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elieved that his instructions to the divisional commander had been ignored.238It was this that actually initiated the 9th Battalion’s immediate relief. BrigadierField felt so badly treated by Savige’s interference that he drafted a resignationletter which explained the difficulties of both fighting and maintaining the supplyroutes. He reiterated that ‘I have no confidence that such a result [placing forcesat the decisive point and maintaining the tracks] will be achieved by operationsbased on one Bn inland and sea movement on an unfavourable coast’.239 UltimatelyField was forced to accept the order but it was largely the 61st Battalion, operatinginland, that was left to deal with the repercussions. As the campaign progressedhigher policy was refined to the point where it allowed one brigade to be in actionwhile another was deployed forward to provide rear-area security and maintainthe lines of communication.240 In this respect the 7th Brigade suffered from beingthe first formation to undertake protracted operations in the south. As always,the people who bore the results of such deliberations were the frontline soldiers.It is not surprising that the 61st Battalion’s historian made a number of generalreferences to the unrealistic expectations of higher headquarters.241The other area where this basic underestimation of the challenges facing thebrigade was demonstrated was in the limited offensive support provided for itsoperations. Matthews was critical of the artillery ammunition allocations availableto the 9th Battalion, both in the central and southern sectors.242 During thebrigade’s relief in late April Matthews wrote: ‘Brig is very annoyed with 15 Bde,they get all they ask for particularly arty fire. Says he should now apologise tohis COs for all the restrictions he has placed on them in the past’.243 Although238 Field’s diary, 25–26 February 1945, AWM 3DRL6937, Item 7; ‘Telephone conversationGOC 2 Aust Corps and GOC 3 Aust Div’, 25 February 1945, AWM 3DRL2529, Item32.239 Draft letter from Field to Bridgeford, undated (probably 26 February 1945), p. 3,AWM 3DRL6937, Item 32.240 ‘3 Aust Div Report on Operations November 1944–August 1945’, pp. 31–2, AWM3DRL2529, Item 75. Compare ‘2 Aust Corps Operation Instruction No 7’, 26 February1945 to ‘Operational Directive Issued by Comd 2 Aust Corps to GOC 3 Aust Div, 19April 1945’, 3DRL2529, Item 88.241 Watt, History of the 61st Infantry Battalion, pp. 209–10.242 Matthews diary 13, 3 February 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5; Matthews diary 14,23 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.243 Matthews diary 16, 27 April 1945, AWM PR89/079, Item 5.A tale of three battalions — 55