Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana

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the other hand, a much more constructive deduction can be made that this provisioncompels the executive body to report to parliament on the state of affairs of the securityagencies. Under this interpretation, parliament is afforded the mandate to scrutinizebroadly or with some reservations the overall operations of the security agencies. 67It can further be argued that Act 526 does not provide any systems ofparliamentary oversight. The Act did not envisage the question of composition, mode ofselection, mandate, degree of access to so called ‘sensitive’ information, relations withother forms of oversight and form of reporting by the executive. All these systems couldhave been set up in the Act to avoid suspicion, politicization and miscommunication thatusually characterize debates between parliament and the security agencies. Another keyissue that Act 526 failed to address is the composition and vetting requirements withrespect to members of parliament who are selected to sit on the oversight committee.There is no clear cut guidance as to what the oversight committee is expected to do andareas where its mandate is expected to cover. More emphasis should have been put onsetting up a design and structure to conduct the oversight mandate.In the overall spirit of the Act, the reporting arrangement seeks to hold thesecurity agencies both accountable and within the rule of law. Act 526 seeks to strip thesecurity actors of their hitherto perceived opacity. The focus of this Act is regarded asconsistent with democratic principles in which no area of state activity can bedemarcated as forbidden to the legislative body, especially where public funds areinvolved. 68 The dilemma here is that while parliamentary involvement lends addedlegitimacy and accountability to national security agenda by ensuring that the securityagencies operate in the service of the state and are protecting the national constitution(instead of pursuing the narrow political or partisan interest of a party in government), italso creates a formidable challenge to the security agencies when they have to divulgesensitive information that may be detrimental to national security. Revealing too muchinformation can create unnecessary alarm in the public and cause the security agenciesto lose credibility and trust with both the public and the government. This dilemma couldbe overcome by developing a clear security policy that outlines the national securitypriorities and outcomes, and how oversight bodies like parliament can constructivelymake an input. In the view of Osei-Bonsu,…even diehard proponents would acknowledge that there aredangers with any system of oversight, that [sic] for instance bringstogether a government and its opponents on one small committee tohear and question often controversial and clandestine activities ofagencies who are authorized to act secretly under the cloak ofnational interest. 69There is also the concern that security agencies can be drawn into politicalcontroversies in the absence of independence and maturity on the part of parliament.Sensitive disclosures may lead to sensationalism in public debate, unsubstantiatedaccusations, and conspiracy theories spreading out under the guise of parliamentaryprivileges. Leaks of sensitive information may also compromise the effectiveness ofsecurity and intelligence operations. Within this particular context, it was only in 1998that the mandatory reporting obligation to parliament provided in Section 17 of Act 52667 See Osei-Bonsu, op. cit.68 Salifu Abdul-Rahaman and Samuel Nuamah, ”Ashiaman shooting: House ask for probe,” The GhanaianTimes, 6 June, 2008, 3.69 Osei-Bonsu, op. cit.12
took place. There have been obvious violations of Section 17 by the executive body. Ofthe estimated 12 annual reports that should been delivered to parliament between 1996and 2008, only one report has been presented – in 2001. However, the requirements ofsubmitting an annual report by the executive body to parliament are neither optional nordiscretionary. On the contrary, they are mandatory and imperative and therefore shouldnot be derogated. 70Given the challenges above and the particularities of the Ghanaian situation,there are three possible ways in which security sector oversight can be set out in law insuch a way that provides sufficient provision for the handling sensitive information. Thefirst approach is to give the PSCD&I wide remit, and then detail specific security matterswhich may not be investigated. This approach is consistent with practices in the UnitedKingdom and Australia. The second approach entails listing a comprehensive list offunctions, which is consistent with current practices in the United States. A third, uniqueapproach would be for the law to simply indicate that regular reporting obligations areowed parliament at specified times. In this case, the scope of parliamentary intrusion isleft wide or narrow depending on the appetite of the oversight body itself.Whatever approach taken, the PSCD&I must have a clear mandate. It should beappointed and representative of a cross-section of the parties in parliament. Itseffectiveness clearly depends on the trust and collaboration that exist between thecommittee and the agencies it oversees.4.1.3 Negotiating the chasm between independent parliamentary oversight andexecutive controlBecause parliamentary oversight is generally weak in relation to the Executive,certain norms and practices have emerged in the practice of Ghana’s parliament thatreflect a general malaise faced by all members of parliament. There are cases wherethis customary praxis provides the executive with further advantage. In Ghana,demonstration of party loyalty and discipline limits oversight. Political party loyalty oftentakes priority over basic legislative functions; parliamentarians are unwilling to challengemembers of government from their own party, as this may undermine their personal andprofessional advancement. As a result, parliamentarians are more tied to towing theparty line than to representing their constituents. This practice is reinforced by theconstitutional requirement that the majority of ministerial appointments come fromParliament. 71 As are consequence of these institutional controls, informal norms haveemerged in which a member of a committee may pass on critical information to anothermember from the opposition, who is able to raise a question that would be embarrassingcoming from a member of the ruling party. In several interviews with members of theSelect Committee on Defence and Interior, this practice seems to be fairly commonamong particular members. But this, it was emphasized, was based on reciprocity andtrust that the member would keep the source of his question confidential. But there is apossibility that this may change as the elections held in December 2008 and January2009 have brought in 85 new members of Parliament. Basically, what this means is thatthe compositions of all the committees will change. 7270 Ibid.71 Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, “Ghanaian public holders remain impervious to conflicts ofinterest,” Democracy Watch, 6:3 and 4, September – December, 2005; Constitution of Ghana, Article 78 (1),1992.72 See Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2008. As of January 9, 2009, the results have not as been declaredin two constituencies, Asutifi South and Akwatia.13
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Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana

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