The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa - Conflict Armament ...

THE DISTRIBUTION OFIRANIAN AMMUNITIONIN AFRICAEVIDENCE FROM A NINE-COUNTRY INVESTIGATION

Published in the United Kingdom by Conflict Armament Research© Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London, 2012First published in December 2012All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without theprior permission in writing of Conflict Armament Research, or as expresslypermitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographicsrights organisation. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of theabove should be sent to the secretary, Conflict Armament Research (admin@conflictarm.com).Copy-edited by Alex Potter (fpcc@mtnloaded.co.za)Design and layout by Julian Knott (www.julianknott.com)Cartography by Jillian Luff (mapgrafix.com)

CONTRIBUTORS TOTHIS REPORTThe following contributors provided comprehensiveresearch and analysis from a wide range of investigationsconducted in African conflicts between the years 2006 and2012:HOlGER ANDERSHolger Anders is an experienced field researcherworking on conventional arms proliferation. He alsoworks as a consultant on developing small armsand light weapons control capacities, particularlyin the African context. He is a leading specialist intracing arms and ammunition in conflict settings,and has previously served as an arms expert on UNsanctions-monitoring groups.JAMES BEVANJames Bevan has more than a decade of experiencein tracking weapons in armed conflicts acrossAfrica. A former field researcher with the SmallArms Survey and head of the UN Group of Expertson Côte d’Ivoire, he is now the director of ConflictArmament Research.ClAUDIO GRAMIzzIClaudio Gramizzi is an independent researcher onweapons, arms flows and conflicts. In addition toexperience gathered while working for Europeannon-governmental organisations, he served asan arms expert and consultant on UN sanctionsmonitoringgroups in Côte d’Ivoire, the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo and Sudan until 2011.JONAH lEFFJonah Leff is the project coordinator for the SmallArms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment(HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan. He establishedthe HSBA Arms and Ammunition Tracing Desk inOctober 2011, which aims to identify weapons typesand their modes of transfer in the two countries. Heformerly served on UN sanctions-monitoring groupson Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, and has authorednumerous papers on armed violence and weaponsproliferation.MIkE lEwISMike Lewis is an experienced researcher onconflict, arms and financial crime. He has workedextensively in Africa, with a particular focus onEast African conflicts. In 2011 he served as aviationexpert on the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan. Hecurrently works for a UK-based non-governmentalorganisation researching corporate tax evasion inAfrica and Asia.The contributors would like to thank a number of peopleand organisations who provided extensive assistance to thedevelopment of this report: Alex Diehl for his technical supportand analysis of ammunition types, Russ Cornell for sharinghis ammunition samples, Chris Chivers for his photographicevidence and insights from Afghanistan, and the StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute for bringing a number ofarms experts around one table. Many people supplied invaluableinformation during investigations for this report, some of them ona confidential basis. The list, which extends back some six years, istoo long to give here. You know who you are. Thank you all for yourcontributions.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 5

ABBREVIATIONSANd ACRONYMSAMIGAmmunition and Metallurgical Industries GroupIRGCIranian Revolutionary Guard CorpsAQIMal-Qaeda in the Islamic MaghrebMICMilitary Industrial CorporationBICBureau International des ContainersNISSNational Intelligence and Security ServicesDIODefence Industries OrganisationSAFSudanese Armed ForcesDRCDemocratic Republic of the CongoYICYarmouk Industrial ComplexFRRForces Républicaines Fédéralistes6Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

INTRODUCTIONConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 9

PHYSICAL EVIdENCE OFIRANIAN AMMUNITIONTRANSFERSThis section presents evidence derived from investigationsconducted between June 2006 and November 2012. Itdocuments the characteristics of Iranian small-calibreammunition—including its packaging—from a range ofinvestigations conducted in Africa. It also draws heavilyon Iranian ammunition identified in cases outside Africa,including maritime interceptions of Iranian weaponry, andmateriel circulating in Iraq and Afghanistan.CARTRIDGESConflict Armament Research has gatheredevidence of three types of Iranian-manufacturedsmall-calibre ammunition circulating on theAfrican continent. The first two types are 7.62 x39 mm in calibre; the third is 7.62 x 54R mm incalibre. There are commonalities among the threetypes, including the composition of cartridgecases, marking formats and projectile (bullet)construction.As Image 1 illustrates, the markings on the first 7.62x 39 mm cartridge—known as the headstamp 1 —indicate a calibre designation (‘7.62 x 39’) and adate mark. In these examples the date mark ‘02’indicates manufacture in 2002. The cartridgesfeature a red primer annulus lacquer.The second type of 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge featuresa lot number (‘257’) at the four o’clock position anda date mark (‘06’) at eight o’clock to form a threeentryheadstamp (rather than the two entries in thetype 1 examples in Image 1). The primer annuluslacquer is green rather than red (see Image 2).Of the two types of cartridges illustrated above,Conflict Armament Research has documented theImage 1Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge, type 1© Conflict Armament Research,2012Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 11

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSImage 2Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge, type 2Notes: The cartridge is spent(i.e. the empty cartridge casealone), having been firedduring the events in Conakryof 28 September 2009. See thecase study on Guinea in thisreport for further information.© Mike Lewis/AmnestyInternational, 2009first type in seven African states, but only identifiedthe second in Guinea. However, cartridges of thesecond type have been identified elsewhere inthe world, including widespread distribution inAfghanistan.With the exception of the headstamp configurationand primer annulus lacquer, the two types ofcartridge are identical in construction, weightand physical dimensions. Each conforms to themanufacturing specifications of ‘7.62 x 39 ball’provided by the Ammunition and MetallurgicalIndustries Group (AMIG) of the Iranian DefenceIndustries Organisation (DIO). 2 Annex 1 of thisreport provides technical information on physicalsamples held by Conflict Armament Research.Headstamp analysis also indicates the identicalstamping font of individual letters on the twoammunition types. Table 1 provides a visual crosscomparisonof the two types of ammunition,including samples documented in Africa andAfghanistan. Although stamping quality 3 differs,particular attention should be paid to thedownward ‘tick’ on the horizontal part of the ‘7’, thedimensions of the ‘6’ and the relative size of the ‘X’.Table 1Visual comparisonof headstampmarkingsNo.Close-up of markingcharacteristicsCartridge information1 Documented after recovery from the 28September 2009 stadium massacre inConakry, Guinea2 Documented after recovery from Talibanforces in Nawa-I-Barakzayi District,Helmand Province, Afghanistan, January20103 Recovered from an unspecified location inAfghanistan, date not providedSources: (1) © Mike Lewis/Amnesty International, 2009;(2) © C. J. Chivers/New YorkTimes, 2010; (3) © Russ Cornell,2012; (4) © Conflict ArmamentResearch, 20124 Documented in service with rebel forces innorthern Côte d’Ivoire, 200912Conflict Arms RearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSImage 3Iranian 7.62 x 54R mmcartridgeNotes: Precise date and placeof documentation withheldfor reasons of confidentiality.The ammunition is packed inquantities of 20 rounds intocardboard boxes. Each greenbattle bag contains ten suchboxes, totalling 200 cartridgesper bag.Source: ConfidentialThe third type of ammunition is 7.62 x 54R mmin calibre and marked in the same format as thefirst type of 7.62 x 39 mm examples. As Image 3illustrates, it also features a calibre designation(‘7.62 x 54’) at the 12 o’clock position and a datemark at six o’clock. In this example, the date mark‘01’ indicates manufacture in 2001.The cartridge conforms to the manufacturingspecifications of ‘7.62 x 54 heavy’ provided by Iran’sDIO. 4 Annex 2 of this report provides technicalinformation from physical samples held by ConflictArmament Research. 5None of the cartridges pictured above is markedwith factory identifying information. While mostSoviet-calibre ammunition (e.g. Russian or Chineseproduction) features a two- or three-digit code toindicate the factory of manufacture, the Iranianexamples do not. This is the primary reason why,when first documenting these types of ammunition,investigators did not identify them as Iranian.A second reason is that, although now beginningto grow in scope and detail, literature on Iranianammunition was previously very limited.Additionally, early investigations found mostsamples of this ammunition unboxed—whetherfound on the battlefield, repacked into bags ortaken from the magazines of users. It was not untilinvestigators began to document ammunitionpackaging in shipments proven to have originatedin Iran that they were able to identify the cartridgesas being of Iranian manufacture.PACkAGINGIranian small-calibre ammunition packaging—whether for 7.62 x 39 mm or 7.62 x 54R mm—consists of several components. These componentsare pictured in Image 4 and include an outerwooden box, green plastic ‘battle bags’ andcardboard sub-units.Image 4Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmammunition box andcontentsNotes: The box contains 1,0007.62 x 39 mm cartridges. Thecartridges are identical inconstruction to those picturedin Image 1 and feature theheadstamp markings ‘7.62 x39’ at the 12 o’clock positionand ‘94’ at six o’clock.Source: ConfidentialConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 13

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSIN THE CASES DOCUMENTEDTO DATE NEITHER THEOUTER WOODEN BOXESNOR THEIR CONTENTS HAVESPECIFIED ANY INFORMATIONTHAT MIGHT IDENTIFY THEMANUFACTURER.The outer wooden boxes differ greatly in designfrom other common types of Soviet-calibreammunition box, including those of Bulgaria, Chinaand Russia. Iranian boxes are approximately 10 cmtaller and feature distinctive rope handles, whileBulgarian, Chinese and Russian examples employwooden handles.There are some small variations in Iranianammunition box construction. For example, thebox pictured in Image 4 has nailed joints, whileother examples (including of 7.62 x 54R mm boxesdocumented in Africa) feature dovetail joints.However, these differences are minor and there arevery few visual differences between Iranian 7.62 x39 mm and 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition boxes.In all documented cases, the outer wooden boxescontain five plastic battle bags, the colour of whichis invariably green. In the case of 7.62 x 54R mmammunition the bags feature markings that specifythe quantity, calibre, lot and date of manufacture(see Image 5). Some examples of 7.62 x 39 mmbags documented by Conflict Armament Researchfeature only the quantity and calibre. 6 RegardlessImage 5Internal configuration ofIranian 7.62 x 54R mmammunition packagingNotes: Location and date ofphotograph withheld for reasonsof confidentiality.© Conflict Armament Research,201214Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF IRANIAN AMMUNITION TRANSFERSImage 6Extract from a US military report detailing weapons seizures in Baghdad, 6 November 2008Notes: Markings on the bags indicate each contains 200 rounds of 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition. They include two lots: lot number96 manufactured in 2006 and lot number 13 manufactured in 2007. Image kindly supplied by Matt Schroeder, manager of theArms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists. Image obtained through a Freedom of Information Actrequest ‘for documents and photographs of weapons seized from arms caches in or near Baghdad from September 2008 untilSeptember 2009’; Matt Schroeder submitted the request to the US Central Command on 23 September 2009.of calibre, each bag contains ten grey cardboardboxes (unmarked), each of which contains 20cartridges.In the cases documented to date neither the outerwooden boxes nor their contents have specified anyinformation that might identify the manufacturer.For these reasons, Conflict Armament Researchhad to employ cross-case analysis—comparingammunition and packaging documented in knownIranian shipments with ammunition and packagingdiscovered elsewhere—to identify the ammunitionas Iranian in origin.To summarise these investigations in brief, ConflictArmament Research observed ammunitionpacked in green battle bags in Kenya (2008) andCôte d’Ivoire (2010). It also documented completepackaging (outer wooden boxes and their contents)in Côte d’Ivoire in 2009 and 2012. In none ofthese cases did it find any evidence to indicatemanufacture by Iran.However, a review of known Iranian shipments orof confirmed Iranian ammunition identifies thesame packaging. First, in October 2010 Nigerianauthorities seized a consignment of weapons andammunition in Apapa port, Lagos. Analysis ofthe bill of lading (see Annex 4) and investigationsby Conflict Armament Research revealed thatthe shipment originated in Iran and containedIranian-manufactured weapons. News mediaphotographs of the seizure included pictures ofgreen ammunition bags identical to those observedin Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. 7Second, Conflict Armament Research obtaineddocuments compiled by US forces operating in Iraqdocumenting seizures of green ammunition bags,which US forces described as ‘Iranian 7.62’. Thebags are identical to those observed in Kenya, Côted’Ivoire and Nigeria (see Image 6).Third, in January 2002 the Israeli military seizeda merchant ship, the Karine A, that was carrying acargo of Iranian weapons. 8 Among a range of otherordnance found on board, Israeli forces seized largequantities of Iranian ammunition in green bags ofthe type documented in Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq, Kenyaand Nigeria. 9Finally, investigations by Conflict ArmamentResearch identified ammunition packed in thesame green bags on the US civilian market. 10The results of these investigations have allowedConflict Armament Research to identify Iranianmanufacturedcartridges and various items ofpackaging across Africa.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 15

AFRICAN GOVERNMENTSAPPEAR TO BE THE MAINVECTORS IN THE SUPPLYOF IRANIAN AMMUNITION[AND WEAPONS] TO ILLICITMARKETS IN AFRICA.

IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICAYEARS OF MANUFACTURE AND DATES OF SUPPlY TO AFRICAIran manufactured a majority of the ammunitiondocumented in this study within the past decade.Analysis of dates marked on cartridges andammunition packaging indicate production in2001 and later, with most production concentratedin the 2002–03 period. The last recorded date ofmanufacture is 2006.The only exceptions to these observations arethe 7.62 x 51 mm cartridges dated 1970 and 1971documented in southern Sudan (now South Sudan)in the hands of civilian users in 2008 (see Image 7).Interviews with users suggest they date from thefirst Sudanese civil war (1955–72). Investigationshave not publicly documented the cartridgeselsewhere in Africa. 11Dates of manufacture provide some indication ofdates of supply. Table 2 lists the 14 cases in thestudy. In each case it notes the manufacturingdates of the cartridges observed and the dateof observation. These dates bracket a range ofpotential supply dates—i.e. the ammunition cannothave been delivered before it was manufactured,nor could it have been delivered after the date onwhich investigators first observed it.While these supply date ranges may appear verybroad, in all probability they are narrower, for tworeasons. First, lead times between production inIran and delivery to an African country could run tomonths, not to mention the fact that ammunitionmay have been stored in the factory for sometime before shipping. Second, the date on whichinvestigators documented the ammunition wasunlikely to be the one on which the ammunitionentered service. For example, in the Kenyainvestigation interviews conducted in June 2006suggest that the Iranian ammunition had beenobserved in service with Kenya Police units at leasta year before (i.e. in or before June 2005). 12In summary, some of the supply date rangesin Table 2, such as for Guinea and Kenya, aresufficiently narrow to date ammunition transfersfrom Iran to within a period of two or three years.In the case of Guinea it is worth noting that theearliest supply date is very close to the March 2007UN Security Council sanctions on Iranian armsexports. 13LEAD TIMES BETWEENPRODUCTION IN IRAN ANDDELIVERY TO AN AFRICANCOUNTRY COULD RUN TOMONTHS.Image 7Farsi-marked Iranian ammunition dating from the 1970s, southern Sudan, 2008Notes: The cartridges feature the manufacturer’s name, Sazman Sanaye Defa (i.e. DIO) at the 12 o’clock position and date codesfor 1970 (left) and 1971 (right) at the six o’clock position.© James Bevan, 200818Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICATable 2Documented Iranian ammunition in Africa, 2006–12, including supply date rangesNotes: All sources are provided in the case study section of this report.Case Country Location Most recentdate ofmanufacture aEarliestobservation bSupplydaterangeCircumstances1 Côted’Ivoire2 Côted’IvoireFormer rebelheldnorth ofthe countryGovernmentforces2003 2009 2003–09 7.62 x 39 mm, supplied to formerrebel forces from the territory ofBurkina Faso2001 2009 2001–09 7.62 x 54R mm, in service withformer government forces3 DRC South Kivu 2003 2009 2003–09 7.62 x 39 mm, identified in servicewith the Forces RépublicainesFédéralistes operating in the HautsPlateaux area of South Kivu4Guinea Conakry 2006 2009 2006–09 7.62 x 39 mm, in service withGuinean government forces5 Kenya TurkanaDistrict2003 2006 2003–06 7.62 x 39 mm, in service with Kenyangovernment forces; also supplied tonon-state Turkana groups6 Niger North of Arlit 2002 2012 2002–12 7.62 x 54R mm, recovered duringmilitary engagements between theNigerien military and al-Qaeda inthe Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)7 Niger BurkinaFaso–Nigerborder8 Nigeria Apapa port,Lagos2002 2012 2002–12 7.62 x 39 mm, intercepted shipmentreportedly originating in theterritory of Burkina Faso2006 2010 2010 7.62 x 54R mm, seized during theinspection of 13 shipping containers9 SouthernSudanEasternEquatoriaState2003 2008 2003–08 7.62 x 39 mm, documented inservice with civilians groups;originally in service with Kenyansecurity forces10 SouthSudan11 SouthSudanJonglei State 2012 N/A Significant quantity of Iranianordnance in service with Khartoumbackedforces; no small-calibreammunition documentedUnity State 2011 N/A Significant quantity of Iranianordnance in service with Khartoumbackedforces; no small-calibreammunition documented12 Sudan South Darfur 2003 2008 2003–08 7.62 x 39 mm, in service withKhartoum-backed forces13 Sudan SouthKordofan14 Uganda Karamojaregion2001 2012 2001–12 7.62 x 54R mm, in service withKhartoum-backed forces2003 2006 2003–06 7.62 x 39 mm, documented inservice with civilians groups;originally in service with Kenyansecurity forcesaIndicates the year of manufacture as marked on cartridge cases or packaging.bIndicates the year in which investigators first observed ammunition marked with a particular year of manufacture.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 19

IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICAAMMUNITION USERSIranian ammunition is in service with a varietyof users. These fall into three broad categories:national defence and security forces, rebel orinsurgent groups, and civilians.In the case of national defence and security forces,there is clear evidence that Iranian ammunitionis in service with Guinean, Ivorian and Kenyanforces. There is also growing evidence to suggestthat Sudan’s security forces also deploy Iranianmateriel—evidenced by extensive supplies toarmed groups in Darfur and South Sudan, andammunition found in positions vacated by theSudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in southern Sudan(see the case study sections of this report).Rebel and insurgent movements also deployIranian ammunition. The Darfur and South Sudancases have already been noted, but this study alsodocuments Iranian ammunition in service withformer rebel forces in Côte d’Ivoire and factionsaligned with AQIM operating in Niger. With theexception of Khartoum-aligned forces in Darfurand South Sudan, the regional sources of thisammunition are unclear. In the Côte d’Ivoire case,ammunition deliveries certainly transited theterritory of Burkina Faso and match the types ofammunition circulating in Darfur, but it remainsunclear if they originated in another African country(see the case study sections of this report).Civilians in several countries also possess Iranianammunition. In Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda,supply clearly points to the Kenyan defence andsecurity forces (see the case study sections of thisreport). The diversion of weapons and ammunitionfrom government forces to civilian markets is apersistent and well-documented problem in Africaand the findings of this study add yet another layerof confirmation.TRANSFERS OF IRANIAN AMMUNITIONwITHIN AFRICAThis study primarily documents the distributionof Iranian ammunition rather than its transferwithin Africa. This is for the simple reason that inmany of the cases profiled in this report there islittle firm evidence to elucidate any clear transferdynamics. There are, however, some clear casesof intraregional ammunition transfers in Eastand West Africa. There is also some evidence thatmight indicate trans-Saharan/Sahelian traffickingbetween the two regions (see Map 1).In East Africa transfers include supplies by Sudan(Khartoum) to various armed forces operating20Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

IRANIAN AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION IN AFRICAEVIDENCE FROM NORTHERNNIGER SUGGESTS THATIRANIAN AMMUNITION IS INSERVICE WITH SAHARA-BASED GROUPS THAT AREREPORTEDLY ALIGNED WITHAL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMICMAGHREB.in Darfur and South Sudan. In some cases thesesupplies also include weapons, such as Iranianmanufacturedrocket launchers, and other militarymateriel (see the case study sections of this report).A separate set of transfers can be identified inthe Kenya–South Sudan–Uganda border region.These involve the retransfer by civilians of Iranianammunition that was formerly in service withKenyan defence and security forces. The transfersare very localised, but nevertheless significant (seethe case study sections of this report).In West Africa there is clear evidence of significanttransfers from the territory of Burkina Faso torebel forces operating in northern Côte d’Ivoire. Inaddition, reports from Niger suggest that Iranianammunition has entered the country from BurkinaFaso. Further evidence from northern Nigersuggests that Iranian ammunition is in service withSahara-based groups that are reportedly alignedwith AQIM (see the case study sections of thisreport). While there may be no link whatsoeverbetween these cases, the fact that Iranianammunition appears to proliferate in the Sahara/Sahel region in addition to East and West Africa isnoteworthy.Moreover, when investigators discovered largequantities of Iranian ammunition in bags innorthern Côte d’Ivoire, they also documented largequantities of Sudanese-manufactured ammunitionstored in the same bags and in the same locations.The Iranian and Sudanese ammunition are ofthe same types as those documented togetherin Darfur and Southern Sudan. While there is noevidence to suggest transfers between these Eastand West African regions, this finding, together withdocumented Iranian ammunition in the Sahara/Sahel region, should be considered in futureinvestigations.VIOlATIONS OF INTERNATIONAlSANCTIONS REGIMESSupplies of Iranian ammunition to rebel forces innorthern Côte d’Ivoire clearly contravened the armsembargo on Côte d’Ivoire imposed by UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1572 (2004). It is unclear exactlywhich parties were responsible for the transfers,although UN reports implicate the Government ofBurkina Faso in similar transfers to rebel forces inCôte d’Ivoire at the time (2005–11).Beyond this case there are reasonable grounds toconclude that Iranian ammunition, dated 2003, mayhave entered the DRC in violation of the UN armsembargo imposed by Resolution 1493 (2003) onarmed groups and militias operating in North andSouth Kivu and Ituri. The origins of this ammunition(following manufacture in Iran) are not known.Similarly, 2004-dated Iranian ammunition identifiedin the Darfur region of Sudan may have enteredthe region in violation of sanctions imposed byResolution 1591 (2005). The date of manufacture issufficiently close to the date on which the sanctionscame into force to suspect this. Sudan continuesto supply Iranian weapons and ammunition to theDarfur region.The 2010 Nigerian case involving the direct supplyof weapons and ammunition from Iran is a clearbreach of UN sanctions on Iranian arms exports.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 21

IRANIAN WEAPONS ANDAMMUNITION ARE INSERVICE WITH FOREIGN-BACKED INSURGENTS,REBEL FORCES, ISLAMIST-ORIENTED ARMED GROUPSAND WARRING CIVILIANCOMMUNITIES.

CASE STUDIESThe following case studies present detailed evidence ofIranian ammunition identified in specific countries andregions of sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to ammunition,the cases also document Iranian weapons, which are alsoin service with government and non-state forces on thecontinent.kENYA, SOUTH SUDAN AND UGANDA, 2006–08Between May 2006 and January 2008 a researcherworking for the Geneva-based Small Arms Surveydocumented 3,382 small-calibre cartridges inservice with a range of state armed forces andnon-state armed groups in the border triangleof Kenya, southern Sudan (now South Sudan)and Uganda. 14 This ammunition included variouscalibres, but the most common type in circulation(approximately 75 per cent of the sample) was theSoviet-designed 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge. Althoughthere was no evidence to suggest it at the time ofthe study, Conflict Armament Research has sinceidentified more than 25 per cent of this 7.62 x 39mm ammunition as having been manufactured inIran (Image 8).In 2006–08 no prior studies had documented thistype of ammunition on the African continent. Inaddition, the ammunition in the sample was largelydiscovered loose (or loaded into magazines) ratherthan boxed in its original packaging. For this reasoninformation such as factory markings or shippinglabels that might have identified the ammunition ashaving originated in Iran was not available.The study did, however, record one instance inwhich the ammunition was found packaged insealed green polythene bags. The bags featured twomoulded handles and had to be cut to gain accessto the cartridges. Each bag contained 20 cardboardboxes, each packed with 20 cartridges. The bagsImage 8Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom northern KenyaNotes: The cartridge illustratedis one of several recoveredfrom various locations inEastern Equatoria (SouthSudan), Karamoja (Uganda)and Turkana District (Kenya).The firing pin mark on theprimer cap results fromdischarge in a weaponfollowing the demilitarisationof the cartridge (by bulletpulling). Photograph of aphysical sample held byConflict Armament Research.© Conflict Armament Research,2012Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 23

CASE STUDIESwere marked with yellow/gold lettering indicatingthe quantity of ammunition, the calibre, lot numberand year of manufacture. Although the sensitivesecurity environment prevented photography of thepackaging, 15 the bags were identical in constructionand marking to Iranian ammunition ‘battle bags’later found elsewhere on the continent (see thecases presented below).The Small Arms Survey study concluded thatKenyan security forces were the primary sourceof the (then-unidentified) Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmammunition circulating in the region—specificallythe Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reserves.Evidence for these assertions included thefollowing:In 2008 Iranian-manufactured ammunition of thetype illustrated in Image 8 comprised 70 per centof sampled 7.62 x 39 mm cartridges in servicewith the Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reserves.The study observed first-hand the Kenya Policesupplying this type of ammunition to armedTurkana civilians in 2007 and 2008.Reports by those supplied with the ammunitionconfirmed that the Kenya Police and Kenya PoliceReserves had distributed it.The prevalence of this type of ammunitiondiminished at greater distances from Kenya (andfrom the Kenya Police and Kenya Police Reservesthat supplied it). 16Although not recognised in 2008 as havingoriginated in Iran, it is clear that the Governmentof Kenya imported very large quantities of Iranianammunition—probably in the range of millions ofrounds.Analysis of the date marks applied to cartridgesindicate production in the years 2001, 2002 and2003, with 97 per cent of the cartridges bearing2003 date marks. A logical conclusion is that thecartridges cannot have been supplied prior to thedate of manufacture (2001), nor can they have beensupplied after the date they were observed (2008).Moreover, given that the majority of cartridges datefrom 2003 and that large-scale observation beganin 2006, there are some grounds for concluding thatthe Government of Kenya acquired the ammunitionbetween 2003 and 2006. This conclusion is arguablylent greater weight by the fact that UN SecurityCouncil prohibited the export of Iranian militarymateriel in March 2007, which should have deterreddirect Kenyan ammunition acquisition from Iranafter that date. 17However, these observations shed little light onthe actual circumstances of Kenya’s acquisitionof the ammunition. Without evidence to thecontrary, supply by a third party (other than Iran)cannot be excluded. However, the time betweenmanufacture and supply (plausibly as little as threeyears) would suggest a very rapid series of transfersbetween three parties—i.e. export from Iran to athird country and subsequent re-export to Kenya.Requests for clarification made to the Governmentof Kenya at the time of the initial investigation andsince remain unanswered. 18DARFUR, SOUTHERN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, 2006–12Iranian ammunition is in service with Khartoumbackedforces in the Darfur region of Sudan. It isalso in service with SAF troops operating on theborder with South Sudan. Although investigationshave not documented supplies of Iranianammunition to Khartoum-backed militias in SouthSudan, they have identified Iranian weapons in allthree regions—Darfur, southern Sudan 19 and SouthSudan.There is also growing evidence to suggest thatthe Government of Sudan manufactures weaponsof Iranian design, operates weapon productionfacilities with Iranian assistance and suppliesIranian-manufactured weapons to forces allied to itin the region.Working in conjunction with independentinvestigators, Conflict Armament Research hasdocumented two types of Iranian ammunition inservice with Khartoum-backed militia forces inDarfur and southern Sudan. The first type is 7.62 x39 mm in calibre and is identical in construction tothe examples documented elsewhere in this report(see Image 9).The second type of ammunition, documented inuse in Darfur and southern Sudan, is 7.62 x 54Rmm in calibre (see Image 10). The cartridge isalso identical to Iranian ammunition identifiedelsewhere in this report. A third cartridge is 12.7 x108 mm in calibre, resembles Iranian-manufactured24Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

CASE STUDIESImage 9Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom Darfur, 2008Notes: The cartridge caseillustrated was one amonga number of identical typesfound following a militaryaction launched by Khartoumbackedmilitia forces in April2008 (location withheld forreasons of confidentiality).Source: Confidentialammunition, but has not been identified positively(see Annex 3 for photographs).Investigators have identified the two types ofIranian ammunition pictured in Images 9 and 10among seizures of weapons from Khartoum-backedforces in Darfur or in abandoned SAF facilities—including Iranian 7.62 x 54R mm cartridgesdocumented inside an abandoned SAF garrison inTess, South Kordofan in May 2012. 20It is unclear why investigators have not yetdocumented Iranian ammunition in service withKhartoum-supplied forces operating in SouthSudan, particularly since these forces—like theircounterparts in Darfur—field a range of weaponsthat are of Iranian manufacture or design.For example, a growing number of Iranian weaponsare in service with Khartoum-backed militia forcesin Darfur and South Sudan, in addition to Iranianweapons deployed by SAF troops operating insouthern Sudan. They include numerous RPG-7-pattern rocket launchers of Iranian design (seeImage 11), 21 Iranian anti-personnel mines and avariety of other Iranian-manufactured militarymateriel. 22 Interviews with captured or defectingmilitia leaders confirm that the weapons have beensupplied directly from Khartoum, specifically byelements within the Sudanese National Intelligenceand Security Services (NISS). 23The manufacturing dates of Iranian ammunitionidentified in the region range from 2001 to 2004.The 2004-dated ammunition identified in Darfur(see Image 10) indicates potential supplies inviolation of the UN Security Council arms embargoon the region (in place since 2004). 24 Although yet tobe documented as being in service with Khartoumbackedforces in South Sudan, extensive Iranianweapons supplies to these forces suggest theprobable supply of such ammunition.Image 10Iranian 7.62 x 54R mmcartridge recoveredfrom South Darfur,April 2010Notes: The cartridge caseillustrated was one amonga number of identical typesfound following a militaryaction launched by Khartoumbackedmilitia forces in Kalmainternally displaced personscamp (near Nyala) anddocumented in April 2010.Source: ConfidentialConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 25

CASE STUDIESImage 11RPG-7-pattern rocket launcher of Iranian design recovered from Khartoum-supplied militia inSouth Sudan, 2012Notes: The weapon is unmarked. It features a moulded pistol grip and a second, pillar-like grip to the rear of the trigger assembly.These characteristics are unique to Iranian-designed RPG-7-pattern launchers. It was seized in Mankien, South Sudan and viewed atthe Sudan People’s Liberation Army 4th Division headquarters in Rubkhona, Unity State on 27 January 2012.© Mike Lewis/Small Arms SurveyBeyond the evidence presented above, thereare growing (albeit fragmentary) indications ofIranian cooperation and technical assistance in themanufacture or retransfer of weapons in Khartoum.These indications are best listed rather thancomprehensively analysed because, while they maysuggest close cooperation between Iran and Sudan,they are not definitive:In January 2007 Iran and Sudan reportedly signeda military cooperation agreement and initiateddiscussions on the sale of Iranian weapons,including ‘Iranian missiles, RPGs, UAVs andother equipment’. 25 Conflict Armament Researchhas received credible reports that the YarmoukIndustrial Complex (YIC) in Khartoum serves as aproduction/onward shipment facility for Iranian/Iranian-designed weapons. 26Conflict Armament Research has also receivedcredible reports that personnel working in theYIC visit Tehran for regular technical training onweapons or ammunition production. The precisenature of this training has not been documented.Reports suggest two or three such visits in 2011–12. 27Images of weapons displayed on the SudaneseMilitary Industrial Corporation (MIC) websitedepict weapons of recognisably Iranian design. 28The YIC operates under the umbrella of the MIC,which is controlled by the NISS.Documented cases of weapons transfers toKhartoum-backed militias operating in Darfurand South Sudan have involved the supply ofIranian weapons and also ammunition consignedto the YIC. 29 Interviews with militia commandersindicate that the Sudanese NISS organised thetransfers. 3026Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

CASE STUDIESIsrael targeted the YIC (although did not claimresponsibility) with air strikes on 23 October2012. Air attacks attributed to Israel and targetingvehicles bound from eastern Sudan to Sinai inJanuary 2009 and April 2011 were reportedlyorchestrated to disrupt shipments of Iranianweapons bound for Gaza. 31These reports do not constitute comprehensiveevidence of Iran’s role in the manufacture orredistribution of Iranian-designed weapons inor from Khartoum. However, viewed against thephysical evidence of weapons documented inDarfur, southern Sudan and South Sudan, and inlight of the proliferation of Iranian ammunitionin the region, they point towards increasingKhartoum–Tehran cooperation in the defencesector.GUINEA, 2009–10In 2009 researchers working for AmnestyInternational documented numerous types ofammunition recovered from the 28 September 2009stadium massacre in Conakry, Guinea and nearbyparts of the city. 32 These types included several7.62 x 39 mm cartridges, of which an example ispictured in Image 12. The cartridges are identical inconstruction to Iranian 7.62 x 39 mm ammunitiondocumented elsewhere in this report. However, inaddition to a ‘06’ date mark indicating productionin 2006, the cartridges also feature lot marks,including ‘161’ and (in Image 12) ‘257’.Although the lot mark differentiates thisammunition from known Iranian ammunitiondocumented elsewhere in Africa, its construction isidentical. The cartridges are brass cased, while theprojectiles are constructed of a lead core encasedin a tombak jacket. 33 In each case the primer issecured with three 120-degree stab crimps.In addition to sharing physical characteristicswith Iranian ammunition identified elsewhere inAfrica, it is identical to ammunition documented inAfghanistan and attributed to Iran (see Image 13). 34Although the lot numbers differ from the Guineansamples, the cartridge construction, primer annuluscolour and headstamp font are the same.Amnesty International concluded that theammunition pictured in Image 12 was in servicewith Guinean security forces at the time of thestadium massacre. In March 2010 investigators withaccess to ammunition used by the Guinean securityforces confirmed that the same type of ammunitionremained in government service. 35Production dates (2006) of the Iranian ammunitionfound in Guinea indicate post-2006 transfer to thecountry. This, and the fact that investigators firstdocumented the ammunition as being in servicewith Guinean armed forces in September 2009,suggests acquisition by the Government of Guineabetween 2006 and 2009. The circumstances of thisacquisition are unclear. Any such transfer afterMarch 2007 would have contravened UN SecurityCouncil sanctions on Iranian arms exports. 36Image 12Iranian 7.62 x 39 mmcartridge recoveredfrom Conakry, Guineaon 28 September 2009Notes: The cartridge is spent(i.e. the empty cartridgecase alone), having beenfired during the events of 28September 2009.© Mike Lewis/AmnestyInternational, 2009Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 27

CASE STUDIESImage 137.62 x 39 mmammunition recoveredfrom Taliban forcesin Nawa-I-BarakzayiDistrict, HelmandProvince, Afghanistan,documented inJanuary 2010Notes: The cartridgeillustrated is one of a numberdocumented during the NewYork Times investigationthat conform to the physicalcharacteristics of ammunitionpositively identified as Iranianin origin and documented inthis report.© C. J. Chivers/New York Times,2010CôTE D’IVOIRE, 2009–12Evidence compiled by Conflict Armament Researchfrom a range of investigations indicates at leasttwo, unconnected supplies of Iranian ammunitionto Côte d’Ivoire. The first occurred between 2002and 2009 and involved transfers of Iranian 7.62 x 39mm ammunition to former rebel forces operatingin northern Côte d’Ivoire. The second case suggeststhat former government forces acquired quantitiesof Iranian 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition after 2000,but plausibly since a November 2004 UN armsembargo on Côte d’Ivoire.Iranian ammunition transfers tonorthern Côte d’IvoireIn October 2009 The UN Group of Experts onCôte d’Ivoire 37 reported extensive transfers ofammunition from the territory of Burkina Fasoto rebel forces in the north of the country. Thesetransfers violated the UN Security Council armsembargo on Côte d’Ivoire imposed by Resolution1572 (2004).The transfers consisted of large numbers ofcartridges—then estimated to be in excess of 0.5million rounds—a substantial proportion of whichthe Group of Experts was unable to identify. 38Conflict Armament Research has since obtainedsamples of the unidentified ammunition andconfirmed that it is Iranian in origin (see Image14). The cartridges are identical in construction,markings and date of manufacture to numerousexamples identified in East Africa (see the casespresented above). 39The Group of Experts found no examples ofthe Iranian ammunition in its original, factorypackaging. Instead, it noted that the ammunitionhad been repacked into hessian bags (see Image15). The Group of Experts concluded that theremoval of ammunition from its packagingincreased the risks of damage from environmentalexposure and handling, and served no militarypurpose beyond concealment. 40Conflict Armament Research’s findings supportthis conclusion. First, many of the hessian bagscontained only one type of identically markedIranian ammunition. This suggests the unpacking ofhomogeneous ammunition straight from its originalfactory packaging. Second—and supporting thisargument—some of the cartridges had been packedinto small black plastic bags, each containingexactly 20 rounds of ammunition. 4128Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

CASE STUDIESImage 14Iranian 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge recovered from northern Côte d’Ivoire, documented in 2009Notes: Photographed in situ. Date and place of documentation withheld for reasons of confidentiality.Source: ConfidentialImage 15Bagged ammunition in northern Côte d’Ivoire, documented in 2009Notes: Photographed in situ. Date and place of documentation withheld for reasons of confidentiality.Source: ConfidentialConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 29

CASE STUDIESImage 16Sudanese-manufactured 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition in northern Côte d’Ivoire, documented in2011Notes: The cartridges pictured on the left and right are date-marked ‘04’, indicating production in 2004. The cartridge pictured inthe centre dates from 2003. The three cartridges feature the number ‘39’. This is the second part of the calibre designation (i.e.7.62 x 39 mm), which is typical of Sudanese-manufactured ammunition. More information on Sudanese marking practices can befound in Small Arms Survey (2011).© Conflict Armament Research, 2011Factory-packaged Iranian ammunition is suppliedin 20-round cartons, which again suggestsdeliberate repackaging directly from factory boxes.Although these findings suggest deliberateattempts to conceal the origins of the ammunition,reports by successive Groups of Experts on Côted’Ivoire firmly implicate the territory of BurkinaFaso in ammunition supplies to Ivorian rebelforces. 42 These reports suggest the delivery by truckof bagged ammunition across the border betweenthe two countries. 43 Nonetheless, the absence ofammunition packaging (and potential evidencesuch as lot markings and shipping documents)prevents identifying the chain of custody beforearrival in the territory of Burkina Faso and onwardshipment to Côte d’Ivoire.There are, however, some indications that theammunition may have transited a third Africancountry. First, there is no documented record ofBurkina Faso having procured Iranian ammunition(although there are records of Burkina Faso’sprocurement of other types of ammunition foundin Côte d’Ivoire). 44 More significantly, Groups ofExperts documented Sudanese ammunition, alsostored in hessian bags, together with the Iraniancartridges (see Image 16). 45This finding may suggest a possible link betweenthe bagged ammunition found in Côte d’Ivoireand regions where Iranian and Sudaneseammunition proliferates in similar quantities.For example,Conflict Armament Research’s analysisof ammunition in Darfur presented in this reportmay suggest some link between the two regions—raising the prospect of trans-Saharan/Sahelian landtransfers. However, at present there is insufficientevidence to draw firm conclusions.Iranian ammunition in service with formergovernment forcesIn addition to the Iranian 7.62 x 39 mm ammunitionidentified in service with former rebel forces,Conflict Armament Research has comprehensivelydocumented Iranian 7.62 x 54R mm cartridges inCôte d’Ivoire. As the following account describes,evidence suggests that, while some of theammunition may have entered the country priorto the November 2004 UN arms embargo, efforts toconceal box markings on other examples suggestspossible post-embargo shipment to Côte d’Ivoire.Investigators initially documented Iranian 7.62 x54R mm ammunition held by rebel forces in 2010. 46They observed the ammunition in very limitedquantities (about 2,000 cartridges) in only onerebel-controlled location (see Image 17). Unlike the7.62 x 39 mm Iranian ammunition in service withrebel forces and repacked into hessian bags, thisammunition remained in its original green factorypackedbattle bags. The fact that it had not beenrepacked and no effort appeared to have beenmade to conceal its origins suggested a differentsource of supply.30Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

CASE STUDIESImage 17Iranian 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition in service with rebel forces in northern Côte d’Ivoire,documented in 2010Notes: Precise date and place of documentation withheld for reasons of confidentiality. The ammunition is packed in quantities of20 rounds into cardboard boxes. Each green battle bag contains ten such boxes, totalling 200 cartridges per bag.Source: ConfidentialThe date of manufacture (2001) pre-dates thearms embargo (November 2004) on Côte d’Ivoireby approximately three years. It also pre-dates thedivision of the country after a military mutiny inSeptember 2002, which left rebel forces in controlof the north of Côte d’Ivoire. This, and the factthat rebel arsenals included arms captured fromgovernment forces, may suggest that the Iranianammunition had been in government servicebefore 2002. If this is the case, its supply to theGovernment of Côte d’Ivoire would have beenlegal, contravening neither the 2004 embargo onCôte d’Ivoire nor the 2007 sanctions on exports ofIranian weapons. 47An analysis of Iranian ammunition in service withformer government forces would appear theeasiest way to resolve this puzzle. However, thisis complicated by two pieces of contradictoryevidence.First, in 2009 an observer in Côte d’Ivoirephotographed part of an Iranian ammunitionbox (see Image 18). 48 The box was then under thecontrol of forces loyal to the former president,Laurent Ggagbo (who was deposed on 11 April2011). Although the photograph indicates no dateof manufacture, it is clear that no attempt has beenmade to erase and conceal the markings on the box.Image 18Partial informationon an Iranian 7.62 x54R mm ammunitionbox in service withgovernment forcesin Côte d’Ivoire,documented in 2009Notes: Precise date and placeof documentation withheldfor reasons of confidentiality.The date of manufactureis not visible in the abovephotograph due to themisaligned camera angle.Source: ConfidentialConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 31

CASE STUDIES32Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

CASE STUDIESSecond, in 2011 and 2012 investigators discoveredIranian 7.62 x 54R ammunition boxes in severalseparate locations in Côte d’Ivoire. 49 These boxeshad been in service with forces loyal to the formergovernment. But, unlike the box observed in 2009(Image 18), they had been systematically painted toconceal marks applied to their sides (see Image 19).In all cases, and despite having been observed indifferent locations, the mode and colour of paintingwere consistent—light blue paint applied only tothe marked sides of the boxes.Because it is difficult to imagine someone takingthe trouble to paint out the markings on onlysome boxes in an ammunition shipment, thesefindings suggest two separate shipments of Iranianammunition to the former Government of Côted’Ivoire. In one shipment there was no attempt toconceal the markings on the ammunition boxes,plausibly because the transfer was legal. In thesecond shipment the markings were deliberatelyconcealed, perhaps because it violated either the2004 embargo on Côte d’Ivoire or the 2007 embargoon Iranian weapons exports.Without further evidence, this conclusion remainsa hypothesis. Similarly, available evidence to datedoes not establish a chain of custody and thereis no information marked on—or found in—theammunition boxes to indicate how and whenthey entered the country. Ammunition identifiedthus far dates from 2000 and 2001—well beforethe aforementioned embargoes, but the effortsto conceal markings on the boxes still provide thefirmest evidence to suggest quasi-legal or illegaltransfer at some point in the ammunition’s history.Image 19Iranian 7.62 x 54R mm ammunition boxes with concealed markings and their contents,documented in 2012Notes: Precise date and place of documentation withheld for reasons of confidentiality. Clockwise from top left: (1) typicalIranian ammunition box construction with rope handles; (2) blue paint applied to box sides to conceal factory markings; (3)battle bag containing 200 rounds, lot-marked ‘18’ and manufactured in 2001.© Conflict Armament Research, 2012Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 33

CASE STUDIESON OPENING THE CONTAINERS, THE NIGERIAN AUTHORITIESDISCOVERED THAT CIVILIAN BUILDING MATERIALS, INCLUDINGSTONE SLABS AND GLASS FIBRE INSULATION PANELS, HADBEEN STACKED IN FRONT OF THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITIONTO CONCEAL THEM.NIGERIAN wEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SEIzURE, 2010On 26 October 2010 Nigerian security forces seized13 shipping containers in the port of Apapa inLagos, Nigeria. In the containers they found 240tonnes of ammunition, including 107 mm rockets;60, 80 and 120 mortar bombs; grenades; and 7.62x 54R mm Iranian-manufactured ammunitiondated 2006 and packed in green battle bags. 50The ammunition and the green battle bags wereidentical to the types described elsewhere in thisreport. Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria confirmed thatthe shipment had originated in Iran, specifically theport of Bandar Abbas. 51The history of this case indicates various effortson the part of entities operating from Iran, Nigeriaand possibly Gambia to conceal the shipment. InSeptember 2010 an African government intelligenceservice 52 received information that entities inGambia had ordered a consignment of weaponsand ammunition from Iran. 53 The intelligenceservice contacted a third party requesting that itattempt to trace 13 containers featuring containeridentification codes with the prefix ‘SOLE’. This wasreportedly not possible because the containerswere ‘shipper owned’ and not registered with theBureau International des Containers (BIC). 54The chain of events that led to the seizure of theconsignment becomes unclear from this pointforward. The consignment that arrived in Apapaport (offloaded at Tin Can Island port on 15 July2010) was not destined for Gambia, but for Nigeria. 55The original bill of lading consigned the shipmentto a person and address in Nigeria. After some time(precise duration unknown) the owner of the goodsinstructed the shipper to forward the containers toGambia. It was at this stage that Nigerian securityforces inspected and seized the consignment.The only firm conclusions that can be drawn fromthis case are that there was an attempt to concealthe contents and that the shipment originated inIran. First, the bill of lading issued on 2 June 2010does not describe the contents of the shipment(see Annex 4). On opening the containers, theNigerian authorities discovered that civilianbuilding materials, including stone slabs and glassfibre insulation panels, had been stacked in front ofthe weapons and ammunition to conceal them.Second, reports indicate that the freight forwarder,Behineh Trading, is a front company for the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and had beeninvolved in earlier shipments of Iranian weapons(seized outside Africa). 56 In addition, one member ofthe IRGC was reportedly involved in organising theshipment from Nigeria. 57 Confidential reports citingstatements by Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria suggestthat this was not only a direct shipment from Iran,but was preceded by two similar shipments.The intended recipient of the shipment isunclear. Originally consigned to Nigeria, butlater to Gambia, it could plausibly have beendestined for any number of recipients—includingregional governments. The fact that the shipmentcontravened the UN sanctions on Iranian armsexports (in force since 2007) would justifyconcealment, regardless of whether the recipientwas a national government or non-state group.34Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

CASE STUDIESADDITIONAl CASESInvestigations compiled by Conflict ArmamentResearch also document Iranian ammunition ineastern DRC and the West African state of Niger.While there is very little evidence to indicatesources of supply in each case, they neverthelessprovide important additional information on thedistribution of Iranian ammunition in countriesother than those described above.DRC, 2009In 2009 investigators documented Iranian 7.62 x39 mm Iranian ammunition of the type pictured inImage 1 at the beginning of this report. Reports bythe user suggest that the ammunition was in servicewith the Forces Républicaines Fédéralistes (FRR), aBanyamulenge armed group operating in the HautsPlateaux region of South Kivu, eastern DRC. 58Investigators also documented Sudanesemanufacturedammunition together with theIranian types. There is no available evidenceto suggest from where the FRR acquired theammunition.Niger, 2011–12Reports from Niger indicate two interceptions ofIranian ammunition by Nigerien security forces. InSeptember 2011 Nigerien military forces recoveredweapons and ammunition in northern Nigerfollowing an engagement with forces reportedlyaligned with AQIM. The seizure included Iranian7.62 x 54R mm ammunition dated 2002 and of thetype documented elsewhere in this report (seeImage 20).In May 2012 Nigerien authorities intercepted asmall shipment of weapons close to the borderwith Burkina Faso. The seizure included 2002-datedIranian 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition of the typepictured in Image 1 at the beginning of this report.Information obtained from Niger suggests that theshipment entered Nigerien territory from BurkinaFaso, but may have originated in Côte d’Ivoire. 59Image 20Iranian 7.62 x 54R mm, unspecified location in northern Niger, 2011Source: ConfidentialConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 35

THE ONLY PROVENCASE INVOLVING DIRECTSUPPLY BY IRAN TOENTITIES OTHER THANAFRICAN GOVERNMENTSIS THE 2010 SEIzURE OFIRANIAN WEAPONS ANDAMMUNITION IN NIGERIA.

CONCLuSIONIran is a recent supplier of ammunition to Africa. Thereis only trace evidence of supply before 2001, but Iranianammunition manufactured in 2002–03 and later-datedexamples are in widespread circulation across thecontinent.Iranian ammunition is in service with four Africangovernments: Côte d’Ivoire (until 2011), Guinea,Kenya and Sudan. Although the circumstances ofacquisition are unclear, the quantities involved inthe Sudan, Guinea and Kenya cases suggest directsupply by Iran. A question mark hangs over theIvorian case because of clear attempts to concealthe shipment.Ten additional investigations find Iranian weaponsand ammunition in service with a variety of nonstateentities, including foreign-backed insurgents,rebel forces, Islamist-oriented armed groups andwarring civilian communities. The sources of thismateriel are difficult to ascertain. All indicationssuggest that direct supply by Iran is unlikelyand that retransfer or diversion from Africangovernment forces is the most likely source.This is certainly the case for Iranian ammunition(and weapons) supplied by Sudan to forces inDarfur and South Sudan. Ammunition transfers toformer rebel forces in Côte d’Ivoire also suggestindirect supply by entities other than Iran,evidenced by the fact that the same transfersinclude non-Iranian ammunition. Kenyan securityforces are the confirmed source of Iranianammunition that is in widespread circulation in theborder regions of Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda.The only proven case involving direct supply by Iranto entities other than African governments is the2010 seizure of Iranian weapons and ammunitionin Nigeria. In the remainder of cases, Africangovernments appear to be the primary vectors inthe supply of Iranian ammunition to Africa’s illicitmarkets.In terms of its role in the African arms market,although a recent entrant, Iran’s ammunition‘footprint’ is widespread. The 14 cases presentedin this report are evidence of this alone. Iranianammunition circulates in conflict-affected regionsfrom East to West Africa. But it is important torecognise that, despite extensive circulation, Iranianammunition and weapons are small in numberin comparison to materiel supplied from formerSoviet-bloc countries and, increasingly, China.The only case to indicate the sustained—andpotentially escalating—supply of Iranian materielis Sudan. In this case there is growing evidenceto indicate large-scale supplies of weapons andammunition from Iran to Sudan and Iraniantechnical assistance in Sudanese weaponsproduction. This trend appears to result from theclose political alignment of Khartoum and Tehran.In all other cases, Iranian ammunition found inservice with African government forces appears tobe the result of ‘opportunistic’ supply. Acquisitionsby Guinea, Kenya and (possibly) Côte d’Ivoireinvolved large quantities of ammunition, but,TEN ADDITIONALINVESTIGATIONS FIND IRANIANWEAPONS AND AMMUNITIONIN SERVICE WITH A VARIETYOF NON-STATE ENTITIES,INCLUDING FOREIGN-BACKEDINSURGENTS, REBEL FORCES,ISLAMIST-ORIENTED ARMEDGROUPS AND WARRINGCIVILIAN COMMUNITIES.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 37

CONCLUSIONTHE AFRICAN ARMS MARKET IS CHANGING, WITH THEINVOLVEMENT OF NEW SUPPLIERS AND THE APPEARANCE OFNEW SUPPLY VECTORS, BOTH LEGAL AND ILLICIT.unlike Sudan, they do not appear to have involvedthe transfer of Iranian weapons. Moreover, datesof manufacture suggest that these transfers tookplace within a relatively short time period and donot appear to have been repeated—although thiscannot be ruled out.Finally, this report’s findings have widerimplications for weapons and ammunitionproliferation in Africa. First, relatively recentsupplies of Iranian ammunition emphasise theevolving nature of the market. The African armsmarket is changing, with the involvement of newsuppliers and the appearance of new supplyvectors, both legal and illicit. Exporters such asChina (and to a lesser extent Iran) appear to beheavily involved in the supply of weapons to Africanstates that are embroiled in armed conflicts.Countries such as Sudan are not simply end usersof foreign-manufactured materiel, but intensiveredistributors.Second, the findings re-emphasise the critical rolethat African governments play in feeding weaponsand ammunition to illicit markets. Investigationsin this report profile ongoing problems associatedwith either the loss or theft of weapons fromgovernment arsenals or deliberate governmentarms supplies to neighbouring insurgencies. Thesetwo factors make African governments the primaryindirect source, not only of Iranian ammunitioncirculating on illicit markets, but arms andammunition from a host of other manufacturers.transfers to Africa are relatively recent, they stillencompass a decade of activity. The fact that thisis the first major report to note Iran’s decade-longinvolvement indicates a worrying lack of capacitydevoted to monitoring illicit proliferation. Despitemillions of dollars spent on international diplomaticinitiatives, such as the UN Programme of Action onSmall Arms or the Arms Trade Treaty process, theresources allocated to field investigations remainslight in the extreme.Interested members of the internationalcommunity stand a far greater chance of assisting—or pressuring—African governments to curtailunchecked arms transfers than they have ofpersuading emerging arms producers to abandonnewly found market opportunities. But to do this,the international community must invest in thenecessary diagnostic side of arms control. Theproblem cannot be adequately addressed unless itis fully understood. Donor governments need to actquickly and provide the appropriate resources tofield-based investigations.Third, these findings suggest severe weaknessesin the international community’s capacity tomonitor—and subsequently address—illicitweapons flows. Although Iranian ammunition38Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

ANNExESANNEX 1: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF IRANIAN 7.62 x 39 mm CARTRIdgES 60The ammunition is 7.62 x 39 mm in calibre andhas a brass cartridge case. The projectile (bullet)weighs 8.1 grams, is 24.6 mm in length and boattailedin design, with a lead core encased in atombak jacket. 61 Numerous documented examplesindicate that the primer annulus colour varies fromred to green (including various shades of the two).The primer is secured with three 120-degree stabcrimps. The headstamp follows a standard formatdisplaying the full calibre designation (‘7.62 x39’) at the 12 o’clock position and an abbreviateddate code at the 6 o’clock position (‘03’ for 2003).The dimension and weight specifications of thiscartridge are consistent with those provided by theIranian DIO’s AMIG.Notes: Photographs of aphysical sample held byConflict Armament Research.Clockwise from top left: (1)full profile of the cartridge; (2)cartridge headstamp; (3) baseof the projectile; (4) full profileof the projectile.© Conflict Armament Research,2012Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 39

ANNEXESANNEX 2: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF IRANIAN 7.62 x 54R mm CARTRIdgES 62The ammunition is 7.62 x 54R mm in calibre and hasa brass cartridge case. The projectile weighs 11.2 g,is 31.3 mm in length and boat-tailed in design, witha lead core encased in a tombak jacket. 63All documented cartridges feature a green primerannulus (various shades). The primer is securedwith three 120-degree stab crimps. The headstampfollows a standard format displaying the full calibredesignation (‘7.62 x 54’) at the 12 o’clock positionand an abbreviated date code at the 6 o’clockposition (‘01’ for 2001). The dimension and weightspecifications of this cartridge are consistent withthose provided by the Iranian DIO’s AMIG.The DIO lists two types of 7.62 x 54R in production.The first is described as ‘7.62 x 54 Light’, which hasa bullet weight of 9.7 g. The cartridge conformsto standard Soviet cartridges intended for usein weapons such as the PKM-pattern machinegun, which is in widespread service in Africa. DIOdescribes the second type as ‘7.62 x 54 Heavy’.The ammunition presented here is of this type.It has a heavier bullet weight (11.2 g) and wasdesigned for use in weapons that are now largelyobsolete, including the Maxim M1910 and SG-43machine guns (dating from the first half of the 20 thcentury). Although this cartridge can be fired fromPKM-pattern weapons, its ballistic characteristicsdiffer from the ‘7.62 x 54 Light’ variant. The resultis that accurate firing would be impaired, primarilybecause PKM-pattern weapon sights are notconfigured for this type of ammunition.Notes: Photographs of aphysical sample held byConflict Armament Research.Clockwise from top left: (1)full profile of the cartridge; (2)cartridge headstamp; (3) baseof the projectile; (4) full profileof the projectile.© Conflict Armament Research,201240Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

ANNEXESANNEX 3: SuSPECTEd IRANIAN 12.7 x 108 mm AmmuNITIONSource: ConfidentialConflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 41

ANNEXESANNEX 4: NIgERIAN wEAPONS ANd AmmuNITION SEIzuRE, OCTOBER 2010: BILL OFLAdINg dATEd 2 JuNE 2010Source: Confidential42Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

ENdNOTES1 The headstamp is applied to the cartridge during manufacture. Specifically, it is applied during aprocess known as ‘drawing’ or ‘extrusion’. In the drawing process a machine forces a cup-shaped pieceof brass into a mould or ‘die’ to form the initial, elongated shape of the cartridge case. A hardenedsteel plug, called a ‘bunter’, then punches a hole (the primer pocket) in the base of the cartridge andsimultaneously impresses the headstamp on the cartridge base.2 See DIO (2012) for technical specifications.3 In the examples given in Table 1 the stamping quality differs primarily due to the condition of thebunter used to impart the headstamp. The bunter features raised markings. After continuous use thebunter becomes worn and the markings imparted to the cartridge head become less well defined andshallower. Variations in the quality and depth of markings on the headstamps pictured in Table 1 arethe result of this process.4 See DIO (2012) for technical specifications.5 Conflict Armament Research has also documented a fourth type of cartridge that may be Iranian inorigin. The cartridge is 12.7 x 108 mm in calibre and features a similar headstamp configuration to thecartridges described above. See Annex 3 for details.6 Information obtained in email and telephone discussions with US-based cartridge collectors, May–June2012.7 Agence France Press photographs of the shipment displaying the green battle bags can be found at.8 For detailed photographs, see IMFA (2002).9 See IMFA (2002) for images of the seized ammunition.10 US-based ammunition collectors report that the ammunition first appeared on the US market in thelate 1990s, described as ‘Portuguese ammunition’ (information obtained in email and telephonediscussions, May–June 2012).11 Observations and interviews by James Bevan in Eastern Equatoria State, (then) southern Sudan,February 2008.12 Interviews conducted by James Bevan in November and December 2006 with civilian users of theIranian ammunition in Turkana North District, Kenya.13 See UNSC (2007).14 For a full presentation of the findings, see Bevan (2008a; 2008b).15 Observations made by James Bevan in Lokichoggio, northern Kenya in January 2008.16 See Bevan (2008a, pp. 46–51) for a presentation of the methodology and findings.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 43

ENDNOTES17 See UNSC (2007, para. 5) for the text of the resolution, which prohibits the supply, sale or transfer ofarms and related materiel from the territory of Iran or by Iranian nationals.18 The Small Arms Survey questioned government ministers at the time of the study as to the originsof the ammunition, but received no adequate response. In 2009 the UN Group of Experts on Côted’Ivoire reportedly requested information on the ammunition concerned, but apparently received noresponse from the Government of Kenya. Back-channel inquiries by Conflict Armament Research withinthe Kenyan defence establishment did not achieve a definitive response. Additionally, in November2012 Conflict Armament Research addressed a letter to the Government of Kenya (via the PermanentMission of the Republic of Kenya to the UN in New York) requesting clarification on the origins of theammunition. It still awaits a response.19 South Kordofan and Blue Nile States.20 Information provided by Claudio Gramizzi in correspondence, November 2012.21 Some of the RPG-7-pattern launchers are marked with the designation A-30, while others feature nomarkings. Investigators have documented one A-30 (source and location withheld) with a packing listindicating production at the Yarmouk Industrial Complex (YIC) in Khartoum. Comparing known Iranianexamples and A-30 types indicates the poorer-quality construction of A-30 models. This may suggestthat Iranian-designed RPG-7-pattern launchers are manufactured at the YIC—particularly given theinformation found on the abovementioned packing list.22 See Small Arms Survey (2012a, p. 3; 2012c).23 Interviews conducted with defecting militia leaders by Conflict Armament Research and the Small ArmsSurvey in South Sudan, September 2012.24 See UNSC (2004b; 2005) for the text of the relevant resolutions on Darfur.25 See reports of the visit of Sudanese defence minister, Abdelrahim Hussein, to Tehran in January 2007,reported in the Sudan Tribune (2007a; 2007b).26 Confidential exchange with a source connected to the YIC (date and location withheld for reasons ofconfidentiality).27 Confidential exchange with a source connected to the YIC (date and location withheld for reasons ofconfidentiality).28 First reported by the Small Arms Survey’s Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment Project (seeSmall Arms Survey, 2012c). The Sudanese MIC website lists three weapons that closely resembleIranian types: the ‘Sinar’ RPG-7-pattern rocket launcher, the ‘Karar’ general-purpose machine gunand the ‘Dinar’ assault rifle. The Arabic version of the website provides greater detail than the Englishpages. See MIC (2012) for more information.29 See, for example, ammunition boxes consigned to the YIC documented in Small Arms Survey(2012b, p. 7).30 Interviews conducted with defected militia leaders by Conflict Armament Research and the Small ArmsSurvey in South Sudan, September 2012.31 International news media widely reported the attacks. See also reports by the Meir Amit Intelligenceand Terrorism Information Center (MAITIC, 2009, pp. 8–10; 2011, pp. 16–17). Conflict ArmamentResearch has received credible information implicating Israel in the 23 October 2012 incident. It alsobases its analysis on Israeli assertions of Iran’s role in Sudan, as expressed in confidential interviewswith representatives of the Government of Israel at various meetings in 2012.44Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

ENDNOTES32 See Amnesty International (2010, pp. 28–29) for details of the sample collected.33 Tombak is a brass alloy with a high copper content. Investigations in 2010 ascertained with the use ofa magnet that the projectiles contained no ferrous material (source and circumstances of observationwithheld for reasons of confidentiality).34 Interviews with British and US military observers in Afghanistan indicate concerns that the late date ofproduction of this ammunition, together with documented supplies of military materiel from Iran toTaliban forces found together with it, suggest Iranian manufacture.35 Source and circumstances of observation withheld for reasons of confidentiality.36 See UNSC (2007).37 Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire established pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution1842 (2008).38 See UNSC (2009, paras. 135–51) for details, including photographs of the cartridges, which arepresented beneath para. 137. Reports from Côte d’Ivoire in 2011–12 suggest that, with rebel forceshaving gained control of Côte d’Ivoire in April 2011, the ammunition in question is now distributedacross the country. In 2009–10 the ammunition was confined to rebel-held territory in the north of thecountry (confidential interviews with observers in Côte d’Ivoire conducted in 2011 and 2012).39 A physical examination conducted by Conflict Armament Research of recovered samples from the tworegions demonstrates the following: the materials and construction; the headstamp design, font andtool markings; and the bullet composition and weights are all identical. In each case the technicalcharacteristics of the cartridges recovered from the two regions conform to data presented by Iran’sDIO (see DIO, 2012).40 Identifying information on or in factory boxes—detailing manufacturer, lot numbers or consignees—could otherwise have been used to establish a chain of custody (and the immediate supplier).41 Source and circumstances of observation withheld for reasons of confidentiality.42 UNSC (2011, paras. 92–110) presents additional evidence of weapons and ammunition transfers fromthe territory of Burkina Faso, including from Burkinabé security forces. UNSC (2012, paras. 24–26;Annexes 6a, 6b) provides evidence of Romanian ammunition initially shipped to the Government ofBurkina Faso having been diverted into what was then rebel-held northern Côte d’Ivoire.43 See UNSC (2009, paras. 145–49).44 See UNSC (2012, paras. 24–26).45 The 2009 Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (UNSC, 2009, Table 4) identified some 7.62 x 39 mmcartridges as being of Sudanese manufacture. Additional analysis by Conflict Armament Research of asecond type of cartridge (described by the Group of Experts as having headstamp markings 1_39_04)confirms that this ammunition is also manufactured in Sudan.46 Confidential report from northern Côte d’Ivoire provided to Conflict Armament Research in 2011.47 See the respective UN Security Council resolutions (UNSC, 2004a; 2007).48 Confidential information reported to Conflict Armament Research in 2011 concerning observationsmade at a military facility in 2009.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 45

ENDNOTES49 Information supplied by an independent observer in Côte d’Ivoire to Conflict Armament Research in2011 and 2012. Confidential source.50 The ammunition is marked with the calibre designation (7.62 x 54), a date code (06) and a lot number(128). The lot number 128 is also marked on the green battle bags (confidential source).51 Confidential source.52 Reportedly in conjunction with a Western intelligence service (precise details unknown) (confidentialsource).53 Confidential source.54 See BIC for more details: .55 The consignment was later diverted to Tin Can Island port and from there to an inland containerterminal under the authority of Apapa port, reportedly due to congestion at Apapa (confidentialsource).56 Confidential source.57 Confidential source.58 Information supplied to Conflict Armament Research by a confidential source, including photographicevidence. The photographs have not been reproduced here for reasons of confidentiality.59 Confidential source.60 Technical analysis kindly provided by Alexander Diehl; see DIO (2012) for technical specifications.61 See endnote 33 for an explanation of ‘tombak’.62 Technical analysis kindly provided by Alexander Diehl; see DIO (2012) for technical specifications.63 See endnote 33 for an explanation of ‘tombak’.46Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

BIBLIOgRAPHYAmnesty International. 2010. ‘Guinea: You did not want the military, so now we are going to teach you alesson: The events of 28 September 2009 and their aftermath.’ Index AFR 29/001/2010. London:Amnesty International. February.Bevan, James. 2008a. Blowback: Kenya’s Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District. Geneva: SmallArms Survey. June.——. 2008b. Crisis in Karamoja: Armed Violence and the Failure of Disarmament in Uganda’s Most DeprivedRegion. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. June.—. 2012. ‘Assessment of weapons seized from the forces of George Athor and John Duit.’ HSBA Arms andAmmunition Tracing Desk. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November.DIO (Defence Industries Organization). 2012. An untitled listing of ballistic and technical data on DIO AMIGsmall-calibre ammunition. Accessed 22 November 2012. IMFA (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 2002. ‘Seizing of the Palestinian weapons ship KarineA—photos.’ 4 January. Accessed 22 November 2012. MAITIC (Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center). 2009. Iran’s Activity in East Africa, theGateway to the Middle East and the African Continent. Tel Aviv: MAITIC. 29 July.——. 2011. In Recent Months Two More Iranian Attempts to Ship Weapons Were Exposed. Tel Aviv: MAITIC. 15March.MIC (Military Industrial Corporation). 2012. ‘Products.’ Company website. Accessed 1 November 2012.Small Arms Survey. 2011. A Guide to Sudanese Ammunition (1954–present). Sudan Human Security BaselineAssessment Tracing Desk Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November.——. 2012a. SAF Weapons Documented in South Kordofan. Sudan Human Security Baseline AssessmentTracing Desk Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. April.——. 2012b. ‘Business as usual: Arms flows to Darfur 2009–12.’ Sudan Human Security Baseline AssessmentIssue Brief No. 20. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. September.——. 2012c. Assessment of Weapons Seized from the Forces of George Athor and John Duit. Sudan HumanSecurity Baseline Assessment Tracing Desk Report. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. November.Sudan Tribune. 2007a. ‘Sudanese minister visits Iranian military airplane complex.’ 17 January.——. 2007b. ‘Iran offers to train and equip Sudan’s army.’ 9 January.UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Resolution 1493 (2003), adopted by the Security Council atits 4797 th meeting on 28 July. S/RES/1493.Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation 47

BIBLIOGRAPHY——. 2004a. Resolution 1572 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 5078 th meeting on 15 November.S/RES/1572.——. 2004b. Resolution 1556 (2004), adopted by the Security Council at its 5015 th meeting on 30 July. S/RES/1556.——. 2005. Resolution 1591 (2005), adopted by the Security Council at its 5153 rd meeting on 29 March. S/RES/1591.——. 2007. Resolution 1747 (2007), adopted by the Security Council at its 5647 th meeting on 24 March 2007.S/RES/1747——. 2009. ‘Letter dated 8 April 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of theSecurity Council.’ S/2009/188. Enclosure: ‘Letter dated 20 March 2009 from the Group of Expertson Côte d’Ivoire to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant toresolution 1572 (2004).’ 8 April.——. 2011. ‘Letter dated 20 April 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of theSecurity Council.’ S/2011/271. Enclosure: Letter dated 17 September 2010 from the Group ofExperts on Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004).’ 27 April.——. 2012. ‘Letter dated 15 October 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of theSecurity Council.’ S/2012/766. Enclosure: ‘Letter dated 14 September 2012 from the Group ofExperts on Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee establishedpursuant to resolution 1572 (2004).’ 15 October.48Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation

Email: admin@conflictarm.comwww.conflictarm.com