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polandAccess to telecommunication data in Poland: Specific problemsand general conclusionsPanoptykon FoundationKatarzyna Szymielewicz and Anna Walkowiakpanoptykon.orgIntroductionPoland, as a member state of the European Union,was obliged to introduce mandatory telecommunicationdata retention as part of the implementationof the so-called Data Retention Directive. 1 As a result,all telecommunications service providers in Polandhave to collect and store so-called metadata (i.e.data showing originator, destination, date and time)for at least 12 months. According to the directive,such data should be made available to the competentnational authorities only in specific cases andin accordance with national law for the purpose ofthe investigation, detection and prosecution of seriouscrimes (as defined by relevant national law). 2However, when implementing the directive, Polandfailed to introduce these rules regarding the useof telecommunications data for law enforcementpurposes. As a result, such information – collectedabout every person using telecommunication servicesin Poland – is used even in the prosecution ofcommon crimes (like theft) and for the sake of crimeprevention.Moreover, Polish law does not provide for anysafeguards that would prevent abuses, such as anexternal supervisory mechanism, court oversight,the obligation to inform the person concernedabout the use of his or her data or the obligation todestroy data after the end of proceedings. 31 European Union. (2006). Directive 2006/24/EC of the EuropeanParliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retentionof data generated or processed in connection with the provision ofpublicly available electronic communications services or of publiccommunications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF2 European Union. (2006). Op. cit.3 Panoptykon Foundation. (2012, April 3). How many times did thestate authorities reach out for our private telecommunications datain 2011? We publish the latest research. Panoptykon Foundation.panoptykon.org/wiadomosc/how-many-times-did-state-authorities-reach-out-our-private-telecommunications-data-2011-wePolicy and political backgroundThe distinction between security and freedom andthe argument that it is not possible to have bothare very powerful notions in Polish public debate. Italso seems to be commonly accepted that if a certainactivity is related to national security, it shouldbe kept secret by default. The argument “becauseit is useful for law enforcement, it must be good forpublic security” is raised whenever the lack of accountabilityof intelligence agencies is mentioned.In addition, law enforcement and intelligence agencieshave a strong influence in drafting the laws thatare meant to regulate their powers.This political climate has enabled what humanrights advocates perceive as possibly the worstimplementation of the Data Retention Directive:Poland opted for the longest possible data retentionperiod (24 months) and, as mentioned, failedto introduce any legal safeguards. Therefore, Polishregulation providing for retention and use oftelecommunications metadata has been heavilycriticised by human rights advocates, the Ombudsmanand the national Data Protection Authority.As a result of persistent pressure exerted byboth human rights organisations and public authorities,in 2011 this legal landscape gradually startedto change. The Ombudsman and Prosecutor Generalfiled six official complaints to the ConstitutionalCourt, arguing that various powers attributed to intelligenceand law enforcement (including the useof telecommunication data) should be limited. Thiscase is still pending. 4 In January 2013 the period oftelecommunications data retention was shortenedto 12 months, but other problems remained. 5 Furtherchanges, however, are expected because oftwo legislative proposals that are under discussion:(i) a draft law introducing a special commission tosupervise intelligence agencies that investigatecomplaints from individuals; and (ii) a draft law lim-4 Klicki, W. (2014, April 4). Służby przed Trybunałem. FundacjaPanoptykon. panoptykon.org/wiadomosc/sluzby-przedtrybunalem5 Klicki, W., & Szymielewicz, K. (2012, October 15). Sejmjednomyślnie przyjął nowelizację Prawa telekomunikacyjnego.Fundacja Panoptykon. panoptykon.org/wiadomosc/sejmjednomyslnie-przyjal-nowelizacje-prawa-telekomunikacyjnegoiting the access to citizens’ telecommunication databy intelligence agencies. 6Surveilling the media:The case of Bogdan WróblewskiIn 2010 one of the most influential Polish dailynewspapers, Gazeta Wyborcza, published an articleclaiming that several journalists who specialised inpolitics were under illegal surveillance. Polish intelligenceagencies – namely the Internal SecurityAgency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznegoor ABW) and the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau(Centralne Biuro Antykorupcyjne or CBA) – gainedaccess to telecommunications data retained forpublic security purposes to spy on at least 10 journalistsbetween 2005 and 2007. The intelligenceagencies denied these allegations, but proof oftheir requests sent to telecommunications serviceproviders proved otherwise. Bogdan Wróblewski,author of the abovementioned article, was amongthe alleged victims of illegal surveillance.According to published information, the CBA spiedon Wróblewski (back then a journalist specialised incourt cases, now at the Supreme Audit Office, thehighest public auditing body) by accessing andanalysing his telephone accounts for six months – accountswhich revealed a list of his contacts, includingjournalistic sources. This happened exactly when Wróblewskiwas working on critical articles dealing withspecial operations conducted by the CBA, which cameunder public scrutiny because of various irregularities.It seemed clear that the CBA tried to find out who Wróblewski’ssources of information were.Because of these suspicions, the public prosecutorconducted an investigation to verify whetherintelligence agencies acted against the law. Oddlyenough, although there was evidence that theCBA and ABW asked telecommunications serviceproviders for data related to journalistic activity,the investigation was closed due to “the failure todetect a crime”. Most of the records of the prosecutor’sproceedings were classified, which made itvery difficult for individuals concerned to challengethe outcome. 76 Ministry of the Interior. (2013). Projekt ustawy o KomisjiKontroli Służb Specjalnych. legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/docs//2/181401/181409/181410/dokument87492.pdf; Senateof the Republic of Poland. (2014). Projekt ustawy o zmianieniektórych ustaw w zakresie przepisów dotyczących uzyskiwania iprzetwarzania przez uprawnione podmioty danych gromadzonychprzez przedsiębiorców telekomunikacyjnych. www.senat.gov.pl/gfx/senat/userfiles/_public/k8/komisje/2014/kpcpp/materialy/wniosek_nik_bilingi03120020140221095724.pdf7 Czuchowski, W. (2010, October 8). Dziennikarze nacelowniku służb specjalnych. Gazeta Wyborcza. wyborcza.pl/1,76842,8480752,Dziennikarze_na_celowniku_sluzb_specjalnych.html .Due to a lack of other legal measures availableto him, in 2011 Wróblewski decided to sue the CBAin civil proceedings, indicating that their actionsviolated his right to privacy, secrecy of correspondence,freedom of expression and freedom of thepress. Wróblewski obtained additional supportfrom civil society organisations that submitted theiropinions to the court (amicus curiae), emphasisinghuman rights violations. One of those organisationswas the Panoptykon Foundation. 8In 2012, a district court in Warsaw ruled that theuse of Wróblewski’s billing data by the CBA violatedhis right to privacy and constituted “typical surveillancefor unknown purposes”. According to thejudge, the CBA should be able to use billing dataonly for the purpose of anti-corruption proceedings(in accordance with the statutory duties of thisagency). The court ordered the CBA to apologise toWróblewski and to delete all data relating to himthat the agency had obtained. 9 The Court of Appealdismissed the CBA’s appeal and upheld the ruling –finally, the CBA publicly apologised. 10Wróblewski’s case showed that imposing theobligation on telecommunications service providersto retain and give intelligence agencies accessto their clients’ data without adequate safeguardsinevitably leads to human rights violations. Whatturned out to be very problematic in this case is thatPolish law does not require intelligence agencies todelete data once it is no longer necessary to retainit. As a result it may be possible to collect and retaindata about a given person for years, even thoughhe or she is not formally suspected of any crime. Itis sufficient for intelligence agencies to prove thatsuch person belongs to a “group under special scrutiny”for security purposes. Security purposes varyfrom allegations of belonging to a terrorist organisationto being part of a religious, political or sexualminority – and in many cases these groups do notjustify surveillance.Without introducing strict control over intelligenceagencies’ powers to access citizens’telecommunications data, and without further legal8 Panoptykon Foundation. (2011). Opinia przyjaciela sądu (amicuscuriae) Fundacji Panoptykon w postępowaniu Bogdan Wróblewskiprzeciwko CBA. panoptykon.org/sites/panoptykon.org/files/opinia_wroblewski.pdf9 Klicki, W. (2012, April 26). Zwycięstwo dziennikarza w sporze zCBA – będą przeprosiny. Panoptykon Foundation. panoptykon.org/wiadomosc/zwyciestwo-dziennikarza-w-sporze-z-cba-bedaprzeprosiny10 Gazeta Wyborcza. (2013, April 26). CBA ma przeprosić dziennikarza„Gazety Wyborczej“ Bogdana Wróblewskiego za to, że za rządówPiS kontrolowało jego billingi telefoniczne. Gazeta Wyborcza.wyborcza.pl/1,76842,13815430,CBA_ma_przeprosic_dziennikarza__Gazety_Wyborczej_.html#ixzz32LVDhTpP198 / Global Information Society Watch poland / 199