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IndonesiaTaming the untameable: Indonesia’s effort to control the growing tideof digital communicationsAnonymousAnonymousIntroductionFollowing three decades of a restrictive Suharto-ledgovernment characterised by “politicalrepression and ideological surveillance,” 1 Indonesiahas morphed into a relatively open society withmore democratic space. Along with this openness, ithas witnessed a massive transformation in the areaof information and communications technologies(ICTs). Indonesia has the fourth largest mobile phonemarket in the world with 278 million subscribers. 2 By2015, it is expected that nearly 115 million will haveaccess to the internet. 3 The country has been hailedby civil society activists as “regional champion forfreedom of expression.” 4 Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta,is called the “social media capital of the world” withmore tweets coming from the city than any othercapital in the world. 5 It is the only country in the regionto provide protection of free speech through alegal framework called the Transparency of PublicInformation Law, which guarantees access to stateinformation, and the Press Law, which protects journalisticwork as “an important component of […] freespeech and access to information.” 6At the same time, legal frameworks continue totightly limit basic freedoms, justified by argumentsconcerning traditional values or the maintenance ofnational security. This is demonstrated through notablelegal setbacks, such as the Mass OrganisationLaw that restricts the right to freedom of association.The Intelligence Law of 2011 enforces furtherrestrictions by allowing the security apparatus “sig-1 Bünte, M., & Ufen, A. (eds.) (2009). Democratisation in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Oxford: Routledge.2 Indonesia’s population is 247 million. Due to multiple phonesubscriptions, this number of mobile subscribers is higher thanthe population. www.redwing-asia.com/market-data/market-datatelecoms3 www.slideshare.net/OnDevice/indonesia-the-social-media-capitalof-the-world4 Southeast Asian Press Alliance. (2013, July 8). Indonesia’s OrmasLaw: A ready weapon against civil society and free speech. IFEX.https://ifex.org/indonesia/2013/07/08/ormas_law5 www.slideshare.net/OnDevice/indonesia-the-social-media-capitalof-the-world6 Southeast Asian Press Alliance. (2013, July 8). Op. cit.nificant latitude in intelligence gathering aimed at‘opponents’ of ‘national stability’.” 7The country’s first and only cyber law, the ElectronicInformation and Transaction Law, prohibitsthe publishing of content to do with gambling, anddefamation and threats. The Indonesian parliamenthas also passed an Anti-pornography Law, which isroutinely used to block LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexualand transgender) content on the internet. 8 In addition,the country has also adopted a number oflaws that prohibit defamation of religion, which isused broadly to block content that provides alternativeviews on Islam, the religion of the majority ofIndonesians.While the boundaries of expression havewidened notably, and are more open generallyin Indonesia than in its regional counterparts,the country is a mixed picture of freedom of expression.As suggested, norms of expression arereinforced through a variety of anti-pornographic,anti-blasphemy and anti-defamation laws. In legalterms and in practice, Indonesia has also regularlydemonstrated that “national security” or “nationalstability” interests trump freedom of expression.While censorship is overt, surveillance is less visiblebut also pervasive, with each carried out bydifferent government agencies.This report looks at communications surveillancein Indonesia by examining the recentpurchases of sophisticated surveillance equipmentby the military. It opens up questions about thepotential use of this new equipment and what thismeans for freedom of expression in the country.Surveillance +In the book Democratisation of Post-Suharto Indonesia,Jun Honna argues that “political repressionand ideological surveillance were the major toolsused” by Suharto to remain in power. 9 These “politico-ideological”surveillance tactics were carriedout principally by the military, targeting journalists,7 Ibid.8 Citizen Lab and Canada Centre for Global Security Studies. (2014).Islands of Control, Islands of Resistance: Monitoring the 2013Indonesian IGF. www.citizenlab.org/briefs/29-igf-indonesia/29-igfindonesia.pdf9 Bünte, M., & Ufen, A. (eds.) (2009). Op. cit., p 230.students, intellectuals and activists, essentiallymuzzling dissenting voices in the country. Whilea relatively free media and civil society activismhave flourished in the wake of Suharto’s removal,the practice of military surveillance continues. TheIndonesian military continues to project a role asthe protector of national unity, and to demarcatethe limits of political and ideological expression inthe country through a range of practices, includingsurveillance.Complementing its traditional intelligence collectingapproaches, and in parallel with the massivegrowth of internet use, the military is expanding itsonline surveillance capability. In January 2013, theJakarta Globe reported that Indonesia’s Ministry ofDefence purchased GBP 4.2 million (USD 6.7million)worth of surveillance products from Gamma Group,a UK-based company that provides sophisticatedsurveillance equipment to governments. 10 While theexact type of product procured was not disclosed,Gamma Group sells products ranging from mobilesurveillance vans to software like FinFisher, whichis capable of monitoring all internet communicationin the country.In fact, FinFisher command and control serverswere already found to be at work in Indonesiain 2012. According to a report released by CitizenLab in 2012, FinFisher products were found on severalIndonesian internet service providers (ISPs). 11The Indonesian government has not publicly statedif it is the one deploying this intrusive software orclarified its intended use. Gamma Group, on theother hand, has stated that it only provides servicesto governments and not private individuals andcompanies. Based on these statements, one cansurmise that complex communication surveillancemachinery is in place in Indonesia, and its use onlyseems to be expanding over time.Rights activists are concerned about the implicationsof these findings. “I’m afraid there’re notenough mechanisms and self-control to ensure thatthis technology is not abused,” Andreas Harsono,Indonesia researcher with Human Rights Watch,told the Jakarta Globe. “Indonesia has no thirdpartyintelligence gathering mechanism – be [it] acourt or a legislative mechanism – to approve wiretapping.The Gamma equipment is a nightmare.” 12The Intelligence Law is applied to intelligencegathering activities in Indonesia. When an updated10 Vit, J. (2013, September 25). TNI surveillance purchase triggersconcern in Indonesia. Jakarta Globe. www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/tni-surveillance-purchase-triggers-concern-in-indonesia11 Citizen Lab and Canada Centre for Global Security Studies. (2014).Op. cit.12 Vit, J. (2013, September 25). Op. cit.version of the law was passed in 2011, rights groupscriticised it for its expansive scope and its vaguewording, which allows for “significant intelligencegathering over opponents of national stability.” 13The government has referred to terrorism, includingtwo bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, aswell as multiple attacks in Jakarta, as justificationfor surveillance. While the government has saidsurveillance products will be used “only for strategicintelligence,” 14 rights groups and activists havewarned that it could be used to monitor, and potentiallysilence, civil society and media.The current situation in West Papua illustratesthe broad application of the government’s definitionof “opponents of national stability”. West Papua 15is the easternmost province of Indonesia with alarge presence of the military’s Special Forces tocombat the Papuan separatist movement, the FreePapua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka orOPM), who have been engaged in armed resistance.International media are blocked from entering theprovince and international organisations have beenprevented from operating in the region.In 2011, a report by Human Rights Watch, citinginternal military documents, asserted that militarysurveillance in the province monitored not onlythe OPM, but a “broad swathe of Papuan political,traditional, and religious leaders and civil societygroups.” 16 This surveillance was carried out entirelywithout “judicial warrant and without clearevidence of wrongdoing.” 17 The internal documentsalso showed that the intention of the governmentwas to prevent the free flow of information to andfrom Papua. According to one document: “Currentpolitical activity [e.g. by civil society and students]in Papua is very dangerous compared to the activitiesof Papuan armed groups, because [civil society]influence already reaches abroad.” 18Physical surveillance and rudimentary surveillancetactics are well known by Papuan activists andjournalists. An Indonesian journalist who wishedto remain anonymous stated in an interview thatphone tapping is common. “When you are in Papuaand if you are calling someone, you can hear otherpeople talking. It is called crossed lines, when it isaccidental. In Papua, every call you make is like13 Southeast Asian Press Alliance. (2013, July 8). Op. cit.14 Vit, J. (2013, September 25). Op. cit.15 Now divided into Papua and West Papua.16 Human Rights Watch. (2011, August 14). Indonesia: Militarydocuments reveal unlawful spying in Papua. Human Rights Watch.www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/14/indonesia-military-documentsreveal-unlawful-spying-papua17 Vit, J. (2013, September 25). Op. cit.18 Human Rights Watch. (2011, August 14). Op. cit.140 / Global Information Society Watchindonesia / 141