《歐美研究》第二十九卷第一期(民國八十八年三月)，1 - 中央研究院歐美所

《 歐 美 研 究 》 第 二 十 九 卷 第 四 期 ( 民 國 八 十 年 十 二 月 ),81-118© 中 央 研 究 院 歐 美 研 究 所The Mystery of A Priori Knowability and thePredicament of Theories of Mental RepresentationEric M. PengAbstractThis essay discusses (1) how the phenomena of a priori knowledgeor justification are to be understood; and, (2) whether andhow theories of mental representation might provide a satisfactoryexplanation for such phenomena. The paradigm example is theproposition that nothing can be both red all over and blue allover—a proposition involving modality. I first propose that a posterioriis non-a priori, and that a priori ways of knowing/justifyingare ways that are symmetric to all experiences.I then argue that no satisfactory explanations of a priori cognitionare given by contemporary cognitive science. Further,though BonJour attempts to understand a priori knowing in termsof “immediate rational insight,” his theory is supplemented withAquina’s metaphysics concerning how to fix mental content. I arguethat his solution is equally unsatisfactory, in that he merelyshifts the mystery of a priori to the mystery of distinguishing essenaturale from esse intentionale.Key Words: a priori knowability, experiential symmetry, analyticproposition, rational insight

2 歐 美 研 究