Principles and practices of EU external representation - Asser Institute

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CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2012/5Blockmans and Wesseland the G20’s impact on the EU and its legal order. First, the authors deal withthe EU’s unique membership of the G20, as it is the only non-state member ofthe club. Also, the EU’s G20 membership amplifies the voices of the EU MemberStates already at the table, as they also have the strongest voice in draftingthe EU’s position for G20 meetings. The question arises to what extent smallerEU Member States, being excluded from direct participation in G20 meetings,have a say on the EU position at the G20. Furthermore, the ‘double’ representationof four EU Member States enables them to a certain extent to bypassthe European decision-making process. In order to solve this, EU MemberStates increasingly coordinate before a G20 summit, but have no control overthe behaviour of their peers during such a summit. The authors answer thequestion to what extent the EU’s basic treaties prescribe such coordination. Inthe second part of their contribution, the authors address the strong influenceof the G20 process on decisions taken at the EU level. The authors show thatthe Union’s good follow-up on G20 decisions allows it to move faster internallyand that the EU and the G20 thus have the potential to further eachother’s agendas.Whereas the topics covered in the contributions cast a wide net over thenew legal questions and challenges with which the European Union’s institutionalframework and law is currently faced, this working paper does by nomeans pretend to be exhaustive. Rather, by addressing ‘selected legal aspects’of the principles and practice pertaining to the external representation of theEuropean Union, the working paper offers new insights into the rapidly developingfield of EU external relations law.Finally, a word of thanks is in place. This working paper has been preparedin the framework of the LISBOAN Workshop ‘EU external representation andthe reform of international contexts: practices after Lisbon’, organised byDr Louise van Schaik (Netherlands Institute of International Relations) andDr Edith Drieskens (University of Leuven), with the support of the LifelongLearning Programme of the European Union, at the Clingendael Institute inThe Hague on 21-22 February 2012. The contributors assembled here aregrateful to the convenors of the LISBOAN workshop for allowing them to publishtheir revised contributions in the working papers series of the Centre forthe Law of EU External Relations.10
The principle of loyal co-operation: A ‘master key’ for EU external representation?The principle of loyal co-operation:A ‘master key’ for EU external representation?Federico Casolari1. IntroductionThe principle of loyal co-operation (also known as duty of sincere co-operation)between the Member States of the European Union (EU) and the EU institutionalactors lies at the very heart of the European integration process. The EUpractice, and in particular the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ),has made clear its systemic role in ensuring, to use Halberstam’s words, ‘theproper functioning of the system of governance as a whole’. 1 In particular, theprinciple – which is at the same time expression of the international principleof good faith, of the fidelity principle characterizing the federal systems (‘Bundestreue’),and of the requirement of unity underlying the European integrationprocess – results strictly linked with other fundamental principles of the EUlegal order, such as effectiveness and supremacy. 2 The loyal cooperation hasbeen taken into consideration in the different facets of the EU action, and loyaltyduties have been established to ensure the internal functioning of theUnion, as well as its external action. This paper intends to highlight the role theprinciple of loyalty may play in order to ensure a more effective representationof the European Union 3 in international fora. It will thus not give an exhaustivereview of the external aspect of the loyalty duties; rather, it will explore theircontribution to the objective, explicitly mentioned in the founding Treaties, topromote EU values and interests in the relations with the wider world (Article3(5) TEU). 4For the sake of clarity, it is convenient to provide first a brief description ofthe meaning of the term ‘representation’ that is used in this paper. Generally1 D. Halberstam, ‘The Political Morality of Federal System’, 90 Virginia Law Review (2004)101, at 104.2 For a general overview, see M. Blanquet, ‘L’article 5 du traité C.E.E. – Recherche sur lesobligations de fidélité des Etats membres de la Communauté’ Librairie générale de droit et dejurisprudence, Paris, 1994; M. Blanquet, ‘Article I-5’, in L. Burgorgue-Larsen, A. Levade, F. Picod(eds.) ‘Traité établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe’, vol. 1, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007, 96; K.Mortelmans, ‘The Principle of Loyalty to the Community (Article 5 EC) and the Obligations of theCommunity Institutions’, 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (1998) 67; O.Porchia, ‘Principi dell’ordinamento europeo’, Bologna: Zanichelli,2008.3 On the basis of the succession of the European Union to the European Community (Art. 1TEU, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty), this paper refers to the European Union without distinguishingbetween the EU and EC framework, except where that distinction is relevant.4 For a recent illustration of the application of loyalty duties in the field of external relations,see E. Neframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field ofEU External Relations’, 47 Common Market Law Review (2010) 323, and the contribution by P.Van Elsuwege and H. Merket in this volume.11CLEER WORKING PAPERS 2012/5
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