him to disengage from the organization.- As far as I can tell, however, there is no formal “oathing” ceremony involved in becoming amember.- Young men approached to become etarras typically resist joining for a very long time before theycast their lot with the organization. Virtually every case study reports that the young man resistedthe first invitations to join, sometimes for as long as 18 months or two years, before finally decidingto become a member. The reasons for delay vary from case to case. Great majority <strong>of</strong> the members<strong>of</strong> ETA continue to live at home. Being a member <strong>of</strong> ETA is time consuming, to be sure; and manymembers report having little time left over for the demands <strong>of</strong> their personal lives once they join.- There are, in general, three kinds <strong>of</strong> activities that occupy the time and energy <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> ETA.The first involves what we might call consciousness raising. The second general type <strong>of</strong> activityengaged in by ETA members has to do with support services for the armed comandos <strong>of</strong> theorganization. The third kind <strong>of</strong> activity undertaken by ETA members is, <strong>of</strong> course, armed assaults onpersons or property, with the intention either to kill or injure people, to kidnap them for subsequentransoms, or to seize money, weapons, automobiles, or other needed resources. My feeling is thatfewer than half <strong>of</strong> the ETA members actually engage in violent actions <strong>of</strong> this sort. But they are theones that give the organization its special insurgent character, as well as attract all the attention.- ETA comandos were given orders to conduct armed attacks about once every eight months- Abouthalf the attacks were conducted in the home town <strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the assault comando- For activeetarras, however, the principal source <strong>of</strong> support seems to me to be the small circle <strong>of</strong> friends, jobassociates, and other ETA members who cluster together for mutual psychological support andassistance.-Most <strong>of</strong> the etarras about whom I have such personal data fell into one <strong>of</strong> two categories. Many hadno real lasting relationships with women-There were others, however, who solved the problemessentially by courting and marrying women who likewise had committed themselves torevolutionary struggle.-That these were not especially happy men but they continued the struggle out <strong>of</strong> a combination <strong>of</strong>factors that blends both positive and negative reinforcements. On the positive side, they receivedsolid support from their close friends and from their spouses (if they were married).-They had also learned to lower their expectation. There are, however, negative forces at work thatdiscourage etarras from leaving the organization, no matter how depressed they may become.-There is, simply put, a fear <strong>of</strong> reprisals- the simple fact <strong>of</strong> the matter is that men usually spendrather brief periods <strong>of</strong> time as ETA members.- I would estimate that the average length <strong>of</strong> time that an etarras spends as an active member <strong>of</strong> theorganization would be less than three years.- Obviously, a number <strong>of</strong> them are killed. Many,probably the majority, are caught and sentenced to long prison terms. And <strong>of</strong> course, there are thosecountless etarras in insignificant support roles who simply blend back into the environment afterthey “retire” from the organization. For some young Basques, ETA is a crucial end point in theirlives, the determinative factor that gives meaning and purpose to an otherwise disorderly and ratherpointless frustration.40. Clayton C. J., Barlow S. H., & Baliff-Spanville B. (1998). Principles <strong>of</strong> group violence with a focus onterrorism . H. V. Hall, & L. C. Witaker (Ed), Collective violence: Effective strategies for assessingand interviewing in fatal group and institutional aggression (pp. 277-312). CRC Press.Call Number: Editor's Annotation: In this chapter, the authors present a compendium <strong>of</strong>psychological principles that contribute to understanding group violence, followed by a discussion <strong>of</strong>terrorism as an example <strong>of</strong> group violence. The authors then propose a general model <strong>of</strong> motivationfor participating in group violence and summarize the processes that contribute to the development<strong>of</strong> such motivation.-The Contribution <strong>of</strong> Group: Processes to Violence- Long ago, Gustave Lebon (1896) argued thatcrowds <strong>of</strong> people may act as entities unto themselves, as if the whole were controlled by oneirrational mind with primitive motivations, with members <strong>of</strong> the crowd losing their individual sense<strong>of</strong> responsibility. Festinger, Pepitone, and Newcomb (as reported in Forsyth, 1994, p. 442) coinedthe term “deindividuation” to describe how individuals become “so submerged in the group that theyno longer stand out as individuals.” Zimbardo (1969) continued the research and developed aprocess model that noted that lowered threshold <strong>of</strong> normally restrained behavior is brought about by
a sense <strong>of</strong> anonymity and diffusion <strong>of</strong> responsibility.- The critical ways in which deindividuation leads to violence appear to include feelings <strong>of</strong>anonymity and reduced responsibility, as well as internal changes that include reduced selfawarenessand perceptual disturbances.- The other concept that should be included in this discussion is the process <strong>of</strong> groupthink (Janis,1982, p. 552)- “a mode <strong>of</strong> thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in acohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation torealistically appraise alternative courses <strong>of</strong> action.” Groupthink reinforces and is in turn reinforcedby the shared beliefs <strong>of</strong> the group members. - Stronger group identity appears to be associated withincreased violence. In an archival study, Mullen (1986) analyzed newspaper accounts <strong>of</strong> lynch mobsin the U.S. in the late 1800s to early 1900s. He noted that as lynchers became more numerousrelative to the victims, the lynchers became less “ self-attentive” and more deindividuated.- Bandura (1986, 1990) posited three categories <strong>of</strong> psychosocial mechanisms that can operate todistance people from morally based self-control: (1) moral justification; (2) minimizing, ignoring, ormisconstruing consequences; and (3) dehumanizing the objects <strong>of</strong> aggression.- Ryan (1997) suggested that the concept <strong>of</strong> “chosenness”, particularly in the Judeo-Christiantradition has been a driving force in the self-righteous justification <strong>of</strong> destroying or subjugatinggroups seen as “not chosen”.- Diffusion <strong>of</strong> responsibility occurs when people in a group feel less responsible for acting or makingdecisions than they would if they were alone (Schwartz and Gottlieb, 1980)- Dehumanization <strong>of</strong> theopponent enhances people’s willingness to use violence.- Bandura (1990) made the point that empathic responses to others’ experiences depend in large parton whether or not we view them as similar to ourselves and that empathic responses strengthen selfsanctionsagainst harming the object for our empathy.- The influence <strong>of</strong> the social environment generally is more powerful than that <strong>of</strong> individualcharacteristics in promoting a dehumanizing attitude. Authoritarian institutional influences areparticularly powerful.- Long (1990) suggested it might be more useful to try to identify “ the most common characteristics<strong>of</strong> terrorism, regardless <strong>of</strong> whether any particular one or combination <strong>of</strong> them is present in any givencase” (p.4). He listed four categories: goals, strategies, operations, and organization.- The most prominent explanations <strong>of</strong> terrorism fall into three categories: structural, rational choice,and psychological (Ross, 1993). Structural theories utilize the view that terrorism is caused byenvironmental, political, cultural, economic, and social factors in societies; rational choice theoriesexplain terrorism in terms <strong>of</strong> cost/benefit analysis by the participants; and psychological theoriesaddress individual and group dynamics in relationship to the formation <strong>of</strong> terrorist groups and thecommission <strong>of</strong> terrorist acts.- Ross (1993) constructed a causal model based on structure. He posited three “permissive” causes:geographical location, type <strong>of</strong> political system, and level <strong>of</strong> modernization, and seven “precipitant”causes (listed in order from least to most important): social, cultural, and historical facilitation:organizational split and development: presence <strong>of</strong> other forms <strong>of</strong> unrest: support: counterterroristorganization failure: availability <strong>of</strong> weapons and explosives: and grievances. The permissive causesact as facilitators <strong>of</strong> the precipitant causes.- Ross (1993, p.323) agreed with Laquer (1977, p.103) that “most terrorist groups come intoexistence as the ‘result <strong>of</strong> a split between the moderate and the more extreme wings <strong>of</strong> an alreadyexistingorganization’ (e.g., political party).” Ross postulated that the more splitting that occurswithin terrorist organizations, the greater the likelihood that at least one <strong>of</strong> the splinter groups willadvocate or use terrorism.- Ross hypothesized that the greater the amount <strong>of</strong> support, the greater the failure <strong>of</strong> counterterroristefforts, and, conversely, the greater the failure <strong>of</strong> counterterrorist efforts, the greater the amount <strong>of</strong>support for terrorists. Ross suggested that the greater the availability <strong>of</strong> weapons and explosives, thegreater the incidence <strong>of</strong> terrorism.- The last and most important precipitant cause is grievances. Ross (1993, p.326) parceled them intoseven categories: economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and social. These grievancescan be directed against “individuals, groups, organizations, classes, races, and ethnicities, bothpublic and private.” Left unaddressed, serious grievances can result in the formation <strong>of</strong> socialmovements or interests groups that can, under the influence <strong>of</strong> the factors mentioned above, evolve
- Page 2 and 3: MethodologyWe have defined terroris
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- Page 40 and 41: Call Number: Editor's Annotation: W
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- Page 48 and 49: splinter off from the main organiza
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- Page 52 and 53: Most past research findings are bas
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- Page 56 and 57: -A second general theory of organiz
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- Page 62 and 63: Call Number: Editor's Annotation: C
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-The necessary dependence on new-se
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it relates specifically to the regi
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or class of phenomena, within a giv
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progress in the analysis of terrori
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-Loyalty in the face of continuing
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Republican electorate and also with
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ecent 1994-96 cease-fire.- certain
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e reported in news media. Even if a
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eaccompanied back to Italy where he
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(non believers) facilitates violenc
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disagreements and disharmony. There
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autonomy, colonial liberation, raci
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introduced as the seminal, grass ro
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identity over personal and familiar
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-Finally, a comprehensive policy to
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-It would be naive to think of suic
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negotiator for the specific situati
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efused to fight in the Lebanese war
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-It has been our impression from fr
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-Many efforts have been made to cat
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drives that are brought about by (a
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word.-Consider now the value of ter
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-The interaction of deprivation and
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maximize its expected political ret
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insights into the underlying dynami
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lengths to secure materials and tec
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influencing the success of amnesty
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-The great diversity of terrorism a
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205. Monroe, K. R., & Kreidie, L. H
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Call Number: Published Abstract: Di
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physiological and psychiatric appro
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2001, suicide attacks amount to 3%
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numbersas an offering to the bloodt
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etween radical family involvement a
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there is no ambivalence concerning
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dynamics the ‘anarchic-ideologues
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especially with the parents (33 per
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esult.-The world is divided into tw
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pressure from supporters, internal
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- 1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Co
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personal rivalry- An extremist fact
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national governments. At this preli
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-Normative Orientations directs peo
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Sicarii views. Insurrection was onl
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-To have a space of one’s own is
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outside the normal range of violenc
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-Various governments sought to curb
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e older (i.e., 40's-50's)-Sex: Pred
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liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (L
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electronic communication and inform
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any other topic on which so much ha
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has exposed some particular cause b
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and alone. Ultimately, terrorism re
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-Conclusions: The motives for param
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272. Sprinzak, E. (2001). Rational
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-One way for individuals to handle
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-Theories of Hate: Fromm (1973/1992
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student tells the convict his misde
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literate in EnglishPoor verbal skil
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features: focusing; personalized vi
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-Even if idiosyncratic, the process
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some other agencies’ inaction. We
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-The RWA is probably the instrument
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students choose Communist student o
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state-oriented tradition: by taking
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phase of semi legality.-Helpers and
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the neo-Fascists were over 40 years
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commonality can be found in the utt
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geographical, and we consider it in
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-The violence struggle against the