Makhanya v University of Zululand - LexisNexis South Africa

31court found itself able to find that the conduct in question was not‘administrative action’ demonstrates ineluctably that the court did notconsider the claim that was before it to be a claim for the enforcement ofLRA rights. The contrary would suggest that the majority regarded the claimas being one for the enforcement of LRA rights when assessing thejurisdictional issue, but to be a constitutional claim when assessing themerits, which would be absurd.THE DECISION IN CHIRWA[76] In Makambi I commented on the difficulty I had deconstructing thelanguage of the majority in Chirwa so as to discover why the high court wassaid to have had no jurisdiction. I do not intend pursuing that line ofenquiry. It is sufficient to say that there are hints in the judgments of themajority of all the three propositions that I dealt with above but none everquite blossomed.[77] If the ratio of its decision to dismiss the claim was that the high courtlacked jurisdiction to consider it then it applies as much in this case, becauseon that issue the two are indistinguishable notwithstanding the differences intheir facts.[78] In this case the employment of Makhanya terminated, as in Chirwa.As in Chirwa that gave rise to a potential claim to enforce LRA rights (aclaim for the enforcement of that right was in fact pursued to its conclusionin this case but that distinction is not relevant). And as in Chirwa the claimthat is now before us is a claim that asserts a separate right that is said tohave been infringed. The right that is asserted in this case is an established