (19%)23


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201259 It was widely accepted, based on the <strong>in</strong>terviews with staff, that theperformance targets were not rout<strong>in</strong>ely monitored or reported upon. <strong>The</strong> ReviewGroup concluded that there was not a rigorous process for performancemanagement and progress chas<strong>in</strong>g to ensure targets were met and to addressoutliers.Recommendation 7:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should review the timel<strong>in</strong>e performance targets, ensur<strong>in</strong>g thatthey are ambitious, but achievable. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure a transparentapproach to report<strong>in</strong>g on progress aga<strong>in</strong>st such targets with early <strong>in</strong>tervention, toimprove performance, as appropriate.3.5 Involvement <strong>of</strong> Families60 <strong>The</strong> Review Group was made aware <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s commitment to<strong>in</strong>volve patients and their families <strong>in</strong> the identification <strong>of</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g from significantadverse event reviews, and efforts had been made to draw families <strong>in</strong>to the process.This was accepted as be<strong>in</strong>g a difficult process.Record<strong>in</strong>g family <strong>in</strong>volvement61 <strong>The</strong> Review Group sought evidence to confirm the number <strong>of</strong> cases that had beenshared with the families s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran supplied a spreadsheet on17 April 2012, with cases that had been monitored. <strong>The</strong>re were 20 cases <strong>in</strong> thespreadsheet perta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g to 2011 and 2012 with records <strong>of</strong> meet<strong>in</strong>gs and telephonecontacts with families. <strong>The</strong> oldest contact was February 2011, and the most recentFebruary 2012. <strong>The</strong> reference numbers <strong>of</strong> the cases did not relate to the <strong>Significant</strong><strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Database DB number<strong>in</strong>g system. <strong>The</strong> reference <strong>in</strong> thespreadsheet would <strong>in</strong>dicate that the record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> family contact commenced aroundFebruary 2011 (for example, the statement ‘one call made prior to record<strong>in</strong>g’ <strong>in</strong> ‘CaseA’). <strong>The</strong>re is no record <strong>of</strong> who made the entries <strong>in</strong>to the spreadsheet, but <strong>in</strong>itials areused throughout relat<strong>in</strong>g to other staff members.62 Many <strong>of</strong> the cases <strong>in</strong> the spreadsheet ended without further formal record<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>the actions to progress outstand<strong>in</strong>g issues. It was subsequently identified that the<strong>in</strong>formation had been transferred to the <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Database.63 <strong>The</strong>re may also be additional <strong>in</strong>formation conta<strong>in</strong>ed, for <strong>in</strong>stance, <strong>in</strong> AthenA butthat would call <strong>in</strong>to question the purpose and robustness <strong>of</strong> the spreadsheet that wassupplied. <strong>The</strong> documentary evidence <strong>in</strong> the spreadsheet, and the failure to reconcile tothe DB number<strong>in</strong>g system, re<strong>in</strong>forced the perception <strong>of</strong> poor record management anddocumentation with<strong>in</strong> the system.64 <strong>The</strong> Review Group also noted that there did not seem to be a consistent way <strong>in</strong>which the significant adverse event review team <strong>in</strong>volved and/or communicated withthe patients/families throughout the process. Whilst there were examples <strong>of</strong>patient/family <strong>in</strong>volvement, this was not consistently applied across the organisation.65 <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that whilst there would be <strong>in</strong>stances where the<strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> wider stakeholders, for example staff or patients/families, may not be24


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012appropriate, the paperwork and responses to questions <strong>of</strong> senior management andoperational staff did not expla<strong>in</strong> why this may be the case.66 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran submitted evidence that identified that 23 <strong>of</strong> the 57 casesunder review (40%) had some level <strong>of</strong> family <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident review. Thiscovered a period from 2010 to 2012.67 Whilst <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran had clear ambitions to raise awareness <strong>of</strong> theneed to <strong>in</strong>volve relatives <strong>in</strong> the significant adverse event review process, theReview Group was unable to obta<strong>in</strong> a complete picture <strong>of</strong> the level <strong>of</strong> family<strong>in</strong>volvement over the 57 cases s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009.Recommendation 8:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should build on its approach to <strong>in</strong>volv<strong>in</strong>g families <strong>in</strong> thecommitment to ensure greater openness.Recommendation 9:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should establish a robust system for track<strong>in</strong>g and respond<strong>in</strong>g tothe issues raised by families. This system should be <strong>in</strong>tegral to the overall system for themanagement <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events.3.6 Staff Involvement68 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran has adopted a model for full significant adverse eventreviews that is led and populated by members <strong>of</strong> staff outside the area <strong>in</strong> which the<strong>in</strong>cident takes place.69 <strong>The</strong> process allows a level <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>volvement and contribution <strong>in</strong> the construction <strong>of</strong>report recommendations and its subsequent action plans. However, aga<strong>in</strong> the ReviewGroup witnessed variation <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>volvement and contribution made by staff to thesedocuments. <strong>The</strong> Review Group heard that it had led, <strong>in</strong> some cases, to a distrust <strong>of</strong> theprocess which then did not support the improvement culture that the <strong>Adverse</strong> EventPolicy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures ultimately sets out to achieve.70 <strong>The</strong> PwC report acknowledged that:“<strong>in</strong> practice, however, from review <strong>of</strong> available documentation for recent reviews and fromdiscussion with staff, this [staff feedback] is not performed consistently and consequently,this could result <strong>in</strong> staff disengagement at the action [sic] implementation stage or lowmorale with<strong>in</strong> the Service be<strong>in</strong>g subject to the SAER”.71 <strong>The</strong> Review Group heard about a number <strong>of</strong> examples <strong>of</strong> robust local<strong>in</strong>vestigation. However, <strong>in</strong> the majority <strong>of</strong> significant adverse event review cases lookedat by the Review Group, the use <strong>of</strong> the local <strong>in</strong>vestigation knowledge and <strong>in</strong>formationwas limited to the <strong>in</strong>itial written statements. This created a level <strong>of</strong> frustration <strong>in</strong> thelocal operational staff, evident through the operational team <strong>in</strong>terviews undertaken on29 and 30 March 2012, who had not been <strong>in</strong>volved or able to contribute to any part <strong>of</strong>the significant adverse event review process.25


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201272 <strong>The</strong> model, adopted <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, <strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dependent scrut<strong>in</strong>y team tolead significant adverse event reviews, excludes staff directly <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cidentsand runs the risk <strong>of</strong> fail<strong>in</strong>g to obta<strong>in</strong> ownership <strong>of</strong> the action plans and improvements.Operational staff also felt, <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stances, that they had important <strong>in</strong>sight andknowledge that could have been shared and used throughout the process, but theprocess did not allow their voice to be heard.73 <strong>The</strong> Review Group concluded that the general approach to the management<strong>of</strong> significant adverse event reviews did not encourage an appropriate level <strong>of</strong>engagement with staff, particularly those directly <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cidents, with aresultant impact on the ownership <strong>of</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs, implementation <strong>of</strong> action plansand ultimately learn<strong>in</strong>g.Recommendation 10:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should review its approach to the <strong>in</strong>volvement <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>in</strong> the<strong>in</strong>vestigation <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events, with the aim <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fer<strong>in</strong>g consistentopportunities for learn<strong>in</strong>g and improvement.74 <strong>The</strong> Review Group did hear positive feedback regard<strong>in</strong>g the contribution <strong>of</strong> theCritical Incident Stress <strong>Management</strong> resource. It was viewed as be<strong>in</strong>g very supportive <strong>of</strong>staff and <strong>of</strong>fered a “structured system <strong>of</strong> care” as set out <strong>in</strong> paragraph 5.3 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong>Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should seek to susta<strong>in</strong>and develop this.Recommendation 11:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should build on its approach to the support <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong>significant adverse events.3.7 Action Plann<strong>in</strong>g75 Dur<strong>in</strong>g the time period studied by the Review Group, the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical GovernanceCommittee received full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports and associatedaction plans and discussed them at their meet<strong>in</strong>gs. <strong>The</strong> m<strong>in</strong>utes recorded vary<strong>in</strong>g levels<strong>of</strong> detail <strong>in</strong> respect <strong>of</strong> the consideration <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event ReviewReports.76 <strong>The</strong> Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Annual Report for 2010/11 notes <strong>in</strong> paragraph 8 that:“Eighteen significant adverse events were reported to the Committee. <strong>The</strong>se took the form<strong>of</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dependent review <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident, identify<strong>in</strong>g contributory factors and a set <strong>of</strong>conclusions and recommendations. <strong>The</strong>se reports were discussed <strong>in</strong> detail by the Cl<strong>in</strong>icalGovernance Committee and were then reviewed (or plan to be reviewed), typically after 6months to check on progress. A review <strong>of</strong> all cases was done to identify causal trends andactions undertaken.”77 <strong>The</strong> PwC report commented that:26


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012“upon conclusion <strong>of</strong> an SAER, the f<strong>in</strong>al report will conta<strong>in</strong> an ‘action plan’ which <strong>in</strong>cludesmeasures to be implemented as a result <strong>of</strong> the conclusions <strong>of</strong> the review, to m<strong>in</strong>imise therisk <strong>of</strong> a similar occurrence <strong>in</strong> the future and to improve the arrangements <strong>in</strong> place whichgave rise to the event. From the review <strong>of</strong> a sample <strong>of</strong> these action plans from 2006 topresent attached to the f<strong>in</strong>al reports, we found these to be thorough, targeted and asignificant degree <strong>of</strong> consultation had taken place to agree the relevant actions, forexample, draft action plans are discussed at Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee meet<strong>in</strong>gsprior to these be<strong>in</strong>g f<strong>in</strong>alised <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al report”. 478 <strong>The</strong> Review Group considered the extent <strong>of</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g, ownership andfeedback relat<strong>in</strong>g to the action plans with<strong>in</strong> and beyond the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical GovernanceCommittee.79 <strong>The</strong> previous Chair <strong>of</strong> the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee <strong>in</strong>dicated <strong>in</strong> his<strong>in</strong>terview that he had believed that all significant adverse event reviews had beenpresented to the Committee. As at 3 May 2012, the position – shared with <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire& Arran – is shown for the 57 cases <strong>in</strong> Table 7 below.Table 7: Review <strong>of</strong> the status <strong>of</strong> the 57 significant adverse events and progressionto Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee (CGC)Status Number %Cases discussed at CGC 38 66.7Cases scheduled to be discussed at CGC 2 3.5Not yet reached CGC stage - ongo<strong>in</strong>g/pend<strong>in</strong>g 12 21.0Did not proceed to CGC 5 8.8Total 57 100.080 A major objective for the Review Group was to confirm that the detailed sample<strong>of</strong> seven significant adverse events had action plans that were produced with<strong>in</strong> thesame time period as the conclusion <strong>of</strong> their reviews and development <strong>of</strong> the reviewreports. Evidence was gathered and analysed to confirm that action plans were <strong>in</strong>existence with<strong>in</strong> these time frames, follow<strong>in</strong>g the Freedom <strong>of</strong> Information (Scotland)Act request by Mr Wilson. <strong>The</strong> Review Group confirmed that for the seven cases, undermore detailed review, that the action plans were developed at the same time as thepreparation <strong>of</strong> the full review reports.F<strong>in</strong>al reports and action plans81 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures describes the process bywhich reports are f<strong>in</strong>alized, and identifies the various roles and responsibilities <strong>of</strong>certa<strong>in</strong> staff, groups and committees <strong>in</strong> this process. Section 9.3.4 details the report<strong>in</strong>gprocess for ‘extreme’ events. <strong>The</strong> Review Group witnessed, through the seniormanagement and operational team session on 29 and 30 March 2012, a degree <strong>of</strong>27


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty as to the flow and presentation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation that culm<strong>in</strong>ates <strong>in</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>alreport.82 <strong>The</strong> full and f<strong>in</strong>al <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports tended to becomprehensive, but <strong>of</strong> variable quality. <strong>The</strong>re was evidence <strong>of</strong> careful consideration andappraisal <strong>of</strong> issues <strong>in</strong> reach<strong>in</strong>g conclusions. However, <strong>in</strong> some <strong>in</strong>stances, therecommendations were sometimes numerous, and without prioritisation. <strong>The</strong> ReviewGroup questioned the consistency <strong>of</strong> the quality <strong>of</strong> the Root Cause Analysis (RCA)through the <strong>in</strong>vestigations.83 <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that there was a degree <strong>of</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>in</strong> relation to theownership <strong>of</strong> the various aspects <strong>of</strong> the report<strong>in</strong>g process. An example <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>cludedvariation <strong>in</strong> parts <strong>of</strong> reports go<strong>in</strong>g to various groups and committees. In one <strong>in</strong>stance,the Review Group noted that an action plan had been reported to the Cl<strong>in</strong>icalGovernance Committee, with the majority <strong>of</strong> actions described as complete. One yearlater, many <strong>of</strong> the actions previously recorded as complete were recorded as ‘ongo<strong>in</strong>g’.84 <strong>The</strong> material from <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran conta<strong>in</strong>ed a summary report <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>formation relat<strong>in</strong>g to <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports and action plansdiscussed at the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee between September 2006 andNovember 2011. It conta<strong>in</strong>s a short summary such as ‘all actions complete’ or‘discussions around the report’. <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that ‘Date Completed’ columnwas blank from February 2009 until the last entry <strong>in</strong> November 2011. <strong>The</strong> ‘Follow-upCompleted’ column refers to some actions that are beyond their due date (for example,July 2011) .85 <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran expla<strong>in</strong>ed that the failure to complete the ‘DateCompleted’ column related to the difficulties <strong>in</strong> obta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g robust <strong>in</strong>formation from thecl<strong>in</strong>ical services as to evidence <strong>of</strong> progress aga<strong>in</strong>st action plans. <strong>The</strong> Cl<strong>in</strong>ical GovernanceCommittee on 22 September 2010, stated that:“the actions [sic] plans tabled <strong>in</strong> this report are historic action plans. Evidence is able to beprovided to show that the recommendations has [sic] been implemented but there is nosystematic collation <strong>of</strong> evidence that the recommendation has been effective. <strong>The</strong>Committee require that this be carried out. [<strong>The</strong> Assistant Director, Healthcare Quality]confirmed that this was be<strong>in</strong>g actioned with<strong>in</strong> the exist<strong>in</strong>g SAER work and that he wouldensure that actions that were tabled today were considered <strong>in</strong> relation to measures <strong>of</strong>effectiveness”.86 <strong>The</strong> Review Group reviewed the m<strong>in</strong>utes <strong>of</strong> the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committeebetween 2009 and 2012. <strong>The</strong> Review Group found only limited examples <strong>of</strong> follow-up tochase progress from the full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports and action plans.<strong>The</strong>re was not a systematic approach to assurance on progress. This was re<strong>in</strong>forced bythe gaps <strong>in</strong> the evidence presented by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran <strong>in</strong> their report cover<strong>in</strong>gsignificant adverse events between September 2006 and November 2011. <strong>The</strong> PwCreport highlighted the fact that:28


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012“for more recent reviews, there is some evidence <strong>of</strong> actions be<strong>in</strong>g implemented, however,this is <strong>in</strong>consistent across Services and does not always appear to be given an appropriatepriority for the operational management <strong>of</strong> cl<strong>in</strong>ical services upon close-out <strong>of</strong> the review”.87 It was noted that work had been advanced to establish progress aga<strong>in</strong>st theaction plans aga<strong>in</strong>st the background <strong>of</strong> the Scottish Information Commissioner’s<strong>in</strong>vestigation. However, the Review Group noted that attempts made <strong>in</strong> November 2011and subsequently <strong>in</strong> March 2012 to establish progress aga<strong>in</strong>st the action plans, had metwith limited success.88 On 20 April 2012, the Review Group requested documentary evidence to confirmthe successful implementation <strong>of</strong> ‘completed’ action plans s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009 that had also beensigned <strong>of</strong>f by the <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee/Group.89 Based on <strong>in</strong>formation received from <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, the analysis<strong>in</strong>dicated that only n<strong>in</strong>e cases had achieved ‘completed’ status: five were fromwith<strong>in</strong> the cohort <strong>of</strong> 57 cases, with the rema<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g four cases prior to 2009. It wasonly possible <strong>in</strong> one case <strong>of</strong> the five to confirm that the action plan was complete.<strong>The</strong> Review Group concluded therefore that there was not a robust andsystematic approach to the implementation <strong>of</strong> action plans and their monitor<strong>in</strong>g.Recommendation 12:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should make urgent progress <strong>in</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g the status <strong>of</strong> allsignificant adverse events review action plans s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009. <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran shouldalso consider the scope to extend their review to cases pre-dat<strong>in</strong>g 2009, with<strong>in</strong> thebounds <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>formation that is available.3.8 Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Learn<strong>in</strong>gInformation presented to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee90 <strong>The</strong> Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee has also received Trend Reports and overallreports on significant adverse events. In September 2010, the Committee received areport on significant adverse event action plans between April 2009 and March 2010.<strong>The</strong> report covered 14 significant adverse events over that year and reported onprogress aga<strong>in</strong>st the action plan for each one. Five <strong>of</strong> the 14 significant adverse eventaction plans are described as ‘<strong>in</strong>complete’ at that stage. <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that atits meet<strong>in</strong>g on 14 September 2011, the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee considered theposition <strong>in</strong> respect <strong>of</strong> 18 significant adverse events that were ‘live and ongo<strong>in</strong>g’. <strong>The</strong>Committee received a verbal report on the 18 events.91 In February 2012, the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee received a report entitledTrend Analysis <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> and Compla<strong>in</strong>ts, 1 July to 31 December 2011. <strong>The</strong> TrendAnalysis identified high-level themes as well as categories <strong>of</strong> adverse events andcompla<strong>in</strong>ts over the time period. <strong>The</strong> report by the Good Governance Institute (2010)notes that “Boards focus too much on <strong>in</strong>dividual serious untoward <strong>in</strong>cidents…andshould systematically consider lower level but <strong>of</strong>ten more reveal<strong>in</strong>g patterns <strong>of</strong> adverseevents and near misses”. <strong>The</strong> Trend Analysis report did not go <strong>in</strong>to any detail <strong>in</strong> respect<strong>of</strong> significant adverse events. This is not a deficiency, so long as there were alternativearrangements to ensure thematic learn<strong>in</strong>g from the significant adverse events.29


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 201292 <strong>The</strong> Review Group concluded that it could not f<strong>in</strong>d conv<strong>in</strong>c<strong>in</strong>g evidence <strong>of</strong> asystem to identify thematic learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events to allowchange and improvement to cl<strong>in</strong>ical practice.Recommendation 13:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure an ongo<strong>in</strong>g approach to thematic learn<strong>in</strong>g, giv<strong>in</strong>gopportunities for those work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran to learn from significantadverse events and to change and adapt cl<strong>in</strong>ical practice accord<strong>in</strong>gly.3.9 Structure and Accountability93 <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that there was a general lack <strong>of</strong> clarity regard<strong>in</strong>g theaccountability l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>in</strong> the <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran system. At times, there was a level <strong>of</strong>ambiguity between operational and pr<strong>of</strong>essional l<strong>in</strong>es <strong>of</strong> accountability as expressed <strong>in</strong>decisions regard<strong>in</strong>g significant adverse event reviews.94 Paragraph 7.1 <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures states that:“each Healthcare Directorate has arrangements <strong>in</strong> place to implement cont<strong>in</strong>uous cl<strong>in</strong>icalimprovements and to ensure effective report<strong>in</strong>g and assurance regard<strong>in</strong>g cl<strong>in</strong>icalgovernance. In relation to all adverse events that are not called for significant adverseevent review, it is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the Lead Investigator to produce summary reportsfor the appropriate Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group. It is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the Chairperson <strong>of</strong>the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group to ensure that for all local reviews <strong>of</strong> adverse events,actions plans are developed and implemented. In addition, the Chairperson is responsiblefor ensur<strong>in</strong>g that action plans aris<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse event reviews areimplemented. This can be delegated as appropriate”.95 Paragraph 7.3 <strong>of</strong> the policy states that:“it is the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the Healthcare Director to ensure that learn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts aredissem<strong>in</strong>ated”.Manag<strong>in</strong>g significant adverse events across the cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance groups96 <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that there were around a further 60 operational cl<strong>in</strong>icalgovernance groups cover<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dividual specialties and services.97 <strong>The</strong> Review Group received a sample <strong>of</strong> papers relat<strong>in</strong>g to the cl<strong>in</strong>icalgovernance groups, with<strong>in</strong> the Healthcare Directorates. <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted thatthere was an <strong>in</strong>consistent approach to the receipt and management <strong>of</strong> action plansacross the groups.98 In more recent m<strong>in</strong>utes <strong>of</strong> the cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance groups, the Review Groupnoted confusion regard<strong>in</strong>g the responsibility for progress<strong>in</strong>g action plans. One member<strong>of</strong> staff advised <strong>in</strong> a meet<strong>in</strong>g that:“summary reports are circulated and she br<strong>in</strong>gs them to the meet<strong>in</strong>g. She advised that sheis happy to go through those for her area for shared learn<strong>in</strong>g but is unclear as to how to30


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012communicate <strong>in</strong>formation on other SAERs…also advised that there are FAIs and advisedthat it is difficult to use all the reports.”99 Paragraph 7.1 <strong>of</strong> the policy sets out clearly the responsibility <strong>of</strong> the Chair <strong>of</strong> theCl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group but paragraph 7.3 also highlights the role <strong>of</strong> the HealthcareDirector <strong>in</strong> ensur<strong>in</strong>g the dissem<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>of</strong> learn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts. <strong>The</strong>re is the risk <strong>of</strong> overlapand confusion <strong>in</strong> these roles, lead<strong>in</strong>g to a potential lack <strong>of</strong> clarity about responsibilitiesand accountabilities between the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group Chair and the HealthcareDirector. <strong>The</strong> evidence from the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group material highlighted theabsence <strong>of</strong> a systematic approach to the shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> action plans and the development <strong>of</strong>a robust approach to wider organisational learn<strong>in</strong>g. <strong>The</strong>re was also <strong>in</strong>sufficient evidenceto <strong>in</strong>dicate a consistent approach to follow-up <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividual actions plans, or ownershipat Directorate level. It was also noted that the full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event ReviewReports were not generally shared at cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance group level.100 <strong>The</strong> Review Group considered that the three tier structure for cl<strong>in</strong>icalgovernance <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran: the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee; theHealthcare Directorate cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance groups; and the specialty and servicelevelcl<strong>in</strong>ical governance groups was complex and unwieldy. <strong>The</strong> large number <strong>of</strong>groups (60+) and different layers runs the risk <strong>of</strong> confusion regard<strong>in</strong>gaccountability and dilut<strong>in</strong>g ownership <strong>of</strong> action plans.Recommendation 14:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should review its cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance structure with the focus ondeliver<strong>in</strong>g a more streaml<strong>in</strong>ed and simpler arrangement, giv<strong>in</strong>g sharper clarityregard<strong>in</strong>g accountability.101 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures sets out on page 26 aFlowchart <strong>of</strong> the review <strong>of</strong> adverse events (Flowchart 3). <strong>The</strong> Flowchart guides staffthrough the steps from adverse event be<strong>in</strong>g reported through to action plans. <strong>The</strong>Flowchart pa<strong>in</strong>ts an ambiguous and unclear diagram <strong>of</strong> how to handle the mostsignificant adverse events.Recommendation 15:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure a focus on empower<strong>in</strong>g cl<strong>in</strong>ical services todevelop, own and progress action plans and to share wider learn<strong>in</strong>g and to reflect this <strong>in</strong>a revised flowchart.102 <strong>The</strong> Healthcare Directors are key senior operational directors <strong>in</strong> the <strong>NHS</strong>Ayrshire & Arran system. <strong>The</strong>y lead and manage complex operat<strong>in</strong>g units and reportdirectly to the Board Chief Executive as effectively ‘chief operat<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong>ficers’ <strong>of</strong> theirDirectorates. However, they appeared to be absent from the ownership <strong>of</strong> the process,<strong>in</strong> practice and as expressed to vary<strong>in</strong>g degrees <strong>in</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy andSupport<strong>in</strong>g Procedures. In the considerable volume <strong>of</strong> emails sent to the Review Group,they were also largely absent from the correspondence regard<strong>in</strong>g the handl<strong>in</strong>g andlearn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse event reviews. This is a potentially significant gap<strong>in</strong> the governance and accountability arrangements.31


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012103 <strong>The</strong> Review Group heard that the new Chief Executive had taken firm action todef<strong>in</strong>e more explicitly the responsibilities and accountabilities <strong>of</strong> the HealthcareDirectors for all aspects <strong>of</strong> the performance <strong>of</strong> their Directorates, and he had written tothem to this effect.Recommendation 16:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should ensure that Healthcare Directors have explicit objectivesrelated to the effective organisation and learn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events, andsuch objectives are cascaded, appropriately, through their Directorates.3.10 Shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> Information<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s policy for shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation104 A core issue shared by those the Review Group <strong>in</strong>terviewed was the<strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> the restrictions placed on <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran to protect patientconfidentiality and the privacy <strong>of</strong> employees. Chiefly, this related to the <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong>the Data Protection Act, the requirement to comply with the Caldicott pr<strong>in</strong>ciples and theFreedom <strong>of</strong> Information (Scotland) Act.105 <strong>The</strong> Review Group heard that the full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reportswere considered to be confidential and restricted <strong>in</strong> their circulation. An email <strong>of</strong> 15May 2010, rem<strong>in</strong>ded directors that the attached full reports – due to be considered bythe Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee – were confidential:“the reports are not for general distribution and no copies can be given to staff withoutexplicit Executive Medical Director or Executive Nurse Director approval”.106 <strong>The</strong> m<strong>in</strong>utes <strong>of</strong> the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee meet<strong>in</strong>g on 5 May 2010 notethat the:“Committee discussed the possibility <strong>of</strong> patients be<strong>in</strong>g identified <strong>in</strong> the reports. It wasagreed that these documents are treated as confidential cl<strong>in</strong>ical <strong>in</strong>formation and are notavailable under Freedom <strong>of</strong> Information (Scotland) Act provisions.”107 <strong>The</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policy and Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures makes it clear <strong>in</strong> section9.3.4 that:“a full copy <strong>of</strong> the report will not be issued to any <strong>in</strong>dividual, either patients, relatives orstaff members, without the explicit authorisation <strong>of</strong> either the Executive Medical orExecutive Nurse Director”.108 <strong>The</strong> policy gives the opportunity for staff to identify: “potential <strong>in</strong>accuracieswith<strong>in</strong> the report”. However, given the restrictions on the circulation <strong>of</strong> the full report,there are extremely limited opportunities, <strong>in</strong> the current policy, for staff to correctmaterial <strong>in</strong>accuracies <strong>in</strong> the report before it is f<strong>in</strong>alised and presented to the Cl<strong>in</strong>icalGovernance Committee. This risks <strong>in</strong>hibit<strong>in</strong>g staff contribut<strong>in</strong>g to reviews <strong>in</strong> an openway, and which ultimately promotes improvement and learn<strong>in</strong>g.32


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012109 <strong>The</strong> Review Group noted that, through the desktop review exercise, a similarscenario existed, where f<strong>in</strong>al reports are written with limited or no <strong>in</strong>volvement orcontribution from those <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident. In one <strong>of</strong> the cases reviewed, thiscreated resentment from operational staff who were unaware <strong>of</strong> the content <strong>of</strong> thereport, recommendations or actions until they were provided with it 10 m<strong>in</strong>utes beforethe Review Group began their questions, at the visit on 29 March 2012.Wider learn<strong>in</strong>g110 <strong>The</strong> Review Group heard evidence from a range <strong>of</strong> staff that they felt that thepolicy was unnecessarily restrict<strong>in</strong>g the shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation and wider learn<strong>in</strong>gwith<strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran. For some, this required <strong>in</strong>dividuals to work around thepolicy <strong>in</strong> order to overcome the perceived obstacles created by the policy. In one<strong>in</strong>stance, the Lead Investigator showed the full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reportto some (but not all) members <strong>of</strong> staff <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>cident. However, <strong>in</strong> that<strong>in</strong>stance it was restricted to allow<strong>in</strong>g staff to read it <strong>in</strong> the Lead Investigator’s <strong>of</strong>fice andnot to take a copy <strong>of</strong> the report away with them. <strong>The</strong> Lead Investigator took the<strong>in</strong>itiative to promote wider learn<strong>in</strong>g outside the terms <strong>of</strong> the policy, but the LeadInvestigator was also clear that <strong>in</strong> a future similar event the current policy would notpermit such a step.111 One member <strong>of</strong> staff referred to the fact that staff <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>cidents were notpermitted to see the full <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Report. In their view, thiswas at risk <strong>of</strong> “disenfranchis<strong>in</strong>g” frontl<strong>in</strong>e cl<strong>in</strong>ical services. A more general themeidentified by the Review Group was that the significant adverse event review processwas “done to them” rather than “with them”. It was noted that <strong>in</strong> one <strong>in</strong>stance staffreferred to a case when a local <strong>in</strong>vestigation report was over-turned by a subsequentsignificant adverse event review by another team. For those <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> the orig<strong>in</strong>alreview, this led to lack <strong>of</strong> ownership and disagreement regard<strong>in</strong>g the conclusions andthe action plan.112 It was noted that the Healthcare Directorates were now be<strong>in</strong>g supported <strong>in</strong>populat<strong>in</strong>g the action plans themselves rather than reports be<strong>in</strong>g written <strong>in</strong> isolation.This was seen to be an important step forward <strong>in</strong> promot<strong>in</strong>g ownership. However,based on the evidence presented, there rema<strong>in</strong>ed considerable confusion about thescope to share <strong>in</strong>formation and the variation <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>terpretation <strong>of</strong> the policy, as well asthe legislation.113 Throughout the review, it was clear to the Review Group that there was not anopen approach to the shar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports. Thish<strong>in</strong>dered the provision <strong>of</strong> contextual <strong>in</strong>formation and wider learn<strong>in</strong>g opportunities for<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran staff. In one Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Group m<strong>in</strong>ute <strong>of</strong> October 2011, itwas acknowledged that it “would be very <strong>in</strong>terest<strong>in</strong>g to have visibility <strong>of</strong> all SAERs acrossA&A”.33


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012114 In the view <strong>of</strong> the Review Group, the approach taken by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire &Arran hampered the delivery <strong>of</strong> the primary objectives <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Policyand Support<strong>in</strong>g Procedures to learn from significant adverse events and topromote wider learn<strong>in</strong>g and improvement.Recommendation 17:<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran should undertake a fundamental review <strong>of</strong> its approach toshar<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>formation aris<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events. It should ensure that theapproach rema<strong>in</strong>s with<strong>in</strong> the legislative requirements, but maximises the opportunitiesfor staff to understand the broader context and background regard<strong>in</strong>g specific <strong>in</strong>cidents.34


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012APPENDIX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCEHealthcare Improvement Scotland: Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran <strong>Significant</strong><strong>Adverse</strong> Event Systems and ProcessesFocus on the <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> Critical Incidents/<strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong>, Action Plann<strong>in</strong>gand Learn<strong>in</strong>gMarch 2012BackgroundConcerns have been raised about the <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s arrangement formanag<strong>in</strong>g, review<strong>in</strong>g and act<strong>in</strong>g on critical <strong>in</strong>cidents and adverse events. <strong>The</strong> Cab<strong>in</strong>etSecretary for Health, Wellbe<strong>in</strong>g and Cities Strategies has now formally asked HealthcareImprovement Scotland to undertake an urgent review <strong>of</strong> the cl<strong>in</strong>ical governancesystems and processes <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, <strong>in</strong> particular those that relate to theirmanagement <strong>of</strong> critical <strong>in</strong>cidents, adverse events, action plann<strong>in</strong>g and local learn<strong>in</strong>g.Healthcare Improvement Scotland has carried out a number <strong>of</strong> similar reviews and thefocus is on ‘diagnos<strong>in</strong>g’ the key issues and support<strong>in</strong>g the relevant <strong>NHS</strong> board(s) <strong>in</strong>develop<strong>in</strong>g and implement<strong>in</strong>g improvement plans. More generally, the focus is onshared learn<strong>in</strong>g across the <strong>NHS</strong> <strong>in</strong> Scotland and healthcare providers generally.<strong>The</strong> specific request for the review has arisen follow<strong>in</strong>g a report by the ScottishInformation Commissioner (Decision 036/2012) – Mr Rab Wilson and <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire &Arran.<strong>The</strong> Scottish Information Commissioner <strong>in</strong>vestigation and a recent (November 2011)<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran Internal Audit report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) –<strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> Review – highlighted a number <strong>of</strong> governance issues <strong>in</strong>relation to the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the cl<strong>in</strong>ical <strong>in</strong>cident review/significant adverse eventprocess with<strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran between 2006 and 2011.Remit and scope <strong>of</strong> reviewHealthcare Improvement Scotland will review and report on <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’ssignificant adverse event policy and support<strong>in</strong>g procedures. <strong>The</strong> aim is to ensure thereis systematic, comprehensive and transparent approach to management and follow-up<strong>of</strong> significant adverse events. <strong>The</strong> review will ensure that the approach maximises theopportunities for learn<strong>in</strong>g, and explicit action for service change and improvement isembedded throughout the organisation. Learn<strong>in</strong>g opportunities will also be sharedmore widely across all healthcare providers.<strong>The</strong> Healthcare Improvement Scotland review will focus on the:• systems related to the identification, <strong>in</strong>vestigation, report<strong>in</strong>g, documentation andlearn<strong>in</strong>g from significant adverse events <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran• relationship between cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance support and operational (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>gmanagement and human resources/cl<strong>in</strong>ical services <strong>in</strong> the management <strong>of</strong>significant adverse events, and35


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012• opportunities for the wider improvement <strong>of</strong> the management <strong>of</strong> significantadverse events <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong>Scotland and healthcare providers <strong>in</strong> general with aparticular emphasis on openness, transparency and shared learn<strong>in</strong>g.Proposed method<strong>The</strong> review will be undertaken us<strong>in</strong>g a group made up <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>dividuals with specialistknowledge from across <strong>NHS</strong>Scotland, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g the Director <strong>of</strong> Scrut<strong>in</strong>y & Assurance atHealthcare Improvement Scotland, and will <strong>in</strong>clude the follow<strong>in</strong>g methods.• Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s serious adverse events policy, procedures andrelated documentation <strong>in</strong> the context <strong>of</strong> their cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance and riskmanagement arrangements.• Draw from/ensure, appropriate l<strong>in</strong>kages with recent related HealthcareImprovement Scotland cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance and assurance work.• Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation systems to support the management <strong>of</strong> significant adverseevents with<strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran.• Interviews with key staff to ascerta<strong>in</strong> typical process adherence andunderstand<strong>in</strong>g throughout the organisation. This will take account <strong>of</strong> the views<strong>of</strong> operational staff at the frontl<strong>in</strong>e, the Executive Team, cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance andany other <strong>in</strong>volved staff. A number <strong>of</strong> key controls will be tested and cover, <strong>in</strong> thefirst <strong>in</strong>stance, the follow<strong>in</strong>g:- a consistent and robust approach to review<strong>in</strong>g and updat<strong>in</strong>g theorganisational understand<strong>in</strong>g, compliance and capability <strong>of</strong> the systemsand process associated with significant adverse events, specifically:- identification <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events- assessment <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g consistent triggers- report<strong>in</strong>g (<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g document storage and consistency) and escalation <strong>of</strong>serious adverse events- key roles and responsibilities follow<strong>in</strong>g a significant adverse event,<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g organisational relationships and partnerships across theorganisation- associated tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g and staff capability- key learn<strong>in</strong>g, shar<strong>in</strong>g, improvement and action plann<strong>in</strong>g, and- staff engagement and follow-up to report<strong>in</strong>g.<strong>The</strong> review will be completed with the presentation <strong>of</strong> a report with associated riskasedrecommendations and may <strong>in</strong>clude any appropriate Learn<strong>in</strong>g and ImprovementBrief<strong>in</strong>gs. This report will be sent to the Scottish Government Health & Social CareDirectorates on completion.36


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012AssumptionsThrough the Healthcare Improvement Scotland review, we will use data, wherepossible, from recent related Healthcare Improvement Scotland cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance andassurance work f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gsThrough the Healthcare Improvement Scotland review, the f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>of</strong> the ScottishInformation Commissioners report will be cited as evidence <strong>of</strong> identified fail<strong>in</strong>gs andwhere available we will use any additional external sources <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation.Through the Healthcare Improvement Scotland review, the PwC report f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs will beused as basel<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>formation and as such the level <strong>of</strong> risk to the organisation will besubject to ongo<strong>in</strong>g assessment where appropriate.<strong>The</strong> ma<strong>in</strong> purpose <strong>of</strong> the Healthcare Improvement Scotland review is to support <strong>NHS</strong>Ayrshire & Arran to further identify potential [and then resolve] key deficiencies with<strong>in</strong>their systems and processes <strong>in</strong> relation to significant adverse events. We will share thewider learn<strong>in</strong>g to support wider improvements across the <strong>NHS</strong> <strong>in</strong> Scotland.Initial key reference documentation• PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) Report – <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> Review –F<strong>in</strong>al Report (November 2011).• Scottish Information Commissioner Report 036/2012 Rab Wilson and Ayrshire& Arran <strong>NHS</strong> Board.• <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran Board & Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee papers 2006-2012.• Documentation held with<strong>in</strong> the cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance function relat<strong>in</strong>g to seriousadverse events.• <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran self-assessment for the cl<strong>in</strong>ical governance and riskmanagement standards: section on serious adverse events.37


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Review Group membershipRobbie Pearson (Chair)Dr Gordon BirniePr<strong>of</strong>essor Kev<strong>in</strong> RooneyDr Mags McGuireRob<strong>in</strong> CreelmanDr Lorna RamsayDr Lesley Anne SmithMark AggletonDirector <strong>of</strong> Scrut<strong>in</strong>y & Assurance,Healthcare Improvement ScotlandMedical Director, Operat<strong>in</strong>g Division,<strong>NHS</strong> FifeUniversity <strong>of</strong> the West <strong>of</strong> Scotland, andConsultant <strong>in</strong> Intensive Care, <strong>NHS</strong> GreaterGlasgow and ClydeNurse Director, <strong>NHS</strong> TaysidePublic Partner and Non-ExecutiveDirector, <strong>NHS</strong> HighlandCl<strong>in</strong>ical e-Health Lead and DivisionalCaldicott Guardian, <strong>NHS</strong> National ServicesScotlandHead <strong>of</strong> Quality, <strong>NHS</strong> HighlandControls Assurance Manager,Healthcare Improvement ScotlandProject management support will be provided by the Directorate <strong>of</strong> Scrut<strong>in</strong>y &Assurance team at Healthcare Improvement Scotland.38


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012APPENDIX 2: EVENTS LEADING TO THE REVIEWFrom 2006 onwards, Mr Wilson made a number <strong>of</strong> requests to see a Critical IncidentReview Report and action plan. This was followed up by requests for further<strong>in</strong>formation regard<strong>in</strong>g Critical Incident Review Reports held by <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran,culm<strong>in</strong>at<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> a request <strong>in</strong> February 2011 for all Critical Incident Review Reports and<strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review Reports (and the action plans derived from these)from January 2005.Mr Wilson was unhappy with the response from <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran and appealed tothe Scottish Information Commissioner. <strong>The</strong> Scottish Information Commissioner set outhis conclusions <strong>in</strong> Decision Notice 036/2012.<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran, <strong>in</strong> direct response to the concerns expressed regard<strong>in</strong>g themanagement <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events, also commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers(PwC) to carry out an <strong>in</strong>vestigation. <strong>The</strong> results <strong>of</strong> that <strong>in</strong>vestigation were reported tothe Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran <strong>in</strong> December 2011,followed by an action plan presented to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee <strong>in</strong> February2012.<strong>The</strong> PwC report made 13 recommendations for improvement but noted that “s<strong>in</strong>ce 2006,particularly s<strong>in</strong>ce 2009, there have been substantial improvements, with strong leadershipsupport <strong>in</strong> respect <strong>of</strong> significant adverse event reviews, and with a clear strategy to makethis process effective and consistent across all services with<strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran”. <strong>The</strong>cover report to the Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Governance Committee acknowledged that“recommendations were also made <strong>in</strong> order to support ongo<strong>in</strong>g improvements particularlyaround report shar<strong>in</strong>g and lessons learned, it was highlighted that these are not criticalrisks to the organisation, and do not have a significant impact on patient safety”.<strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran issued press statements <strong>in</strong> response to the conclusions <strong>of</strong> theScottish Information Commissioner on 22 February 2012 and stated that:“In his request, Mr Wilson asked for copies <strong>of</strong> Critical Incident Reviews (CIRs) and<strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Event Reviews (SAERs) which had been completed s<strong>in</strong>ce January 2005,along with action plans relat<strong>in</strong>g to the reports.We acknowledge that the Commissioner’s criticism <strong>of</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran’s recordsmanagement system prior to 2009 is justified, and apologise that Mr Wilson has had to goto significant lengths to receive the <strong>in</strong>formation he requested.I would like to reassure the public that there has never been any <strong>in</strong>tention to deliberatelywithhold <strong>in</strong>formation from Mr Wilson to which we thought he should have been entitled.Where we applied the Act to exempt <strong>in</strong>formation from disclosure, aga<strong>in</strong> we did so <strong>in</strong> goodfaith.We identified fail<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> our system for conduct<strong>in</strong>g and record<strong>in</strong>g CIRs back <strong>in</strong> 2009. As aresult we took steps to improve the way <strong>in</strong> which we as an organisation conduct <strong>in</strong>cident<strong>in</strong>vestigations. A vital part <strong>of</strong> this process is how learn<strong>in</strong>g is applied to improve patient39


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012care and safety and reduce risk. This is the process now referred to as the <strong>Significant</strong><strong>Adverse</strong> Event Review.Indeed, a recent <strong>in</strong>dependent audit report by Price Waterhouse Cooper, while critical <strong>of</strong>the former process, f<strong>in</strong>ds little fault with the new SAER process for <strong>in</strong>vestigat<strong>in</strong>g adverseevents and publicis<strong>in</strong>g the learn<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>ts from them.”A further statement on the same day said that:“Prior to the <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> Review Process (SAER) <strong>in</strong> 2009 theBoard did not have an established system for captur<strong>in</strong>g actions taken as a result <strong>of</strong> reports<strong>in</strong>to critical <strong>in</strong>cidents. This meant the Board could not ensure and report that all necessarychanges to practice, identified from reports, were implemented. <strong>The</strong> Commissioner wasrightfully very critical <strong>of</strong> this and the Board accepts these comments, which relate to theperiod before 2009.S<strong>in</strong>ce the <strong>in</strong>troduction <strong>of</strong> SAERs the necessary audit trails and assurance systems havebeen <strong>in</strong> place. This has been confirmed to the Board by both an external PwC audit that itcommissioned <strong>in</strong> 2011, and now also by the Commissioner’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>gs.”<strong>The</strong> review by Healthcare Improvement Scotland has sought to give external scrut<strong>in</strong>yand assurance to the process <strong>of</strong> the management <strong>of</strong> significant adverse events <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong>Ayrshire & Arran.40


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012APPENDIX 3: LIST OF ADVERSE EVENTS ON <strong>NHS</strong> AYRSHIRE & ARRANSIGNIFICANT ADVERSE EVENT REVIEW DATABASE (<strong>in</strong> chronologicalorder)Key: x = not <strong>in</strong>cluded/outwith remitCases with<strong>in</strong>HealthcareImprovementScotlandreview remit(<strong>in</strong>dicatedby number)Scottish Info. Commissionerremit / on <strong>NHS</strong> A&A website(<strong>in</strong>dicated by number)Year <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>cidentA&A DBREFType <strong>of</strong> SAER -Desktop / Fullx 1 2002 DB32 FullNotex x 2003 DB33 Desktopx x 2003 DB91 Fullx 2 2003 DB96 Fullx 3 2004 DB31 Fullx 4 2004 DB36 Fullx x 2004 DB52 Fullx 5 2005 DB37 Fullx x 2005 DB63 Fullx 6 2005 DB64 Desktopx 7 2005 DB71 Fullx 8 2006 DB2 Fullx 9 2006 DB3 Fullx 10 2006 DB27 Full41


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Cases with<strong>in</strong>HealthcareImprovementScotlandreview remit(<strong>in</strong>dicatedby number)Scottish Info. Commissionerremit / on <strong>NHS</strong> A&A website(<strong>in</strong>dicated by number)Year <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>cidentA&A DBREFType <strong>of</strong> SAER -Desktop / Fullx 11 2006 DB28 Fullx 12 2006 DB34 Fullx x 2006 DB35 Fullx 13 2006 DB38 Fullx 14 2006 DB39 Fullx 15 2006 DB42 Fullx 16 2006 DB55 FullNotex 17 2007 DB26 Fullx x 2007 DB29 Full Directorate led reviewx 18 2008 DB19 Fullx 19 2008 DB20 Fullx 20 2008 DB21 Fullx x 2008 DB23 Desktop Directorate led reviewx 21 2008 DB24 Fullx 22 2008 DB30 Fullx 23 2008 DB47 Fullx 24 2008 DB48 Fullx 25 2008 DB70 Full1 26 2009 DB4 Full2 27 2009 DB5 Full3 x 2009 DB8 Desktop Desktop report to supplement a compla<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>vestigation4 28 2009 DB9 Full42


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Cases with<strong>in</strong>HealthcareImprovementScotlandreview remit(<strong>in</strong>dicatedby number)Scottish Info. Commissionerremit / on <strong>NHS</strong> A&A website(<strong>in</strong>dicated by number)Year <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>cidentA&A DBREFType <strong>of</strong> SAER -Desktop / Full5 29 2009 DB10 Full6 30 2009 DB11 Full7 31 2009 DB12 Full8 32 2009 DB13 Full9 33 2009 DB14 Full10 34 2009 DB15 Full11 35 2009 DB16 Desktop12 36 2009 DB17 Full13 37 2009 DB18 Full14 38 2009 DB40 Full15 39 2009 DB41 Full16 40 2009 DB43 Desktop Report on website but no action plan17 41 2009 DB44 Full18 42 2009 DB45 Full19 (43) 2009 DB51 Desktop Await<strong>in</strong>g clearance20 x 2009 DB54 Desktop Desktop report to supplement a compla<strong>in</strong>ts <strong>in</strong>vestigation21 44 2009 DB68 DesktopNote22 45 2010 DB6 Full23 46 2010 DB7 Full24 47 2010 DB56 Full25 x 2010 DB57 Full26 x 2010 DB58 Full27 48 2010 DB59 FullWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI request43


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Cases with<strong>in</strong>HealthcareImprovementScotlandreview remit(<strong>in</strong>dicatedby number)Scottish Info. Commissionerremit / on <strong>NHS</strong> A&A website(<strong>in</strong>dicated by number)Year <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>cidentA&A DBREFType <strong>of</strong> SAER -Desktop / Full28 49 2010 DB60 Desktop29 x 2010 DB61 Full30 x 2010 DB62 Full31 x 2010 DB66 Full32 x 2010 DB67 Full33 50 2010 DB69 Desktop34 51 2010 DB72 Full35 52 2010 DB73 Desktop36 53 2010 DB74 Desktop37 54 2010 DB75 Full38 x 2010 DB77 Full39 x 2010 DB80 Desktop40 x 2010 DB86 Full41 x 2010 DB87 Full42 x 2010 DB90 Full43 x 2010 DB92 Full44 x 2010 DB93 Desktop45 x 2010 DB94 FullNoteWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI requestWith<strong>in</strong> Scottish Info. Commissioner scope but Review not concluded attime <strong>of</strong> FOI request46 x 2011 DB76 Full44


<strong>The</strong> <strong>Management</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Significant</strong> <strong>Adverse</strong> <strong>Events</strong> <strong>in</strong> <strong>NHS</strong> Ayrshire & Arran – June 2012Cases with<strong>in</strong>HealthcareImprovementScotlandreview remit(<strong>in</strong>dicatedby number)Scottish Info. Commissionerremit / on <strong>NHS</strong> A&A website(<strong>in</strong>dicated by number)Year <strong>of</strong><strong>in</strong>cidentA&A DBREFType <strong>of</strong> SAER -Desktop / Full47 x 2011 DB78 Full48 x 2011 DB79 FullNote49 x 2011 DB81 Desktop50 x 2011 DB82 Full51 x 2011 DB83 Full52 x 2011 DB84 Full53 x 2011 DB85 Full54 x 2011 DB88 Full55 x 2011 DB89 Full56 x 2011 DB95 Full57 x 2012 DB97 Desktop45


www.healthcareimprovementscotland.orgEd<strong>in</strong>burgh Office | Elliott House | 8-10 Hillside Crescent | Ed<strong>in</strong>burgh | EH7 5EATelephone 0131 623 4300Glasgow Office | Delta House | 50 West Nile Street | Glasgow | G1 2NPTelephone 0141 225 6999<strong>The</strong> Healthcare Environment Inspectorate, the Scottish Health Council, the Scottish HealthTechnologies Group and the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidel<strong>in</strong>es Network (SIGN) are keycomponents <strong>of</strong> our organisation.

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