Fending <strong>of</strong>f the Use <strong>of</strong> a Rule 12(f) Motion to StrikeAffirmative <strong>Defense</strong>sBy Peter M. Durney andJonathan P. MichaudTHIS ARTICLE addresses potentiallyeffective arguments a defendant mayraise when confronted with a motion tostrike affirmative defenses based upon theSupreme Court’s decisions in BellAtlantic Co. v. Twombly 1 and Ashcr<strong>of</strong>t v.Iqbal. 2 As most litigators by now know,in Twombly, the Supreme Court held thatin order to withstand a motion to dismiss,a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts in acomplaint to allege “a plausibleentitlement to relief.” 3 Plaintiffs havesince argued, with some success, that thisheightened pleading standard applies withequal force to a defendant’s affirmativedefenses. Facing such a motion early onin litigation can present myriad problemsfor a defendant. Upon being properlyserved with a Summons and Complaint,without the benefit <strong>of</strong> discovery and withonly twenty-one days to file an answer infederal court, defendants to a large extentmust anticipate the pro<strong>of</strong> and raiseappropriate defenses in somewhat <strong>of</strong> avacuum. Yet, should an aggressiveopponent immediately challenge some <strong>of</strong>those defenses, the very real prospectlooms <strong>of</strong> possibly losing otherwise validaffirmative defenses, should an <strong>of</strong>fensemotion be successful. This articlediscusses the various rationales used byfederal district courts in deciding suchmotions and considers how a defendant1 550 U.S. 544 (2007).2 556 U.S. 662 (2009).3 550 U.S. at 559.Peter M. Durney hasbeen a partner at Cornell& Gollub in Boston since1987. He has representedhundreds <strong>of</strong> domestic andforeign corporations inthe state and federalcourts in each <strong>of</strong> the NewEngland states and elsewhere in the U.S.His broad litigation experienceencompasses personal injury, productsliability, medical device, automotive,marine and commercial litigation,pr<strong>of</strong>essional malpractice and appellatework.Jonathan P Michaud is anassociate in the productsliability and toxic tortpractice group at Cetrulo& Capone LLP in Boston,Massachusetts. In thatcapacity, he is part <strong>of</strong> ateam <strong>of</strong> attorneys thatdefend and advise clients on a local,regional and national level and act asdefense liaison counsel for asbestosactions in Massachusetts and RhodeIsland.may best fend <strong>of</strong>f such an attack to ensurethat its affirmative defenses are preservedat least until adjudicated on the merits.I. The Heightened PleadingStandard under Twombly/IqbalIn Twombly, the Supreme Courtconsidered the pleading standardsufficient to satisfy the requirement that aplaintiff make “a short and plain
Fending <strong>of</strong>f the Use <strong>of</strong> a Rule 12(f) Page 439statement <strong>of</strong> the claim that the pleader isentitled to relief.” 4 The Supreme Courtheld that in order to survive a motion todismiss pursuant to Federal Rule <strong>of</strong> CivilProcedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must pleadsufficient facts “to raise a right to reliefabove the speculative level.” 5 Thisstandard “requires more than labels andconclusions,” such that “a formulaicrecitation <strong>of</strong> the elements <strong>of</strong> a cause <strong>of</strong>action will not do.” 6 Thus, the Twomblycourt expressly retired the longestablished standard established set forthin Conley v. Gibson, 7 which held that apleading should not be dismissed “unlessit appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffcan prove no set <strong>of</strong> facts in support <strong>of</strong> hisclaim which would entitle him to relief.” 8The new heightened pleadingstandard subsequently was clarified inIqbal, as the Supreme Court reiteratedthat a plaintiff’s “complaint must containsufficient factual matter, accepted as true,‘to state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face.’” 9 The Iqbal court furtheroutlined the two underlying principles <strong>of</strong>Twombly. First, in evaluating thesufficiency <strong>of</strong> a complaint, bare legalconclusions that do nothing more thanrecite the elements <strong>of</strong> a cause <strong>of</strong> actionare not entitled to an assumption <strong>of</strong>truth. 10 Second, a complaint must containsufficient factual allegations to allow acourt to infer that it states a “plausible4 Id. at 557; FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2).5 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.6 Id. at 556.7 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).8 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (citing Conley).9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 563).10 Id. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at555).claim for relief.” 11 Courts considering amotion to dismiss were thereby directedto engage in a two-pronged analysis: (1)to identify legal conclusions that are notentitled to an assumption <strong>of</strong> truth; and (2)to identify factual allegations anddetermine if, taken as true, “theyplausibly give rise to an entitlement torelief.” 12 The Circuit Courts <strong>of</strong> Appealhave not ruled on whether the heightenedpleading standard <strong>of</strong> Twombly/Iqbalapplies to the pleading <strong>of</strong> affirmativedefenses, and there is fairly evendisagreement between, and even within,the United States district courts. 13II.Affirmative <strong>Defense</strong>sFederal Rule <strong>of</strong> Civil Procedure8(b)(1)(A) requires a party responding toa pleading to “state in short and plainterms its defenses to each claim assertedagainst it.” 14 Rule 8(c)(1) states that adefendant “must affirmatively state anyavoidance or affirmative defense,” andprovides a list <strong>of</strong> nineteen affirmativedefenses. 15 However, this list <strong>of</strong>11 Id. at 1950.12 Id.13See, e.g., Cottle v. Falcon HoldingsManagement, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-95-PRC,2012 WL 266968, *1 (N.D. Ind. January 30,2012) (noting split among district courts onissue).14 Rule 9(b) provides that certain defenses,fraud, mistake, and condition <strong>of</strong> the mind,must be plead with particularity.15 Those affirmative defenses are “accord andsatisfaction; arbitration and award; assumption<strong>of</strong> risk; contributory negligence; discharge inbankruptcy; duress; estoppel; failure <strong>of</strong>consideration; fraud; illegality; injury byfellow servant; laches; license; payment;release; res judicata; statute <strong>of</strong> frauds; statute