Core Avionics Master Plan - NAVAIR - U.S. Navy

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Core Avionics Master Plan 2011 Appendix A-4C. Cooperative Combat Identification (ID). The Combat ID CapstoneRequirements Document (CRD) defines Combat ID as follows: “the process of attainingan accurate characterization of detected objects in the joint battlespace to the extentthat high confidence, timely application of military options and weapons resources canoccur.” The Cooperative Combat ID capability element addresses systems that enabledetection and positive identification of friendly forces, coalition partner forces and civilneutrals that are cooperatively providing signals to identify themselves.1. Current capabilities.Most military aircraft provide their identification using modes of the Mark XII IFFlegacy systems. Modes 1, 2 and 4 are reserved for military use, with Mode 4 usingencrypted interrogations. Modes 3/A and C are used jointly by both civil and militaryATC. The legacy IFF architecture is cooperative in nature and employs a Question andAnswer (Q&A) exchange format. Replies to interrogations identify contacts as friendly orneutral and provide limited mission data. This information is used to confirm friendlycontacts, enhance air traffic control and prevent fratricide. Cooperative Combat IDapplies to both military and civil contacts. Civil aircraft are also using Mode S as theirprimary means to provide PPLI messages to ATC. Those signals, especially if theyinclude EHS parameters, could provide much more information to military operatorsthan can be interpreted by their Mode 3/A and C transponder interrogations; however,few military assets are currently equipped to exploit the Mode S signals.Cooperative Combat ID extends beyond identification of other airborne contacts.One of the primary missions of Naval Aviation is tactical support of ground operations,whether in the form of logistics re-supply, troop insertion/extraction, combat search andrescue, or Close Air Support (CAS) precision engagement. Safe support of groundforces requires awareness of location of friendly forces. Ground forces have pervasivelyimplemented Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) tools. Theater commandershave required their airborne assets to be (temporarily) configured with BFSA capability.Supplemental Global War on Terror (GWOT) and Overseas Contingency Operations(OCO) funds were leveraged to implement one-way reporting tools that provide groundforces awareness of airborne asset location, but two-way SA exchange has not beenimplemented to the degree that ground forces have employed. Aspects that challengesuccessful integration into airborne platforms include latency of information due tohigher maneuvering speeds, increased operating ranges for signals, displaypresentation integration with other cockpit functions, ancillary equipment required toamplify and receive signals, concepts of operations with ground forces and definition ofdata classification. USMC leadership has committed to following Army programmanagement system design and evolution. Partial BFSA utility has been deployed onCH-46, CH-53D/E, MH-60R Air Ambulance, MH-53E and MV-22. Each platform usedindependent resources to integrate their equipment.A-4 Cooperative Surveillance 10
Core Avionics Master Plan 2011 Appendix A-42. Funded Enhancements and Potential Pursuits.Integrated Blue Force Situational Awareness. (2011) The CH-53E will be the firstNaval Aviation platform to incorporate an integrated BFSA capability. It will utilize theground forces FBCB2 software and hardware for two-way tactical information exchange.The integrated solution is being incorporated into the cockpit with the aircraft‟sCNS/ATM cockpit upgrade. It will be implemented to enable modification to evolvingBFSA standards and architectures.Fused Sensor and Tactical Data Collaborative Combat ID (CID). (2013) Thefusion server integrated into the JSF hosts software that combines and compares targettrack information obtained from all on-board sensors, as well as from tactical informationdata-linked from outside sources. If multiple sensor track parameters are similar, acontact attribute can be considered more reliable than if it were derived from a singlesource data point. Similarly, intelligence and sensor data combinations can be used todiscount parameters that may not be as reliable from a single range or condition limitedsensor, or one that may be getting spoofed. Automated fusion will produce a higherconfidence factor CID solution.Improved Combat ID (Mode 5). (2013) NSA decertified Mode 4 in 2003. Mode 4 iscurrently authorized for use; however, NSA will no longer certify development ormodifications of systems that only provide Mode 4. Next generation interrogators andtransponders have been designed to facilitate a growth path for the integration of MARKXII/A Mode 5 IFF systems. Current USN Mode 5 equipment includes the AN/APX-123transponder and the AN/UPX-41(C) shipboard digital interrogator. Other IFF equipmentplanned for Mode 5 upgrades include the AN/APX-119, AN/APX-122, AN/APX-111(V),and AN/UPX-40. These systems are being equipped with Mode 5 Level I interrogationand lethal interrogation override, and hooks for M5L2-B “squitter” (2 MHz signal) and“triggered” replies. The reply or broadcast signal provides platform identification (uniquenumber for that particular airframe and country of origin), GPS location and a timestamp. Mode 5 Level 1 provides target identification with a significant improvement inrange, better discrimination of closely-spaced platforms (reduced signal garbling using arandom reply delay instead of a fixed time delay), reduced false signals and a reductionin spoofing and exploitation vulnerability. This allows multiple aircraft in tacticalformation to reply separately, offering greater SA to command and control elements andother tactical participants. The lethal interrogation override function allows interrogatorsto attempt to get responses from inadvertently secured friendly unit transponders as alast resort prior to engagement. M5L2 provides improved SA. To improve security,Mode 5 has a new NSA-developed encryption algorithm, a shorter crypto validity time,and encrypts both the interrogation and reply signal. Mode 5 is backward compatiblewith existing Mode 4 and civil IFF capability, and is compatible with civil ATC, includingMode S. A Mode 5 interrogator has already been planned for shipboard applicationsand for select aircraft, including: P-8A, F/A-18A+/C/D/E/F, EA-18G, E-2D and MH-60R.First airborne capability will be deployed in 2013.A-4 Cooperative Surveillance 11
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Core Avionics Master Plan - NAVAIR - U.S. Navy

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