addition theorem depending on the points which are included in it <strong>and</strong> are corresponding tothe elementary propositions.As to the totalities of the second type considered above, they include, because of their verystructure, only such joins 34 , that are reducible to finite or countable joins, so that we do nothave to mention non-measurable totalities; consequently, all the propositions of the totalities,both of the fourth <strong>and</strong> the second type, acquire quite definite probabilities once thearithmetizing function F(z) is chosen.3.2.7. Arithmetization of Totalities of the Third TypeOn the basis of what was said about totalities of the fourth type, we already know that afterarithmetization only a countable totality of possible elementary propositions can be left in theconsidered totality. The difference between arithmetized totalities of the third <strong>and</strong> the fourthtypes only consists in that there exist infinite joins making sense in the fourth, but not in thethird type; we do not therefore mention here probabilities of such joins. All the other joinswill have the same probabilities in both totalities.Summarizing all that was said about the arithmetization of infinite totalities, we see that, towhichever type they belong, this procedure is entirely determined by the function F(x) 35 , onwhose choice the very type of the totality also depends because a point of discontinuity ofF(z) corresponds to each elementary proposition, <strong>and</strong> vice versa. If we admit the generalizedconstructive principle, we obtain, depending on the nature of F(z), totalities of the second <strong>and</strong>the fourth types. If, however, we hesitate to attach sense to some infinite joins (<strong>and</strong>combinations), our totalities should be attributed to the first or the third type.3.2.8. Arithmetizaton of the Totality of IntegersIntegers <strong>and</strong> their finite joins provide an example of a totality of the third type. If we linkto them all the possible infinite joins, we obtain a totality of the fourth type with a countabletotality of elementary propositions. Its arithmetization is usually achieved on the basis of theassumption that all numbers are equally possible. This premise however is obviouslyinadmissible because it would have implied that the probability of each number is zero, i.e.,that no number could have been realized, <strong>and</strong>, in addition, the generalized addition theoremwould have been violated because the sum of the probabilities of a countable totality ofpropositions with probability 0 would have been unity.The difficulty of selecting a law of probability for the numbers depending, in eachconcrete case, on the statement of the problem at h<strong>and</strong>, cannot justify the choice of a law,even if it is simple, contradicting the main principles of the theory of probability. We mayconsider such a limit of probabilities of some propositions, that corresponds to a graduallyincreasing restricted totality of numbers, under the assumption that in such totalities thenumbers are equally possible, but that limit is not the probability of a definite proposition ofour infinite totality.Another inadmissible assumption, connected with the one just mentioned, is made as oftenas that latter, viz., that the probability for the number N, when divided by a prime number ato provide a remainder , does not depend on the remainder left after dividing N by a primenumber b. Indeed, let o = 0, 1 = 1 be the two possible remainders after dividing N by two; o = 0, 1 = 1 <strong>and</strong> 2 = 2, the remainders after dividing it by three; etc. Then, according to theassumption, the probabilities of all the infinite combinations ( <strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> …) are equal, butmost of these combinations are impossible, because, when dividing N by a greater number,all the remainders obtained become equal to N, so that, for example, the combination (0, 1, 0,1, …) of the remainders is impossible. And it would follow that also impossible are thosecombinations which correspond to integers.It is also possible to attach another meaning to all the combinations if we connect each ofthem with the series
x = /2 + /(23) + … + /(23… p n ) + …where p n is the n-th prime <strong>and</strong> < p n . Then any combinations of the remainders correspondto all the values of x contained between 0 <strong>and</strong> 1 36 . The values of x corresponding to integers(according to the condition, this is the only possible case) are characterized by periodicityindicated above <strong>and</strong> are obviously countable, whereas its other values are uncountable. Itwould therefore be absolutely wrong, when assuming that all the numerical values 37 < p nare equally possible, to consider as certain that x belongs to the first, to the countable totality,<strong>and</strong> that its pertaining to the second one is impossible.It is thus necessary to admit, that the use of the term probability in the theory of numbers(for example, “the probability that a number is a prime is zero”) is in most cases unlawful;there, the sense of that term does not correspond to the meaning attached to it in the theory ofprobability.4. Supplement. Some General Remarks on the Theory of <strong>Probability</strong> As Being aMethod of Scientific Investigation4.1. The Possibility of Different Arithmetizations of a Given Totality of PropositionsIn the previous{main}chapters, I attempted to establish the formal logical foundation ofprobability theory as a mathematical discipline. For us, propositions were until now onlyabstract symbols without any concrete substance having been attached to them. We have onlydetermined definite rules for performing operations on them <strong>and</strong> on the appropriatenumerical coefficients which we called probabilities. We proved that these rules did notcontradict one another <strong>and</strong> allowed under certain conditions to derive by mathematicalcalculations the probabilities of propositions given the probabilities of some otherpropositions.However, only the logical structure of a totality of propositions, which at least for finitetotalities is usually understood in each concrete case without any difficulty, does not sufficefor arithmetizing totalities; some additional conditions are still needed for calculating all theprobabilities by means of the principles of probability theory. Indeed, if we throw a die <strong>and</strong>restrict our attention on two possible outcomes, on the occurrence <strong>and</strong> non-occurrence of asix, we have a simple pattern O, A, A , . We obtain the same pattern when throwing a coin,<strong>and</strong>, also, when again considering the throws of a die <strong>and</strong> regarding the cases of an even (2,4, 6) or an odd (1, 3, 5) number of points as differing from each other. In the latterexperiment we have the same scheme O, B, B , although A is a particular case of B. It isnot difficult to conclude now that the same arithmetization (for example, the assumption thatall the elementary propositions are equally possible) of all the logically identical totalitieswould have led to an unavoidable contradiction.And so, not all the conditions needed for the arithmetization of a totality follow from itsformal logical structure; only the real meaning that we attach to probability providesadditional information for preliminary agreements which are arbitrary from the mathematicalviewpoint. On the other h<strong>and</strong>, our calculations are practically <strong>and</strong> philosophically interestingonly because the coefficients derived by us correspond to some realities. {Thus, a certaincoefficient}(the mathematical probability) should provide the highest possible precisionconcerning the degree of expectation of some event on the basis of available data; in otherwords, of the measure of predetermination of the event given some objective information. Ifwe state that the mathematical probabilities of events A <strong>and</strong> B are equal (i.e., that the eventsare equally possible), it means that the totality of the available objective data is such that anyreasonable person must expect them both to an absolutely the same extent.4.2. The Origin <strong>and</strong> the Meaning of the Axioms of the Theory of <strong>Probability</strong>
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of All Countries and to the Entire
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(Coll. Works), vol. 4. N.p., 1964,
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individuals of the third class, the
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From the theoretical point of view
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experimentation and connected with
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Russian, and especially of the Sovi
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station in England. This book, as h
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Uspekhi Matematich. Nauk, vol. 10,
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variety and detachment of those lat
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46. On the distribution of the regr
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119. On the Markov method of establ
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No lesser difficulties than those e
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Separate spheres of work considerab
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10. Anderson, O. Letters to Karl Pe
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Hier sind, im Allgemeinen, ganz ana
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Jedenfalls, glaube ich erwiesen zu
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werde ich das ganze Material in kur
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considered as the limiting case of
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and, inversely,] = m ...1 2 N[ ch h
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µ 2 2 = m 2 2 - 2m 2 m 1 2 + m 1 4
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(x k - x k+1 ) … (x k - x +) = E(
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the thus obtained relations as pert
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[1/S(S - 1)(S - 2)][(Si = 1Sx i ) 3
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( N −1)((S − N )(2NS− 3S− 3
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µ 5 + 2µ 2 µ 3 = U [S/S] 5 + 2U
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case, the same property is true wit
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It follows that the question about
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then expressed my doubts). And Gned
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For Problem 1, formula (7) shows th
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Let us calculate now, by means of f
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ϕ′1(x)1E(a|x 1 ; x 2 ; …; x n
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Theorem 3. If the prior density 3
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P( ≤ ≤ |, 1 , 2 , …, s )
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6. A Sensible Choice of Confidence
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0 = A 0 n, = B2, = B2, 0 = C 0 n
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Note also that (95),(96), (83),(85)
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Γ(n / 2)Γ [( n −1) / 2]k = (1/2
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f (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ) = 1 if x
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and the probability of achieving no
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E = kEµ. (14)In many particular ca
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a = np, b = np 2 = a 2 /n, = a/nand
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with number (2k - 2), we commit an
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(67)which is suitable even without
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" = 1/[1 - e - ], = - ln [1 - (1/
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Such structures are entirely approp
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11. As a result of its historical d
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exaggeration towards a total denial