CHAPTERNINEDigital SignaturesA digital signature is the digital analogue of a handwritten signature. The signature of amessage is data dependent on some secret known only to the signer and on the content ofthe message. A digital signature must be verifiable without access to the signer’s privatekey.9.1 RSA Signature SchemeThe RSA signature scheme is a signature scheme with message recovery — the signedmessage is recovered from the signature.Key generation. This step is exactly as for RSA enciphering. The signer generates apublic key (e, n) and guards a private key (d, n), where n = pq is the product of two largeprimes.Signature generation. Encode the message m in Z/nZ, and output the signature s =m d ∈ Z/nZ, computed using the private key (d, n).Verification. Compute m = s e ∈ Z/nZ.9.2 ElGamal Signature SchemeThe ElGamal signature scheme requires an encoding of the message m as an element ofZ/(p − 1)Z.Key generation. This step is exactly as for ElGamal enciphering. The signer generatesa public key (p, a, c), where c = a x mod p, and guards the private key (p, a, x), where ais a primitive element of Z/pZ and x is an integer in the range 1 ≤ x < p − 1 withGCD(x, p − 1) = 1.Signature generation. The signer selects a random secret integer k in the range 1 ≤79
k < p − 1 with GCD(k, p − 1) = 1, and computesr = a k mod p and s = l(m − rx) mod (p − 1),where l = k −1 mod (p − 1), and the signature (r, s) is output.Note that r is well-defined in Z/pZ, but that to form s it is necessary to choose a minimalpositive integer representative and reinterpret it mod(p − 1).Verifcation. The signature is verified first that 1 ≤ r ≤ p − 1, or rejected. The valuesv 1 = c r r s mod p, and v 2 = a m mod p,are next computed, and the equality v 1 = v 2 is verified or the signature rejected.Proof of equality. v 1 = c r a kl(m−xr) = a xr a m−xr = a m = v 2 .9.3 Chaum’s Blind Signature SchemeChaum’s blind signature scheme is an RSA-based scheme, adapted for blind signatures.In the protocol below we assume that Bob has set up a public RSA key (e, n) with correspondingprivate key (d, n), so that Bob’s RSA signature functions is S B (m) = m d .1. Initial setup: Alice obtains Bob’s public key (e, n) and chooses a randompublic session key k, such that 0 < k < n and GCD(k, n) = 1.2. Blinding: Alice computes m ∗ = mk e , and sends m ∗ to Bob.3. Signing: Bob computes s ∗ = m ∗d , which he sends back to Alice.4. Unblinding: Alice computes s = k −1 s ∗ , which equals S B (m) = m d .As an application we mention a naive digital cash scheme. Suppose that Alice wants towithdraw a digital $100 from her account to be spent anonymously at a later date. Shewrites 1000 notes from the bank, each certifying its value to be $100, and blinds them,each with a separate session key. The bank asks for the session keys to 999 of these notes,verifies that each has the correct value, and blindly signs the last one, deducting $100 fromher account, and returns the blinded signed $100 note to Alice for use as cash.9.4 Digital Cash SchemesWe won’t go into details of a particular digital cash protocol, but list the ideal propertieswhich such a scheme should satisfy, as spelled out by Okomoto and Ohta in 1991(Crypto’91).1. Digital cash can be sent securely through an insecure channel.2. Digital cash can not be copied or reused.80 Chapter 9. Digital Signatures
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Author (David R. Kohel) /Title (Cry
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CONTENTS1 Introduction to Cryptogra
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PrefaceWhen embarking on a project
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information. We introduce here some
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ut strings in A ∗ map injectively
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CHAPTERTWOClassical Cryptography2.1
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LV MJ CW XP QO IG EZ NB YH UA DS RK
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As a special case, consider 2-chara
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Note that if d k = 1, then we omit
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ExercisesSubstitution ciphersExerci
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Ciphertext-only AttackThe cryptanal
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of size n, suppose that p i is the
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Note that ZKZ and KZA are substring
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Checking possible keys, the partial
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which has no common factors with p
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sage: p = 2^32+61sage: m = (p-1).qu
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sage: a5 := a^n5sage: c5 := c^n5sag
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The application of this function E
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5. (∗) How many elements a of G h
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1. The value f(0) of the polynomial