Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana

• Statements; 49• Annual reports submitted on the activities of each Ministry, Department andAgency;• Quarterly expenditure returns;• Visits and follow-ups; and• Setting up of sub-committees to examine particular issues.In the case of Ghana, it has also been argued that, a broader (if unspoken) basisto empower parliament may derive from its control of the public purse, its role as awatchdog over the public interest, and its powers of investigation into public corporationsor any body paid out from public funds. 50 According to J. E. Ackah, the previous twotermchair of the Finance Committee and, until 2004, the ranking member of the Defenceand Interior Committee, oversight entails “keeping track of how appropriated funds arespent; that is monitoring the budget and whether the activities of the executive are beingcarried out consistent with the law.” 51 In practice, this goes beyond fiduciaryresponsibility to ensuring that policies and actions are taken in accordance with the law.In terms of the budgetary cycle, parliament plays an indirect role in implementingsubsequent budgets, which occurs through two processes: firstly, through debates,questions, and suggestions in plenary and, secondarily, through exhaustive negotiationsin standing and select committees on each ministry’s activities and on expenditureproposals. According to the Standing Orders, prior to the passing of the Appropriationand Finance Bills, members of these committees must subject the two bills to thoroughdebate. 52The extent to which parliament’s powers “materialize in practice will depend verymuch on the actual ability and determination of Parliament to exercise them.” 53 Thehighly complex nature and environment of the security sector frequently presents aparticularly difficult challenge for effective exercise of oversight. Some of the issuesinvolved in performing oversight functions of this sector are often too technical formembers who have not had earlier military experience nor have been given any specifictraining in issues dealing with security. Indeed, this is more acute as security serviceshave peculiar organizational cultures, rules, and practices and are governed by secrecylaws, all of which can potentially pose problems if an oversight committee is notconversant with these institutional norms. The detailed operations, rules of combat,weapons procurement and use by members of this sector are beyond the professionalcapacity of the average members of both the standing and select committees. Forexample, in January 2003, Parliament approved USD 55 million for the Ministry ofDefence to “acquire equipment including helicopters to facilitate Ghana’s participation inUN peacekeeping operations” in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Yet, the originalestimated cost for these helicopters, contract provisions for training personnel, andprovision of spare parts and tools was only USD 19,695,600. 5448 Motions request Parliament to debate a particular issue in which the public has expressed a particularinterest. See Standing Orders of Parliament, No. 79 (4), November 2000.49 Standing Orders of Parliament, No. 72, November 2000.50 Eboe Hutchful, 2004, op. cit, 8.51 Interview, Accra, September 2004.52 See Standing Orders of Parliament, Nos. 140 -148 and 150, November 2000.53 Eboe Hutchful, 2004, op. cit, 8.54 Ministry of Defence, Update on the supply of Helicopters – to the Ghana Armed Forces by Wellfind Ltd.(n.d.) (January, 2003), p. 1 quoted in Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, “Military Imports and SustainableDevelopment: Case Study Analysis – Ghana,” 2004, 10.9