Psychology of Terrorism - National Criminal Justice Reference Service

splinter off from the main organization. Other terrorist organizations are formed as extremistfactions of broader social movements that renounce violence but support the same political goals.These organizational factors are especially useful in explaining how terrorist behavior can becomeself-sustaining regardless of objective success or failure and of changing conditions.- Wilson argues that the fundamental purpose of any political organization is to maintain itself.-Wilson views the position of organizational leadership in terms of the nature of the incentives anorganization provides for its members.- Collins and Guetzkow term these nonpolitical incentives“interpersonal” as opposed to “task-environmental” rewards.- The popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated exclusively by deep and intransigentpolitical commitment obscures a more complex reality. At least four categories of motivation can bedefined distinct from the organization’s ideological purpose. These incentives are (1) the opportunityfor action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) the acquisition of materialreward.- There seems to be two patterns of group processes relating to the decision to resort to terrorism. Inthe first case, individuals join groups that are on the periphery of the actual terrorist organization,which is, in a sense, at the center of a concentric circle. People then move through the groups to thecore, sometimes following close friends or relatives. The decision to resort to terrorism is gradualand indirect. Involvement in the terrorist organization may not, at the outset, have been a deliberatechoice.- The second pattern of group development occurs when the existence of the group precedes thedecision to turn to terrorism. The adoption of the terrorist strategy is a collective decision by thegroup as a whole or by a faction within the group. Such decisions are usually hotly debated.- Wilson suggests that the organization’s political purpose affects its stability. He distinguishes threecategories of purpose: single-issue, ideological, and redemptive. Although most terroristorganizations are ideological, in the sense of being based on beliefs that compromise a systematic,comprehensive rejection of the present political world and the promise of a future replacement, someare single-issue groups. The Rand Corporation describes issue-oriented groups as common butshort-lived. The third incentive, redemption, is characteristic of organizations whose effortsconcentrate primarily on changing the lives of their members or followers rather than changing theoutside world.- In their redemptive aspects terrorist organizations resemble religious cults, which generally requirethe absolute commitment of members to a rigid system of belief that divides the world into the savedand the damned.- Wilson concludes that all conspiratorial organizations tend over time to substitutegroup solidarity for political purpose as the dominant incentive.- The group becomes simultaneously more introverted and unrealistic, as contacts with society aresevered. Terrorism, thus, becomes self-sustaining, as the group acts to maintain itself rather than toinstigate political change.- Hirschman maintains that dissatisfied followers of an organization have two options: “exit” or“voice.” “Exit” can indicate that two courses of action: (1) joining an established rival organizationthat provides more satisfactory incentives; or (2) leaving with enough similarly discontentedassociates to form a new organization.- Exit often occurs after an attempt to exercise “voice” has failed.- Although terrorist organizationsusually attempt to define exit as betrayal and threaten severe punishment for treason, factionalism isnot uncommon.-Terrorist organizations tend, however, to view “voice” as a more serious threat than exit. Most areextremely intolerant of internal dissent, thereby promoting factionalism to resolve internal conflict.- This rigidity has several sources. Cohesion and solidarity are important values- To enforce obedience and acceptance, leaders can rely on only two rational sources of authority(they also have a certain command over the group because of psychological dependencies). First,their skills at organization and strategy are known by their past record. Second, Verba suggests,generally with regard to small groups, that leaders rely on their position as an “agent of impersonalforce” and as representative of group norms to legitimize their directives.- Terrorist organizations often deliberately build loyalty through ideological indoctrination andthrough emphasizing the external threat. Loyalty is demonstrably strongest when the possibility ofexit exists, but members choose to stay anyway. Organizations establish what Hirschman terms“severe initiation costs” to prevent members’ departures. If members have invested a lot to join an