PLJ volume 37 number 1 -01- Deogracias Eufemio

objective may and should be undertaken within the framework of our
Constitution and laws, the limits of which have been transcended by the
resolution complained of, insofar as petitioner herein is concerned.115
It seems that the glaring circumstance which accounted for the
divergent results reached in these two cases was the disheartening
fact that in the Racuyal case, the Commission on Elections and the
Supreme Court found that petitioner therein had been confined in
the Psychopatic Hospital; that he was still a psychiatric case; and
that he had not introduced satisfactory evidence to show that his
mental condition had improved. Presumably, the Court believed that
petitioner was really not qualified to run for the office of Pre~ident
of the Philippines.
One of the qualifications for the office of President is that the
candidate must be a "qualified voter," i.e., one who has all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. One of
the groups disqualified under Sec. 99· of the Revised Election Code
refers to "those persons who are insane or feebl~minded."
It seems that the Commission on Elections and the Supreme
Court were inclined to believe that petitioner was included within
the aforesaid category of persons disqualified, in the absence of satisfactory
evidence that his mental faculties had improved. On the
other hand, in the Abcede case, no such circumstances were established.
In this connection, it may be noted that the tenor of the Supreme
Court resolution in the Abcede case gives the impression that the
amendment of Sec. 37 of the Revised Election Code by Rep. Act No.
3036, really did not confer any substantial authority upon the Commission
on Elections different from what it could lawfully do under
Sec. 37 prior to its amendment as previously construed in the cases
of Garcia v. Imperial 1 l!6 and Abcede v. Imperial. ll7 It seems that
the law must state with more definiteness and particularity, the instances
when a candidate shall be considered to have "no bona IMe
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed." By its resolution in the Abcede case, the Supreme
Court, in effect, canalized the authority of the Commission to refuse
to give due course' to certificates of candidacy within the bounds
of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid Garcia case. The hope
"" The resolution in the Abcede case was the basis of, and reiterated in, subsequent eases of
the same nature, to wit: Javinez v. Com. on Elections, G.R. No. L.19054, Nov. 9. 1961; Praxed •••
Floro v. Com. on Elections. G.R. No. L·19086. Nov. 10. 1961. Since the elections had already
been held and the issue had become moot. the Court did not deem it necessary to promulgate any
extended opinion on this matter.
111 Sv.pro, note 106.
u'lbitl.