The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

themselves -- such as gods, or robots. For in order to serve the ends of human beings, even godswould have to be prayed to, and robots would have to be programmed and commanded (if onlyby a remote control device); these actions of praying or commanding would have to be freelychosen as means to the ends the human beings have freely set. Another way of putting it is this:Human beings have the privilege -- or, if you prefer, they are subject to the curse (Kantrecognizes that it can be viewed in both ways) -- that whatever good they achieve, and whateverhappiness they enjoy, must be the result of their own work: it must arise from their setting an endand their selecting, or perhaps inventing, the means necessary to achieve it, and then applying themeans through actions chosen by the human being as such means (cf. I 8:19-20, MA 8:111-112).It follows that as a rational being, I necessarily will in general, and as far as possible(consistent with other demands of reason) that the actions I perform should serve ends I have set,rather than serving different ends, ends set by others. This is a necessary demand of rationalagency, part of its essential structure. It is also a demand entirely independent of whateverparticular ends I may have, or even the ends I ought to have. Moreover, I recognize that otherrational beings necessarily have exactly the same rational interest that I do in choosing theiractions to further their own freely chosen ends, rather than having their actions constrained topromote ends chosen by others. To recognize a being – whether oneself or another -- as a rationalagent is to view it as lying under the indispensable rational necessity that it wills to be free, as faras possible, consistent with other demands of reason, to pursue its own ends rather than beingforced to have its actions serve the ends set by others without its freely given co-operation orconsent.My demand to be externally free is therefore qualified by the demand of reason that othershave the same rational claim on external freedom that I do. No one’s external freedom can7