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This report would not be complete without mention of <strong>the</strong> valuable guidance andassistance provided by <strong>the</strong> Bde Comd and his staff… The fact that each request fromthis Unit received <strong>the</strong> approval and support of Bde HQ, gave assurance that <strong>the</strong>Unit was being solidly backed up by Bde and that <strong>the</strong>y had a full appreciation of <strong>the</strong>situation forward.234It is most doubtful that Dexter felt <strong>the</strong> same way. The strong relationshipbetween Field and McKinna should be considered an important contributingfactor to <strong>the</strong> 25th Battalion’s effectiveness.Field told <strong>the</strong> official historian that <strong>the</strong> Bougainville campaign ‘often seemedto be conducted “on a shoestring” and required results with minimum casualtiesdespite <strong>the</strong> hard tasks’.235 This was not a feeling unique to <strong>the</strong> 7th Brigade, buta review of its operations in <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>rn sector does suggest that this brigade,in particular, was simply asked to do too much with too little—something thatmust have placed considerable stress on <strong>the</strong> morale of <strong>the</strong> formation’s units. Thismanifested itself in a constant pressure to produce results, as Mat<strong>the</strong>ws’ diaryindicates on more than one occasion. Bridgeford’s divisional order of 3 Februaryspecifically stated that once <strong>the</strong> junction at Mosigetta was secured ‘not more thaninf bn should be based inland in order that <strong>the</strong> maintenance problem be kept to<strong>the</strong> minimum’.236 Field’s appreciation <strong>the</strong> next day concluded: ‘It is my opinion that<strong>the</strong> decision to base not more than one Battalion inland following <strong>the</strong> capture ofMosigetta will be quite inadequate for tasks ensuing <strong>the</strong>reafter’.237 He developedhis subsequent operations on <strong>the</strong> basis that this assessment had Bridgeford’sendorsement but on 25 February <strong>the</strong> corps commander intervened when he234 ‘25 Aust Inf Bn Report on Operations in South Bougainville 16 January to 14 April1945’, p. 28, 25 Infantry Battalion War Diary, January–April 1945, AWM 52, Item8/3/63.235 Notes by Field on Long’s draft of The Final Campaigns, p. 1, AWM 67, Item 3/126/4.236 ‘3 Aust Div OP Instr No 19’, 2 February 1945, Appendix DD to ‘7 Aust Inf Bde Reporton Operations 26 Oct 44 to 16 May 45’, 7 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1945,Appendices, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.237 Field’s appreciation, 3 February 1945, Appendix D to ‘7 Aust Inf Bde Report onOperations 26 Oct 44 to 16 May 45’, 7 Infantry Brigade War Diary, August 1945,Appendices, AWM 52, Item 8/2/7.54 — A tale of three battalions

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