The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa - Conflict Armament ...

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CASE STUDIESImage 11RPG-7-pattern rocket launcher of Iranian design recovered from Khartoum-supplied militia inSouth Sudan, 2012Notes: The weapon is unmarked. It features a moulded pistol grip and a second, pillar-like grip to the rear of the trigger assembly.These characteristics are unique to Iranian-designed RPG-7-pattern launchers. It was seized in Mankien, South Sudan and viewed atthe Sudan People’s Liberation Army 4th Division headquarters in Rubkhona, Unity State on 27 January 2012.© Mike Lewis/Small Arms SurveyBeyond the evidence presented above, thereare growing (albeit fragmentary) indications ofIranian cooperation and technical assistance in themanufacture or retransfer of weapons in Khartoum.These indications are best listed rather thancomprehensively analysed because, while they maysuggest close cooperation between Iran and Sudan,they are not definitive:In January 2007 Iran and Sudan reportedly signeda military cooperation agreement and initiateddiscussions on the sale of Iranian weapons,including ‘Iranian missiles, RPGs, UAVs andother equipment’. 25 Conflict Armament Researchhas received credible reports that the YarmoukIndustrial Complex (YIC) in Khartoum serves as aproduction/onward shipment facility for Iranian/Iranian-designed weapons. 26Conflict Armament Research has also receivedcredible reports that personnel working in theYIC visit Tehran for regular technical training onweapons or ammunition production. The precisenature of this training has not been documented.Reports suggest two or three such visits in 2011–12. 27Images of weapons displayed on the SudaneseMilitary Industrial Corporation (MIC) websitedepict weapons of recognisably Iranian design. 28The YIC operates under the umbrella of the MIC,which is controlled by the NISS.Documented cases of weapons transfers toKhartoum-backed militias operating in Darfurand South Sudan have involved the supply ofIranian weapons and also ammunition consignedto the YIC. 29 Interviews with militia commandersindicate that the Sudanese NISS organised thetransfers. 3026Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation
CASE STUDIESIsrael targeted the YIC (although did not claimresponsibility) with air strikes on 23 October2012. Air attacks attributed to Israel and targetingvehicles bound from eastern Sudan to Sinai inJanuary 2009 and April 2011 were reportedlyorchestrated to disrupt shipments of Iranianweapons bound for Gaza. 31These reports do not constitute comprehensiveevidence of Iran’s role in the manufacture orredistribution of Iranian-designed weapons inor from Khartoum. However, viewed against thephysical evidence of weapons documented inDarfur, southern Sudan and South Sudan, and inlight of the proliferation of Iranian ammunitionin the region, they point towards increasingKhartoum–Tehran cooperation in the defencesector.GUINEA, 2009–10In 2009 researchers working for AmnestyInternational documented numerous types ofammunition recovered from the 28 September 2009stadium massacre in Conakry, Guinea and nearbyparts of the city. 32 These types included several7.62 x 39 mm cartridges, of which an example ispictured in Image 12. The cartridges are identical inconstruction to Iranian 7.62 x 39 mm ammunitiondocumented elsewhere in this report. However, inaddition to a ‘06’ date mark indicating productionin 2006, the cartridges also feature lot marks,including ‘161’ and (in Image 12) ‘257’.Although the lot mark differentiates thisammunition from known Iranian ammunitiondocumented elsewhere in Africa, its construction isidentical. The cartridges are brass cased, while theprojectiles are constructed of a lead core encasedin a tombak jacket. 33 In each case the primer issecured with three 120-degree stab crimps.In addition to sharing physical characteristicswith Iranian ammunition identified elsewhere inAfrica, it is identical to ammunition documented inAfghanistan and attributed to Iran (see Image 13). 34Although the lot numbers differ from the Guineansamples, the cartridge construction, primer annuluscolour and headstamp font are the same.Amnesty International concluded that theammunition pictured in Image 12 was in servicewith Guinean security forces at the time of thestadium massacre. In March 2010 investigators withaccess to ammunition used by the Guinean securityforces confirmed that the same type of ammunitionremained in government service. 35Production dates (2006) of the Iranian ammunitionfound in Guinea indicate post-2006 transfer to thecountry. This, and the fact that investigators firstdocumented the ammunition as being in servicewith Guinean armed forces in September 2009,suggests acquisition by the Government of Guineabetween 2006 and 2009. The circumstances of thisacquisition are unclear. Any such transfer afterMarch 2007 would have contravened UN SecurityCouncil sanctions on Iranian arms exports. 36Image 12Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom Conakry, Guineaon 28 September 2009Notes: The cartridge is spent(i.e. the empty cartridgecase alone), having beenfired during the events of 28September 2009.© Mike Lewis/AmnestyInternational, 2009Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 27
Page 1 and 2: THE DISTRIBUTION OFIRANIAN AMMUNITI
Page 5 and 6: CONTRIBUTORS TOTHIS REPORTThe follo
Page 9: INTRODUCTIONConflict Armament Resea
Page 12 and 13: PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNI
Page 14 and 15: PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNI
Page 16: AFRICAN GOVERNMENTSAPPEAR TO BE THE
Page 19 and 20: IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN
Page 21 and 22: IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN
Page 23 and 24: CASE STUDIESThe following case stud
Page 25: CASE STUDIESImage 9Iranian 7.62 x 3
Page 29 and 30: CASE STUDIESImage 14Iranian 7.62 x
Page 31 and 32: CASE STUDIESImage 17Iranian 7.62 x
Page 33 and 34: CASE STUDIESSecond, in 2011 and 201
Page 35 and 36: CASE STUDIESADDITIONAl CASESInvesti
Page 37 and 38: CONCLuSIONIran is a recent supplier
Page 39 and 40: ANNExESANNEX 1: TECHNICAL SPECIFICA
Page 41 and 42: ANNEXESANNEX 3: SuSPECTEd IRANIAN 1
Page 43 and 44: ENdNOTES1 The headstamp is applied
Page 45 and 46: ENDNOTES32 See Amnesty Internationa
Page 47 and 48: BIBLIOgRAPHYAmnesty International.
Page 50: Email: admin@conflictarm.comwww.con

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