Winning Hearts and Minds? - Tufts - Tufts University

Figure 1Source: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction,“Quarterly Report to the U.S. Congress” (April 30, 2011),142–3.The contemporary origins of militaryinvolvement in delivering assistance lie in theAllied preparations for the invasions of NorthAfrica and Western Europe in the course ofWorld War II. However, it is perhaps morestrongly associated with the Cold Warcounterinsurgency campaigns of the 1950sthrough the 1970s, principally the Britishexperiences in Malaya, Oman, and Aden(Yemen), and the U.S. experience in Vietnam.The phrase “hearts and minds” is usuallyassociated with Field Marshal Sir GeraldTempler, 15 and his ultimately successful conductof the British-led counter insurgency campaignin Malaya (1948–60). Since the “MalayanEmergency,” the phrase has often been used as aform of shorthand for the overall Britishapproach to counter-insurgency: emphasizingwinning the “hearts and minds” of thepopulation through securing the support of thepeople. The approach shaped British strategyboth in Malaya and in dealing with the MauMau rebellion in Kenya. In the 1970s, it wasinfluential in Northern Ireland. The kernel ofthe strategy was to establish secure zones, useminimum force, apply development, and addresspolitical grievances that underlay the rebellions— all in order to turn the population against theinsurgents. At the same time, outside of thesecure areas, the strategy was to implementmilitary measures designed to inflict attrition onthe military component of the insurgency. Thisapproach has been contrasted with tactics thatstress more conventional military means, are lessfocused on developing the support of thepopulation, and are less concerned with avoidingcivilian casualties.The U.S. experience began as Civil Affairs inWorld War II but has echoed the British path inits association with counter-revolutionary warfare,particularly in programs such as the CivilOperations and Revolutionary DevelopmentSupport Program (or CORDS) during theVietnam War. These counter-insurgencyapproaches tended to bring together efforts toseparate the population from the insurgents whileproviding a variety of reconstruction programs towin over the sympathy of the population. Thephrase “hearts and minds” was also associatedwith the U.S. military and strategies adopted tocontain the communist insurgency in Vietnam.President Lyndon B. Johnson is quoted in May1965 when he argued that U.S. victory would bebuilt on the “hearts and minds of the people whoactually live out there. By helping to bring themhope and electricity you are also striking a veryimportant blow for the cause of freedomthroughout the world.” 16 This approach shapedboth U.S. strategy and rhetoric on the war inIndo-China and led to efforts to coordinatedevelopment and security approaches that wouldcounter communist propaganda and isolate theinsurgents from the people. Under Johnson theU.S. “committed itself to ‘pacification’ of SouthVietnam by providing both security anddevelopment support. U.S. officials, both civilianand military, would provide ‘advice’ and resourcesfor economic development projects, such asrebuilding roads and bridges, while the militarywould train and equip South Vietnam’s police andparamilitary groups to hunt down insurgents.” 1715John Cloake, Templer: Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer (London: Harrap, 1985). Footnote 1 states that Templerfirst used the term on April 26, 1952.16Lyndon B. Johnson quoted in Francis Njubi Nesbitt, “Hearts and Minds and Empire.” Foreign Policy in Focus (March 20, 2009), http://www.fpif.org/articles/hearts_and_minds_and_empire.17Ibid.14Feinstein International Center