The Reformed Committee on Food Security. A briefing paper for ...

<strong>The</strong> global food price crisis of 2007/2008 – plunging another 150 million people into food insecurityand raising the number of globally malnourished to a staggering 1 billion – emphatically underscoredthe failings of the global food security institutional architecture. This created a sense of urgency whichled to the creation of new coordination mechanisms such as the UN Secretary-General’s High LevelTask Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HLTF); proposals – particularly from G8 countries– for new entities such as a Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security (GPAFS); and, importantly,to the launch of a process to reform the pre-existing, yet underperforming, <strong>Committee</strong> onWorld Food Security. Indeed, for those seeking transparent and centralised food security governance,providing meaningful participation opportunities for civil society and underpinned by the principleof one-country one-vote, it was vital that the responses to the food price crisis were focused on renewingthe UN architecture, and not in creating new, opaque arrangements (such as the proposedGlobal Partnership). In that meeting room at FAO on the 17th October, the loud applause heraldedthat efforts to ensure exactly this had been successful.<strong>The</strong> reform blueprint of the CFS 2 contains the outline of a body whose potential for the future of foodand agricultural governance and policy-making cannot be overstated. However, the full realisation ofthis potential is dependent upon many factors, and a continuation and extension of the CSO engagementthat has been so critical to this process so far is a major part of that. <strong>The</strong> purpose of this briefingpaper is to help facilitate that engagement by:• Providing a brief overview of the context and process in which the CFS was reformed(Part 2);• Providing an overview of three different elements of the renewed CFS – its vision androles, actors and mechanisms, and levels and relations (Part 3);• Highlighting some of the opportunities and challenges for civil society within the re-newed CFS (Part 4), and;• Tentatively offering some suggestions for lobbying strategies for civil society at thenational level (Part 5).2 <strong>The</strong> reform document which provides the blueprint for the renewed <strong>Committee</strong> on World Food Security (<strong>Committee</strong>on World Food Security (2009) “Reform of the <strong>Committee</strong> on World Food Security: Final Version”, FAO Reference:CFS:2009/2) can be located here: http://cso4cfs.org/document-library/4

This growth of institutions has led to a complicated picture for global food and agricultural governanceand policy-making. <strong>The</strong> sheer range of international entities of relevance to food and agriculturetoday is suggested by the fact that when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon convened a High LevelTask Force to respond to the 2007/2008 food price crisis, it counted no less than twenty different bodieswithin its participants 5 .<strong>The</strong> problem of institutional fragmentation is compounded by fundamental disagreements at the globallevel on how best to attain food security. <strong>The</strong>se disagreements reflect ideology, interest, disciplinaryand institutional location, and – of fundamental importance in the case of small scale producersand providers – experience. Whilst, in principle, bodies such as the Conference of FAO are supposedto provide global level spaces in which to discuss, deliberate, and reflect upon the merits of the differentfood and agricultural policies, in practice this has not happened 6 . <strong>The</strong>refore, prior to the CFSreform, there existed no effective space for food security policy dialogue at the global level.To a large extent this reflects the hegemony of neoliberal thinking which has dominated – and stillexerts a strong influence over - development policy and its related fields for the greater part of thelast 30 years. However, with many of the fundamental premises of neoliberalism now being routinelycalled into question even by those who were once at the vanguard of their advocacy, and a range ofcrises associated with the dysfunctionality of unregulated markets, there has been a growing andwidespread recognition of the need for a global food security policy dialogue. <strong>The</strong> opposition to neoliberalismfiercely demonstrated by an organized global civil society has of course been an importantpart of this context.Four important dynamics then of the historical context for global food security activity are:• An absence of effective political will;• A fragmented and complex institutional environment;• <strong>The</strong> dominance and subsequent calling into question of neoliberalism;• <strong>The</strong> emergence of an organised and effective global civil society.5 <strong>The</strong> full list of HLTF members includes representatives of the following institutions: Food and Agriculture Organization(FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights (OHCHR), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) ,International Labour Organization(ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries,Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States (OHRLLS), UN Conference on Trade andDevelopment (UNCTAD), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Environment Programme (UNEP), Office of theUN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Food Programme (WFP), World Health Organization(WHO), World Trade Organization (WTO), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), Department ofPolitical Affairs (DPA), Department of Public Information (DPI), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).6 See: FAO (2007) “Report of the Independent External Evaluation of the Food and Agricultural Organizationof the United Nations”, particularly “Chapter Four: Governance”. Available at: http://www.fao.org/pbe/pbee/en/219/index.html8

In June 2008 French President Sarkozy, when addressing the High Level Conference on World FoodSecurity at FAO proposed the creation of a Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Securitywith three key pillars: international policy coordination; an international group of experts (based inFAO); and a world financial facility for food security (based at IFAD). This became a provocative andcontroversial idea, largely due to the fact that it was never clearly defined by those who advocatedit, and seemed to mean something completely different for each different actor. For some there was afear that this Partnership would involve moving food security responsibility outside of the UN systemand increasing the role of the private sector, but at the various different meetings and discussionsin which the attempt was made to bring this idea to life a lack of consensus amongst its advocatesand stiff opposition from a broad range of actors – including a strong and well organized civil society- meant that its momentum was more or less redirected to the CFS reform process.In April 2008 to July 2009 at a series of their meetings, G8 countries had food security on their agenda,and made a number of declarations and financial commitments in the name of addressing global foodinsecurity 8 .Whilst the above selective list shows how the food price crisis resulted in a significant outburst of foodsecurity related activity at a global level, which for many marked a long overdue return of the problemof global hunger to the attention of the international community, many elements of this activitywere regarded as aggravating or compounding the historical weaknesses of the global food securitysystem outlined above. For some, the lack of transparency and the exclusiveness of these processeswas a major concern. From this perspective both the threat they seemed to pose to the principle of onecountry-one vote, and their inability or reluctance to heed the voices of rural peoples in their formulationswere profound weaknesses. For others, the further fragmentation that seemed to be suggestedby, for example, the launch of a completely new initiative such as the Global Partnership, decreasednot increased the likelihood of system effectiveness. And for others some of the commitments thatrepeated throughout the declarations seemed less to be the product of bottom up needs assessmentand more coloured by ideology or national interest.In the wake of these reservations, and following on from the momentum of a deep and thoroughgoing reform process directed at its host institution - the FAO - in October 2008 member states agreedto embark on a process to reform the <strong>Committee</strong> on World Food Security. At the time some long-termonlookers felt that this would be a slow process, but this proved not to be the case, with the discussionsand negotiations being brought in fact to a successful conclusion by October of 2009.8 See July 2008 G8 Hokkaido Toyako Leaders Statement on Global Food Security http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2008/doc/doc080709_04_en.htmlAnd: July 2009 G8 L’Aquila Joint Statement on Global Food Security http://www.g8summit.it/G8/Home/Summit/G8-G8_Layout_locale-1199882116809_Atti.htm10

<strong>The</strong> Contact Group Process:Producing a Blueprint for CFS Reform<strong>The</strong> mechanism for producing the reform document was a Contact Group especially established bythe Bureau of the CFS under the visionary leadership of its Chair Maria Del Carmen Squeff, AlternatePermanent Representative of Argentina to FAO. In a departure from the normal working practicesof the CFS (and other inter-governmental bodies) the Contact Group provided unprecedented participationopportunities for civil society, who were more or less entitled to the same degree of accessand participation as member states - tabling and responding to reform proposals through the ContactGroup’s website and attending and intervening at the Rome meetings. Though civil society were notthe only actors invited into the extended Contact Group, and the full list of participants also includedother UN bodies and, in theory at least, the private sector, it was widely recognised by member statesthat civil society participation was fundamental to the successful conclusion of the process and thevision of the final document.From its first meeting in April 2009 to the adoption of the reform document in October later thatyear, the Contact Group met physically a total of seven times, with much website mediated activityin-between. During this time the reform document went through a number of different drafts, as ContactGroup participants worked within four Working Groups to consider 1) the Role and Vision of therenewed CFS; 2) its Membership and Decision Taking; 3) its Mechanisms and Procedures, and; 4) itsHigh Level Panel of Experts. Within the context of these working groups discussion and negotiationfocused implicitly upon such questions as:• Who should be entitled to participate in the renewed CFS and what should their participationrights be?• What roles should the CFS play within the global food security “system” and how authoritativeshould it be?• With which other parts of the international system should the CFS be related, andhow?• What “mechanisms” does the renewed CFS need in order to be able to fulfill its roles?11

Whilst the success of the IPC in the Contact Group was directly related to their considerable experienceand organisation (having clear positions and knowing how to articulate them), that there wasa broad degree of harmony amongst the civil society actors involved in the Contact Group was alsoan advantage, and a strengthened working relationship with International NGOs Action-Aid andOxfam in particular has been – and continues to be – very productive. However, across civil societymore generally there is still a tension between those who believe that the best way of attaining foodsecurity is to assert the agency (through the provision of participation opportunities) for “those mostaffected by food insecurity” and those who profess to work on behalf of this constituency, mainlythrough their advocacy work. Following its reform the CFS has become a much more attractive andrelevant space for all CSOs whose work is relevant to food security, which threatens to make this tensionmore relevant and there have been signs that this is perhaps the case.<strong>The</strong> conclusion of the Contact Group process in October 2009 represented a significant victory forthose who sought to channel the responses to the food crisis into the UN system. It also resulted inthe production of a reform document outlining the contours and responsibilities of a body whosepotential significance for global food security governance cannot be overstated. <strong>The</strong> following sectionwill outline the key features of this renewed body.13

3. THE RENEWED CFS: VISION AND ROLES;ACTORS AND MECHANISMS; LEVELS AND RELATIONSI. THE VISION AND ROLES OF THE RENEWED CFSOverall Vision<strong>The</strong> aspirations for the renewed CFS are stated very clearly on the first page of the reform document:<strong>The</strong> reforms are designed to redefine the CFS’ vision and role to focus on the key challengesof eradicating hunger; expanding participation in CFS to ensure that voices of all relevantstakeholders are heard in the policy debate on food and agriculture; adopt its rules and procedureswith the aim to become the central United Nations political platform dealing with foodsecurity and nutrition; strengthening its linkages with regional, national, and local levels;and supporting CFS discussions with structured expertise through the creation of a High LevelPanel of Experts (HLPE) so that the decisions and the work of the CFS are based on hardevidence and state of the art knowledge [Emphasis added].(CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 2).This brief paragraph makes reference to a number of key elements the presence of which is whatendows the renewed CFS with its potential. Whether or not this potential is realised depends on theextent to which – through implementation of the reform document - the CFS is able to realise theseelements both individually and collectively.<strong>The</strong>se elements are:• Political centrality - <strong>The</strong> renewed CFS is intended to be the central political space withinthe global food security architecture. It is the place, therefore, where public authorityover the global food security agenda is to be located. This is in contrast to the presentsituation where public authority is weak and fragmented.• Inclusivity - <strong>The</strong> CFS provides unprecedented participation opportunities for a rangeof stakeholders “particularly those most affected by food insecurity” (CFS:2009/2: Paragraph7). This inclusivity extends to all aspects, periods, and levels of the work undertakenby the CFS.• Policy orientation - <strong>The</strong> CFS aspires to impact upon policy. It seeks to be concrete andaction oriented. It seeks to make a tangible contribution towards the food security agenda.• Linking the different levels - Both with regards to its “inputs” and its “outputs” theCFS aspires to be meaningfully and dynamically connected with all levels of food securityactivity, especially the “reality on the ground” (CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 23). This14

multi-level dynamic means that the renewed CFS will relate to all the different levels ina two-way relationship, taking inputs from each of the different levels, and producingoutputs to shape action at these levels.Among those important elements not mentioned in this paragraph we might also add:• <strong>The</strong> Right to Food - <strong>The</strong> renewed CFS makes explicit mention to the Right to Food, andasserts the realisation of this right as a key objective.Roles<strong>The</strong> renewed CFS has been assigned six fundamental roles, to be implemented within sets of threein a two-phase process. This two-phase process was designed so that the CFS could embark on whatwere regarded by some member states as its less controversial work (the roles assigned within phaseone) without getting bogged down in negotiations over its other roles (those within phase two).Because of the interconnectedness of these roles, however, we can anticipate – and this seems to beborne out by the current status of the implementation process – that in practice it will be difficult toseparate them.<strong>The</strong> six roles are:To be implemented within the first phase (commencing October 2009)I. Coordination at global level – <strong>The</strong> CFS reform document describes this role as to “[p]rovide a platform for discussion and coordination to strengthen collaborative actionamong governments, regional organizations, international organizations and agencies,NGOs, CSOs, food organizations, and other relevant stakeholders” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph5.i).II. Policy convergence – “Promote greater policy convergence and coordination, includingthrough the development of international strategies and voluntary guidelines onfood security and nutrition” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 5.ii).III. Support and advice to countries and regions – “At country and/or region request,facilitate support and/or advice in the development, implementation, monitoring andevaluation of their nationally and regionally owned plans of action for the elimination ofhunger, the achievement of food security and the practical applications of the “VoluntaryGuidelines for the Right to Food” that shall be based on the principles of participation,transparency and accountability.” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 5.iii).15

To be implemented within the second phase (elements of which will commence October 2010)• Coordination at national and regional levels – <strong>The</strong> CFS reform documents describesthis role as to “[s]erve as a platform to promote greater coordination and alignment ofactions in the field, encourage more efficient use of resources and identify resource gaps.”(CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 6.i).• Promote accountability and share best practices at all levels – “<strong>The</strong> CFS should helpcountries and regions, as appropriate, address the questions of whether objectives arebeing achieved and how food insecurity and malnutrition can be reduced more quicklyand effectively.” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 6.ii).• Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition – “in order toimprove coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders.”(CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 6.iii).It is clear that – although they were assigned to two separate phases during the reform discussions– there is potentially a lot of overlap between these roles. For instance, the first role in phase One, “Coordinationat a global level”, consists of providing a “platform for discussion and coordination to strengthencollaborative action”. Collaborative action seems already to imply some sort of agreement, or process ofreaching agreement about what it is that needs to be done. This therefore seems to overlap – despitetheir apparent separation – with the third role in phase Two “Develop a Global Strategic Framework”, theobjective of which is to “improve coordination and guide synchronized action”. Additionally, the secondrole of Phase Two “Promote accountability and share best practice” requires “developing an innovative mechanism,including the definition of common indicators, to monitor progress” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 6.ii).<strong>The</strong> production of “common indicators” again presupposes or implies agreement or convergenceabout what it is that needs to be done, and so we can say that from the outset of the CFS’s work programme- and continuing all the way through the implementation period – one of the central pillarsof the CFS’s work will be to seek to generate agreement about what it is that needs to be done to achieve foodsecurity, to translate this agreement into general principles and policies for coordinated action, and to monitortheir implementation.16

II. ACTORS AND MECHANISMS WITHIN THE REFORMED CFSIn the pre-reform CFS civil society had already been recognised as having a central role to play in themonitoring of states’ implementation of the World Food Summit’s Plan of Action. However the renewedCFS has extended unprecedented participation opportunities to a wider range of actors resultingin a body whose composition now extends well beyond member states. Indeed, during the ContactGroup process civil society actors such as the IPC were concerned that the list of those entitledto participate within the CFS would be too long, and crowd out the voices of smallholder producers.This concern however – whilst recognised – was not validated by governments, who finally agreed toinclude IFIs and private philanthropic foundations.As noted above, at the global level the CFS is divided into two main areas of work – the Plenary andthe intersessional work, and there are three main categories of actors who participate in this work.CFS actors: Members<strong>The</strong> first category of actors is Members – <strong>The</strong>se are states that are members of the FAO and the UN.According to the reform document:Members take part fully in the work of the <strong>Committee</strong> with the right to intervene in plenaryand breakout discussions, approve meeting documents and agendas, submit and present documentsand formal proposals, and interact with the Bureau during the intersessional period. Voting and decisiontaking is the exclusive prerogative of Members, including drafting the final report of CFS Plenarysessions. [Emphasis added].(CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph: 10).17

<strong>The</strong> Strategic Framework of the CFSDuring the Contact Group negotiations civil society – particularly the IPC – attached aspecial importance to the CFS being assigned the role of generating a Global StrategicFramework for food security and nutrition. This was eventually assigned to Phase IIof the implementation process, though in practice the definition of common principlesof action underpins the CFS’s work from the outset, and this is reflected perhaps by thefact that the process of defining the Strategic Framework has already tentatively begunwith the production of a couple of concept notes, and the provisional scheduling ofdiscussion on the Framework for the next CFS Plenary – the 36th (11-16th October).<strong>The</strong> reform document is short on details about the Strategic Framework, simply statingthat its goal is “to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide rangeof stakeholders.” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 6.iii). It also adds that the Framework isTo be flexible so that it can be adjusted as priorities change;To be built upon “existing frameworks such as the UN’s Comprehensive Frameworkfor Action (CFA), the Comprehensive Agriculture Development Programme(CAADP), and the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the ProgressiveRealisation of the Right to Adequate Food.” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 6.iii).During the Contact Group process – and in the concept notes – the issue of how theStrategic Framework should relate to these existing frameworks was raised, with theIPC calling for an evaluation of, for instance, the CFA as part of this process. <strong>The</strong> processof defining the Strategic Framework will be a test case for determining how farthe CFS can go towards realizing its visionary potential. As stated earlier in this paper,inclusivity and linkages with the “reality on the ground” are two principles right atthe heart of the renewed CFS. <strong>The</strong> challenge will be to design a process for formulatingthe Global Strategic Framework which meaningfully realises both. We can anticipatethat this will pose big challenges both to those charged with designing and managingthe process and those – civil society in particular – without whose contribution theprocess will be empty.18

CFS actors: Participants<strong>The</strong> second category is Participants – It is within this category that the unprecedented inclusivityof the renewed CFS becomes visible. This is expressed both through the breadthof actors included within this grouping, and also the fact that – with the exception ofdecision-making authority – Participants enjoy participation rights more or less equal tothose enjoyed by member states. That is the right to intervene in plenary and breakoutdiscussions, approve meeting documents and agendas, submit and present documentsand formal proposals. <strong>The</strong>y are also asked to:Commit regularly to intersessional activities of the <strong>Committee</strong> at all levels and interactwith the Bureau during the intersessional period through the Advisory Group establishedby the Bureau.(CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 12).<strong>The</strong> category of Participants is divided into five sub-categories, each representing a constituencyof actors whose participation was deemed within the Contact Group processcentral to the securing of food security and the elimination of hunger. <strong>The</strong>se five subcategoriesare:I. Representatives of UN agencies and bodies with a specific mandate in thefield of food security and nutrition;II. Civil society and non-governmental organizations and their networks withstrong relevance to issues of food security and nutrition.III. International agricultural research systems;IV. International and regional Financial Institutions, regional developmentbanks, and the World Trade Organization (WTO);V. Representatives of private sector associations and private philanthropicfoundations active in the areas of concern to the <strong>Committee</strong>.19

CSOs are therefore included within the CFS under the class of Participants, there being five subcategoriesof participants in total. Within Category ii: “Civil society and non-governmental organizations”the CFS reform document goes into more detail, specifying that inclusion within this categoryneeds “particular attention to organizations representing”:• Smallholder firmly farmers;• Artisanal fisherfolk;• Herders/pastoralists;• Landless;• Urban poor;• Agricultural and food workers;• Women;• Youth;• Consumers;• Indigenous Peoples, and;• International NGOs whose mandatesand activities are concentrated in areasof concern to the <strong>Committee</strong>.CFS Actors: Observers<strong>The</strong> final category of participants within the CFS is Observers – This category includes regional,national, and local actors including regional associations of countries; CSOs/NGOs other than thoseattending as participants; and other networks and associative organizations. <strong>The</strong>se actors can applyfor Observer status for specific items or entire sessions, but have to be invited to speak by the Chair.States Still the Central ActorsPrior to its reform, whilst the CFS recognised the value of the role to be played by civil society in, forexample, monitoring states’ implementation of the food security commitments they made in globalsummits, this role – and the participation rights civil society enjoyed to do it - were marginal to thatassigned to states. It is clear from the categories above that the renewed CFS has extended unprecedentedparticipation opportunities to civil society, but also a much wider group of actors.However, it is important to note that the CFS continues to be an intergovernmental body, and recognisesmember states as the principle actors in the elimination of hunger and attainment of food security.It does this in a number of ways:• Firstly, it assigns decision-making power within the reformed CFS to member statesalone (Paragraph 10);• Secondly, it asserts the importance of country owned plans for tackling food insecurity,(Paragraph 5.iii), and;• Thirdly, it holds states accountable for addressing food insecurity and monitors theirprogress towards this (Paragraph 6.ii).20

<strong>The</strong> All Year Work Programme of the CFS:Plenary and Intersessional ActivityGiven its expanded roles the CFS now engages in an all-year programme of work whichincludes its annual meetings – <strong>The</strong> Plenary; and the work conducted between Plenaries toprepare, gather information, disseminate outputs etc – its intersessional activity.<strong>The</strong> Plenary: This is the annual meeting of the CFS – and the main event in the CFS calendar.According to the reform document the Plenary is the central body for decision-taking,debate, coordination, lesson-learning and convergence by all stakeholders at global level onall issues pertaining to food security and nutrition and on the implementation of the VoluntaryGuidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in theContext of National Food Security.(CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 20).<strong>The</strong> Plenary is open to all three categories of CFS participants: Members, Participants, andObservers, each category however varying in terms of the participation rights enjoyed byits members. <strong>The</strong> next plenary meeting of the CFS – the 36th in its history – will be at FAOheadquarters, Rome, from October 11th – 16th, 2010.Intersessional activity: <strong>The</strong> intersessional work of the CFS is not spelled out exactly withinthe reform document, but we can anticipate that, from a civil society perspective, it wouldinclude:Bringing awareness of developments impacting upon food security (e.g., “land grabbing”)to CFS member states;Proposing and commenting on Plenary preparations (agendas, briefing documents,proposals for the HLPE etc);Monitoring the implementation of CFS outcomes at local, national and regional,and global levels.21

CFS Relations with different levelsAgain, using the distinction between CFS inputs and CFS outputs, the reform document proposesthat the CFS relate to the different levels in the following indicative ways:Global LevelAs shown above, the CFS establishes linkages at the global level through its (five categories of) participants,who are both able to contribute to inputs and asked to take note of its outputs. .It also relates to a global network of experts through its High Level Panel of Experts. And it also relates,through its reporting, to FAO Conference (the main governing body in FAO) and the UN GeneralAssembly through its Economic And Social Council (ECOSOC).<strong>The</strong> CFS: Key Mechanisms I<strong>The</strong> annual meeting of the CFS is the Plenary but aside from this body there a number of otherimportant mechanisms that facilitate the activity of the Membership and Participants withinthe CFS, particularly during the intersessional period.<strong>The</strong> Bureau represents the broader membership (member states) of the CFS between plenarysessions. It ensures coordination among all actors and advances tasks in preparation for CFSplenary sessions. <strong>The</strong> Bureau has a Chairperson (Noel de Luna of the Philippines), and 12members. Members of the Bureau serve a two year term.<strong>The</strong> Advisory Group provides a bridge between Participants and the Bureau, and its functionis to “provide input to the Bureau regarding the range of tasks which the CFS Plenary hasinstructed it to perform.” (CFS, 2009/2: Paragraph 32). <strong>The</strong> Advisory Group is not to exceedthe numbers of the Bureau and its 13 members serve the same term as the Bureau – two years.Membership of the Advisory Group is comprised as follows, following its division into fivecategories:· Five representatives from Category 1 - UN bodies and agencies with mandates in food securityand nutritionFAO, Hafez Ghanem, Assistant Director General, Economic and Social Department.WFP, Mohamed El-Kouhene, Deputy Director, Multilateral and NGOs Relations Division.IFAD, Jean-Philippe Audinet, Operational Policy and Technical Advisory Division.Right-to-Food, Olivier De Schutter, Special Rapportuer on the right to food - Office of23

the High Commissioner for Human Rights.High Level Task Force, David Nabarro.· Four representatives from Category 2 - CSOs and NGOsIPC, Beatriz Gasco, IPC Secretariat.MIJARC, George Dixon Fernandez, President.Oxfam, Chris Leather, Food & Agriculture Policy Adviser.ROPPA, Mamadou Cissokho, Honorary President.· One representative from Category 3 - International Agricultural Research BodiesBioversity International, Emile Frison, Director General.· One representative from Category 4 - International Financial and Trade InstitutionsWorld Bank, Juergen Voegele, Director, Agriculture and Rural Development Department.· Two representatives from Category 5 - Private Sector/Philanthropic FoundationsBill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Prabhu Pingali, Head of Agricultural Policy andStatistics, Agriculture Development Division.International Agri-Food Network, Keith Jones.Regional level<strong>The</strong> CFS will attempt to draw inputs from and disseminate outputs to the regional level through:• <strong>The</strong> regional conferences of various UN food and agriculture entities (FAO, IFAD andthe WFP);• Civil society networks;• Private sector associations;• Other regional bodies dealing with food security and nutrition issues, and;• (Provisional) Other regional organizations such as NEPAD/CAADP, MERCOSUR,etc.24

National level<strong>The</strong> CFS will attempt to draw inputs from and disseminate outputs to the national level through:• Multi-disciplinary national (food security) mechanisms (which member states are en-couraged to strengthen or establish);• <strong>The</strong> field presences of United Nations Country Teams, the HLTF, the InternationalAlliance against Hunger and its National Alliances, national food security groups, andcivil society networks and private sector associations, and;• In the case of countries with weak capacity –notes that ways to do this need to befound.<strong>The</strong> CFS: Key Mechanisms II<strong>The</strong> CFS Secretariat is another important element of the renewed CFS. At the moment theCFS’s Secretarial needs are provided by the FAO alone, but as an important part of the attemptto increase the relevance of the renewed CFS it was proposed to move to a joint or rotatingSecretariat, shared between the three Rome-based UN food and agricultural institutions – theFAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme(WFP). <strong>The</strong> idea behind this is that the more actors and institutions that can participatein the different levels of the CFS’s work, the more relevant it will be. For the moment thisidea for the Secretariat is provisional, though from 2011– whilst still headed by a Secretaryfrom FAO – it will include staff from the other two institutions.<strong>The</strong> Secretariat’s role is to assist the Plenary, the Bureau and Advisory Group and the HighLevel Panel of Experts.According to the reform document, the final component of the CFS is the High Level Panel ofExperts (HLPE) – the function of which is to provide the CFS with “structured food securityand nutrition-related expertise to better inform its sessions.” (CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 36). Feedinginto the Plenary and working with the Bureau, the HLPE is supposed to help memberstates and other stakeholders in designing strategies and programmes for food security. <strong>The</strong>HLPE is comprised of two main components:A Steering <strong>Committee</strong>. 10 – 15 internationally recognized experts.Ad hoc project teams. A larger network of food security and nutrition experts acting on aproject-specific basis and selected by the Steering <strong>Committee</strong>.25

Though taking slightly longer than expected the 15 members of the Steering <strong>Committee</strong> havenow been appointed. This small diverse group consists of both world-renowned experts suchas Indian Agricultural scientist Monkombu Sambasivan Swaminathan (known as the fatherof the green revolution in India but whose views now include the strong advocacy of organicagriculture) and other perhaps lesser-known figures. It is clear however that amongst a significantminority of steering group members there is a stated commitment to strong civil societyparticipation within food security strategies.Relations Amongst Different Components of the Global CFSAs the text boxes on pages 18 and 19 indicate, the global CFS – and its members and participants – hasa number of different mechanisms to help coordinate its work and fulfill its roles, particularly duringthe interesessional period. According to the reform document, these are related to each other in thefollowing ways:Plenary• Sends requests to HLPE for “scientifically sound, clear and concise written reports/analyses for Plenary or intersessional purposes.” (Paragraph 41).Bureau• Represents the broader membership (states) between plenary sessions;• Ensures coordination among all actors and levels during intersessional work in preparationfor the CFS;• Directs the work of the HLPE;• Sends requests to HLPE for “scientifically sound, clear and concise written reports/analyses for Plenary or intersessional purposes.” (Paragraph 41).Advisory Group• Provides inputs (substantive work and advice) to the Bureau during the intersessionalperiod on behalf of the five different constituencies of Participants.CSM (Civil Society Mechanism)• Determines the allocation of seats for Participants and Observes in consultation withthe Bureau.26

Secretariat• Assists the Plenary, the Bureau the Advisory Group and the HLPE in their work.HLPE• Works through Plenary and the Bureau to support CFS members and other stakeholdersin designing strategies and programs for addressing food insecurity.<strong>The</strong> Global CFS: Actors & Mechanisms27

IV. THE RENEWED CFS: OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES<strong>The</strong> CFS: Two Hypothetical Outcomes<strong>The</strong> following are two hypothetical outcomes of the implementation process, one successful,the other not. <strong>The</strong>y are designed simply to illustrate both something of the potential of the renewedCFS and the challenges that confront the realisation of that potential.A dynamic, inclusive, action-oriented authoritative body.Following the successful conclusion of the Contact Group process and the production of its reformdocument, the renewed CFS progresses smoothly through the implementation phase, establishingitself as an effective and authoritative body in the eyes of all key stakeholders. It does this in a numberof different ways. Firstly, its strong links with the ground - articulated in particular through nationalfood security mechanisms and civil society networks - ensures that the voices of those most affectedby food insecurity – backed up by supportive NGO and expert analysis – is clearly heard withinthe CFS Plenary. <strong>The</strong>ir voices are heard in two fundamental ways – firstly, in raising the issues thatmost affect them; and secondly, in being part of the process to shape policy outcomes. In the contextof a strong political investment by member states (reflected by a commitment of resources, a commitmentto meaningful report, and a commitment to implement CFS outputs) the CFS’s strong linkswith the ground are two-way, translated into principles of action which are translated into effectiveaction. Though lacking legal authority, through sheer normative power derived from its inclusivityand multi-level linkages, the CFS provides a conditioning influence over both other internationalorganizations of relevance for food security and the private sector. <strong>The</strong> successful establishment ofpublic authority over the global food security agenda results in rapidly diminishing numbers of themalnourished.28

A confused and irrelevant bodyFollowing the successful conclusion of the Contact Group process and the production of its reformdocument, the renewed CFS stumbles through the implementation phase, before finally witheringaway into irrelevance. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, States fail to follow through with the resourcesnecessary for successful implementation, leading to a CFS suffering chronic undercapacity. Overwhelmedby the sheer range of inputs it receives without having a clear idea of how to process them, CFSPlenaries soon become associated with strong feelings of dissatisfaction and irrelevance amongst allthe major stakeholders. CSOs in particular find the experience especially frustrating, as despite theclear commitment in the reform document, there is little or only limited signs of those steering theprocess taking the pledge to hear the voices of “those most affected by food insecurity” seriously. <strong>The</strong>lack of political commitment and a meaningful inclusivity leads to the body being ignored by otherinstitutions and the private sector. <strong>The</strong> prospect of establishing effective public authority over theglobal food security agenda is abandoned for at least another decade, resulting in continued chronicmalnourishment for millions of people.Overview<strong>The</strong> previous three sections have discussed different elements of the reformed CFS – its vision androles; actors and mechanisms; and levels and relations. Summing up, we can say that the renewedCFS:• Is both a body which meets annually and an “Intersessional” process with a continualwork programme;• Retains its status as an intergovernmental body - in which states both are ultimatelyheld accountable for the realisation of food security and the right to food, and hold executivepower within the <strong>Committee</strong>, yet;• Provides significant participation opportunities for a wide range of actors in every aspectof its work, including civil society but also others including IFIs, the WTO, and theprivate sector;• Has a work programme which includes receiving inputs and producing outputs acrossits different roles;• Has roles that – overlapping and interconnected - include generating policy conver-gence and coordinated food security action, and of which the formulation of a GlobalStrategic Framework is a central part;• Has a number of different components at the global level to facilitate its work and toprovide representation during the intersessional period for those entitled to participate inits work (Bureau, Secretariat, Advisory Group, High Level Panel of Experts);• Seeks to establish strong and meaningful linkages with the “reality on the ground”.29

ChallengesAt the introduction to this paper it was proposed that the potential/implications of the renewed CFSfor food security governance could not be over-exaggerated. <strong>The</strong> box on page 21 (<strong>The</strong> CFS: TwoHypothetical Outcomes) seeks to indicate both what it would like to realise that potential and an alternative.In reality of course both represent opposing extremes in a spectrum of possibilities – and itmight well be the case that for every issue addressed by the CFS the outcome – and the configurationof constraints and enabling factors which conditions this - is different. Amongst the list of generalchallenges that potentially inhibit the realisation of the CFS’s potential, however, we can include:Capacity It is evident that significant capacity is needed by many different actors or componentswithin the CFS in order to realise its potential. For example, the reform document outlines a workprocess for the CFS which involves taking many inputs from a wide range of actors at all different levels.To translate these into a strategic framework, or common indicators for attaining food security isgoing to take significant skill and resources, within the Bureau and the Secretariat in particular. In theabsence of these there is the danger of the CFS becoming just a confused talking-shop. This capacityrequires resources, including budgetary but also knowledge and training. What type of training, forinstance, will those overseeing the process receive to enable them to hear “the voices of those mostaffected by food insecurity”?<strong>The</strong> CFS: A Multi-Level, Multi-Actor Body and Process (Taking inputs and producing outputsacross all the different levels.30

Inclusivity Realising the inclusivity of the reform document is going to require a major shift inthe way that both member states and perhaps UN officials are used to operating. Sharing space with“those most affected by food security”, finding modes of communication which enable their participation;creating methodologies and processes for weighing the multiple inputs that the CFS is goingto receive – this is going to require both special effort and good will. Moreover, whilst private sectorparticipation has been underwhelming up until now, if the CFS starts to acquire political authoritythere is a danger – and very real prospect - that they will seek to deploy their considerable resourcesto try and influence it work. <strong>The</strong> same could be said also of member states that fear that their commercialinterests are being threatened by CFS interventions. What impact might this have upon civilsociety participation?Political relevance <strong>The</strong> CFS seeks to be “the central United Nations political platform dealingwith food security and nutrition” (CFS: 2009/2: Paragraph 2). <strong>The</strong> idea of centrality impliesestablishing a relationship between the CFS and the other parts of the UN system of relevance forfood security in which the latter are politically subordinate to the former. <strong>The</strong> obstacles to this arepotentially quite considerable. <strong>The</strong>se would include, generally speaking:• A high degree of fragmentation across the different parts (different entities with diffe-rent mandates) of the UN system of relevance for food security (including weak coordinationlinks between them);• State incoherence at the global level in different fora of relevance to food security, (differentministries pursue different objectives) related to;• State internal incoherence within Capitals (countries rarely have inter-ministerial foodsecurity coordination, and where this is attempted it has proven quite difficult).Another important challenge related to establishing the political relevance of the renewed CFS emergesfrom the new roles that have been assigned to it. <strong>The</strong>se new roles imply the transformation of theCFS from a fairly dead space in which Ministers make (unrelated) declarations (the old CFS), to onein which a serious engagement with policy is required (the renewed CFS). Ministers carry politicalauthority, but they lack the time to sustain a serious engagement with policy. <strong>The</strong>re seems to be a tension,therefore, between these two ambitions of the CFS’s roles, and preparations for the 2010 Plenarysuggested that this was the case.31

4. CSO PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE RENEWED CFSAs stated above, the participation of civil society organizations, and particularly the IPC, during theContact Group process was fundamental to the production of the reform blueprint the great potentialof which has been one of the central messages of this briefing paper. Many of the positions advocatedby the IPC during this time were successfully incorporated into the final document. This includes:• <strong>The</strong> importance of the roles of policy formulation and the production of a strategic frameworkto CFS functioning;• <strong>The</strong> necessity of meaningful linkages between the CFS and the different levels, especiallythe local;• <strong>The</strong> importance of securing a privileged space for smallholder producers;• <strong>The</strong> need for civil society participation within the CFS to be founded upon the principleof CSO autonomy;• <strong>The</strong> need for representative mechanisms – the Advisory Group – to facilitate the workof civil society within the CFS during the intersessional period.Following the successful adoption of the reform document in October 2009 – and much celebrationby those that had been working hard throughout the entire Contact Group process – the renewedCFS became one of the major focuses of attention at the People’s Food Sovereignty Forum in Rome,November 2009. During this event a number of key principles for future CSO participation in the renewedCFS were reinforced, including the importance of ensuring that the CFS provides a space for“those most affected”, and that civil society should review their participation within the renewed CFSafter a three year period, considering whether or not it has become an effective body for them. Importantly,the People’s Food Sovereignty Forum acknowledged the commitment and effectiveness oftheir representatives who had been participating in the Contact Group process, and mandated themto continue their work as the CFS moved forward into the implementation phase.32

A closer look at CSO participation within the renewed CFSAs stated above, the renewed CFS provides unprecedented participation opportunities for a range ofactors, including civil society. This includes both the right to participate in the CFS plenary – intervening,approving meeting documents and agendas, submitting and presenting documents and formalproposals – and within the intersessional work, for which the mechanism of the Advisory Group hasbeen established. Additionally, civil society are identified as being fundamentally important to theCFS’s links with the different levels – regional, national and local. Of CSO participation in the CFS wecan say that civil society have the opportunity to participate in the CFS’s work:• Across all its different roles;• Throughout its entire work period (plenary and intersessional), and;• At all the different levels (“from the global up to the local”) 1.Aside from in exercising decision-making authority, one other important difference in the participationrights enjoyed between civil society and member states is that the number of civil society actorsable to attend the Plenary will be limited. <strong>The</strong> exact number of CSOs able to attend will be negotiatedbetween the Bureau and a special mechanism – like the Advisory Group – intended to facilitate CSOengagement with the renewed CFS. This mechanism is the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM).<strong>The</strong> Civil Society MechanismParagraph 16 of the reform document, under the heading of “Consultation/Coordination Mechanismsand Activities” provides a preliminary outline of the functions and purpose of the CSM:16. Civil society organizations/NGOs and their networks will be invited to autonomouslyestablish a global mechanism for food security and nutrition which will function as a facilitating bodyfor CSO/NGO consultation and participation in the CFS. Such mechanism will also serve inter-sessionalglobal, regional, and national actions in which organizations of those sectors of the populationmost affected by food insecurity, would be accorded priority representation. Civil society organizations/NGOswill submit to the CFS Bureau a proposal regarding how they intend to organize theirparticipation in the CFS in a way that ensures broad and balanced participation by regions and typesof organizations keeping in mind the principles approved by the CFS at its Thirty-Fourth Session inOctober 2008 (CFS: 2008/5; CL 135/10: paragraph 15).1 This was a phrase used accidently at the People’s Food Sovereignty Forum in Rome, 2009, but which was celebratedfor its assertion that the global level only has meaning in support of the attainment of outcomes at thelocal.33

<strong>The</strong> activities of the mechanism will include:I. Broad and regular exchange of information, analysis and experience;II. Developing common positions as appropriate;III. Communicating to the CFS and, as appropriate, its Bureau through representativesdesignated by an internal self-selection process within each civil society category;IV. Convening a civil society forum as a preparatory event before CFS sessions if so decidedby the civil society mechanism.(CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 16).At present, the process of formulating this mechanism is well under away, largely through the productionof two draft proposals by a steering group comprising Action-Aid, the IPC, and Oxfam International.<strong>The</strong>se proposals have been circulated through civil society and comments received havebeen incorporated into subsequent drafts. <strong>The</strong> intention is – following the completion of a final thirddraft – to convene a CSO forum prior to the <strong>Committee</strong> on World Food Security’s plenary meeting,beginning October 11th, 2010 to approve the Civil Society Mechanism. It is worth noting, however,that it is anticipated by those steering this process that the performance of whatever mechanism isagreed will be reviewed after one year 2 .Different Agendas at the CFSBefore moving to the final section of this briefing paper it is worth perhaps commenting on what wemight call the dynamics of the differing agendas that we might expect to find being pursued by thedifferent actors involved within the CFS. Notwithstanding the future prospect of states or the privatesector seeking to inhibit its effectiveness, it is also worth commenting on what we may call the generaltone, or spirit of the CFS as expressed in the reform document. On the spectrum of potentially conflictual/cooperativerelations, this is firmly located down the cooperative, or collaborative end. Wefind this embodied in language that permeates the document throughout, including the descriptionof the CFS as a:Platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together. (Paragraph 4);And the definition of one of its major roles as:To strengthen collaborative action among governments, regional organizations, international organizationsand agencies, NGOs, CSOs, food producers’ organizations, private sector organizations,philanthropic organizations, and other relevant stakeholders. (Paragraph 5).2 <strong>The</strong> draft proposals for the CSM and other relevant documents can be found here: http://cso4cfs.org/34

For rural social movements whose existence is often founded upon grassroots struggles for survivalin the context of antagonistic power relations and competing interests, the move to collaborative action– especially with the range of “stakeholders” included within the category of participants, someof whose actions and attitudes are associated in the experiences of the movements with the difficultiesthey face on the ground – will be difficult and more than likely undesirable for them.For these actors the historical project has been to defend the interests of their members - and the waysof life within which they are embedded – through, amongst others, the articulation of rights claimsmaking use of existing legal frameworks – such as the Right to Food; through seeking the enactmentof new legal instruments – such as a Charter on Peasants Rights; and through the development offrameworks such as Food Sovereignty – which assert both the political meaning of food and the politicalsubjecthood of smallholder producer and providers, whilst seeking to defend locally orientedand ecologically sustainable (agri)food systems. A defensive posture is not a collaborative one and,for those charged with managing the implementation of the CFS reforms such as the Bureau, creatinga process which recognizes and accommodates the historical (and contemporary) experience of ruralmovements (and the virtual impossibility of participating in a collaborative project whilst your owngrassroots existence is under threat) – will be fundamental to the CFS realizing its mandate of ensuring:That the voices of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most affected by food insecurity - areheard.(CFS:2009/2: Paragraph 7).35

5. CIVIL SOCIETY ROLES GOING FORWARDOne of the central messages of this briefing paper has been that the potential of the renewed CFS forfood security governance cannot be exaggerated, but that there are significant challenges to the fullrealisation of this potential. It is has also been emphasized that this potential will not be realisedindependently of continued CSO engagement with the process. Amongst the crucial roles that wemight expect CSOs to play in the implementation period, we can include:• Ensuring that member states follow through and commit significant resources (finan-cial, political, etc) to the realisation of the vision of the renewed CFS as an inclusive, politicallysignificant, policy-oriented body with meaningful linkages to the ground;• Bringing to the awareness of the CFS the significant challenges and threats faced by“those most affected by food insecurity” at the grassroots;• Participating in the policy dialogue from the strength of their position as grassrootsactors;• Raising awareness of the renewed CFS and its participation opportunities amongst thewider range of CSO stakeholders, and;• Raising awareness of the CFS amongst those parts of their domestic governments whomight not be aware of its reform, and its significant potential.Clearly this is a big agenda for civil society, and indicates a pressing need – in most cases – for significantextra capacity. In the absence of civil society obtaining that extra capacity and being able to fulfillthe roles assigned to it – indeed, that it secured for itself during the Contact Group process – plus thosementioned above, the CFS stands considerably less chance of being able to realise its full potential.In fact we can say that, unequivocally, either future food security governance at the global level willbe meaningfully inclusive – assigning participation rights to a wide range of CSO actors backed upby their capacity to exercise those rights – or it will have no future.36

6. SPECIAL FOCUS: THE SPANISH SITUATIONFor Spanish CSOs many of the challenges and tasks that face them in the CFS are the same as thoseconfronting global civil society more generally, and which have been touched upon above. Of particularrelevance in the Spanish context is the apparent orientation of the Spanish government away fromthe CFS and towards the World Bank’s Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAPFS)– an initiative that is characterized both by a very low level of public legitimacy and the attempt toresolve policy dialogue in favour of a set of prescriptions the efficacy of which is globally contested.Indeed, it is the widely recognized disagreement on which of the available policy choices at hand inpursuit of food security objectives is most effective – at the global level at least – which has given riseto the recognized need for the type of policy dialogue that is a central role of the CFS. Lacking boththe recognition of this need, and the willingness of many important CSOs to engage with its process,the GAFSP represents a regressive measure for food security governance.More generally, the GAFSP underscores both the fragmentation that exists across the global food securitysystem, and the competition that the CFS faces as it seeks to become “the centralUnited Nations political platform dealing with food security and nutrition.” For Spanish CSOs, therefore,a specific challenge is to contest this orientation of the Spanish government, and – in referenceto the potential of the CFS as outlined within this briefing document - focus their commitment andenergy upon CFS implementation.37

References• <strong>Committee</strong> on World Food Security (2006) “Mid-Term Review of Achieving the WorldFood Summit Target”, FAO Reference: CFS: 2006/3.http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/cfs/cfs32/index_en.htm• <strong>Committee</strong> on World Food Security (2009) “Reform of the <strong>Committee</strong> on World FoodSecurity: Final Version”, FAO Reference: CFS:2009/2.http://cso4cfs.org/document-library/cfs-reform/• ETC (2008) “Food’s Failed Estates”. www.foodsovereignty.org• FAO (2007) “Report of the Independent External Evaluation of the Food and AgriculturalOrganization of the United Nations”.http://www.fao.org/pbe/pbee/en/219/index.html• <strong>The</strong> Secretary-General’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis(2008) “<strong>The</strong> Comprehensive Framework for Action.