injustices, but most <strong>of</strong>ten occurs through the general injustice <strong>of</strong> social customs – the waywomen, for instance, are treated in virtually all cultures, or the general injustice <strong>of</strong> the so-called“free” market (which is <strong>of</strong>ten manipulated by the powerful in ways even libertarians pretend toobject to – though these ways never seem sufficient to dislodge them <strong>from</strong> their pious deferenceto it). A society like ours, that denies a free life to millions upon millions <strong>of</strong> its citizens throughgeneral injustice, subjecting them through economic vulnerability to the arbitrary choice <strong>of</strong>others, cannot all itself a free society just because it leaves the wealthy <strong>and</strong> powerful free to denyothers the freedoms which are theirs by right. It instead comes close to being, in Kant’s technicalsense <strong>of</strong> the term, a barbaric society: ruled by force, where most are deprived <strong>of</strong> rightful freedom(VA 7:331).When human rights in Article 25 are, justified in this way, by being seen as necessaryconditions for a free life, those whose wealth <strong>and</strong> power threatens these rights are not viewed aslacking in “compassion,” missing some virtue which it would be nice if they had, but is at leastacceptable for them to lack. Instead, they are unmasked as what they really are: wrongdoers,criminals in relation to natural rights, refusing respect to the dignity <strong>and</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> others. Onthe other side, those who dem<strong>and</strong> what is theirs under these rights are not seen as beggars askingfor h<strong>and</strong>outs, but as dem<strong>and</strong>ing no more than what properly belongs to them. Kant saw thesepoints clearly, <strong>and</strong> expressed them eloquently, in two memorable unpublished fragments <strong>of</strong> the1760s:“Many people take pleasure in doing good actions but consequently do not want tost<strong>and</strong> under obligations toward others. If one only comes to them submissively, theywill do everything: they do not want to subject themselves to the rights <strong>of</strong> people, butto view them simply as objects <strong>of</strong> magnanimity. It is not all one under what title I getsomething. What properly belongs to me must not be accorded me merely assomething I beg for” (Ak 19:145).22
“In our present condition, when general injustice is firmly entrenched, the naturalrights <strong>of</strong> the lowly cease. <strong>The</strong>y are therefore only debtors, the superiors owe themnothing. <strong>The</strong>refore, these superiors are called ‘gracious lords’. But he who needsnothing <strong>from</strong> them but justice can hold them to their debts <strong>and</strong> does not need to besubmissive” (Ak 20:140-141).23