Normalising-the-Unthinkable-Report

The challenge, indeed the requirement of the Act, is to demonstrate in any given case that thereis no alternative to animal experimentation of the kind proposed – that the desired and desirableobjective cannot be achieved in any other way. If this were interpreted as the requirement toshow that the desired result could not be achieved in any other way, then it would be verydifficult indeed to demonstrate. In principle, and with enough changes assumed, any numberof desirable results might be achieved. It is usually, and more plausibly however, interpretedas a requirement to show that the desired result is not likely to be achieved in any other way.But this means – ‘is not likely, given present circumstances’. It is therefore open to opponents ofexperimentation to argue that present circumstances should be changed so as to make it morelikely. (APC, 2003, p. 15; emphases in original)6.33. The admissions here are telling. We are told that ‘it would be very difficult indeed to demonstrate’ anynecessity for animal experiments. We are further told that the best case that can be managed is that the desiredresult ‘is not likely to be achieved in any other way’. However one characterises these admissions, it should beclear that animal testing fails the test of necessity as understood ethically 6 . At the outset of its review, the APCargues that ‘it is evident that procedures that inflict injury on animals for reasons other than their own goodrequire robust defence’ (APC, 2003, pp. 8–9). That being so, we have to conclude that the APC has simply failed toprovide such a defence.6.34. Another way of looking at this is to consider an actual experiment, which concerned diagnostic tests fortuberculosis. One hundred and sixty subjects were selected, and tuberculin was injected into their eyes, skin, andmuscles. Reports of the experiments detail the moans from the subjects, who were unable to sleep because ofthe pain in their eyes. ‘They kept their little hands pressed over their eyes, unable to sleep from the sensationsthey had to undergo’ (Lederer, 1995, p. 80).6.35. The subjects were not animals, however. They were human children. All were under the age of eight, andall but twenty-six were from St. Vincent’s Catholic Orphanage in Philadelphia. The experiments were performed in1908 as part of a series of clinical trials in Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore to test the value of tuberculin as apossible cure for tuberculosis (Lederer, 1995, pp. 80–81).6.36. The vast majority of people would regard such experiments on children as morally objectionable. In supportof this view, they might point to various factors such as the innocence of the children, their defencelessness, theirinability to consent, their inability to comprehend what was happening, and the obligation of the orphanage toprotect orphaned children, not to mention the suffering the children had to undergo. But the question is, howcan we logically oppose such tests on children without also opposing similar tests on other sentient animals? Tobe consistent in our moral reasoning, we must evaluate actions that harm all sentient creatures, not just humanones.6.37. It is worth pointing out that however gruesome these tests might appear, they were performed with a highmoral purpose. The aim of the experiments – to find a cure for tuberculosis (then an invariably fatal disease) –was surely laudable. And did they achieve useful results? Almost certainly the experiments yielded some scientificknowledge, even knowledge that could not have been (at the time) obtained elsewhere (indeed, more usefulknowledge than from experimenting on animals of a different species). Despite that, most people would arguethat it is wrong to use innocent children as means to an end, even if the results may prove beneficial. Even if therewere gains, most would regard them as ‘ill-gotten’ (Regan, 1983, p. 393).6.38. But consider this: the moral factors that might be deployed in defence of the children are almost identicalto the moral factors that can be deployed in defence of animals also subjected to experiments. Animals too cansuffer. Animals too cannot give or withhold consent. Animals too cannot represent themselves. Animals too are6The point is made even more starkly in the covering letter from APC chair Professor Michael Banner to the Home Office ministercommending the review. He writes, ‘While we conclude that some uses of animals may yield scientific knowledge, weargue that this does not settle the question of justification’ (APC, 2003, p. 1, our emphasis).38 Normalising the Unthinkable: The Ethics of Using Animals in Research