The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

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The foundation of the entire sphere of right lies in the fact that human beings have goodreason to protect rightful freedom; and this reason is independent of ethical value, and of theprinciple of morality grounding ethical duties. The problem is to understand this independentground of rightful freedom, and also how it remains independent of the value that grounds thecategorical imperative of morality that Kant derived in the Groundwork. Another way to look atthis problem is to see it as providing an interpretation and defense of Kant’s claim that rightfulexternal freedom – independence from constraint by the choice of another – is “the sole originaland innate right belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity” (MS 6:237). And ifthe sphere of right is to be independent of that of ethics, this defense must be independent ofKant’s claim in the sphere of ethics that humanity in persons is an end in itself.External freedom and the rational structure of action. The solution to this problem, Ibelieve, lies in Kant’s conception of the fundamental rational structure of action. All action forKant is based on setting an end – an object or state of affairs to be produced. It is the essentialcharacteristic of rational nature to set ends: “Rational nature discriminates itself from the rest inthat it sets itself an end” (G 4:437). An action, by its concept, is that which lies within the powerof the agent, and is chosen by the agent as a means to some end (G 4:417). Kant says: “Thatwhich serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is the end… By contrast,what contains merely the ground of the possibility of the action whose effect is the end is calledthe means” (G 4:427).Practical reason applies to action in a variety of ways. First, it applies instrumentally: Rulesof skill tell us the best means to a given end, while a technical imperative of reason, groundingthe rational authority of such rules, requires us, on pain of a failure of rationality, to take theindispensable means in our power toward any end we have set (G 4:414-415). Second, reason4
applies to action prudentially: Pragmatic or prudential reason counsels us to form an idea ofhappiness, to make it an end, and to give it rational priority over all other ends of inclination (G4:415-416). And third, reason applies to action in the form of the moral law: The general basis ofall ethical duties is the moral law as presented in the Formula of Humanity as End in Itself (FH),An end in itself is not an end we set or an object to be brought about, but something alreadyexisting having a value for whose sake we are required to do or refrain from certain actions (G4:427-430). The categorical imperative that grounding our ethical duties commands us to setcertain ends -- our own perfection and the happiness of others (MS 6:385-388). The moral lawalso forbids us to set certain ends (for example, the unhappiness of others, pursued for its ownsake), and it further forbids us to use certain mean to our ends that are inconsistent with treatingourselves or other rational beings as ends in themselves.All ethical obligations, all categorical imperatives, rest in this way on rational constraintsarising out of ends – ends in themselves, which we are required to treat as ends, or ends we arerequired by morality to set. All actions required or forbidden by ethics, or by categoricalimperatives, are required or forbidden on account of some end -- ultimately, the objective worthof humanity as an end in itself, which we are required to respect in our actions. But the ethicalimperative treats actions as required, prohibited or meritorious on account of their relation toobligatory ends to be produced: our own perfection and the happiness of others (MS 6:385-388).Envious or malicious actions, for example, are forbidden because they make the unhappiness ofsome person into an end, while actions that perfect our skills or improve our character aremeritorious because they further the end of our own perfection and beneficent actions aremeritorious because their end is the happiness of another.5
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The Independence of Right from Ethics Allen Wood Right and ethics ...

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