or split into terrorist organizations.- Terrorists learn from others’ examples as well as from their own experience.- According to Reich (1990, p. 263), psychological explanations <strong>of</strong> terrorism have not dealt with theenormous variety and complexity <strong>of</strong> the issue. He observed, “Even the briefest review <strong>of</strong> thehistory <strong>of</strong> terrorism reveals how varied and complex a phenomenon it is, and therefore how futile itis to attribute simple, global, and general psychological characteristics to all terrorists and allterrorism. - Some types <strong>of</strong> background are over-represented in terrorists. Post (1990) cited evidencefrom several extensive studies <strong>of</strong> terrorists’ backgrounds that indicate that many <strong>of</strong> them came fromthe margins <strong>of</strong> society or were unsuccessful in their personal lives, jobs, and educations, or both. -Tedeschi and Felson (1994) emphasized that learning from the repeated success <strong>of</strong> aggressivebehavior is a major factor in encouraging groups to engage in violence.-Terrorists generally are not impulsive, either individually or in groups. On the other hand, they doexhibit the propensity to take risks.- A high proportion <strong>of</strong> terrorists appear to be stimulus seekers. They are attracted to stressfulsituations and are quickly bored when inactive (Long, 1990).- Post (1990, p.35) “The cause is not the cause. The cause, as codified in the group’s ideology,according to this line or reasoning, becomes the rationale for acts the terrorists are driven to commit.Indeed, the central argument <strong>of</strong> this position is that individuals become terrorists in order to jointerrorist groups and commit acts <strong>of</strong> terrorism.”- Terrorists use coercion as a form <strong>of</strong> social influence (Tedschi and Felson, 1994). Tedschi andFelson have identified three primary social motives for using coercion: (1) to influence others toobtain some benefit, (2) to express grievances and establish justice, and (3) to assert or defend socialidentities.- Bandura (1990, p. 186) “The path to terrorism can be shaped by fortuitous factors as well as by theconjoint influence <strong>of</strong> personal predilections and social inducements.”- Although the study <strong>of</strong> terrorism is difficult and far from complete, the evidence suggests thefollowing general characteristics <strong>of</strong> these groups, reflecting many <strong>of</strong> the principles that apply togroup violence in general: Individual and group are influenced by their environment, includingpolitical, cultural, historical, economic, and social factors. When deciding on a course <strong>of</strong> action,they weigh risks/costs vs. benefits in service <strong>of</strong> obtaining desired goals or resources. They usestrategies, tactics, and operations to create an imbalance <strong>of</strong> power in the terrorists’ favor. They workto create a strong group identity, with an “us vs. them” (in-group vs. out-group) mentality. Thisfosters groupthink. Members typically are not deranged. Although there is no personality pr<strong>of</strong>ilethat could be characterized as typical <strong>of</strong> terrorists, certain traits appear to be over-represented amonggroups’ members, including risk-taking (although they are not impulsive), low self-esteem, feelingout <strong>of</strong> control <strong>of</strong> their lives, and ascribing their failures to outside sources. Many <strong>of</strong> them come fromthe margins <strong>of</strong> society, and it is not uncommon for them to have experienced significant disruption<strong>of</strong> life during childhood. Terrorist leaders are, on the average, more hostile and narcissistic thantheir followers. Leaders manipulate followers’ emotions, and utilize coercion and disengagement <strong>of</strong>moral responses to help enable the perpetration <strong>of</strong> violence, especially on innocent people.41. Cohen, G. (1966). Women <strong>of</strong> violence: Memoir <strong>of</strong> a young terrorist. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Call Number: Unable to Locate42. Collins, E., & McGovern M. (1997). Killing rage. London: Granta Books.Call Number: Editor's Annotation: The principal author, Eamon Collins, is a former IntelligenceOfficer with the IRA where he personally was responsible for several murders. In this book, whichis written as popular work more than a scholarly treatise, he recounts his story <strong>of</strong> involvement in theIRA and in terrorist activities. He focuses heavily on descriptions <strong>of</strong> the culture and context(emphasizing his personal conditions <strong>of</strong> socioeconomic deprivation) <strong>of</strong> Northern Ireland breeding akind <strong>of</strong> collective anger that was then used to justify violence and human atrocities. He attempts toportray the violence and collateral disorder starkly, and not apologetically. To the extent that thereader can rely on the author’s self-reflective insights, appraisal <strong>of</strong> social influence, and internalnarration, certain psychological lessons could potentially be inferred, although it is quite unclearhow well these experiences would generalize, even to others involved in terrorism in NorthernIreland.
43. Colvard, K. (2002). Commentary: The psychology <strong>of</strong> terrorists. British Medical Journal , 324(7333), 359.Call Number: Key Quote Summary: Terrorist groups are not usually composed <strong>of</strong> violent people, butpeople who choose to use violence as a tool to what they see as a reasonable end.- The people who choose violence are usually fairly ordinary people in extraordinary groups, and weshould look at the psychology <strong>of</strong> group processes rather than at individual psychopathology tounderstand their behaviour.- Accounts <strong>of</strong> how people become affiliated with violent groups <strong>of</strong>ten show more details aboutfriendship and courtship than political grievance.- Violent groups are usually embedded within a network <strong>of</strong> psychological and ideologicallegitimacy, which gives them both material and moral support.44. Cooper, H. H. A. (1978). Psychopaths as Terrorists. Legal Medical Quarterly, 2, 253-262.Call Number: Editor's Annotation: It would be all to easy to write that it is not necessary to be apsychopath in order to be a terrorist. In fact, it is almost certain that it does not. <strong>Terrorism</strong>, like anyother serious undertaking, requires dedication, perseverance, and a certain selflessness. These arethe many qualities that are lacking in the psychopath.-Allied to this flattening <strong>of</strong> the emotions in the psychopath is a lack <strong>of</strong> moral responsibility thatmakes his actions peculiarly ungovernable.45. Cooper, H. H. A. (1976). The terrorist and the victim . Victimology: An International Journal, 1(2), 229-239.Call Number: Unable to Locate46. Cooper, H. H. A. (1985). Voices from Troy:What are we hearing? Out thinking the terrorist: An internationalchallenge . Proceedings <strong>of</strong> the 10th annual symposium on the role <strong>of</strong> behavioral science physicalsecurity Washington, DC: Defense Nuclear Agency.Call Number: Unable to Locate47. Cooper, H. H. A. (1977). What is a terrorist? A psychological perspective. Legal Medical Quarterly, 1, 16-32.Call Number: Editor's Annotation: Shifts from question <strong>of</strong> "what is terrorism" to "what is aterrorist?"-Terrorists must develop justifications for their terrorist actions.- They also must believe it is neccessary and effective.-Terrorists are not born terrorists they become them.-Terrorists are complex human beings and are quite diverse. They must be able to detach themselvesagainst the suffering <strong>of</strong> others.-Argues that reasons we need to understand terrorists include: knowing under what circumstancesthey might kill a hostage; knowing the extent to which they might put their own lives at risk in aconfrontation; know extent <strong>of</strong> capability to use new technology.-Draws analogy between terrorists and bullies (callous and project their own pathological fears ontoothers) and between terrorists and tortures.-A somewhat dated, naive psychological description <strong>of</strong> terrorists. No research basis or theoreticalframework.48. Cordes, B. (1987). Euro terrorist talk about themselves: A look at the literature. P. Wilkinson, & A. M.Stewart (Eds), Contemporary research on terrorism (pp. 318-336). Aberdeen: Aberdeen UniversityPress.Call Number: Editor's Annotation: By using the primary materials provided by the terroriststhemselves, i.e., memoirs, statements, interviews and communiqués much information about theterrorist mindset and decision making can be gleaned.- What terrorists say about themselves is <strong>of</strong>ten more revealing than they intend.- The fundamental contradiction for terrorists is that while they are deliberately employing what wein fact regard as terrorist violence, they characterize their actions as something else.- To comprehend the terrorist mindset it is crucial to uncover the rationale, motivations andmechanisms for such denial.-This chapter takes a look at some <strong>of</strong> the dynamics <strong>of</strong> terrorism and proposes a simple framework forexamining the terrorists’ view <strong>of</strong> themselves and their actions.
- Page 2 and 3: MethodologyWe have defined terroris
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- Page 40 and 41: Call Number: Editor's Annotation: W
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- Page 52 and 53: Most past research findings are bas
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- Page 62 and 63: Call Number: Editor's Annotation: C
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it relates specifically to the regi
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or class of phenomena, within a giv
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progress in the analysis of terrori
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-Loyalty in the face of continuing
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Republican electorate and also with
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ecent 1994-96 cease-fire.- certain
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e reported in news media. Even if a
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eaccompanied back to Italy where he
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(non believers) facilitates violenc
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disagreements and disharmony. There
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autonomy, colonial liberation, raci
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introduced as the seminal, grass ro
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identity over personal and familiar
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-Finally, a comprehensive policy to
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-It would be naive to think of suic
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negotiator for the specific situati
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efused to fight in the Lebanese war
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-It has been our impression from fr
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-Many efforts have been made to cat
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drives that are brought about by (a
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word.-Consider now the value of ter
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-The interaction of deprivation and
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maximize its expected political ret
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insights into the underlying dynami
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lengths to secure materials and tec
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influencing the success of amnesty
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-The great diversity of terrorism a
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205. Monroe, K. R., & Kreidie, L. H
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Call Number: Published Abstract: Di
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physiological and psychiatric appro
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2001, suicide attacks amount to 3%
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numbersas an offering to the bloodt
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etween radical family involvement a
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there is no ambivalence concerning
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dynamics the ‘anarchic-ideologues
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especially with the parents (33 per
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esult.-The world is divided into tw
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pressure from supporters, internal
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- 1.00 Historical, Cultural, and Co
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personal rivalry- An extremist fact
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national governments. At this preli
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-Normative Orientations directs peo
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Sicarii views. Insurrection was onl
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-To have a space of one’s own is
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outside the normal range of violenc
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-Various governments sought to curb
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e older (i.e., 40's-50's)-Sex: Pred
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liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (L
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electronic communication and inform
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any other topic on which so much ha
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has exposed some particular cause b
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and alone. Ultimately, terrorism re
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-Conclusions: The motives for param
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272. Sprinzak, E. (2001). Rational
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-One way for individuals to handle
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-Theories of Hate: Fromm (1973/1992
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student tells the convict his misde
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literate in EnglishPoor verbal skil
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features: focusing; personalized vi
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-Even if idiosyncratic, the process
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some other agencies’ inaction. We
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-The RWA is probably the instrument
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students choose Communist student o
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state-oriented tradition: by taking
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phase of semi legality.-Helpers and
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the neo-Fascists were over 40 years
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commonality can be found in the utt
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geographical, and we consider it in
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-The violence struggle against the