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I-95 Corridor CoalitionIntermodal Service at the NewarkLiberty International Airport TrainStationObservations and Lessons LearnedOctober 2004

Intermodal Service at theNewark Liberty International AirportTrain StationObservations and Lessons LearnedPrepared for:I-95 Corridor CoalitionSponsored by:I-95 Corridor Coalition – Intermodal Transfer of People and Goods CommitteeNew Jersey TransitPort Authority of New York and New JerseyAmtrakContinental AirlinesAcknowledgements:Special acknowledgement and gratitude are extended to the following agencyrepresentatives who participated extensively in the interagency collaboration and I-95Corridor Coalition support project to assist in planning and implementing the openingand operation of the AirTrain Newark air/rail service. Many more than this list from eachagency played a part, and their commitment is gratefully acknowledged.New Jersey Transit – Rick Mariani, Sandra Check, Jerry Lutin, Steve Clark, JackConway, Bill McIntyre, Jeff Linton, Jim Samuelson.Port Authority of New York/New Jersey – Nancy Johnson, Diane Papianni, Ed McCarthy,Kevin Lejda, Joann Breslin.Amtrak – Walter Ernst, Fred Bartoli, Joan McDonnell, Wayne Manning, Ken Carter.Continental Airlines – Rick Hoefling.October 2004This report was produced by the I-95 Corridor Coalition. The I-95 Corridor Coalition is a partnership of state departments oftransportation, regional and local transportation agencies, toll authorities, and related organizations, including law enforcement, port,transit and rail organizations, from Maine to Florida, with affiliate members in Canada. Additional information on the Coalition, includingother project reports, can be found on the Coalition’s web site at http://www.i95coalition.org.

Intermodal Service at the Newark Liberty International Airport Train StationObservations and Lessons LearnedTable of ContentsIntermodal Service at the Newark Liberty International Airport Train Station – ExecutiveSummaryiiProject BackgroundMajor ConclusionsCollaboration LessonsAgency Lessons LearnedMajor Conclusions from the Review of the Newark Liberty International Airport RailConnection Project 2The context of the Newark air/rail project 2How is the air/rail project working? 3Integration accomplishments 3Dealing with basic conflicts in policy 4The concept of collaborative decision-making 4Making the collaboration work 5Design challenges 6Collaboration in the design process 6The two elements of service integration 7Integration of the fare collection media 7Integration of passenger information 8Signage at the Rail Platform 9The goal: seamless, continuous information 9Can the rail information be consolidated in one place? 10Can the services at the station be unified? 10Major lessons learned 11The demands of an intermodal transfer station are unique 11The intermodal mandate needs to be continued into the operational phase 12The rail services themselves must be designed for the unique role 13Conclusions 13I-95 Corridor Coalition - i - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

Intermodal Service at the Newark Liberty InternationalAirport Train StationObservations and Lessons LearnedExecutive SummaryThis “Lessons Learned” report describes the background and outcomes of theI-95 Corridor Coalition’s assistance with the implementation of the Newark LibertyInternational Airport Train Station and Intermodal facility. The Coalition’s role was toserve as the voice of the intermodal traveler and coordinate among the organizationsinvolved: NJ Transit, the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey, Amtrak andContinental Airlines. It documents major observations and lessons during thecollaboration process that resulted in the launch of a new air-rail service in the NortheastCorridor. The report is based on interviews undertaken by the I-95 Corridor Coalition,the personal experiences of several key agency players and the observations of manywho were involved in the project work before and after the intermodal station opening.Project BackgroundIn July 2001, the I-95 Corridor Coalition began a project with three public and oneprivate transportation provider – NJ Transit, the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey,Amtrak and Continental Airlines – to assist in the opening and implementation of a newintermodal facility that was in its final construction phase. This intermodal facilityincluded a new Rail Station (Newark Liberty Airport Station), and an extension of theNewark Airport existing monorail system (renamed AirTrain Newark). These facilitiesconnect a Newark Liberty International Airport passenger to public rail transportation onthe Northeast Corridor. The collaborating agencies asked for assistance from theCoalition to plan and implement seamless operational coordination for the new service,focusing especially on passenger information. This report contains agency lessonslearned from that effort.The agency representatives comprising the project team requested various typesof assistance from the Coalition beginning three months before station opening inOctober 2001 and continuing over the subsequent two years of expanding ridership. Forexample, the Coalition assisted by:• supporting the pre-opening interagency planning process among NJ Transit,Amtrak and the NY/NJ Port Authority;• planning and delivering an orientation to over 600 people about the multiagencyintermodal station;• assisting the agencies in developing and documenting operating scenariosfor major disruptions in service;I-95 Corridor Coalition - ii - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

• providing multiple assessments and recommendations for improvingpassenger flow and passenger information at the intermodal station; and forimproving passenger information on agency websites and signs at thestations and airport;• compiling an inventory of all the passenger information systems (all agencies)that feed information to the passenger using the intermodal station;• interviewing customer service specialists who staff the intermodal station (twoagencies) to compile the most common customer issues with flow andinformation at the intermodal station – presented those findings• presenting a comprehensive review (CD-ROM) to all the agencies of thepassenger experience in getting information about and ultimately using theintermodal station, with suggestions for improvementsA more technical phase of the Coalition project will be completed by early 2005, and willresult in the refinement of a regional transit passenger information architecture inaccordance with the National ITS Architecture standards – using the passengerinformation inventory completed earlier as a starting place, and using Turbo Architecturesoftware as a documenting tool.Major ConclusionsSome major conclusions from review of the air-rail connection project are:• Agency collaboration has the great value of acknowledging the independence andperspective of each partner in the collaboration; however, it does not have a clearlocus of power to make -- and to complete -- the implementation of complexdecisions.• Collaboration is enhanced through facilitation by a “neutral” third party -- such as theI-95 Corridor Coalition in this case -- whose interest and role is to promote theseamless experience for the customer across agency lines.• The two key challenges to the integration of services provided by separateinstitutions are the integration of information, to describe the full multi-segment tripand the integration of fare collection media to pay for the full multi-segment trip.• The project components most susceptible to problems in multi-year implementationare passenger information systems.• Customer service, operations and technical staff from all the operating agenciesneed to provide input into the design process;• The customer perspective must truly be understood by all and a commitment mustbe made to do what’s best for the customer, regardless of historical leanings andpotentially conflicting policies.Collaboration LessonsThere are vast issues associated with implementation of a large-scale intermodalfacility by three public agencies. The opening of AirTrain Newark service connectingairport passengers to/from public rail transportation represents an ambitious program ofmulti-agency partnership to create a truly intermodal transfer facility. In order to bringabout the joint project, the agencies operated as a collaboration of equals, with no oneI-95 Corridor Coalition - iii - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

organization having an explicit veto power over the acts of the other agencies. Thestrengths and weaknesses of the strategy of collaboration became evident.The addition of the Coalition as a neutral third party proved to be beneficial. Asoperational issues were discussed, the Coalition was able to ask questions, raise issuesand make suggestions to focus on advocacy for the customer outside of a specificagency’s self interest. As Rick Mariani of NJ Transit described it, “the Coalition helpedus to understand that despite our goal of seamlessness, there were many seams thatthe passenger would experience.” Nancy Johnson of the Port Authority of NY/NJdescribed the role of the Coalition as “the people who bring us together and make uschallenge our own way of thinking.”The agencies’ staffs that most need to collaborate to ensure high qualityoperational coordination, particularly in the area of service information, are differentpeople than the agencies’ staffs charged with the responsibility of collaborating acrossagency lines to design and build the facility. Therefore, it’s important to involveoperations and customer service staff in the project design process. They areresponsible for ensuring that customers have the information they need to use theservice.Major Agency Lessons LearnedThe goal of a seamless experience for a passenger’s intermodal trip presentsmany challenges, requiring significant operational coordination. For the interagencyteam working on the Newark air-rail project, integration accomplishments are evidentthroughout the station design and service amenities. Two key integration challenges forthis multi-segment trip proved to be the integration of the fare collection, and theintegration of passenger information. Both of these areas have provided opportunitiesfor continued improvements. Major agency lessons learned include:• The demands of an intermodal transfer station are unique – this was not just anotherrailroad station; the passenger is different and has different expectations and needs.• The intermodal mandate needs to be continued into the operational phase; once theservice is running, the continued attention to service quality has to rise above singleagency budgets and priorities.• The rail services themselves must be designed for the unique role; the space andamenities in a rail station and in the rail car are different for a long-distance travelerwith luggage.Fulfillment of the original goals for the interagency air/rail service project willrequire further activity and continued agency commitment to guarantee the traveler aseamless experience benefiting from the services of the separate agencies. The key tothe success of the service is the successful integration of information to the passenger.A final observation is that a system and measures to monitor the performance ofmulti-jurisdictional and multi-modal facilities that serve a unique customer base needs tobe established, followed by a mechanism to make final improvements needed tooptimize the investments already made.I-95 Corridor Coalition - iv - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

standards – using the passenger information inventory done earlier as a startingplace, and using Turbo Architecture software as a documenting toolMajor Conclusions from the Review of the Newark Liberty International AirportRail Connection Project• Collaboration is enhanced through facilitation by a “neutral” third party -- such as theI-95 Corridor Coalition in this case -- whose interest and role is to promote theseamless experience for the customer across agency lines.• Collaboration among equals is an emerging decision-making structure of our time: ithas the great value of acknowledging the independence of each partner in thecollaboration; however, it does not have a clear locus of power to make, and tocomplete the implementation of complex decisions. Collaboration benefits theoutcome, but is not necessarily easy.• There are two key elements to the integration of services provided by separateinstitutions; integration of information, to describe the full multi-segment trip;integration of fare collection media to pay for the full multi-segment trip. The NewarkLiberty International Airport Rail connection project provides examples of challengesfor both key elements.• During the construction process, budgets are clearly understood, and the politicalcommitment to complete the project on time is acutely felt; after the constructionbudget has been spent, gaining the power to make needed refinements and updatesto the original construction project is more difficult.• The project components most susceptible to problems in multi-year implementationare passenger information systems. Because their technology is evolving at such afast rate, refinements are often lost in the pressing needs of other projects. The final1% of expenditure needed is often difficult to find and, as a result, serious problemsmay be unresolved for an extended period of time.• A post construction contingency fund for after the fact refinements should beconsidered in the budgeting process.• It is clear that all elements of the operating entities need to make their input into thedesign process: exactly when this should occur cannot be pinpointed precisely.• The customer perspective must truly be understood by all and a commitment mustbe made to do what’s best for the customer, regardless of historical leanings andpotentially conflicting policies.The context of the Newark air/rail projectAcross the country, airports are dealing with environmental implications of thetrips they generate. But, few airports have dealt with the creation of entirely newservices, or even entirely new terminal facilities to deal with the challenge of airportground access. This report covers lessons learned in the development of the integratedair/rail service at Newark Liberty International Airport, including the extension of theexisting monorail facility to the Northeast Corridor Amtrak/NJ Transit train line. Thisintermodal station project represented the single largest contribution to date of anyeastern American airport to deal with the serious issues of airport ground access. Itsscale was only recently surpassed by the opening of AirTrain JFK -- the similar conceptused by the Port Authority to provide public transit access to their JFK Airport. TheI-95 Corridor Coalition - 2 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

contribution of the airport agency to the ground service is, at this moment,unprecedented in the American experience.Currently, agencies up and down the eastern seaboard are either contemplatingor actively implementing investments to improve airport access to key downtown activitygenerators. From Lower Manhattan to Orlando, commitments are being made toimprove the connections from major airports. The amount of capital dollars being spenton these specialized linkages is vast. This report to the Coalition concludes that, inaddition to high levels of architectural and physical characteristics of facilities, there isalso a need to plan and execute the operational details that create a unique product for aunique section of the market. Many of these operational details concern (a) the way inwhich information is given to the passenger over the several links of her/his journey and(b) complementary services that passengers need or want such as advance check-in orphysical baggage accommodations. In essence, the collaboration created to undertakethe capital investment needs to be continued and even expanded through the refinementand improvement of the total service concept.The agencies’ staffs that most need to collaborate to ensure high qualityoperational coordination, particularly in the area of service information, are differentpeople than the agencies’ staffs charged with the responsibility of collaborating acrossagency lines to design and build the facility. Therefore, it’s important to involveoperations and customer service staff in the project design process. They areresponsible for ensuring that customers have the information they need to use theservice.How is the air/rail project working?From an analysis of the aggregate market statistics available, it is clear that theNewark project has resulted in a significant increase in overall public mode share, andthus has contributed to lessening the airport passenger’s reliance on taxis, privateautomobiles, and other low occupancy modes. In the 2004 period January 1 – August 1,the station has averaged nearly 3600 passengers per day, resulting in a yearly averageof well over 1.3 million passengers per year. The June – August months of 2004 saw anaverage of just over 4000 daily passengers. The five days beginning July 3, 2004 – overthe long holiday weekend – reached an average just over 5000 passengers each day.By any method of observation, total public transportation ridership to NewarkLiberty International Airport is up sharply as a result of the initiation of the AirTrainservice. This market share is estimated to be 5%, which would make the rail programdirectly comparable with that of Boston and Chicago, greater than that of most Americanrail systems, while lower than that of Washington DC. The core ridership of theseservices seems to be a sub-group of the population that understands how to use a bigcity commuter rail system, and how to travel with relatively small amounts of baggage.Integration accomplishmentsThe accomplishments of the multi-agency project are significant. The user of theshort distance airport monorail and the longer distance train can purchase one ticket,I-95 Corridor Coalition - 3 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

ather than two. Whether the passenger is continuing on with Amtrak or with NJ Transit,one ticket can pay for two separate services. For some, one ticket can cover aContinental flight from anywhere in the system, which includes the fee to the trainstation, and includes the Amtrak fare to several onward destination cities. Anddistinctions between “airport type” amenities and services are apparent at the transferstation. In what is clearly a suburban railroad station, neatly uniformed Airport customerservice representatives patrol the platforms, offering help on just about any issue thatmight arise.At the challenging location of the fare collection area, trained personnel are there24 hours a day to help with the ticketing/fare collection process. In the waiting area forthe airport-bound monorail, information about real time status of all flights from theairport is available exactly where it is needed. Facilities ready to deliver baggage checkinservices are also available and were initially staffed by Continental Airlines. Usageover time has shown that airport passengers connecting by rail use carry-on luggagemore frequently, therefore not needing remote check-in services significantly. Theairline weighed its cost to staff and operate the off-site baggage check-in against thebenefits, and the service was discontinued.Dealing with basic conflicts in policyThere are many examples of situations where the different agencies had differentdemands on their formulation of policies towards the joint facility. In making decisionsabout the operation of the AirTrain Newark, the Port Authority had to keep in mind theimplications for the entire population of airport customers, as well as the implications onthe as-yet-uncompleted AirTrain JFK. The issue of the fee for service between the airterminals and the Train Station was a sensitive one for the Transit advocates; from theview of the Transit advocate, it makes little sense to give a monorail ride for free to thosegoing to parking facilities, while charging for those going to the environmentallypreferable public mode service. From the point of view of fiscal responsibility, theparking user is paying a high price for the parking, and therefore is paying his/her waywithin the total budget process of the airport. The customer using the AirTrain monorailto the parking is not getting anything for free, and is in fact, about to pay a major sum forthe privilege of parking at the airport. In the end, both the Transit agency and airportagency imposed a supplementary charge on the user of the transfer facility, and thatsupplementary charge was consistent with the charge for AirTrain JFK.The concept of collaborative decision-makingThe story of the development Newark International Airport Train Station is thestory of a successful collaboration of separate agencies acting together as equals, eachwith significant roles to play, and none with overarching power over any of the others.The creation of these services and facilities is a classic example of the emerging patternof collaboration within a field of equals. This has good implications and it has badimplications. On the one hand, without collaboration only products or services from asingle agency will ever be created or provided. On the other hand, with collaboration,one agency’s priority item may be on another agency’s “punch-list” at a lower priority,resulting in details left hanging, and solutions not implemented quickly.I-95 Corridor Coalition - 4 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

Making the collaboration workThe Newark Intermodal Connection project is an excellent case study incollaboration. In this model of implementation, there is no one single lead agency thatcan mandate the others to follow its recommendations. Everything, then, must benegotiated. This causes each agency representative to, in effect, play two separateroles; the advocate and defender of the agency’s legitimate self interest, and theadvocate of the best end state for the customer.Rick Mariani of NJ Transit said that the first lesson of the project was that in theapplication of collaboration, “each designee has to have an expansive view of the worldbeyond the organization’s boundaries. That view must be customer centered, that theoutcome must be best for the customer.”In such a working group, Mr. Mariani noted, “the small group has to buy into a setof objectives that they all agree upon. That agreement of the objectives is defined asoutcomes…. [you must] measure each of the debates against the objectives, agreedupon by the agencies they represent.” From a practical viewpoint, Mr. Mariani alsostated that one person needs to be the overall convener of the representatives to movethe project along.Several months before the scheduled opening, an additional “neutral” partnerwas added to the collaboration when the implementing agencies requested assistancefrom the I-95 Corridor Coalition. The collaborating agencies are all members of the I-95Corridor Coalition, so the Coalition had a stake in a successful outcome for all theagencies. The Coalition team, assigned by the Coalition membership, was asked towork with the interagency “Operations and Communications” Committee, a newly formedinteragency group convened to plan for the opening of the new station. As operationalissues were discussed, the Coalition was able to ask questions, raise issues and makesuggestions to focus on advocacy for the customer outside of a specific agency’s selfinterest. As Mr. Mariani described it, “the Coalition helped us to understand that despiteour goal of seamlessness, there were many seams that the passenger wouldexperience.” Nancy Johnson of the Port Authority of NY/NJ described the role of theCoalition as “the people who bring us together and make us challenge our own way ofthinking.”The I-95 Coalition worked with operations staff from each of the agencies todevelop and document scenarios for inter-agency communication steps duringsignificant service disruptions on any of the three rail services. The Port Authorityprovided consultant resources and staff with extensive experience working on theimplementation and operation of airport rail systems from around the world to draftdetailed procedures for the AirTrain Newark operation and incorporated the higher levelinteragency scenarios into that work.The I-95 Corridor Coalition also worked diligently with the interagency committeeto develop an orientation program for over 550 personnel that emphasized theuniqueness of the new intermodal rail station and the role of the various agencies inproviding a seamless experience for the passengers. This orientation program initiatedthe dialogue that would allow the agencies to understand one another better. During thefirst 18 months of operation, the Coalition continued its agency-neutral customerI-95 Corridor Coalition - 5 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

Mr. Mariani of NJ Transit concluded “Never leave customer informationrequirements, and associated system specs, till ‘later’ ... It always results in creating aproject in which it's clear that customers' need for information becomes an afterthought,with a very slim agency ability to address issues due to ‘time’ and ‘funding’ constraintsthat always arise at the end of projects.”At the same time, the design construction and implementation process has to bestructured to allow for major improvements in the technologies to be applied. Mr. Marianipointed out that in the area of information technology, it is simply impossible for theoptimal design to be specified early in the process: the advances in technology arehappening so rapidly that they cannot be resolved at any early point in the design orconstruction process. This leads to a need to define the needs of the customer forinformation early in the process, with the specification of the exact technology for displayto come at a later point.The two elements of service integrationThere are two key elements to be dealt with in the integration of transportationservices provided by several separate service providers; 1) the integration of the farecollection media for the multi-segment trip, and 2) the integration of information aboutthe multi-segment trip.Integration of the fare collection mediaThe requirements of a multi-agency fare collection medium will be morecomplicated than that required by either agency alone. For the connections between thePA’s AirTrain and the NJ Transit Commuter rail, a compromise was reached. TheNewark Liberty International Airport access fee is $5.00, which is added to the basic NJTransit rail transportation ticket cost to the Airport Train Station from anywhere in NewJersey. For travel on NJ Transit between New York City and Newark LibertyInternational Airport the access fee is $7.00. These fees are shared between NJ Transitand the Port Authority to defray the cost of service provision.On the back of the existing paper commuter rail tickets, a magnetic stripe wasadded which activates fare gates at the new station’s central transition point to/from theAirTrain. In the optimal condition, everyone who has purchased a ticket to this rail stationhas already paid the access fee for the operation of the monorail in addition to the basecost of their train trip. The access fee is included in the cost of a ticket purchased from aticket vending machine or a ticket agent. These tickets have the magnetic stripe. Oneswipe of the ticket at the fare gate activates the gate and properly records the revenuesallocated to each agency for transportation and AirTrain monorail access. At facevalue, this was an elegant solution. But, problems surfaced dealing with the culture ofusage.In the NJ Transit commuter rail system, (unlike California’s Bay Area RapidTransit or Washington Metropolitan Area Transit’s METRO, for example) it had not beenthe tradition for the traveler to keep his/her ticket until the end of the journey. Once theI-95 Corridor Coalition - 7 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

conductor had punched the ticket, it was not returned to the passenger. For trips to theairport rail station, new habits had to be learned by both passengers and conductors.The conductors were trained to give the ticket back to the user, advising of its use toaccess the AirTrain portion of the terminal. This new process did not have a smoothstartup, especially on busy commuter trains where conductors barely have theopportunity (or the room) to walk to every car between stops. Some passengersdiscarded the returned ticket or put it away, and in other cases, the conductors simplykept the entire ticket.Beyond this, the NJ Transit system relies quite heavily on longer term (monthly)tickets for use between a commuter’s home and work stations. Passengers holdingmonthly tickets for stations other than Newark Liberty International Airport whooccasionally exit at the Airport Station must purchase a $5.00 ticket upon exiting thetrain to pay the access fee and activate the fare gate. And, for those passengers whochoose to purchase their ticket on board, they pay an extra five dollar surcharge if theiroriginating station had a ticket vending machine or ticket agents on duty. Conductorsissuing these on board tickets ask for the base transportation fare plus the $5.00surcharge, but cannot issue an encoded machine-readable ticket with the airport accessfee included. Having already paid five dollars more than the normal fare for a rail ticket,many of these customers were sometimes confused when they were told to pay yet anadditional five dollars to proceed through the fare gate. All parties we interviewed agreedthat the signage system to make patrons aware of the need to pay the additional fees isvirtually non-existent.Thus, a significant number of NJ Transit patrons are rejected by the automatedfare collection machines at the gate. To these confused patrons must be added thoseholding Amtrak tickets, which could not be designed with the required magnetic strip, butwhich include the access fee if the ticket is written with Newark International LibertyAirport (EWR) as the origin or destination. Sooner or later, holders of the Amtrak ticketsconclude that they must go to the staffed fare collection booth, at which point the railtickets are manually examined, and the user is allowed through.The result of all these variations on ticket format is, in the estimate of those weinterviewed, a problem in which about one quarter of riders are rejected at theautomated gate. (By an unfortunate condition of the automated fare collectionequipment, even those with the proper magnetic striped ticket are surprised to learn thatthe fare gate machines read the magnetic stripe on the tickets upside down from what iscustomary in other machines such as bank ATM’s.) The scene at the fare gate canoften be characterized by frustrated and aggressive instructions from customer servicereps telling passengers how to insert the tickets. Add to that a slow printing speed forthe NJ Transit ticket machines, and the result is a very poor flow of determinedpassengers through the gates.Integration of passenger informationA major conclusion of the Newark Air/Rail project is that a disproportionatenumber of the issues to be addressed, and problems to be overcome, concern theprovision of passenger information. Most of the issues remaining in the management ofI-95 Corridor Coalition - 8 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

the joint services concern passenger information and information about the paymentmechanisms.Signage at the Rail PlatformA major area in which the limitations of collaboration are revealed is the issue ofthe passenger information signs on the platform. It is a subject on which all the partiesagree action has to be taken, but short term solutions are not clear, and long termsolutions are just that – long term. Simply stated, the platforms signs often give outinaccurate train information. While the signs at the bridge level are supported by thelatest information from the dispatching process, the signs on the platform itself are not.They are simply tied to a fixed schedule reflecting only when the trains were expected toarrive. Thus, when a train is more than five (5) minutes late, the signs automatically startto display the next train that is scheduled. Inevitably, this causes anxiety among thosewho believe that their train has been cancelled, or is simply not coming.All parties are aware of the problem, and all have made contributions to solvingthe problem, but it remains unsolved. For example, when Amtrak officials realized howserious was the departure sign issue, they altered the original operating plan (whichcalled for trains from both agencies on one track) to utilize two tracks in each direction,thereby eliminating the situation in which the departure sign would misidentify an NJTransit train as an Amtrak train, and vice versa. The failure of the signage system ledthem to use separate tracks, helping the customer to know where the Amtrak train wouldbe and where the NJ Transit train would be. Associated signs were placed at thetransfer station to guide passengers to the correct tracks. The issue of a patronboarding an Amtrak train, confusing it for a NJ Transit train, has effectively beenaddressed in this manner. But the issue of boarding the wrong NJ Transit train remainsunsolved, particularly in the outbound direction, which has multiple terminal endpointsand trains with different station stops. . NJ Transit conductors have been asked to stepoutside their train and announce which train it is, but NJ Transit crew performance is lessthan 100%.On the inbound platform, virtually all of the trains are going to the same place(Newark and Manhattan), with Amtrak using only Track 1, while NJ Transit uses onlyTrack A. Amtrak management has identified a potentially greater role for Amtrakpersonnel, particularly in the outbound direction. The Amtrak team knows exactly whattrain is proceeding through Newark Penn Station, and thus they can know exactly whatis approaching the outbound track at Newark Liberty International Airport (the nextstation going westbound).. Thus, the staff in the ‘ushers’ booth’ at Newark Penn Stationhave the ability to override the schedule based information on the upstairs multicolormonitors, but they have to do so by retyping the change into the separate NewarkLiberty International Airport station sign system. A major lesson to be learned is thateach element of the passenger information system must be able to communicate withthe other elements, through some form of information system ‘architecture.’ Resultingfrom the early interagency discussions on these problems, the Port Authority purchasedCCTV and Public Address system equipment to assist Amtrak and NJ Transit personnelin information delivery. Everyone agrees that an integrated solution is needed.The goal: seamless, continuous informationUltimately, the long term goal for the service would call for the seamlessinterconnection of information systems. On the enplaning cycle (the path from the trainI-95 Corridor Coalition - 9 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

to the airplane) the airline information is well displayed in the AirTrain portion of the jointTrain/AirTrain terminal complex. A full list of airline arrivals and departures is displayedat the far end of the AirTrain platform, exactly where people are waiting for the airportconnection. In the best of worlds, this airline information would also be displayed atsome location within Penn Station New York, presumably in an area closely associatedwith NJ Transit departing tracks, and physically separate from Long Island Railroaddeparting tracks, connecting to JFK. The 2002 opening of a new, separate waiting areafor NJ Transit patrons makes this concept more feasible than before. Such an airportoriented waiting area would require separate signage showing the departure informationfor only those trains stopping at the Newark Liberty International Airport Train Station.Fortunately, such a sign has already been developed by Continental Airlines for thePenn Station New York operation, but it is underused in its present single location.On the deplaning cycle, (the path from the airplane to the train) the informationflow is a bit more problematic. The new trailblazing graphics from baggage claim levelcapture the real functions of the “AirTrain” very well. The “AirTrain” is described assomething that takes the user to the other terminals, to parking facilities, and also to “thetrains to New York, Newark, Philadelphia, [and] Trenton.” But there is no mention ofLong Branch or Bay Head, NJ – the other destinations directly reachable by trainsserving the Airport. The disciplined use of one color for airport terminal functions, asecond color for airport commercial functions, and a third color for connections to otherplaces on the ground is highly successful. At key moments of decision and passengerflow at the entrance to the AirTrain stations, rail service information is presented to thepassenger, but in a manner that could only be readily understood by a traveler wellfamiliar with the NJ Transit system and its many separate lines and services.Can the rail information be consolidated in one place?A major lesson to be learned is that good information requires specific tools. Thebest place to give out information about airplane departures is exactly where it is nowlocated: on the AirTrain monorail departure platform. The best place to give out routingguidance for the regional rail system would be on the bridge at a point before theindividual has purchased either an Amtrak or an NJ Transit ticket. At this location, astationary computer could be available to all travelers with both quick station-to-stationrouting information, and more detailed address to address trip itinerary planning througha permanent connection to agency trip planning systems. Both NJ Transit’s quickstation to station planner and the more elaborate interface with the address to addresssystem should be implemented on a self service basis, with the occasional use by theTrain Station Staff.Can the services at the station be unified?The total picture of customer service within the station is one of severalorganizations trying to help the customer simultaneously—all of which can be confusingto the customer! The result of this multi-agency, multi-responsibility structure is apresentation to the user which is less “seamless” than is desired. Most of theparticipants we interviewed would like to see one set of staff at the station, allempowered to deal with whatever issue the customer brings up. In the best of all worlds,there would be one staff with a seamless mandate, --to solve whatever problem thatcustomer has. In order to accomplish this, roles would have to be merged.I-95 Corridor Coalition - 10 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

At the moment, the division of roles and responsibilities is somewhat confusing tothe user. The fare gate managers are tasked with the responsibility to deal withticketing/entry issues on a fair and equitable basis. They must make judgments aboutwhen to accept an Amtrak ticket (an entirely manual process) and when to override therules. (For example, when a late night passenger buys a ticket, and spends more thanfive dollars to enter the train area, that same passenger is supposed to be charged anadditional five dollars to escape back into the airport to find a taxi cab after missing atrain connection.) While the Customer Service Representatives are not authorized tomake decisions at the fare gate, they sometimes become the advocate of the needs ofthe passenger.The hypothetical team could be called the Newark Liberty International AirportTrain Station Customer Representatives; theoretically, each staff member would beempowered to give advice about Continental/Amtrak tickets (but not to sell themdirectly), answer questions about train routings to any destination, advise on how toproceed through the fare gates, accept/reject Amtrak tickets at the fare gate, and giveout information about the status/location of outgoing flights from the Airport. The staffwould be trained about the problems associated with the on-platform train displays, andhave access to the best train information.Major Agency lessons learnedThe demands of an intermodal transfer station are uniqueThe first lesson: an intermodal transfer facility between air passengers and railpassengers is NOT just another train station and it is NOT just another airport terminal. Itis a place where passengers have information requirements far different from therequirements of commuters who make a daily decision over and over. A keyobservation about the air/rail facility is the high proportion of users who are not used tothe particular trip they are taking. A user of the train may be going to the West Coast forthe first time, to Europe for the first time, or to South or Central America for the first time.Thus, the psychological state of the passenger is of a new user, whether or not the userhas used the train before. Of course, all of the non-resident users of the station areunfamiliar with the facilities. The result of all of this is that the information needs of theuser are intense and problematic.For many in the rail agencies, the project was “just another station.” A majorlesson to be learned from this experience is that this is not true: it is not just anotherstation. It has to be seen in a broader context of the responsibility of the agencies tocarry out higher level political decisions. It is a facility in which a higher level of service ismatched with a significantly higher fare. It has been argued elsewhere that the future ofthe public transportation will hinge on the ability to create separate market products forseparate market groups, something the publicly subsidized industry has beenunderstandably reticent to do. Indeed, a recent study sponsored by the TransportationResearch Board concluded that there is no ‘market’ for airport ground access services;there are a series of unique market segments.I-95 Corridor Coalition - 11 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

The intermodal mandate needs to be continued into the operational phaseWe have observed that airport access services are different from the dailymandate of the commuter rail agency, and different from the usual set of responsibilitiesundertaken by an airport agency. The political process, in city after city, has called outairport access as a challenge above and beyond the set of services for the dailycommute. From a societal point of view, there is no question that this priority isaccepted at the highest political level. But when it gets down to the details, the moneyhas been spent and agencies are legitimately in a budget crunch. This means that thesystems simply do not work as well as they should. The need to deal with airport accessis often acknowledged in the capital prioritization process, but not in the operatingbudget process.This project review shows that an airport transfer station is qualitatively differentin its requirements from a standard commuter rail station. By its very nature, one half ofthe potential market is simply unfamiliar with the terms, the names and details of theoperations of the services at this station. Thus, the format of passenger information, theformat of a sign, the nomenclature for the track numbers, and the nature of the throughticket – all of these are requirements of a specialized product that is demanded of thespecial context of that product. Expectations of the passengers are different. Thecommuter is using the train for the primary segment of his/her trip. For the airlinepassenger, the train is the connecting segment, resulting in different information needsand a higher level of anxiety about schedules and status.One the one hand, the railroad operator should openly embrace the concept thatthis station is different, that this set of customers are different, and that this high-faremarket has demands that are qualitatively different than the rest of the market. On theother hand, the airport authority has an obligation to direct passengers to the rail service,to explain the rail service, and to smooth over inherent difficulties in the physical act oftransfer. The role of each can be separate, but mutually supportive.Messages should be clear, and functions should be clear. Many, but not all, ofour interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with early marketing of the generic AirTrainas a new mode which connects both Newark and JFK airports with Manhattan, which itdoes not do. We heard consistent reports of optimistic riders entering Penn Station andrequesting the location of the AirTrain to Newark Liberty International Airport. Uponbeing informed that NJ Transit and Amtrak provided service to the Newark LibertyInternational Airport Train Station, users were reported to be resistant to believe it. Theattempt to create an agency-wide brand did not work, and caused considerableconfusion. By comparison, the trailblazing graphics at Newark are precise and exactabout what the AirTrain does, and implicitly what it does not do. In a similar manner, therevised AirTrain website is markedly improved in its description of what the AirTrain isand is not; what it does do and what it does not.Nancy Johnson of the Port Authority explained that the lessons learned from theNewark experience are already being applied in the design of the JFK service toJamaica. The lessons, said Johnson, are “about information, and how to provideinformation, how to tell them clearly what they need to know, and do not make itcomplex.” As an example, lessons learned from the Newark experience can be seen inthe design of the new JFK AirTrain website. There, the traveler can choose to use a “tripplanner” on the home page of the website. A simple drop down menu offers a variety ofI-95 Corridor Coalition - 12 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004

major destinations. Upon clicking a chosen destination, carefully phrased text describesthe way to get to the connecting station (there are two) and the services available at thatstation. This is a great improvement over earlier attempts to provide ground accessdescriptions for the initial Newark AirTrain project.The rail services themselves must be designed for the unique roleHaving dealt with the question of the management of the transfer facility, thereremains the appropriateness of the rail service itself. A train designed to carry amaximum number of commuters to/from work each day is not designed to facilitate thelong distance traveler with luggage. A commuter rail station that cannot accommodateovernight parking wasn’t designed with the long distance traveler in mind. It wasreported to us that local conductors have described those with major baggage as asafety hazard to the regular users. And, given that there is no place to put the baggageother than over the heads of existing passengers on a fast moving train, this may not beuntrue. Reportedly, resentment has been reported by the daily commuters who have notonly an additional station stop worsening their overall travel time, but having to climbover baggage otherwise not associated with the commuter experience.ConclusionsThe rail station serving the Newark Liberty International Airport is a remarkableachievement as a major capital facility, carefully financed, designed and built. The roleof the airport agency in collaboration with the rail agencies was, at its time, almost totallyunprecedented. What is less clear concerns the remaining details needed to maximizethe positive impact of its operations. At the time of capital planning and construction,deadlines forced all the parties into a working partnership. Now, the capital planningdeadlines and milestones have been met and accomplished. What remains are a seriesof refinements to the physical plant, and to the way in which the services are offered tothe public in a seamless manner. With the obvious deadlines of construction a thing ofthe past, the same spirit of urgency needs to be applied to the smaller physical andoperational challenges.At present, a major theme in transportation management (indeed in themanagement of the very agencies providing services at the Newark Liberty InternationalAirport Rail Station) is the need to monitor the performance of the system as seen andexperienced by the user. Therefore, the remaining challenge observed by the projectteam is to establish a system and measures to monitor the performance of multijurisdictionaland multi-modal facilities that serve a unique customer base, followed by amechanism to make final improvements needed to optimize the investments alreadymade.I-95 Corridor Coalition - 13 - Newark AirTrainOctober 2004