Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung Internet-Supplement ...

Beiträge zur Geschichte 

der Arbeiterbewegung 

Internet-Supplement 

No. 1 / 2000 

AUS DEM INHALT 

Richard Croucher: The Trade Union Congress, the Britisch 

Authorities in Occupied Germany and Trade Union Demands 

1947–1952 .............................................................................................. 3 

Rezensionen .......................................................................................... 16 

trafo verlag 

1. Jahrgang • No. 1 • 10. September 2000

2 BzG-Supplement No. 1/2000 

Inhaltsverzeichnis 

Richard Croucher: The Trade Union Congress, the Britisch 

Authorities in Occupied Germany and Trade Union Demands 

1947–1952 ................................................................................................................ 3 

Rezensionen 

Laslo Sekelj: Vreme Bešcašca. Ogledi o vladavini nacionalizma 

[Zeit der Schmach. Überlegungen zum Aufstieg des Nationalismus] 

Akademia Nova*Institut za evropske studije, Belgrad 1995. 

(Hanna Behrend) .................................................................................................... 16 

Rechtsstaat und Klassenjustiz: Texte aus der sozialdemokratischen 

“Neuen Zeit” 1883–1914. Hrsg. und mit einem Anh. vers. von Detlef 

Joseph. Freiberg (Breisgau). (Wolfgang Schröder) ............................................... 16 

Neil Gregor: Stern und Hakenkreuz. Daimler-Benz im Dritten Reich. 

(Manfred Behrend) ................................................................................................. 18 

Heinz Niemann: Meinungsforschung in der DDR. Die geheimen Berichte 

des Instituts für Meinungsforschung an das Politbüro der SED. 

und 

Neinz Niemann: Hinterm Zaun. Politische Kultur und Meinungsforschung 

in der DDR – die geheimen Berichte an das Politbüro der 

SED. (Stefan Bollinger) ......................................................................................... 20

BzG-Supplement No. 1/2000 3 

The Trades Union Congress, the British 

Authorities in Occupied Germany and 

Trade Union Demands, 1947–1952. 

RICHARD CROUCHER, CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC TRADE 

UNION MANAGEMENT, CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY 

The DGB came into existence in Munich in October 1947. Yet by then, the local 

foundations of a revived German trade unionism were laid in the Western occupation 

zones. Indeed, the British encouraged unionism at the local level before mergers created 

larger unions. The British zone was particularly important in the development in 

German trade unionism. By 1948, 2.8 million workers were unionised in the British 

zone, compared to 1.6 million in the American. Trade union density was also highest 

there. 1 It was there, too, that the DGB (britische Besatzungszone) and Hans Boeckler 

were based. German trade unionists were inclined to look to the British and their 

recently-elected Labour government to provide a counterweight to American and 

French influence. The nature of trade unionism in the zone was therefore of general 

significance for German trade unionism more widely. 

This article focusses on a discussion between Hans Gottfurcht, a leading German 

exile and trade unionist, appointed as liaison officer between the British Trade Union 

Congress (TUC) and the emergent trade unions in the British zone, and the senior 

British occupation official responsible for industrial relations policy issues, Reginald 

Luce. The exchange took place in June and July of 1947.The British occupying 

administration wished to exercise strict control over the development of German trade 

unionism. In the British view, unions were important elements in the democratisation 

of German society, which they saw as over inclined towards centralisation and 

obedience. They were well-equipped to exercise control, since they employed a 

relatively large number of people in Germany and were therefore well informed. The 

key part of the occupation government responsible for trade union issues was Manpower 

Division. Manpower Divisions’ partner and advisor was the TUC, a body which 

felt that it stood at the centre of the oldest trade union movement in the world.During 

the Second World War, the TUC was closely consulted and involved by government: 

many trade unionists took up official positions. In the immediate post-war years, close 

relationships with government and the Foreign Office were maintained while contacts 

developed with German trade unions.Because multilateral international trade union 

co operation and organisation were bedevilled by developing Cold War conflict,


Richard Croucher 

bilateral relations were especially important. Gottfurcht and Luce were therefore central 

to a strong and important institutional relationship. 

What follows is relevant to the historical discussion on the rebuilding of trade 

unionism in Germany. Many general scholarly surveys of British occupation 

government pay little attention to the subject. 2 British memoirs tended to stress, and 

almost certainly overestimate, the TUC’s influence in shaping German trade unionism. 3 

Their viewpoint, first put during the occupation period, was sometimes adopted by 

later historians. 4 This view has frequently been sharply criticised for underestimating 

the weight of German activity.Discussion has focussed on the TUC’s first delegation 

to Germany in 1945, and its role in Boeckler’s abandonment of the Einheitsgewerkschaft 

concept. Some have seen the visit as determinant of later developments. 5 Yet, 

as we demonstrate, later discussions are also significant. It has also been argued by 

one recent historian that the TUC did not act independently of Manpower Division’s 

alleged attempt to ‘export’ the British system of industrial relations to Germany.He 

further contended that Manpower Division was less constructive than other parts of 

the occupation government in developing the co-determination system. 6 We examine 

the terms of discussion between the TUC and the British authorities in Germany at 

two specific historical junctures in an attempt to throw further light on these subjects. 

Our argument is that Gottfurcht had an important opportunity for debate with Manpower 

Division that was not taken, and that this had consequences for the British 

administration’s attitudes. It is also demonstrated that whatever Manpower Division’s 

shortcomings, that Division was greatly preferred by Gottfurcht to other parts of the 

occupation government. 

The article begins by providing background. We sketch some of the concerns of 

the German trade union movement at the time of the discussion, suggesting that the 

juncture was an important one for the unions. The biographies of the two discussants 

are also outlined. The core of the article is an account of the exchange between the 

two men. This shows that Gottfurcht largely retreated from criticisms he had made 

of the British Military Government in a report he had made to the TUC. Possible 

reasons for his retreat are touched on. Finally, the exchange is contrasted with a later 

one between a senior British official in Germany and the General Secretary of the 

TUC, indicating the general direction of the British authorities’ attitudes. 

During the first exchange, Luce rightly stressed that the context in early 1947 was 

one in which many key issues remained unresolved and subject to discussion. British 

policy was still evolving. The position was critical since trade union organisation 

was taking shape. The industrial relations system more widely, in terms of employers’ 

associations and the operation of Works Councils (revived from below immediately 

after the war and given a new legal basis by the Allied Control Council’s Law 22 of 

April 1946), was at an early point in its evolution. 7 In these circumstances, the new 

union organisations might have some influence. Indeed, they saw this and sought to



negotiate the structural aspects of the new system. The allies had imposed a wage freeze 

and in the shattered state of the economy industrial action was extremely difficult. 

Union activity therefore sought to influence the legislators rather than employers. Trade 

union demands focussed on denazification, the transfer of important industries to public 

ownership, co-determination and economic planning. Demands to limit the dismantling 

of war industries were arising. By mid-1947, the unions paid increasing attention to 

securing their position in co-determination at company level. They were well aware 

that in negotiations on co determination legislation the current level of union 

organisation within Works Councils would be the starting point. Their emphasis on 

the subject was encouraged by large employers in the arms, iron and steel industries. 

The opportunity to obtain co-determination rights appeared at the same point as the 

first positive action taken by the British Military Government to break up the large 

iron and steel cartels. The employers’ tactic of offering to set up bi-partite codetermination 

in these industries as a counter to this policy in early 1947 had the effect 

of encouraging unions towards a policy of opposition to dismantling plant and the 

break up of large corporations. 

Gottfurcht was aware of the pivotal nature of the moment. A Social Democrat, 

like most German trade unionists of the time, he had from 1919 to 1933 been a fulltime 

union official for the Zentralverband der Angestellten in the Berlin region. After 

1933 he was forced into underground trade union activity, leaving for Britain in mid- 

1938. There, just before the outbreak of war, he was elected Chairman of the Trade 

Union Centre for German Workers in Britain. He broadcast to Germany during the 

war and built a close co-operation with the TUC. The Centre was an important focus 

for developing governmental and union contacts. After its dissolution soon after the 

end of war Gottfurcht was one of the first exiled unionists to visit Germany. He visited 

Germany regularly from October 1945 onwards. He was also a visiting lecturer at 

the Foreign Office’s Wilton Park training centre, run by the Foreign Office, through 

which many German trade unionists passed in the post-war years. In the summer of 

1947, he had just been confirmed by a decision of the British TUC’s General Council 

as the official liaison officer with the German trade unions represented since April 1947 

by the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (britische Besatzungszone). The appointment was 

at the request of German unions expressed through their British Zonal Secretariat. 

Gottfurcht knew the key individuals in the two trade union movements’ senior echelons. 

He was a confidant of both Sir Vincent Tewson, General Secretary of the TUC, and 

Hans Boeckler, recently elected head of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (britische 

Besatzungszone) before becoming Chairman of the all-West German DGB in 1949. 

For his part, Boeckler was the prime personality within the German unions before 

his death in February 1951. He increased his power in international affairs within the 

DGB in 1949 by reserving the right to deal with international issues personally. As 

for Tewson, he was influential among European trade unions generally (though disliked



by the Americans) and was elected President of the ICFTU in mid-1951. Gottfurcht 

was therefore a pivotal figure who was in a position to influence other important 

individuals.His advice to Tewson and Boeckler was an important factor in their mutual 

perceptions and in those of the occupation government. 8 

Luce was Chief of the Manpower Division of the Control Commission (British 

Element), the Division with principal responsibility for trade unions. His background 

was not that of the typical British senior civil servant of the inter-war years. He had 

been educated at King’s College London rather than at Oxford or Cambridge. In 1939, 

he had entered the Ministry of Labour and between 1942 and 1945 had served as 

Assistant Secretary, working closely with Ernest Bevin, the Minister and ex-General 

Secretary of the Transport and General Workers’ Union. During his period with 

Bevin, Luce was working in a context in which setting a positive environment for 

the development of collective bargaining was emphasised. Above all, the department 

worked to implement ‘voluntaryism’, within which the state encouraged the 

development of both employers’ associations and trade unions to resolve differences. 

Luce won Bevin’s trust and so when the latter became Foreign Secretary in the postwar 

Labour Government he was seconded to the Foreign Office to take up the German 

post. Gottfurcht and Luce came from quite different backgrounds, but both had extensive 

experience of industrial relations and their general views on the subject were 

probably quite similar. They met frequently in the crucial period for German unions 

between October 1945 when Gottfurcht first returned to Germany and 1950. In that 

year, Gottfurcht was appointed Education Officer for the International Confederation 

of Free Trade Unions in Brussells while Luce became Commissioner for Schleswig- 

Holstein. 

Gottfurcht visited Germany in February and March 1947 and wrote a detailed report 

on the trade union situation. The document was written for the TUC and the Military 

Government. Gottfurcht painted a detailed picture of the unions’ state, the industrial 

relations situation, and workers’ living conditions. He also made critical remarks about 

British policy towards the development of industrial relations institutions in Germany. 

There was a general criticism related to the Military Government’s ‘toleration of the 

employers’ point of view’. Unions, on the other hand, had to penetrate ‘barbed wire 

entanglements’ to press their case. More specifically, Gottfurcht criticised the authorities 

for their attitude to employers’ associations. The government should make it unlawful 

for employers to form associations which did not include collective bargaining among 

their functions, and additionally associations which included those but not certain other 

functions. The Military Government was also criticised for intervening on the operation 

of the Works Council law. The unions wished to limit the rights of non-unionists to 

stand for Works Councils in that they would have to receive a list of nominees 

amounting to 10% of those eligible to vote in the election.This was an attempt to play 

on fears current at the time among Allied officials that Communists might be able



to take advantage of the creation of Works Councils to increase their influence at 

workplaces. The British Military Government intervened to prevent the unions from 

insisting that their policy be followed in elections in the North Rhine province, bringing 

complaints both from them and Gottfurcht. He also criticised the authorities’ insistence 

that the unions state publicly that their Model Works’ Agreement was not backed by 

the Military Government. Finally, returning to the more general level, Gottfurcht 

complained that the Government had been ‘extremely’ reluctant’ to disown the actions 

of a particular officer who had issued a circular to his subordinates propagating an 

interpretation of the Works Council Law (Law No.22) which was inaccurate and 

unfavourable to unions. Both the circular and the Military Government’s apparent 

reluctance to withdraw it were cited as evidence of anti-trade union bias. 9 

The circular had been written by D.C. Lee, Property Control Officer in Kreis Group 

HQ, Bielefeld, on 28 February, 1947, to his local Property Control Officers. These 

officers had considerable power in many enterprises and often carried ultimate 

responsibility for their industrial relations. 

They were employees of the Finance Division of the Military Government, which 

was primarily concerned with protecting British interests in Germany. The Finance 

Division, unlike most others, was not subject to one of the two SubCommisions which 

stood at the head of the government and therefore enjoyed a relatively autonomous 

status.Lee attempted to clarify the role of Betriebsraete under Law 22. He listed thirteen 

points on which there appeared to him to be confusion. Most of his interpretations 

tended to limit Betriebsraete’s influence in senses which were probably not envisaged 

by the law. One was that the Betriebsraete did not have the right to inspect the firm’s 

books (point 1), that management did not have to consult Betriebsraete when changing 

working methods (point 6), and that Betriebsraete ‘will not receive any special 

protection from dismissal’ (point 10). All managements and Property Controllers were 

to be informed that any proposed agreement had to be copied to Bielefeld HQ and 

that agreements reached which were not in accordance with the letter’s terms would 

be cancelled. The memorandum was sent out under cover of a letter claiming that it 

was ‘the valid and authorised interpretation by Military Government of Works Council 

Law no.22.’ 10 This was repudiated by Luce’s subordinate Frank Kenny, Zonal Liaison 

Officer in the Industrial Relations Branch of Manpower Division, in a letter to Albert 

Carthy of the TUC’s International Department, dated 20 May, 1947. Kenny added 

that the employers had ‘seized avidly on the document, duplicated it and circulated 

it throughout the British Zone’. There was evidence that it was being used in a similar 

way by employers in the American and French zones. 11 The episode was described 

in the Manpower Division’ s Industrial Relations Branch internal Monthly Bulletin 

as ‘ill-starred and notorious’. Since the circular had claimed to reflect policy, the Soviet 

delegation to the Control Commission Germany’s Manpower Directorate asked 

publicly for clarification of the British attitude to Works Councils. Altogether, it had



been ‘a considerable embarrassment to us’. A weapon had been handed to the Soviet 

Union in the Cold War. 12 The episode confirmed Kenny, Gottfurcht and others in their 

view that the role of Property Controllers in industrial relations was an obstruction 

to Manpower Division’s work. 

Luce wrote to Gottfurcht to refute his allegations, dealing with each in turn.He 

began by taking up the employers’ association issue. The policy was a general one 

for application to all German organisations.In a passage which apparently drew on 

the ‘voluntaryism’ concept, Luce explained that it was policy not to prescribe what 

associations should do but to ensure that ‘they should be permitted freely to exercise 

that right (the right to association-RC) for any lawful purpose ‘(emphasis original RC). 

The general point was ‘what we are out to achieve in Germany ... we want Germans 

to realise a sense of responsibility for conducting their own affairs-within limits. By 

and large we are feeling our way towards defining what those limits should be.’ Some 

industries would be ‘socialised’, and in general employers and employees would be 

encouraged to work on the basis of ‘joint consultation and agreement. The essence 

of the idea is the voluntary principle’. Therefore it was not appropriate to specify the 

form of organisation to be adopted by either side of industry. The second specific matter 

concerned Works Councils and their relationship with unions, which Luce described 

as ‘very difficult’. He assured Gottfurcht that ‘we have given the problem a great deal 

of anxious thought’. He also stated unequivocally that ‘we never wanted the Works 

Council law’. One of the earliest government instructions had provided for the election 

of workers’ representatives ‘as a stopgap until the trade unions could take over the 

job of organising representation in factories etc.’ (emphasis original-RC) Luce and 

his colleagues had expected unions to insist on representation through their own 

‘stewards or some similar arrangement, and that they would rely on their own strength 

rather than on a law. The unions, however, insisted on a law.’ None of the four 

occupying powers, he wrote, was prepared to frame the law in such a way as to give 

unions absolute control of the Works Councils. ‘We took care to give unions an 

opportunity to put their foot in the door, but from that point onwards, they had to rely 

on the build-up of their membership inside the factories to gain control of the Works 

Councils’. He felt that the problem with the unions’ proposals in relation to requiring 

non-unionists to show 10% support for their nomination was that it would amount 

to a restriction on workers’ democratic rights and would therefore operate in 

contradiction to the purpose of the law. In response to the union argument that the 

proposed requirement was designed to exclude ‘frivolous’ candidates and Communists 

who were ‘vocal’ and might capture ‘irresponsible’ support, he made two replies. 

Firstly, the requirement could be imposed on all candidates. Secondly, had the unions 

not ‘Something to lose in this matter which is much more important than the occasional 

success of a non-union candidate in a Works Council election. Are they not leaving 

themselves open to some very barbed attacks from political opponents?’ He went on



‘I would assure you that all our sympathies are with the trade unions in their desire 

to achieve control of the Works Councils. We did not interfere in the matter until we 

received complaints from the North Rhine province. We came to the conclusion that 

the unions were acting very ill advisedly, and that we ourselves could not justify 

allowing the rule to operate if, as was likely, we were challenged.’ Conceding that 

their communication to unions could have been better worded, Luce pointed out that 

if the employers had appealed to them, then they would have had to disown the unions’ 

own guidance. The employers would have had an opportunity to discredit the unions, 

something that was ‘quite clearly appreciated’ by the their Zonal Secretariat when 

they agreed to issue an explanatory circular. In respect of the final specific criticism 

regarding the officer (although not named directly by Luce, this was D. C. Lee) who 

had issued incorrect instructions in respect of the Works Council law, Luce himself 

adopted a questioning and even incredulous tone: ‘You would not seriously suggest 

that Military Government, as a whole, is to be judged by the actions of individual 

officers who may from time to time act unwisely, or choose an unhappy phrase when 

expressing themselves.’The officer had been compelled to retract his circular, which 

was disowned as Military Government policy. ‘Are you sure that we were ‘extremely 

reluctant’ to do that, and would you have had as (sic. Presumably ‘us’ was intended- 

RC) do something more to the unfortunate man?’ Finally, Luce responded to the general 

accusation of anti union bias: ‘Is there really evidence here of anti-trade union bias 

on the part of Military Government? Does the history of the past two years contain 

no evidence to the contrary? There are many who think us strongly biased in their 

favour!’ (emphases original-RC) 13 

Gottfurcht’s reply opened in a most conciliatory way. Expressing gratitude for 

Luce’s detailed comments, he wrote that ‘Everyone who has to deal with contemporary 

political matters is subject to errors of judgement’ and that an open and frank exchange 

might correct at least some of them. He then explained that ‘I never thought to accuse 

Manpower Division of having any kind of anti-trade union bias. Quite the contrary 

might be the case as far as my reports, verbal and written, are concerned. As I repeatedly 

had the pleasure to discuss trade union matters with you I know only too well that 

the directives issued by your HQ favoured trade union development in a very positive 

sense.’ Although one or two officials had shown enmity to trade unionism, Luce’s 

speech to unions of October 1946 had been ‘warmly received and I joined them in 

gratefully acknowledging the wise and far-seeing decisions involved in that speech’. 14 

He went on to offer a general caveat: ‘I may as well mention that a man who has to 

deal with complicated matters in a language which is not that of his origin, runs into 

the danger of being a bit clumsy, even more so when it is in writing; I, at least, 

sometimes feel guilty of such a tendency!’ Turning to the substantive issues, he began 

by agreeing fully with Luce’s statement “That trade unions are ‘by deliberate design 

of Military Government well ahead of any organisation that the employers can show’”.



However, the fact was that unions had been ‘on trial’ as democratic organisations for 

the previous two years. Now that they were being allowed more freedom of operation, 

the employers, with a much worse democratic record, were being offered the same 

freedom. ‘Everyone who knows German employers of the past will doubt their desire 

to accept the democratic way of life; they will never deny their obligations but they 

will skillfully try to evade them.’ The weakness of employment meant that real power 

did not lie in the hands of unions and regulations were correspondingly more important. 

‘You surely would not welcome a multitude of trade unions, why should a ‘divide 

et impera’ machinery on the employers’ side be encouraged?’ (emphases original- 

RC) On the Works Council question, he did not think the disagreement ‘of too great 

importance and I admit that some of your arguments are convincing’. He did not doubt 

that complaints had been received from the North Rhine employers as they would 

take every opportunity to undermine trade unionism, while even complaints ostensibly 

coming from workers ‘might well have been fabricated by the advocates of heavy 

industry’. With respect to Lee, Gottfurcht agreed that no further action should be taken 

against him. On the other hand, ‘I happened to be in Bielefeld when the incident 

occurred and I know the effect it had. It took quite a while to get a statement from 

Military Government clarifying the situation. You know how the employers jumped 

at their opportunity. Very speedy action, i.e. the sending out of a counter statement 

24 hours after the first one was known, could have undone the harm caused. This, 

and only this, I meant when I spoke of ‘reluctance’” Regarding the Model Works 

Agreement, Gottfurcht wrote simply ‘I fully endorse what you say’. In other words, 

he agreed that union policy was poorly conceived and that it invited political criticism. 

His letter concluded ‘Please let me assure you once again that I am most thankful to 

you personally and to so many of the members of your division for all the kindness 

shown to me. You will, I am certain, believe me that any critical comments were desired 

to help forward a great cause to which you and I are equally devoted’. 15 

What remained, then, of Gottfurcht’s initial criticisms after the exchange? The 

principal point was that relating to employers’ associations. On this issue, Gottfurcht 

mounted a defence of his initial position by reference to the comparatively poor 

democratic record of German employers. However, he did not explicitly insist that 

the legal regulation which he proposed remained valid. He maintained a small part 

of his criticism of the Military Government in practice when he referred to the slowness 

of their response to Lee’s damaging circular in the context of the employers’ speedy 

seizure of the opportunity presented. He also cast some doubt on the bona fides and 

authenticity of the complaints from North Rhine employers. Nevertheless, he did not 

choose to argue his case for requiring non unionists to obtain a 10% nomination.Despite 

Gottfurcht’s statement minimising the topic, it was arguably the most important issue 

of detail in the discussion because it related both to trade union efforts to control the 

Works Councils and to their wider political position. With the benefit of hindsight,



we may see that the matter was relevant to setting the terms in which the later discussion 

on Mitbestimmung was held.Gottfurcht chose not to pursue it, and he appeared to 

accept Luce’s arguments here. Nor did he pursue the general issue of anti-union bias 

within the Military Government. In fact, he was notably conciliatory on this point, 

stressing that he had never intended to criticise Manpower Division. 

The implicit contrast between Manpower Division and other sections of the Military 

Government was significant. The difference between the attitude of different sections 

of the Military Government towards unions was in many ways of great importance. 

Lee was a Property Control Officer and in his circular had addressed his local 

subordinates. It was a frequent cause of complaint that officials outside of Manpower 

Division came from accountancy or legal backgrounds and had less understanding 

of trade union rights than those within the Division, many of whom were industrial 

relations specialists from the Ministry of Labour. Increasingly, as the British Element 

of the Control Commission reached the end of its operational period, the Manpower 

Division became less important in relation to other Divisions, to Gottfurcht’s dismay 16 . 

This is relevant to Dartmann’s criticisms of the Division. These have considerable 

force, and indeed we argue that Gottfurcht missed an opportunity to improve the 

Division’s practice.But they have also to be set in a wider context.Property Control 

Officers had wide powers over very many enterprises, including influence over the 

work of Betriebsraete. It was Manpower Division that had been seen to intervene to 

prevent Property Control officers from abusing these powers 17 . 

When challenged by Luce, Gottfurcht had largely climbed down, especially in those 

areas directly concerned with trade union matters. The reasons for his retreat may have 

been partly personal. He had only recently been officially confirmed as official liaison 

officer between the TUC and the German trade unions in the British zone and may 

have felt insecure in his position. Stripped of German nationality by the Nazi regime, 

he had recently chosen to apply for British nationality, which was granted in February 

1948 16 . Aware of the close relations between the TUC and government he may have 

been wary of challenging a senior British official for fear of prejudicing his application. 

He may have felt an underlying loyalty to his adopted country and in particular, with 

his social democratic background, to the new Labour government. Nevertheless, it 

seems unlikely that someone of such evidently strong beliefs would concede a case 

that he felt to be unfaithful to reality. It also seems improbable that someone who had 

been prepared to take the risk of clandestine activity after 1933 would neglect the 

interests of his comrades in the German unions for personal reasons. He may, though, 

have felt that loyalty to the German union cause itself meant that he could not afford 

to challenge Luce. He possibly saw it as important to support those who might be 

regarded as his allies in government. Further, unforeseeable, issues might have to be 

pursued with Luce. It is of course also possible that he accepted large parts of Luce’s 

arguments simply because he believed them on reflection to be accurate.



Perhaps there was something of a missed opportunity here. If so, it could be 

interpreted as a small part of the wider opportunity unions missed to put their ideas 

for social reorganisation into effect in this period which has been suggested by some 

historians such as Michael Schneider. 18 Schneider felt that by the standards of the 

unions’ own pretensions and the mood of the population, initial instinct would lead 

one to accept that this was in fact the case. 

Yet he absolves the German unions from that charge in view of the context: they 

had to face occupying powers. 

Schneider argues that the British Labour Government may have been sympathetic 

to the unions’ plans, but they were neither willing nor able to defy the Americans to 

whom ideas of a ‘social state’ were quite alien. The argument is plausible, but was 

not tested at the time because the British did not attempt to persuade the Americans 

of the German union case. Nor were they lobbied to do so by the TUC. It has been 

suggested that the TUC did not support the German unions in their demands because 

of their subordination to the British Government. 19 In the case of the TUC’s rejection 

of Boeckler’s demand for one all-embracing union federation, McShane argues that 

this was related to the TUC’s view of the German character, since it stressed the German 

tendency ‘to blindly obey instructions from Headquarters’ 20 Yet these general 

explanations may be complemented by a quite particular one: Gottfurcht took the view 

at a critical stage in developments that Luce should not be challenged across a broad 

front. 

Gottfurcht’s exchange with Luce may have reflected his perception of TUC attitudes 

and policies towards, and links with, the British Government but is significant for 

its apparent consequences. The exchange certainly seems to have had the effect of 

making Gottfurcht less prone to criticise the Military Government, and may also have 

brought a corresponding increase in Luce’s confidence in his own views. After the 

debate, Gottfurcht’s reports to the TUC on the German situation became in general 

less critical of the Military Government’s activities. His report of May 1949, for 

instance, placed great emphasis on the question of Manpower Division’s Labour 

Advisors, who were being reduced and whose roles were being taken over by others, 

who had, he felt, shown their hostility to trade unions in the past. 21 In this sense, it 

confirmed his earlier views on the relatively positive attitudes of the Manpower 

Division. The later reports were more concerned to secure appropriate staffing of the 

occupation government than to criticise their policies. By the time that Gottfurcht 

resigned from his position as TUC-DGB liaison officer, Tewson agreed with Ludwig 

Rosenberg of the DGB that there was less need to carry on the liaison in the same 

way, even though he wished to carry on the ‘intimate’ relationship with the DGB. 22 

Tewson wrote just over two years after the Gottfurcht-Luce exchange, but discussion 

in the interim had tended to shift in the general direction of trying to assist the German 

unions in their attempts to gain restitution of their pre1933 property, and away from



the industrial relations matters raised earlier. 23 If Gottfurcht became less critical of 

the British as an occupying power then it was unsurprising if the TUC intervened rather 

less. Whether this was positive or negative from the German point of view is an 

interesting question the answer to which would largely depend on a judgement of the 

wider impact of TUC intervention which German historians would be better qualified 

to make. 

The general trend was perhaps inevitably in the general direction of less intervention 

as an increasing number of fundamental issues were resolved. From 1949, and the 

foundation of the DGB, TUC officials had in any case to take into account the fact 

that the Germans now had a national centre whose prerogatives had to be respected. 

It is therefore difficult to disentangle the impact of this particular discussion from the 

broader trend. 

However, a later incident is of interest in this connection, since it shows that even 

after the election of the Adenauer government, senior British officials in Germany 

felt that it was possible to request Tewson to intervene in support of German employers. 

It occurred in early 1952, during the crucial period of negotiation of the terms on which 

Mitbestimmung was to be conducted. The context had changed. Although occupying 

powers still played a role in the government of Germany, a German government had 

been elected in the West. The political situation became increasingly difficult for the 

unions as the Cold War intensified and their codetermination proposals were depicted 

as drawing on Soviet rather than German experience. By mid1950, there was deadlock 

on the DGB’s proposals and a campaign of industrial action began which was strongly 

resisted by the employers. Bipartite co-determination in the coal and steel industries 

was agreed by the spring of 1951, but in early 1952 the extension of this scheme to 

the economy as a whole was still under discussion. The tenor of parliamentary 

discussion on both the coal and steel and the wider arrangements led the DGB, now 

led by Christian Fette, to fear that the government and employers were strongly opposed 

to extending the bi-partite arrangements. 

At this time, German trade unions were represented on an Anglo-American Joint 

Productivity Council whose aim was to raise productivity in the two occupying powers’ 

zones in Germany. In March 1952, Herr Stork of the Verband der Deutschen Industrie 

based in Frankfurt visited Sir Thomas Hutton, a British member of the Productivity 

Council. According to Hutton, Stork told him that the unions were unwilling to 

participate in a programme of productivity teams unless their demands for codetermination 

were accepted. Hutton encouraged him to talk to Tewson or someone 

else in the TUC. Hutton wrote to Tewson: ‘It occurs to me that you might feel it 

desirable to use your international contacts to resolve this difficulty’. 24 Tewson replied 

that ‘This is one of those matters in which it is very difficult to interfere in other people’s 

business’, but he hoped to be seeing Fette in Brussels in the following week and ‘I 

will try to make an opportunity to see how matters stand’. 25 As his earlier reply implied,


Tewson does not appear to have taken any action to influence Fette. It is an illustration 

of how inaction by the TUC could be ‘benevolent neutrality’. 

The incident, taken in relation to the earlier exchange between Gottfurcht and Luce, 

indicated the way the relationship between the British authorities in Germany, the TUC 

and the DGB had developed. Sir Thomas Hutton was sufficiently confident of obtaining 

a positive response to his request for Tewson to exert influence on Fette that he could 

write to Tewson in this way. Comparing the two incidents, it is apparent that in the 

Luce-Gottfurcht exchange Luce defended the Military Government’s attitude to 

German trade unionism. In the Hutton-Tewson exchange, Hutton demonstrated quite 

a different attitude. He attempted to use the TUC against the DGB in a matter of great 

importance. He therefore went well beyond anything attempted by any part of the 

Military Government at an earlier stage. 

The head of Manpower Division appears to have exerted an influence on Gottfurcht 

which led the latter to reduce his criticism of the authorities. The Gottfurcht- 

Luce exchange was important to the British authorities’ perception of the degree of 

acceptance of their activities in Germany. From that point on, Gottfurcht’s criticism 

became muted. The TUC therefore received reports from their chief informant that 

were decreasingly critical of Military Government policy. The influence of relatively 

pro-union elements among the British authorities in Germany diminished in the late 

1940s. Eventually, a British representative like Hutton could suspect that the TUC 

might even be prepared to pressurise the DGB to drop action designed to improve 

the prospects of a better deal on Mitbestimmung. 

Notes 


1 M. Schneider, Kleine Geschichte der Gewerkschaften, J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn: 1989, p.241. 

2 See for example, C. Scharf, H-J Schroeder (Hrsg.), Die Deutschlandpolitik Grossbritanniens und die 

Britische Zone, 1945-1949. Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden: 1979. 

3 E.Silver, Vic Feather TUC, Victor Gollancz, London: 1973. 

4 See, for example, M.Fichter, Besatszungsmacht und Gewerkschaften, West-deutscher Verlag, Opladen: 

1982. 

5 A fierce debate around this question erupted in the 1970s, focussed on the importance of the TUC’s 

1945 delegation to Germany and its importance in German trade unionists’ abandonment of their Einheitsgewerkschaft 

concept. [Gerhard Beier’s review of J. Klein, Vereint sind wir alles? Untersuchungen 

zur Enstehung von Einheitsgewerkschaften in Deutschland. Von der Weimarer Republik bis 19467. 

(Fundament-Verlag der Dr. Sasse &Co., Hamburg:1972) appeared in Internationale wissenschaftliche 

Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (IWK), 10 (1974), pp.262-4. Klein 

replied in IWK, 11 (1975), pp.141-3, suggesting that the TUC delegation compelled Boeckler and his 

colleagues to accept their view (p.143).R. Steininger, ‘England und die deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung’, 

in Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte, XVIII (1978), pp.41-118, took a similar line.For a review of 

published literature since the Beier-Klein exchange, see D. McShane, International Labour and the 

Origins of the Cold War, Clarendon Press, Oxford:1992. 

6 C. Dartmann, Re-Distribution of Power, Joint Consultation or Productivity Coalitions? Labour and Post- 

War Reconstruction in Germany and Britain, 1945-53, Universitaetsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, Bochum:



1996, pp.24670 and p.268. Dartmann contends that ‘The TUC did not institutionalise any links with 

the German unions apart from fraternal attendance at Congresses, invitations to the newly emergent 

international bodies or the Trade Union Marshall Plan conference, or individual relief actions...’ (p.246) 

Having somewhat undermined his initial assertion by providing evidence of links, Dartmann dealt with 

the appointment of Gottfurcht as liaison officer by saying that it was ‘the only concrete attempt.....the 

effectiveness of which was doomed to be very limited from the start, though’ but without explaining 

why he considered it so ‘doomed’. (p.246) Dartmann’s view of Gottfurcht’s work differs from that taken 

by Boeckler (see note 8 below) and Tewson (see note 19 below). Dartmann also argued that those 

parts of the Allied Control Commission for Germany concerned with economic matters were more 

creative in developing codetermination than Manpower Division. (p.268). 

7 Law 22 is examined in P.Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War, Stanford University Press, Stanford: 

1988, p. 167. 

8 Tewson to Gottfurcht, 4 June, 1947. MRC: 292/943/12. All documents referred to are from the TUC’s 

archive deposited in the Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick and are prefixed ‘MRC’. In September 

1947, Tewson and Boeckler had a long conversation when the latter visited the TUC Congress 

in Southport, during which the latter expressed ‘considerable satisfaction’ with Gottfurcht’s liaison work 

between the two movements. [Tewson to Bell, 18 September, 1947. MRC: 292/943/12] 

9 Gottfurcht’s Report on Germany, May, 1949. MRC: 292/943/118. 

10 514/PC/10: ‘Law No.22-Works Council’, 28 February, 1947. MRC: 292/943/12. Property Control 

remained in control of many important enterprises as late as 1951. (Public Record Office [PRO]: FO 

1023/342) 

11 Kenny to Carthy, 20 May, 1947. MRC: 292/943/12. 

12 IR Branch Monthly Bulletin, 47/2. PRO: FO 1051/433. 

13 Luce to Gottfurcht, 26 June, 1947. MRC: 292/943/12. 

14 The speech had explained that British policy had been to obtain a sound growth from below, and that 

although this had resulted in a large number of small unions, Luce would not intervene to prevent larger 

bodies being formed. He encouraged the creation of a co-ordinating body. ‘Speech made by Mr. R.W. 

Luce to the Trade Union Zonal Council at Bielefeld on 4 October, 1946’. MRC: 292/943/12. 

15 Gottfurcht to Luce, 7 July, 1947. MRC: 292/943/12. 

16 Gottfurcht’s Report of May 1949. MRC:292/943/118. 

17 Gottfurcht thanked Ernest Bell and Albert Carthy of the TUC’s International Department, as well as 

Tewson and Walter Citrine, General Secretary and ex-General Secretary of the TUC respectively, in a 

letter informing them that he had been successful in his application for British nationality: ‘To express 

my gratitude to all of you is my deep-felt desire at this juncture’. Gottfurcht to Bell, 11 February, 1948. 

MRC: 292/943/12. 

18 M. Schneider, op.cit., p.259. 

19 R. Steininger, op.cit., pp. 69-90. 

Steininger’s view that ‘die Briten’ of the TUC and Foreign Office need hardly be differentiated between 

has been challenged by evidence produced by Weiler, who shows that the Foreign Office complained 

in late 1947 that the TUC was giving insufficient active support to the Foreign Office in its attempts to 

combat both Communist and American Federation of Labour influence in Germany.(P. Weiler, op.cit., 

p.178). D. McShane, op.cit., p.226. 

20 D. McShane, op.cit., p.219. 

21 Gottfurcht’s report of May 1949. MRC: 292/943/118. 

22 Tewson to Rosenberg, 18 March, 1950. MRC: 292/943/17. Gottfurcht was succeeded as liaison officer 

by his old colleague Richard Broh, who held the position for much of the 1950s. 

23 Gottfurcht to Boeckler, 27 January, 1950. MRC: 292/943/12. 

24 Sir Thomas Hutton to Sir Vincent Tewson, 13 March, 1953. MRC: 242/943/18. The German employers’ 

attitudes on this occasion seem to support Gottfurcht’s view of them as fundamentally hostile to cooperation 

with trade unions. 

25 Tewson to Hutton, 14 March, 1952. MRC: 242/943/18. 

ends


Rezensionen 

Laslo Sekelj, Vreme Bešcašca. Ogledi o 

vladavini nacionalizma 

[Zeit der Schmach. Überlegungen zum Aufstieg 

des Nationalismus] 

Akademia Nova*Institut za evropske studije, 

Belgrad 1995. 

Der 1949 in Subotica geborne Politologe, 

Soziologe und Philosoph Laslo Sekelj ist leitender 

Mitarbeiter am Institut für europäische 

Studien in Belgrad. Zu seinen zahlreichen Publikationen 

gehören Werke über Marx, die 

Sozialdemokratie und den Bolschewismus, 

die sozialen Bewegungen und das politische 

System in Ungarn und über Anarchismus, Gemeinwesen 

und Utopie. 

Im vorliegenden Werk geht es um die makrosozialen 

Folgen des ethnischen Nationalismus 

speziell in Bezug auf ethnische Minderheiten 

am Beispiel der Entstehung und Auflösung 

des jugoslawischen Bundesstaats zwischen 

1929 und 1991. Für den Autor ist der militante 

Ethnonationalismus mit seiner antimodernen 

Politik die direkte Folge des Selbstverwaltungssozialismus. 

Bereits bei der Gründung 

des jugoslawischen Staats sei es um die 

Grundfrage Demokratie oder Diktatur gegangen. 

So habe bereits die Diktatur König Alexander 

VI. 1929 diesen Konflikt verschärft, 

dessen Lösung der Aufbau einer Demokratie 

gewesen wäre. Der Autor betont, daß nur ein 

jugoslawischer Bundesstaat den Rahmen für 

ein friedliches Miteinander der Serben, Kroaten 

und Muslime bilden könne, in dem das 

Gewaltmonopol beim Staatenbund liege. In 

einem Kapitel über Antisemitismus und die 

nationalen Konflikte in Jugoslawien stellt 

Sekelj fest, daß der Antisemitismus zwar nicht 

das bedeutsamste Beispiel für den Ethnonationalismus 

sei, aber die ständige Begleiterscheinung 

antimoderner Ideologien, Bewegungen 

und Parteien. Die Minderheitenrechte 

seien ein ebensolcher Mythos wie die individuellen 

und kollektiven Menschenrechte, 

deren Teil sie sind. Die Forschungen des Au- 

tors bewiesen die Notwendigkeit eines Konzepts 

der individuellen und kollektiven kulturellen 

Autonomie für die nationalen Minderheiten 

in Serbien für die Lösung des Kosowo-Konflikts. 

Dagegen habe die seit dem 

Zusammenbruch des jugoslawischen Staates 

praktizierte Reduktion des Politischen auf das 

Nationale “Schurken den Aufstieg ermöglicht 

und ein Regime der Schmach etabliert” (152) 

und ein demokratisches, auf dem freien Individuum 

in einer Zivilgesellschaft basierendes 

Gemeinwesen verhindert. Damit wären alle 

großen Ideen, wie die nationale Selbstbestimmung, 

Demokratie, Sozialismus und die Einheit 

der Jugoslawen instrumentalisiert und 

pervertiert worden. 

Hanna Behrend 

Rechtsstaat und Klassenjustiz: Texte aus 

der sozialdemokratischen “Neuen Zeit” 

1883 - 1914 /hrsg. und mit einem Anh. vers. 

von Detlef Joseph. Freiberg (Breisgau) ; 

Berlin: Haufe, 1996 

Haufe-Schriftenreihe zur rechtswissenschaftlichen 

Grundlagenforschung, hrsg. v. Hermann 

Klenner, Bd. 9, 544 S. 

Die Neuformierung der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 

seit den 60er Jahren des 19. Jh. 

vollzog sich unter der Option einer innerhalb 

des Rahmens der bestehenden Staats- und 

Gesellschaftsordnung legalen Bewegung, die 

zugleich alternative politisch-soziale Wertund 

Zielvorstellungen verkörperte, die über 

das bestehende System hinauswiesen. Die 

Legalität, wesentliche Existenzbedingung für 

die öffentliche (nicht-geheime) Organisation 

und Voraussetzung für ihre Entwicklung zur 

Massenbewegung, mußte erst ertrotzt werden. 

Die großen Prozesse Lassalles in den beginnenden 

60er Jahren oder der aufsehenerregende 

Leipziger Hochverratsprozeß gegen Bebel 

und Wilhelm Liebknecht vom Jahre 1872 sind 

herausragende Belege dafür, in welchem 

Maße juristische Mittel Bestandteil dieser 

Auseinandersetzung waren. In allen Bereichen

Rezensionen 

– von der Verteidigung der Existenz der Organisationen 

über die Durchsetzung der zugestandenen 

Bewegungsfreiheit bis zur Einberufung 

und Leitung einer simplen Versammlung 

– war die keineswegs oberflächliche 

Kenntnis von Gesetzesvorschriften unabdingbar. 

Von Anfang an hatte die aufkommende 

Arbeiterbewegung eine besondere Affinität 

zu Recht und Gesetz. Advokaten wie 

Toelcke, zeitweise Vizepräsident des Allgemeinen 

Deutschen Arbeitervereins, oder 

Puttrich und Freytag, die eng mit Bebel und 

Liebknecht zusammenwirkten, spielten eine 

bedeutende, von der Historiographie meist gar 

zu leicht übersehene Rolle im Formierungsprozeß 

der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung. 

Umso verdienstvoller ist die vorliegende 

Dokumentation, die mit einer Auswahl aus der 

Fülle des zwischen 1883 und 1914 in der 

“Neuen Zeit” publizierten Materials den 

Gesamtkomplex “Rechtsstaat und Klassenjustiz” 

in den Blickpunkt rückt. Diese Auswahl 

ist in drei Abteilungen gruppiert: I. Rechtstheoretisches 

(11–122, 5 Beiträge), II. 

Gesetzgebungstheoretisches (125–249, 10 

Beiträge) und III. Justizpraktisches (253–354, 

12 Beiträge). Von den in den Band aufgenommenen 

27 Beiträgen stammen allein 12 von 

Franz Mehring, weitere 4 von Karl Kautsky, 

2 von dem Rechtsanwalt Siegfried Weinberg, 

die restlichen 9 von bekannten oder weithin 

unbekannten Autoren (August Bebel, Eduard 

Bernstein, dem Rechtssoziologen Eugen 

Ehrlich, Hugo Haase, Wolfgang Heine, dem 

österreichischen Sozialdemokraten Emil Kaler 

und Karl Liebknecht sowie von Ernst Ludwig 

und E. Norden). Die Auswahl dürfte Detlef 

Joseph schwer gefallen sein. Daß er sich dennoch 

dafür entschied, die einzelnen Titel fast 

ausnahmslos ungekürzt einzubringen, verdient 

besonders hervorgehoben zu werden. 

Den Quellentexten hat der Hrsg. einen Essay: 

“Die Neue Zeit”, die Sozialdemokratie und 

das Nachdenken über Recht, Justiz und 

Rechtsstaat (359–382) angefügt. Als Kernpunkt 

dieser Untersuchung bezeichnet der Vf. 

“den Versuch (!) der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, 

marxistisches Gedankengut auf die 


Analyse und Bewertung des Rechts und der 

Justiz im Deutschen Kaiserreich anzuwenden” 

(357). Diese in der DDR-Historiographie 

gängige Fragestellung erscheint uns insofern 

als zu eng, als sie den tatsächlichen historischen 

Prozeß nur in einem speziellen Sektor 

erfaßt. Der Vf. räumt ein, daß Marx und Engels 

keine separate Rechtsphilosophie verfaßt 

haben, die “Deutsche Ideologie” unbekannt 

war, das “Elend der Philosophie” bis 1885 nur 

in französischer Sprache vorlag. Auf den 

Verweis auf das Kommunistische Manifest, 

den Anti-Dühring sowie die Kritik des Gothaer 

Programms von 1875 1 folgt die Behauptung, 

Repressivpolitik und Klassenjustiz gegen 

die Arbeiterbewegung und die Linke 

“bewiesen die Richtigkeit des materialistischen 

rechtstheoretischen Ansatzes von Marx 

und Engels und bildeten einen Ausgangspunkt 

(!) des politischen Kampfes der Sozialdemokratie” 

(S. 363). 

Diese gedankliche Konstruktion ist ein jahrzehntelang 

gebrauchtes Schema, das nur eine 

“Aneignung” der Auffassungen von Marx und 

Engels zuläßt und damit eine aus der gesellschaftlichen 

Praxis entspringende eigenständig-schöpferische 

Leistung ignoriert. Für die 

deutsche Arbeiterbewegung war es ein glücklicher 

Umstand, daß sie sich in engem Zusammenhang 

mit Marx und Engels formieren 

konnte. Aber grundlegende Entwicklungen 

entsprangen nicht oder nicht in erster Linie der 

Theorie, sondern praktischen Zwangslagen. 

Das betraf ganz zentrale Problemkomplexe, 

von denen oft genug Sein oder Nichtsein 

abhing, so das auf der Suche nach der effektivsten 

Organisationsform der Arbeiterbewegung 

entwickelte Parteimodell, das sich in 

1 Aus längst verstaubter Literatur wird leider der 

unberechtigte Vorwurf, die Adressaten hätten 

die Programmkritik geheim gehalten, übernommen 

(365). Die Publikation des internen 

Material lag selbstverständlich ganz und gar in 

der Hand der Verfasser, die darauf verzichteten. 

Überdies wurden wesentliche Punkte der 

Kritik durch den im Protokoll des Gothaer Kongresses 

1875 abgedruckten “Leipziger Antrag” 

zur Verbesserung des Programmentwurfs aufgegriffen.


Europa durchsetzte und gewiß nicht eine Kopie 

des Bundes der Kommunisten war, die 

“revolutionäre Parlamentstaktik” einschließlich 

erfolgreicher, politisch selbständig geführter 

Wahlkämpfe, das Verhältnis von Partei 

und Gewerkschaften, die Schaffung der Einheit 

der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung 

1875 oder die Anti-Geheimbunds-Taktik im 

Kampf gegen das Sozialistengesetz. Diese die 

internationale Arbeiterbewegung motivierenden 

Leistungen waren keineswegs bloße “Anwendung” 

vorgegebener Prämissen, was nicht 

zuletzt aus der Distanz hervorgeht, die sich 

Marx und Engels bei der Gründung der “Eisenacher” 

Partei (weder Volkspartei noch 

Lassallekirche), besonders bei der Vereinigung 

von 1875 (ungeachtet der Tatsache, daß 

eine sozialistische Partei von Gewicht nur in 

Deutschland bestand und somit gleichsam 

Überlebensträger der internationalen sozialistischen 

Bewegung war!) und selbst in der 

Anfangsphase des Sozialistengesetzes (“Zirkularbrief”, 

erst seit dem Nachruf auf Jenny 

Marx 1881 Mitarbeit von Engels am 1879 

gegründeten illegalen “Sozialdemokrat”) auferlegten. 

So paradox es klingen mag: Es gab 

richtungweisende Entscheidungssituationen, 

in der grundlegende Voraussetzungen für die 

weitere Durchsetzung des Marxismus gegen 

den Widerstand aus London gesichert wurden, 

was die “Londoner” schließlich meist akzeptierten. 

Die lebendige Arbeiterbewegung, 

deren führende Funktionäre die Theorie, wie 

sie sie rezipieren konnten, als Leitstern nahmen, 

entsprang aus der Praxis, aus den realen 

politisch-gesellschaftlichen und ökonomisch-sozialen 

Verhältnissen, mit denen sie 

sich im existentiellen Interesse auseinanderzusetzen 

hatte, und die durch Erfolge und 

Rückschläge ihrerseits für die Geltendmachung 

und Entwicklung des Marxismus eine 

neuartige – und zwar auch theoretische – Basis 

schuf. 

Dies traf – wie der Vf. überzeugend darlegt 

–namentlich auch auf die Analyse der Strategie 

und Praxis der Gesetzgebung durch die 

Sozialdemokratie zu, die sich einem immensen 

Spannungsfeld gleichsam materialisier- 

Rezensionen 

te, angefangen von einer Fülle von Einzelprozessen 

über einschneidenden Repressivgesetze 

wie dem Sozialistengesetz, der Umsturz- 

oder der Zuchthausvorlage bis hin zur 

Sozialgesetzgebung, die für die Arbeiterbewegung 

auch als eine juristische Herausforderung 

verstand (Arbeitersekretariate usw.) 

bis hin zur rechtlichen Verfahrensweise (Strafprozeßordnung 

usw.) und der Fixierung des 

Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches. Damit ist nur 

stichwortartig die vom Vf. skizzierte Gesamtproblematik 

und der Materialreichtum des 

lesenswerten Bandes angedeutet, der – über 

die aussagekräftige Dokumentation hinaus 

(10–354) – durch den umfangreichen Anmerkungsapparat 

(383–518) an Gewicht gewinnt. 

Eine einschlägige Bibliographie (517–532) 

und ein Sachregister runden den interessanten 

Band ab, mit dem ein bislang geradezu 

sträflich vernachlässigter Bereich der Praxis 

und Theorie der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung 

in den Blickpunkt gerückt wird. 

Wolfgang Schröder 

Neil Gregor: Stern und Hakenkreuz. Daimler-Benz 

im Dritten Reich 

Propyläen Verlag, Berlin 1997, 448 S. 

Als das Buch 1997 in Englisch und Deutsch 

erschien, war der Dozent für Neuere Geschichte 

der University of Southampton Neil 

Gregor 28 Jahre alt. Er legte ein beachtenswertes 

Werk vor, das exakt zur neuerlich 

verschärften Auseinandersetzung um Entschädigungen 

für die ausländischen Arbeitssklaven 

Hitlers und der deutschen Konzerne paßt. 

Eingangs stellt der Autor die Entwicklung der 

Daimler-Benz AG, welche 1926 durch Fusion 

miteinander zuvor konkurrierender Unternehmen 

entstand, an der Wende zu den 30er Jahren 

dar. Diese Entwicklung war durch die 

Weltwirtschaftskrise beeinträchtigt, die auch 

dieser Firma schwere Einbußen zufügte. Sie 

ermöglichte es ihr zugleich, für längere Zeit 

das Lohnniveau zu senken. (49) Noch vor

Rezensionen 

Hitlers Machtantritt begann dann die wirtschaftliche 

Erholung der Automobilindustrie. 

Nazidiktatur und Rüstung, an der sich Daimler-Benz 

schon in der Weimarer Republik beteiligt 

hatte, begünstigten indes den Aufschwung 

besonders der großen Firmen. 

Schwer verständlich ist Gregors Polemik 

gegen Karl Heinz Roth und dessen verdienstvolle 

Arbeit “Der Weg zum guten Stern des 

‚Dritten Reichs‘” im 1987 zu Nördlingen 

erschienenen “Daimler-Benz-Buch”. (85f.) 

Denn Roth hat keine “Verschwörungstheorie” 

von der Art konstruiert, wonach der Konzern 

mit dem Dreizack-Stern Hitler um des Rüstungsgeschäfts 

willen zur Macht gebracht 

haben soll. Er wies die vielfältigen, für beide 

Seiten vorteilhaften Bindungen zwischen 

dem prominenten Lkw- und Pkw-Hersteller 

sowie der NS-Führung und –Bewegung nach, 

wodurch seine Darstellung in diesem Belang 

konkreter und besser als die Gregors ist. 

Ansonsten stimmen beide Verfasser in allem 

Wesentlichen überein. Sie beurteilen den 

Konzern, seine enormen Leistungen in der 

Luftwaffen-, Heeres- und Marinerüstung, den 

hohen Anteil an der Ausbeutung kriegsgefangener 

und ziviler ausländischer Arbeitssklaven, 

von Juden und KZ-Häftlingen, die 

ausgezeichneten Kontakte von Daimler-Benz 

zur Nazispitze in gleicher Art und Weise. 

Allerdings legt Gregor Wert darauf, durchgehend 

zu betonen, daß der entscheidende Beweggrund 

für das Tun und Lassen der Konzernherren 

deren Eigeninteresse, genauer das 

der Firma war. Aus eben diesem Grunde förderten 

sie einerseits die Deutsche Arbeitsfront 

mit ihrer Volksgemeinschafts- und unternehmerfreundlichen 

Propaganda, trugen sie andererseits 

dafür Sorge, daß sich die DAF nicht 

in Belange der Geschäftsleitung einmischte. 

Mit Hitlers und Görings Hilfe gelang es der 

Leitung sogar, zeitweise von Himmler unterstützte 

DAF-Attacken gegen drei mit jüdischen 

oder “halbjüdischen” Frauen verehelichte 

Vorstandsmitglieder, darunter den Vorstandsvorsitzenden 

Wilhelm Haspel, abzuwehren 

und einen Führungswechsel bei Daimler-Benz 

zu vermeiden. (258ff.) 


Den Rüstungsboom half die Firma bis zuletzt 

forcieren. Sie engagierte sich aber möglichst 

wenig durch Kapitalanlagen, um nicht den 

Weg für zivile Produktionen nach dem Krieg 

zu blockieren. Als sich der Waffengang dem 

Ende näherte und die Agonie des Naziregimes 

begann, war sie gleich anderen Konzernen 

zwar um eine nochmalige Produktionssteigerung 

bemüht. Doch wurde diese durch 

höhere Arbeitsintensität und weitere Verlängerung 

der Arbeitszeit bewirkt. Mit Bezug auf 

die ganze Rüstungsindustrie faßt der Autor 

den Vorgang verallgemeinernd so zusammen: 

“... die Ausbeutung der wehrlosesten Opfer 

des Regimes nahm in vieler Hinsicht erst in 

dem Augenblick die schlimmsten Ausmaße 

an, als die Unternehmen sich innerlich bereits 

vom NS-Regime verabschiedet hatten und nur 

noch versuchten, die eigene Haut zu retten.” 

(291) 

Nachdem sie vorher an Raubzügen in anderen 

Ländern und am Raubbau an Arbeitssklaven 

teilgehabt hatten, wirkten die Herren von 

Daimler-Benz auch an Programmen der Regierungsinstanzen 

zur Dezentralisierung 

ihres Maschinenparks zwecks Vermeidung 

von Bombenschäden und an der Verlagerung 

ganzer Fertigungsstätten in stillgelegte Bergwerke 

eifrig mit. Es ging ihnen darum, die eigenen 

Produktionsmittel für Friedenszeiten zu 

bewahren, und schließlich widmeten sie sich 

fast nur noch dieser Aufgabe. Auch dabei arbeiteten 

sie eng mit der SS zusammen, die die 

zum Ausbau unterirdischer Produktionsstätten 

nötigen KZ-Häftlinge stellte und sie nach 

rücksichtsloser Auspowerung zu Vernichtungszwecken 

wieder abtransportierte. 

Den raschen Nachkriegserfolg von Daimler- 

Benz führt der Verfasser u. a. darauf zurück, 

daß der Konzern keine großen Substanzverluste 

erlitt und lediglich 15 Prozent seiner 

Werkzeugmaschinen einbüßte. Er verfügte 

über beträchtliche Rücklagen und hatte sich 

schon Anfang 1944 verstärkt wieder der Lkw- 

Herstellung zugewandt. Zusammen mit der 

streng verbotenen, gleichwohl aber insgeheim 

praktizierten Entwicklung neuer ziviler Fahrzeugmodelle 

bedeutete das, sich frühzeitig für


einen erfolgreichen Konkurrenzkampf in der 

Friedenswirtschaft zu wappnen. Gregor hat 

mit seiner abschließenden Feststellung recht, 

daß der vom NS-Regime gewollte und begonnene 

Krieg der deutschen Wirtschaft keine 

“Modernisierung” brachte. “Man täte einem 

Regime, das sich durch eine historisch einzigartige 

Destruktivität auszeichnete, zuviel der 

Ehre an, würde man ihm eine Vorkämpferrolle 

für eine konstruktive Entwicklung bescheinigen.” 

(377) Gleichzeitig ist aber unbestreitbar, 

daß Unternehmen wie Daimler-Benz 

dank Nazidiktatur und zweitem Weltkrieg 

enorm gewachsen sind, im wahrsten Sinne des 

Wortes also Kriegs- und Diktaturgewinnler 

waren. 

Zu bemängeln an dem insgesamt vortrefflichen 

Buch ist das nahezu völlige Fehlen der 

Deutschen Bank als agierende Größe. Durch 

ihre Spitzenposition im Aufsichtsrat, der im 

Fall der Daimler-Benz AG dem Vorstand weisungsmäßig 

übergeordnet war, hat sie mehr 

als andere die Unternehmenspolitik bestimmt. 

Manfred Behrend 

Heinz Niemann: Meinungsforschung in der 

DDR. Die geheimen Berichte des Instituts 

für Meinungsforschung an das Politbüro 

der SED. Bund-Verlag GmbH. Köln 1993, 

408 S. (I); 

ders.: Hinterm Zaun. Politische Kultur und 

Meinungsforschung in der DDR - die geheimen 

Berichte an das Politbüro der SED. 

edition ost. Berlin 1995, 255 S. (II) 

Einer der Gründe des Unterganges der DDR 

wie der anderen staatssozialistischen Regimes 

war die Unfähigkeit und der faktische Unwille 

der jeweiligen Führungen, sich ein reales Bild 

von den Problemen und Widersprüchen ihrer 

Gesellschaft zu machen. Obwohl eine tatsächliche 

Öffentlichkeit und freie Medien fehlten, 

hätten sie mit den systemeigenen Mitteln dazu 

trotzdem weitgehend und nur für sich exklusiv 

in der Lage sein müssen. Sie besaßen alle 

Möglichkeiten, sich Informationen zu Stim- 

Rezensionen 

mungen und Sachverhalten im Lande zu verschaffen. 

Für die SED gehörten zu diesen 

Möglichkeiten die reguläre Systeme der 

Stimmungs- und Meinungsberichte, die alle 

Organisationsstrukturen der Partei, aber auch 

der FDJ, des FDGB und der Massenorganisationen 

sowie der Blockparteien meist monatlich 

und in besonderen Situationen auch 

öfter erstellten. Zu diesen Informationsquellen 

gehörten die Eingaben der Bürger an Parteiund 

Staatsorgane ebenso wie die nicht wenigen 

Zuschriften, die die Massenmedien erhielten. 

Nicht zuletzt sorgte das Ministerium für 

Staatssicherheit mit seinen offiziellen wie inoffiziellen 

Mitarbeitern dafür, daß über jede 

Regung im Lande informiert werden konnte. 

Nur, was half ein solch perfektes Informationssystem, 

wenn es nicht für die Meinungsbildung 

und Entscheidungsvorbereitung der 

obersten Führung genutzt wurde. Ein Blick in 

die Archive zeigt, daß nicht wenige Informationen 

im Prozeß ihrer Verdichtung geschönt 

und in Sprachhülsen verpackt wurden, die den 

Politbürokraten genehm waren, daß Berichterstatter 

durch entsprechende Formulierungen 

dafür sorgten, daß schlechte Nachricht nicht 

unbedingt sofort auf den Boten zurückfiel. 

Ausschlaggebend war aber die zunehmende 

Wahrnehmungs- und Denkblockade, die zumindest 

die SED-Führung um Honecker in 

ihrem letzten Jahrzehnt hinderte, die Wirklichkeit 

real wahrzunehmen und entsprechend zu 

reagieren. Zu fest war das selbst gebaute geistige 

Bild einer heilen Welt, einer Insel der 

Seligen, die man zwar nicht sein wollte, aber 

doch sehr wohl war. “Der Betrug an der Öffentlichkeit 

wurde immer mehr zum öffentlichen 

Selbstbetrug”, der auch die eigene Sicht 

verkleisterte. (I: 58) 

Solch ein idyllisches Bild wollte sich Honekker 

nicht durch zuviel Wirklichkeit zerstören 

lassen. Da mußten Strukturen und Möglichkeiten 

stören, die die Wirklichkeit, die Stimmungen, 

Meinungen, Einstellungen gar wissenschaftlich 

verallgemeinert aufbereiteten 

und der Führung, geschweige denn der Öffentlichkeit 

vorlegten. Nicht zuletzt deshalb 

hatten es die Soziologie mit ihren empirischen 

Untersuchungen in der DDR so schwer.

Rezensionen 

Heinz Niemann, einem auch schon vor der 

Wende kritischen Politikwissenschaftler, ist 

es zu verdanken, daß er auf eine besondere 

Facette dieser Geschichte von Wirklichkeitssuche 

und -verweigerung in zwei erstaunlichen 

Büchern aufmerksam macht. Denn in der 

DDR gab es neben der soziologischen Forschung 

– die sich mühsam in den 60er Jahren 

durchsetzen konnte, nachdem sie unter 

Stalin als bürgerliche “Afterwissenschaft” 

nicht nur beargwöhnt, sondern auch unterdrückt 

wurde – auch zwei Institute, die systematisch 

der sonst als bürgerlich verschrieenen 

Meinungsforschung frönten. Das war zum einen 

das Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung 

Leipzig, das immerhin das Ende der DDR 

überdauern konnte und erst Opfer der deutschen 

Einheit wurde. (Siehe dazu neuerdings 

umfassend Friedrich, Walter/Förster, Peter/ 

Starke, Kurt (Hrsg.): Das Zentralinstitut für 

Jugendforschung Leipzig 1966–1999. Geschichte, 

Methoden, Erkenntnisse. edition ost. 

Berlin 1999) Die andere Einrichtung war das 

Institut für Meinungsforschung in der Deutschen 

Demokratischen Republik (das faktisch 

unter dem Dach des damaligen Instituts für 

Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der 

SED residierte), 1964 von Ulbricht gegründet 

und 1979 sang- und klanglos von Honekker 

aufgelöst wurde. 

Dieses Institut war lange Zeit nur Insidern 

bekannt. Seine wohl 246 Umfragen, davon 

über 100 zu unmittelbar politisch relevanten 

Fragestellungen, waren der Vergessenheit anheimgestellt 

und selbst in dem sonst so archivierungswütigen 

System war dafür gesorgt 

worden, daß nicht einmal die papierenen 

Zeugnisse nach der Auflösung übrig bleiben 

durften. 

Daß die 60er Jahre sowohl einen relativen 

Durchbruch der Soziologie brachten wie die 

Gründung zweier solcher Institute und gerade 

auch eines Meinungsforschungsinstituts ist 

nicht zufällig. Mit dem alten Ulbricht hatte die 

DDR einen Parteiführer, der sich endlich einer 

wissenschaftlichen Sicht – die er selbst oft 

genug auch in dieser Zeit subjektivistisch 

durchbrach – verpflichtet fühlte. Für seine 


Wirtschaftsreform des Neuen Ökonomischen 

Systems brauchte er verläßliche wissenschaftliche 

Daten. Ihm war das politische Risiko 

solcher Arbeit durchaus bewußt, nicht zufällig 

setzte er mit Karl Maron einen bisherigen 

Innenminister als Chef des Instituts ein. 

Die von Niemann zusammengestellten und 

mühsam beschafften Befragungsberichte zeigen 

aber, daß zu Ulbrichts Amtszeiten und 

auch noch danach Gründlichkeit und wissenschaftliche 

Redlichkeit die Arbeit des Instituts, 

seiner Mitarbeiter, aber auch vieler Helfer 

bestimmten. Niemann weist nach, daß bei 

allen zu beachtenden Besonderheiten der 

Arbeit unter den gegebenen undemokratischen 

Strukturen und bei allen Einschränkungen 

durch ideologischen Brillen diese Untersuchungen 

sowohl wissenschaftlich wie repräsentativ 

waren. Darum passen sie nicht in das 

Raster sowohl der damaligen Machthaber - 

Honecker mißtraute selbst einem ZK-Institut 

und beseitigte es schließlich – wie auch der 

heutigen Vergangenheitsaufarbeiter. Die nach 

dem Ende der DDR bestimmende Pauschalverurteilung 

und -abwertung des ostdeutschen 

totalitären Staatswesens kann und vor allem 

will wenig mit differenzierten, ja partiell positiven 

Wertungen der DDR etwas anfangen. 

Denn die Umfragen zeigten nachdrücklich, 

daß viele Elemente der SED-Politik eine breite 

Unterstützung unter der DDR-Bevölkerung 

fanden. Aber natürlich nicht die von der SED- 

Führung sonst bei Wahlen erwarteten 99,9 

Prozent-Ergebnisse. Sie zeigten eben auch die 

Grenzen der Zustimmung insbesondere in der 

nationalen Frage auf, wo zwar Mehrheiten für 

die DDR als eigenständiges System votierten, 

aber doch deutliche Minderheiten die Politik 

der Abgrenzung nicht mitmachen wollten. So 

zitiert Niemann Umfragen aus der Mitte der 

70er Jahre, die davon ausgingen, daß 72 Prozent 

der Befragten im Vergleich die gesellschaftlichen 

Verhältnisse der DDR denen der 

BRD vorziehen würden. Nur 6 Prozent erklärten 

sich für die BRD. 84 Prozent waren bereit, 

die DDR bewaffnet zu verteidigen. Allerdings 

stellt sich – zumal in den Hochzeiten 

der Honeckerschen Wirtschafts- und So-


zialpolitik - die Sicht auf eine mögliche Überlegenheit 

der Sozialismus gegenüber dem 

Westen differenziert dar: militärisch wurde sie 

immerhin von 50 Prozent angenommen, wirtschaftlich 

von 53 Prozent, kulturell von 77 

Prozent, sozial von gar 94 Prozent – aber 

wissenschaftlich nur von 39 Prozent und technisch 

von 21 Prozent (I: 49). 

Für das schließliche Auflösen des Instituts 

dürften weniger die einzelnen Zahlen ausschlaggebend 

gewesen sein als vielmehr das 

generelle Mißtrauen Honeckers und seiner 

Crew gegenüber Wissenschaftlern, die eigenständig 

agierten und bei aller Anpassung doch 

der Wahrheit verpflichtet waren. Niemann 

verweist auf das Problem, daß die Meinungsbefragungen 

zwar die breite Unterstützung für 

die SED belegten, aber die Führung diese 

Ergebnisse weder öffentlich machte noch über 

Schritte zur Öffnung, zur Demokratisierung 

des politischen Systems bereit war nachzudenken. 

Vielmehr ängstigten die Menetekel von 

1953, 1956 und 1968. Honecker und seine 

Fraktion veranlaßten ja selbst den Sturz Ulbrichts 

und die Beendigung des NÖS unter 

Rückversicherung bei der sowjetischen Führung. 

“Die schwierige Antwort liegt im totalitären 

Wesen des Systems, das die Menschen 

‘total’ für sich will, nur eine möglichst 

100%ige Zustimmung akzeptiert. Auch wären 

schwierige Interpretationsprobleme aus 

dem Widerspruch zwischen den üblichen 99% 

Ja-Stimmen bei Wahlen und den Ergebnissen 

der Meinungsforschung entstanden.” (I: 55) 

Sich gar von unzuverlässigen Intellektuellen 

mit Volkes Stimme erklären zu lassen, was 

politisch notwendig ist und wo es Defizite und 

Handlungsbedarf geben soll, auch das für eine 

“unfehlbare” Führung ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit. 

Stefan Bollinger 

Impressum 

Redaktion 

Dr. Herbert Mayer, Chefredakteur 

e-Mail: dr.mayer@trafoberlin.de 

Dr. Wolfgang Weist, Herausgeber 

e-Mail: dr.weist@trafoberlin.de 

Postal. Anschrift: trafo verlag, Redaktion BzG, 

Finkenstraße 8, D-12621 Berlin 

BzG und BzG-Supplement im Internet 

unter 

http://www.trafoberlin.de/bzg.htm 

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http://www.trafoberlin.de 

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ISSN der BzG: 0942-3060

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