PLJ volume 37 number 1 -01- Deogracias Eufemio

orders of demolition in the ejectment cases; that Judge Caluag be
enjoined from enforcing the preliminary injunction he issued in the
prohibition case instituted by the Company; and that the Land Tenure
Administration be ordered to institute the expropriation proceedings
as authorized by Rep. Act No. 2616. The Court of Appeals
gave due course to the petition for certiorari and issued an ex parte
writ of preliminary injunction, which had the effect of dissolvingthe
writ of preliminary injunction issued by Judge Caluag, "so that the
Land Tenure Administration may thus properly file the, complaint
for expropriation." The Court of Appeals refused to lift the preliminary
injunction, despite the Company's contention that said
court had '110 jurisdiction since the writ of injunction was issued
by the Court of Appeals not "in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction,"
as required by law. l4l Hernce,the Company instituted this certior.ari
proceedings in the· Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld the Company's contention. It held
that the writ of injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was null
and void for want of jurisdiction. The authority of the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus and other auxiliary writs and processes is
expressly limited to their issuance "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
142 The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to issue such
writs must be based on the existence of a right to appeal to it from
the judgment on the merits in the main case. Since the issuance
of orders for execution and demolition, after the judgment in the
ejection cases had become final and executory, is not appealable,
and since the prohibition case instituted by the Company involved
the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 2616, an issue which falls
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals has rIP authority to interfere by prerogative writ in either
litigation.
The Court also held that the preliminary injunction issued by
.fudge Caluag was merely an incident to the main case for prohibition,
and was intended to prevent such principal case and any remedy
that may be granted therein from being rendered moot and nugatory
by the filing of the expropriation proceedings. 143 That the alleged
unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 2616 could be invoked as
a defense in the expropriation proceedings does not alter the right
of the Company to raise it as an issue in the prohibition case, witnout
awaiting the institution of expropriation proceedings. The
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