The Russian Federation Navy: An Assessment of its Strategic ...

mobilization readiness; strategic mobility; a high strength level in well-trained and wellpreparedpersonnel, including enlistees; [and] high level of equipment and resources’. 47The military modernisation is intended to substantively transform the posture, capabilitiesand outlook of the Russian Armed Forces; President Medvedev stated the objective as beingto provide ‘a qualitative modernisation of our Armed Forces to give them a new, forwardlookingperspective’. 48 A major element of this is a shift in strategy from that of a groundcomponent-centric force to one emphasising air-and-space and maritime forces deliveringlong-range precision-guided munitions. 49 This is intended to enable the attainment ofobjectives by the application of ‘fire for effect’; or via:effective selective strikes onto a small number of “strategically significant” or“vitally valuable” objects of an enemy, discontinued or infringed function of whichcan lead to impossibility of continuation of aggression or will “catastrophically”reduce efficiency of use of its combat weapons. 50This is a component of Russia’s de-escalation concept whereby the application of forceagainst strategically vital targets can serve the ‘purpose of compulsion of the enemy toterminate immediately military aggression’. 51 The Priority Tasks of the Development of theArmed Forces of the Russian Federation states that ‘Special significance is attached toprompt disablement of the opponent’s infrastructure concerned with political and economicmanagement, and its systems of communication...’ It also suggests that traditional conceptsof concentrating manpower and equipment needs dispensing with and replaced by‘dominating manoeuvre’ whereby the adversary is defeated via the concentration of effortsthrough manoeuvre and the application of ‘massive fire strikes’ rather than mass. 52 Inaddition, the first priority in armed conflict has shifted from attaining a physical advantage tothat of attaining supremacy in the information sphere; that is, ‘gaining the dominatinginfluence in the public mind and in troop and arms control’. 53Further, there is an increasing interest in the application of force as a means of influencingthe behaviour of an adversary or coalition. This was highlighted by the then Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Masorin:• interdependence of national economies at the world level that makes itpossible, by affecting the economy of one or several countries, to trigger offunacceptable economic vacillations or crises in the entire coalition ofpotential adversaries; ... [and]• high dependence of the economies of the industrially advanced countries onan uninterrupted functioning of their energy supply and transport systems,something that makes it possible to regard elements of those systems as thekey objects for influencing the economies of the potential adversaries. 54The evolving conceptual basis of the Russian Armed Forces is a component of a wider shiftin the posture and physical focus of the military. This is especially so with regard to therelative importance of the three services, that is, an increasing prominence for the Air Force47 Rukshin, ‘Doctrinal Views on Employment and Organizational Development of the Armed Forces of Russia’.48 Speech at an Extended Session of the Defence Ministry Board, 17 March 2009.49 The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.50 Colonel M V Fomin, ‘Formation of a Rational System of Weapons of Long-Range Aviation’. MilitaryThought, No. 2, 2007.51 Ibid.52 The Priority Tasks of the development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, p. 59.53 Ibid.54 Admiral Vladimir Masorin, ‘Naval Doctrine as a Component Part of the Russian Federation MilitaryDoctrine’, Military Thought, No. 2, 2007.8