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(ISPs), 18 a further rights violation, if the allegationsare true.Recently, hundreds of police officers who haveparticipated in the graft investigation into the governmenthave also been detained on espionagecharges. 19These developments have deepened polarisationin society, making it easier for the increasinglydraconian surveillance laws to find acceptance. TheAKP has also been able to retain its votes in the30 March local elections 20 and later have its presidentialcandidate, none other than Prime MinisterErdoğan himself, get elected in the first round of thecountry’s first-ever popular presidential electionon 10 August, in spite of serious graft allegations,harsher internet controls, and Orwellian powers beinggranted to the country’s spy agency.ConclusionsInternet users and the global public are increasinglymore sensitive about unchecked government surveillance,particularly following Edward Snowden’srevelations about the extent of US National SecurityAgency (NSA) surveillance – which was not asecret for many concerned with surveillance 21 priorto Snowden’s leaks. Now world governments seemto be finding ever more intrusive ways of interceptingcommunications. Globally, we can forget aboutprivacy.However, the situation in Turkey seems to bemore alarming, as there is little public discussion onthe effects of unchecked surveillance. To the contrary,an overwhelming majority of the public seemsto be content with the stricter powers of the government,if the outcomes of the two recent electionsare any indication. Debate on how to protect citizensfrom unnecessary and unchecked governmentsurveillance has taken place in Turkey, but onlyamong civil society groups, rights organisationsand academics. International bodies, includingthe European Union (EU), have reacted to Turkey’sstricter surveillance laws, but these have had littleeffect on the government’s plans to centralise surveillancepowers.In addition to this depressing milieu, it shouldbe noted that in some of the ongoing wiretappingcases, it is not yet clear who has done the eavesdropping.Although legally the telecoms body TİBhas the right to wiretap phone lines based on courtorders, intelligence units of the police force and thegendarmerie also have some technical capabilitiesto monitor communications, although the extent ofthese capabilities is debated. 22 Jurists and lawyershave offered different interpretations as to what islegal, usually depending on their political stanceand level of partisanship. Ambiguity concerningwho is authorised to monitor real-life or electroniccommunications in Turkey is a direct consequenceof the increasing polarisation, which helps the administrationjustify and acquire consent for goingafter “parallel structures”, or other imagined enemies,to consolidate Erdoğan’s supporters.History has shown time and again that eventhe most democratic government will abuse widespreadsurveillance powers if it has them. In theTurkish case, the unchecked access to the personaldata of citizens for what some say are “warringfactions” nested within the state hierarchy makesthe issue even more complicated. It is very difficultat this time to pinpoint the perpetrators ofwarrantless wiretapping. Certainly, there are manychallenges of attempting to maintain control overthe population; 23 however, there is no indication asof yet that challenges from political groups mightactually work against the government in the end.Currently, political opposition, human rights groupsand generally disadvantaged groups are extremelydistressed about Turkey’s descent into a police orsurveillance state. However, systematic rights violationsare undeniably a major threat to everyone,including the members of the majority. Another potentialvictim of unchecked state surveillance arethe power holders, a fact that the AKP governmenthas seen first-hand already.Action stepsTurkish civil society organisations have been evenmore active than before about reminding usersof their rights to privacy and raising their voicesagainst internet surveillance and monitoring. Forexample, in 2012, the Chamber of Computer Engineers(BMO) released a comprehensive User RightsManifesto 24 backed by eight organisations includingprofessional chambers, anti-censorship andinternet rights groups. However, these efforts havehad little outreach, given the politically tense situationin the country. Activists should continue theirefforts in creating awareness on state surveillance,but perhaps make certain modifications:• Street protests against internet censorship areincreasingly seen as anti-government actionsin Turkey. Organisations should find ways tocommunicate with parts of society that aresceptical of groups that they associate with theGezi protests.• All civil society organisations must find a way toconvince the AKP administration to reduce thepolitical polarisation in the country. Hostilityamong a divided public breeds less transparency,which in turn facilitates unlawful or legalbut unnecessary state surveillance.• Educational institutions at all levels shouldmake internet freedoms a part of their curriculaand teaching programmes.• All civil society organisations, even if they arenot in the field of technology or communicationsfreedoms, should treat internet libertiesas a basic human right and include this freedomin their wider agenda. Rights activists should focuson communicating with civil society groupsfrom other fields.• Although independent media and journalistfreedoms are increasingly threatened inTurkey, 25 journalists should be braver and moreoutspoken on the subject of state surveillance.• The international community has beenextremely critical of Turkey’s increasingly dictatorialexpansion of surveillance laws. It mightbe helpful if international bodies and organisationssuch as the Organization for Security andCo‐operation in Europe (OSCE), the UN or the EUalso concentrated on reaching out to the majoritythat seems to approve of the government’ssurveillance policies.Fighting for democracy and transparency in times ofpolitical repression takes not only courage but innovationand reinventing ideas to make sure that thepublic understands that dissenters and governmentcritics are not the country’s enemies. Populist authoritarianismcan be defeated only by gaining thesupport of government supporters, not antagonisingthem.18 Statement from Google: Turkish ISPs block access to Google DNSservers (in Turkish), T24 website, 31 March 2014. t24.com.tr/haber/google-dnsleri-turk-servis-saglayicilar-engelliyor,25484519 AP story on what is known as the “July 22 Operation” in Turkey:Fraser, S. (2014, July 22). Turkey detains police for ‘spying’ andwiretaps. AP. bigstory.ap.org/article/turkey-police-involved-graftprobe-detained20 The Economist. (2014, April 5). Erdoğan on a roll. The Economist.www.economist.com/news/europe/21600161-ak-party-winsconvincingly-what-next-erdogan-roll21 Unseen.org founder Chris Kitze interview with RT: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CvMiKT4R_F0#t=2022 One of the former police chiefs accused of spying on thegovernment claims it is technically impossible for the policeforce to eavesdrop on the encrypted phone lines of the primeministry, although the prosecution – which has the blessingof the AKP government – claims that this was exactly what thepolice officers have done. Interview with Yakub Saygılı: Akman,N. (2014, August 11). ‘I’m ready to serve many years in prison ifwhat I did was illegal’. Today’s Zaman. www.todayszaman.com/interviews_im-ready-to-serve-many-years-in-prison-if-what-i-didwas-illegal_355343.html23 Darren Smith notes that “maintaining a complete securityapparatus in controlling a population is expensive in terms ofresources, money, and political backing.” Smith, D. (2014, April26). Op. cit.24 BMO Manifesto, in Turkish: www.bmo.org.tr/2012/04/18/internetkullanici-haklari-bildirgesi-yayinlandi25 Kramer, D., Robbins, C., & Schenkkan, N. (2014). Democracy inCrisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey. Washington, DC:Freedom House. www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Turkey%20Report%20-%20Feb%203%2C%202014.pdf250 / Global Information Society Watch turkey / 251