The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa - Conflict Armament ...

CASE STUDIESON OPENING THE CONTAINERS, THE NIGERIAN AUTHORITIESDISCOVERED THAT CIVILIAN BUILDING MATERIALS, INCLUDINGSTONE SLABS AND GLASS FIBRE INSULATION PANELS, HADBEEN STACKED IN FRONT OF THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITIONTO CONCEAL THEM.NIGERIAN wEAPONS AND AMMUNITION SEIzURE, 2010On 26 October 2010 Nigerian security forces seized13 shipping containers in the port of Apapa inLagos, Nigeria. In the containers they found 240tonnes of ammunition, including 107 mm rockets;60, 80 and 120 mortar bombs; grenades; and 7.62x 54R mm Iranian-manufactured ammunitiondated 2006 and packed in green battle bags. 50The ammunition and the green battle bags wereidentical to the types described elsewhere in thisreport. Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria confirmed thatthe shipment had originated in Iran, specifically theport of Bandar Abbas. 51The history of this case indicates various effortson the part of entities operating from Iran, Nigeriaand possibly Gambia to conceal the shipment. InSeptember 2010 an African government intelligenceservice 52 received information that entities inGambia had ordered a consignment of weaponsand ammunition from Iran. 53 The intelligenceservice contacted a third party requesting that itattempt to trace 13 containers featuring containeridentification codes with the prefix ‘SOLE’. This wasreportedly not possible because the containerswere ‘shipper owned’ and not registered with theBureau International des Containers (BIC). 54The chain of events that led to the seizure of theconsignment becomes unclear from this pointforward. The consignment that arrived in Apapaport (offloaded at Tin Can Island port on 15 July2010) was not destined for Gambia, but for Nigeria. 55The original bill of lading consigned the shipmentto a person and address in Nigeria. After some time(precise duration unknown) the owner of the goodsinstructed the shipper to forward the containers toGambia. It was at this stage that Nigerian securityforces inspected and seized the consignment.The only firm conclusions that can be drawn fromthis case are that there was an attempt to concealthe contents and that the shipment originated inIran. First, the bill of lading issued on 2 June 2010does not describe the contents of the shipment(see Annex 4). On opening the containers, theNigerian authorities discovered that civilianbuilding materials, including stone slabs and glassfibre insulation panels, had been stacked in front ofthe weapons and ammunition to conceal them.Second, reports indicate that the freight forwarder,Behineh Trading, is a front company for the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and had beeninvolved in earlier shipments of Iranian weapons(seized outside Africa). 56 In addition, one member ofthe IRGC was reportedly involved in organising theshipment from Nigeria. 57 Confidential reports citingstatements by Iran’s ambassador to Nigeria suggestthat this was not only a direct shipment from Iran,but was preceded by two similar shipments.The intended recipient of the shipment isunclear. Originally consigned to Nigeria, butlater to Gambia, it could plausibly have beendestined for any number of recipients—includingregional governments. The fact that the shipmentcontravened the UN sanctions on Iranian armsexports (in force since 2007) would justifyconcealment, regardless of whether the recipientwas a national government or non-state group.34Conflict Armament ResearchThe Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa: Evidence from a Nine-country Investigation