Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana

in the sub-region as the main priority areas for his committee and has initiated moves tobring to an end some of the crises through dialogue. He stated that the Committee wouldnot just consult with officials, but would also conduct public consultations. That fact thatcivil society organizations will be consulted regularly for expert input to the Committee’sformulation of security policies, resource allocation, and general analysis is a welcomedevelopment. There is further room for regionally-based research centers with skills insecurity analysis to support the work and emerging capacity of the Committee.At the same time, there is uneasiness between the Committee’s activities vis-àvisnational executive authority and the role of national assemblies. The DSCI Chairsounded a note of caution even before the Committee began its oversight: “We are notusurping the powers of ECOWAS Heads of State; all we are doing is to act as anadvisory body to them in areas that concern the development of the sub-region.” TheParliament, he continued, intended to “work hand in hand with ECOWAS Heads ofState,” including ”meeting with the presidents of each country to discuss modalities forour peace moves so that it helps us to take decisions.” 118 Such deferential consultation,if more than rhetoric, does not bode well for the Committee’s functioning as more thanan executive rubber-stamp.7.4.3 Emerging contradictions and confusionsThere are problems associated with the Defence, Security, and Integration CommitteeChair’s perception of the Parliament’s role and power in relation to the heads of state,and specifically to members of the Mediation and Security Council. Notwithstanding hisconcerns, the ECOWAS Parliament is sovereign in its actions and power; it cannot anddoes not “usurp” executive power – rather, it has started to exercise some checks andbalances. The Chair’s concerns take cognizance neither of the Parliament’s supranationalitynor of the ECOWAS declaration of constitutional principles, which in theorybinds all member states concerning separation of powers between the Executive,Legislature and Judiciary. 119The Parliament has responsibilities in ECOWAS conflict prevention, primarilyconcerning financing and oversight. Under ECOWAS’s new mechanism for conflictprevention, certain aspects of its peacekeeping operations automatically fall underscrutiny by certain parliamentary committees, especially the Defence and SecurityCommittee and the Budgeting Control and Accounts Committee. The Protocol’s article36 (1) asserts that ‘the Executive Secretary shall make provision in its annual budget, forfunds to finance the activities of the Mechanism…[However] as soon as the Protocolgoverning conditions for application of the Community Levy enters into force, apercentage of the said Levy shall be earmarked for these activities’. The Parliamentadministers the Community Levy.In so far as community funds are disbursed for a peacekeeping activity, both ofthe above committees have the authority to ensure that the budgets are properlyapplied. However, the Protocol asserts in Article 37 (1) that ‘the states contributingcontingents may be invited to bear the cost of operations during the first three (3)months.’ Subsection (2) does reassure that ‘ECOWAS shall refund the expenditureincurred by States within a maximum period of six (6) months.’ There is a potentialdifficulty here. Once funding for a peacekeeping operation is shifted from the communityto the national level, issues of national security come into play. Then there is a naturalreluctance to openly discuss national security spending. Worse, most West African118 Ibid. Ghanaian Times, 4.119 ECOWAS 2001b, 6.26