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the then-director general of the Rwanda Utilitiesand Regulatory Authority (RURA), the exercisewas due to “East African Community (EAC) resolutionswhere all countries agreed to implementthe SIM card registration (SCR), which is relatedto the security of mobile subscribers – such asfighting mobile-based crimes – in the region.” 21This was confirmed by some researchers such asNicola Jentzsch, who affirms that the East AfricanCommunications Organization (EACO) has been amajor proponent of SIM registration, encouragingnational governments in the region to adoptrelevant laws and regulations, or to support voluntaryinitiatives. She went on to mention EACO’smotivation: the belief that forcing customers toregister SIM cards will reduce the opportunitiesfor malevolent actors to use mobile devices anonymouslyto undertake unlawful or socially harmfulactivities, including kidnapping, drug traffickingand terrorism. 22East African countries like Kenya, Rwanda,Uganda and South Sudan are working towardsestablishing a cross-border SIM card registrationframework in a new effort to curb the rise in crimesperpetrated through the use of mobile devices. 23Biometric identityA biometric system for the identification of citizensstores all the resources needed to identify aperson, based on their digitised fingerprints andphotographs.In Rwanda, the National Identification Agency(NIDA) has opted for ICT-based initiatives to speedup citizen registration. Under the motto “SmartID, Smart Ideas”, Rwanda has built a populationregister to issue secure national identity cards,driving permits and integrated smartcards that willbe multi-purpose to enhance quick public servicesdelivery. 24 Services that come with the card includepersonal identification, insurance assessments,and bank and immigration services, among others.This avoids the need to carry many cards to accessthe different services.Since January 2014, citizens from three partnerstates (Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda) have begunto use the smartcard to cross their respective21 Bright, E. (2013, February 4). SIM card registration gets under way.The Rwanda Focus. focus.rw/wp/2013/02/sim-card-registrationgets-under-way/22 Donovan, K. P., & Martin, A. K. (2014, February 3). Op. cit.23 Wokabi, C. (2013, December 23). East African states to share SIMcard, national ID data. Pan African Visions. panafricanvisions.com/2013/east-african-states-share-sim-card-national-id-data24 www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/socialprotection/Building_Robust_Identification_Systems_Session_Packet.pdfborders without presenting any passport orpass. 25 The interconnected national ID system ismeant to facilitate the faster movement of peoplebetween the three countries, and at the sametime to ensure that people moving from one countryto another do not fake their nationalities andidentities.Arguments against the establishment of biometricdata collection state that studies of nationalID card programmes have consistently found thatcertain ethnic groups are disproportionately targetedfor ID checks by the police. Privacy Internationalgoes further by pointing to the genocide againstTutsis in 1994, when ID cards designating theirholders as Tutsis cost thousands of people theirlives. For them, an ID card enables disparate identifyinginformation about a person that is storedin different databases to be easily linked and analysedthrough data-mining techniques. This createssignificant privacy vulnerability, especially giventhe fact that governments usually outsource theadministration of ID programmes to unaccountableprivate companies. 26Following the success of the national ID programme,Rwandan government stakeholders areoptimistic about the potential success of this initiative.Many stakeholders believe that the Rwandansmartcard initiative will enhance their quality ofservice delivery while reducing lengthy turnaroundtime. 27Interception of communicationsIn August 2013, the Rwandan government passedamendments to a 2008 law relating to the interceptionof communications. While reading mostmedia articles criticising the law, laypeople in thefield lose track of what it is and what it is not, whenit is lawful and when it is unlawful, and who is authorisedto intercept communications.The law defines communications interceptionas “any act of listening, recording, storing,decrypting, intercepting, interfering with, or carryingout any other type of surveillance over voiceor data communications without the knowledgeof the user and without explicit permission to doso.” 2825 IWACU. (2014, January 14). ID cards to replace passports in EAC.IWACU English News. www.iwacu-burundi.org/blogs/english/idcards-to-replace-passports-in-eac/26 https://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/id27 Sivan, S. K. (n/d). Enhancing public and private sectordelivery through Rwandan national smart card initiative. www.appropriatetech.net/files/ENHANCING_PUBLIC_AND_PRIVATE_SECTOR_DELIVERY.pdf28 Law relating to the interception of communications.Relevant authorities are authorised to carry outinterception of communications for national securitypurposes. 29 According to the law, this is doneon a criminal suspect: “[W]hen all other proceduresof obtaining evidence to establish truth havefailed, the prosecutor in charge of investigations,may, after obtaining a written authorisation by theProsecutor General of the Republic, listen, acknowledgeand intercept record[ed] communications,conversations, telegrams, postal cards, telecommunicationsand other ways of communicating.” 30The law governing telecommunications, meanwhile,recognises privacy and data protection, andforbids interception of communications in its Article54. It states: “Every user’s voice or data communicationscarried by means of a telecommunicationsnetwork or telecommunications service, remainsconfidential to that user and the user’s intendedrecipient of that voice or data communications.” Ifa court authorises the interception or recording ofcommunications in the interests of national securityand the prevention, investigation, detection andprosecution of criminal offences, the above articleis not applied.Government authorities of “the relevant securityorgans” are authorised to apply for an interceptionwarrant. In May 2014, the government appointedthe Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman as ateam of inspectors in charge of monitoring thatinterception of communication which is done in accordancewith the law. 31 No person shall reveal anyinformation which he/she accessed in the exerciseof his/her responsibilities or duties in relation tothis order, except when authorised by the head ofthe security organ which has carried out the interception(Article 8). 32The following acts are not considered as interceptionof communications:• Evidence of a crime collected after the messagereached the receiver.• Evidence based on communication recorded bythe sender or the receiver or other person withoutusing a monitoring device for interception ofcommunications. 3329 Ibid.30 Law N° 13/2004 relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure. www.refworld.org/docid/46c306492.html31 2014 Presidential Order appointing inspectors in charge ofmonitoring the interception of communication.32 2014 Prime Minister’s Order determining modalities for theenforcement of the law regulating interception of communication.33 Ibid.ConclusionAs is becoming the practice in most democraticcountries, in Rwanda intercepts of oral, telephonicand digital communications are initiated by lawenforcement or intelligence agencies only after approvalby a judge, and only during the investigationof serious crimes.Arguments against communication interception,based on asserting that the reasons advancedfor interception are weak, seem to be on the extremeside when a developing country is involved.In the absence of clear case studies and unbiasedopinions that consider both the pros and cons ofcommunications surveillance, the public is not ableto know how surveillance can make a safer societyas proposed by governments, or how it can deterioratetheir rights as argued by human rights activists.With SIM registration, your email, ID and phoneare linked together. The requirement by big corporationsto provide a telephone number when usingtheir services, for instance, is also dangerous andpromotes unnecessary personal data surveillance,since users are not aware who is accessing theirdata and what the data is being used for.Action stepsApart from the existing laws in place, the Rwandangovernment should consider the following when itcomes to communications surveillance:• The government needs to sensitise Rwandancitizens through awareness campaigns on procedures,practices and legislation regarding thesurveillance of communications. This should bedone in order to increase their knowledge onmatters related to surveillance on the one hand,and to help them use communication channelsresponsibly on the other hand.• Telecommunications and internet service providersshould increase the quality of what theyoffer to the clients, since poor service that requirescitizens to seek help from a customercare desk is likely to expose the clients’ privacy.• Rwandan civil society and human rights organisationsshould be in a position to understandwell what is involved in communications surveillancein order to avoid relying on speculativeinformation.212 / Global Information Society Watchrwanda / 213