The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

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with the power to coerce. Every rational being, as a being that sets ends and chooses actions asmeans to them, wills that as far as possible, consistent with other demands of reason, its actionsshould serve its own ends rather than being constrained to serve the ends of another. As arational being acting under the idea of obligation as conformity to universal law, it can rationallyclaim for itself only so much such external freedom as is consistent with a like freedom for allother rational beings according to universal law. This determines the limits of external freedomthat are consistent with right. These two applications of the concept of obligation as conformityto universal law are distinct and even disjoint, since the application to ethics concerns inner selfgovernmentonly, not external constraint, and the latter concerns only what actions may and maynot be externally constrained, not the rules for rational self-government.The universal principle of right, therefore, cannot possibly be based on or derived from thesupreme principle of morality -- even if what Kant calls “the universal law of right” (MS 6:231)commands categorically. This is because a categorical imperative is one which carries theincentive to its obedience within itself, rather than borrowing the incentive from elsewhere (G4:414). That is what makes the moral law governing ethics a principle of inner self-governmentrather than a principle of external constraint. Since it belongs to the concept of juridicallegislation that the incentive must be borrowed from elsewhere, hence allowing for externalcoercion as an incentive to obedience, no juridical law or duty of right can, considered as such,be a categorical imperative. If in fact there is also a categorical imperative to comply with dutiesof right (as Kant holds that there is, in the form of the “universal law of right”), then this must bebecause there is also an ethical incentive to comply with the legislation of right. “So while thereare many directly ethical duties, internal legislation makes the rest of them, one and all [i.e.duties of right], indirectly ethical” (MS 6:220-221).16
In other words, either duties of right are always also (indirectly) ethical duties, or there is anethical incentive, independent of the legislation of right itself, to comply with duties of right.Consequently, duties of right, considered as such, are not ethical; they must have a foundationindependent of ethics, or the supreme principle of morality. If it is for us a categorical imperativeto limit our actions to those that are right (according to the universal principle of right), this is amatter of ethics, not of right. The foundation of that principle, and of duties of right, in fact, thefoundation of the entire legislation of right, must be different from and independent of thecategorical imperative of ethics. The legislation of right also stands in need of an independentfoundation because right makes stronger claims, in one important respect, than any ethicallegislation could justify. Specifically, duties of right may be coercively enforced, while thecoercive enforcement of ethical duties is always wrong – contrary to right, hence also (if dutiesof right also make an ethical claim on us) contrary to ethics and to the categorical imperative.Right therefore requires a rational foundation entirely independent of ethics. And it has one,based on the line of reasoning presented above.This is the only way Kant’s theory of right makes sense. It is the only way that duties ofright can be seen as duties whose fulfillment may justifiably be coerced. It is the only way tounderstand Kant’s claim that ethical legislation includes the incentive of duty, while juridicallegislation leaves out the incentive from which duties are to be performed (permitting theseincentives to be supplied by external coercive force). It is the only way to see how right andethics can be two independent parts of morals, while also being subject in common to the generalconcept of obligation – based on the condition that our maxims must conform to universal law.Kantian right is sooner socialist than libertarian. The basic idea of Kant’s theory ofright is that external freedom -- not being constrained by the choice of others, not being forced to17
Page 3 and 4: imperative of duty, then Kant seems
Page 5 and 6: applies to action prudentially: Pra
Page 7 and 8: themselves -- such as gods, or robo
Page 9 and 10: 6:231). “Right and authorization
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Page 13 and 14: Coercion is never justified in the
Page 15: standards of right, be coercively p
Page 19 and 20: the less rich and less powerful. If
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The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

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