Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana

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functions without fear or favor. 41 PAC’s performance is further enhanced by the fact thatsince the Chair comes from the largest opposition group in parliament, there is an addedincentive to check the workings of the Executive, especially to ensure that, if not for anyreasons, political points can be scored and to embarrass government. 42 Therefore “bypractice and convention, the committee has, since the establishment of the FourthRepublic, been chaired by the leader of the largest opposition party in Parliament,” 43 withthe rest of the seats proportionally distributed among parties represented in Parliament.In a recent development, members of the Finance Committee have complainedabout the manner in which the Auditor-General seemingly takes instructions from thesecurity agencies and ministers in the performance of his duties. Members of thiscommittee bemoaned such actions and decried that, “such development[s are]dangerous and inimical to the development of Ghana’s fledgling democracy and [tend] toerode confidence in the role of parliament as a watchdog of the Executive arm ofgovernment.” 44The Finance Committee deals with matters relating to finance and the economygenerally, but has the authority where “there has arisen an urgent or unforeseen needfor expenditure … to authorize advances from the Contingency Fund to meet the needand report to Parliament.” Furthermore, when such an advance has been made thecommittee is bound to ensure that “supplementary estimates for replacement of theadvance are prepared and laid before the House.” 454.2 Parliamentary Oversight: Theory versus practice 46This section examines to what extent theory and practice converge in the performanceof oversight functions by the three parliamentary committees with security oversightresponsibilities, the Defence and Interior Committee, the Finance Committee, and thePublic Accounts Committee. There are several mechanisms and tools for both thestanding and select parliamentary committees to exercise their oversight functions. Themain processes for oversight performance are through:• Questions to Ministers; 47• Motions; 4841See “Ghana: After the Public Accounts Committee Hearing - What Next?”http://allafrica.com/stories/200711010706.html, accessed 3 June, 2008.42 See the Standing Orders of Parliament that specifies the functions of this Committee, especially StandingOrder 165 (1) which stipulates that the committee must not consist of more than 25 members and is under aChairperson who does not belong to the party which controls the Executive branch of government. SeeBagbin, Alban, “The Role of the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament and how it can effectivelypromote and enforce an ethics of management in the public service,” GII Alert, 2, June 2004, 6.43 . Interview with the Head of the PAC, Accra, 15 May 2008. See also Nana Sylvanus Kumi, “MPS clashover Auditor’s report,” Daily Guide, 9 June 2008, 15. This concerned 12 reports emanating from the office ofthe Auditor-General, and going back to 2005, had not been laid before the House for appropriate action.44 The Independent, ‘Auditor General takes orders from Ministers, National Security’, 13 July 2004, 3. Underthe Ghanaian Constitution, the Auditor-General is required to submit its annual report on public accounts toparliament within six months of the end of the fiscal year. Sometimes reports are submitted years after thelegally mandated deadline. The Auditor-General’s dependence on the executive for funding undermines itsindependence. For a comparative analysis of budgetary processes in Africa, see Budget Transparency andParticipation II: Nine African Case Studies, ed. Classens, Merrit & Albert van Zyl, (Cape Town: Africa BudgetProject, 2005).45 Standing Orders of Parliament, 169 – 170 (1) & (2), November 2000.46 This section draws on Aning, “A Comparative Analysis of Security Sector Governance in West Africa: TheGhana Case,” Fredrich Ebert Stiftung, Ghana, 2004.47 This gives opportunities to parliamentarians to question Ministers on their performance. Ministers havethree weeks to respond. See Standing Orders of Parliament, No. 66 (1), November 2000.8
• Statements; 49• Annual reports submitted on the activities of each Ministry, Department andAgency;• Quarterly expenditure returns;• Visits and follow-ups; and• Setting up of sub-committees to examine particular issues.In the case of Ghana, it has also been argued that, a broader (if unspoken) basisto empower parliament may derive from its control of the public purse, its role as awatchdog over the public interest, and its powers of investigation into public corporationsor any body paid out from public funds. 50 According to J. E. Ackah, the previous twotermchair of the Finance Committee and, until 2004, the ranking member of the Defenceand Interior Committee, oversight entails “keeping track of how appropriated funds arespent; that is monitoring the budget and whether the activities of the executive are beingcarried out consistent with the law.” 51 In practice, this goes beyond fiduciaryresponsibility to ensuring that policies and actions are taken in accordance with the law.In terms of the budgetary cycle, parliament plays an indirect role in implementingsubsequent budgets, which occurs through two processes: firstly, through debates,questions, and suggestions in plenary and, secondarily, through exhaustive negotiationsin standing and select committees on each ministry’s activities and on expenditureproposals. According to the Standing Orders, prior to the passing of the Appropriationand Finance Bills, members of these committees must subject the two bills to thoroughdebate. 52The extent to which parliament’s powers “materialize in practice will depend verymuch on the actual ability and determination of Parliament to exercise them.” 53 Thehighly complex nature and environment of the security sector frequently presents aparticularly difficult challenge for effective exercise of oversight. Some of the issuesinvolved in performing oversight functions of this sector are often too technical formembers who have not had earlier military experience nor have been given any specifictraining in issues dealing with security. Indeed, this is more acute as security serviceshave peculiar organizational cultures, rules, and practices and are governed by secrecylaws, all of which can potentially pose problems if an oversight committee is notconversant with these institutional norms. The detailed operations, rules of combat,weapons procurement and use by members of this sector are beyond the professionalcapacity of the average members of both the standing and select committees. Forexample, in January 2003, Parliament approved USD 55 million for the Ministry ofDefence to “acquire equipment including helicopters to facilitate Ghana’s participation inUN peacekeeping operations” in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, the originalestimated cost for these helicopters, contract provisions for training personnel, andprovision of spare parts and tools was only USD 19,695,600. 5448 Motions request Parliament to debate a particular issue in which the public has expressed a particularinterest. See Standing Orders of Parliament, No. 79 (4), November 2000.49 Standing Orders of Parliament, No. 72, November 2000.50 Eboe Hutchful, 2004, op. cit, 8.51 Interview, Accra, September 2004.52 See Standing Orders of Parliament, Nos. 140 -148 and 150, November 2000.53 Eboe Hutchful, 2004, op. cit, 8.54 Ministry of Defence, Update on the supply of Helicopters – to the Ghana Armed Forces by Wellfind Ltd.(n.d.) (January, 2003), p. 1 quoted in Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, “Military Imports and SustainableDevelopment: Case Study Analysis – Ghana,” 2004, 10.9
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Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana

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