Normalising-the-Unthinkable-Report

6.20. The second paragraph states that those who follow Jeremy Bentham hold that animals capable of sufferingare on an ‘equal footing’ with human beings. But that is not the case. Singer’s position (following Bentham and J.S. Mill) is that there should be ‘equal consideration of interests’, but that does not mean that all interests shouldbe treated equally or counted equally. Indeed, as shown previously, Singer does not oppose all experiments onanimals. Taking suffering into account does not require positing an ‘equal footing’ of all interests. Humans, forexample, will have certain interests (e.g., participation in a parliamentary democracy) that other sentient beingswill not and vice versa.6.21. The second paragraph continues: ‘These people hold that being sentient confers a moral right on animalsthat they should not be used by human beings for research whose purpose is mainly to benefit humans. Someactivists are prepared to uphold this view by violence’. And in a footnote to the first sentence, SCHOL says, ‘This isthe view taken by philosophers as Peter Singer …’ (House of Lords, 2002, p. 15, fn 40). But of course, as we haveshown, that is not Singer’s view since he accepts the legitimacy of some experimentation (and he is also antiviolencein virtually all conceivable cases). Moreover, the view that sentiency incurs ‘a moral right’ on sentientsalso misreads Singer. He does not believe that animals have moral rights as such, although this language issometimes used by him as a shorthand. ‘These people’ to whom SCHOL refers in the same line implicitly includeBentham himself, yet as a utilitarian like Singer, Bentham does not believe in moral rights and elsewhere eventalks of rights as ‘nonsense upon stilts’ (Schofield et al., 2002).6.22. Then, the second paragraph ends by saying, ‘Some activists are prepared to uphold this view by violence’.Who these ‘some’ are is nowhere defined, and the statement’s relevance to this part of SCHOL’s report is unclear,unless it is an attempt at guilt by association. While it is true that a tiny minority of animal activists have resorted toillegality, even violence, in defence of animals, it does not follow that these activists necessarily follow Bentham’sargument (or rather, SCHOL’s misunderstanding of it) or that Bentham’s argument requires violent protest.6.23. The third paragraph begins: ‘More commonly, there are those who hold that the whole institution of morality,society and law is founded on the belief that human beings are unique amongst animals. Humans are thereforemorally entitled to use animals, whether in the laboratory, the farmyard or the house, for their own purposes.’Leaving aside the grandiose claim that the ‘whole institution’ (or, more accurately, institutions) of ‘morality, societyand law’ depends upon human ‘uniqueness’, it is worth pondering what human uniqueness may mean or entail.All animals are unique in their own way; they may excel in aspects, such as speed, flight, language, physique,and so forth, that put humans to shame. In that sense, humans too are unique in possessing certain abilities andcharacteristics that not all animals share. But human uniqueness, no more significant than any other animal’suniqueness, does not by itself constitute an argument for using or not using other species.6.24. When the paragraph continues – ‘Humans are therefore morally entitled to use animals, whether in thelaboratory, the farmyard or the house, for their own purposes’ (our emphasis) – we are confronted by a nonsequitur. It simply does not follow that because humans are unique, they have the moral right to exploit otheranimals. That there are differences within and between species cannot be doubted. But the issue to be confrontedis whether any of these differences are morally relevant, and without demonstrating how human uniqueness ismorally relevant, the attempted argument collapses.6.25. SCHOL continues: ‘And this belief is sometimes combined with a further belief that there is a moralimperative for human beings to develop medical and veterinary science for the relief of suffering, among bothhumans and other animals. This moral imperative permits the use in research laboratories of animals, whosesuffering must be weighed against the ultimate relief of suffering towards which research is directed.’ Again weare dealing with ‘beliefs’ rather than arguments as such. Beliefs are stated, but reasons for them are not given, letalone assessed. To make the point more emphatically, people have all kinds of beliefs about all kinds of things,but the question is which beliefs are better justified. Morality does not get settled by an opinion poll, as if we cantell the shape of the Earth by taking a poll. Precisely why human uniqueness should involve this ‘moral imperative’is not at all clear, and no reasons are given for it.6.26. The report concludes the paragraph with this: ‘This moral imperative permits the use in research laboratoriesof animals, whose suffering must be weighed against the ultimate relief of suffering towards which research is36 Normalising the Unthinkable: The Ethics of Using Animals in Research