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While short in duration, this period of action set important conditionswithin <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade before its more gruelling operations in <strong>the</strong> south. Theattacks conducted by <strong>the</strong> 9th and, in particular, <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalions gave <strong>the</strong>seunits tangible victories that attracted <strong>the</strong> attention of <strong>the</strong> senior commanderson Bougainville. The divisional commander sent congratulatory signals to bothunits and Savige told Field on 4 January that ‘I’m proud of you and your boys’.88Importantly for <strong>the</strong> COs, regardless of any tensions that may have existed, <strong>the</strong>irvictories had won <strong>the</strong>m <strong>the</strong>ir brigade commander’s confidence. Field later told <strong>the</strong>official historian that ‘The leadership of <strong>the</strong>se two officers laid a solid foundationfor later successes in <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn zone of Bougainville’.89 As <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalionhad noted, <strong>the</strong>se actions also provided an opportunity for <strong>the</strong> two battalions togain valuable combat experience. The 61st Battalion enjoyed nei<strong>the</strong>r of <strong>the</strong>seadvantages. In addition to providing a company for <strong>the</strong> 9th Battalion’s rear security,Dexter also provided a platoon to <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalion for <strong>the</strong> same purpose, as wellas maintaining security tasks within Torokina. On 26 December an additionalcompany also relieved <strong>the</strong> 2/8th Commando Squadron of its security responsibilitiesin <strong>the</strong> Hanemo sector.90 The fighting also demonstrated <strong>the</strong> practicaldifficulties of meeting <strong>the</strong> higher level imperative to minimise casualties at <strong>the</strong>tactical level. If any offensive action was to be undertaken, no amount of firepowerwould ever remove <strong>the</strong> requirement for infantry to close with <strong>the</strong> enemy and thisinevitably meant at least some casualties. Importantly, Mat<strong>the</strong>ws’s diary entriesconcerning officer morale indicated a potentially serious problem that sustainedoperations would exacerbate.88 9 Infantry Battalion War Diary, 19 December 1944, December 1944, AWM 52, Item8/3/46; Field’s diary, 2 January 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7; Field’s diary, 4 January1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7.89 Notes by Field on Long’s draft of Chapter 6 of The Final Campaigns, p. 7, AWM 67,Item 3/126/4.90 ‘61 Aust Inf Bn Op Instr No.3’, 25 December 1944, Appendix 18 to 61 InfantryBattalion War Diary, December 1944, AWM 52, Item 8/3/96.18 — A tale of three battalions

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